ORDER : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C . has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 25.06.2011 passed by the learned Session Judge, Rajsamand in Sessions Case No. 54/2009 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Javed Khan & Ors.), whereby the accused respondents were acquitted of the offences under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of IPC . 2. The matter pertains to an incident which occurred in the year 2009 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2012. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant- State, are that on 10.07.2009, a report was lodged by the complainant – Hanif Khan at Police Station Dehat Kotwali, District Etah alleging therein that the truck bearing registration no.HR-55- G-7384, while traveling from Ahmedabad to Delhi at about 7:00 AM on National Highway No.8 near Village Melyathedi, met with an accident in which Khurshid Khan expired. The driver of the truck was Javed Khan and the conductor was Khurshid Khan, the deceased. 4. On the basis of the aforementioned complaint, an FIR was registered for the offence under Section 279 and 304-A of IPC and the investigation accordingly commenced. 5. During investigation, on 20.08.2009, Matloob Khan, father of the deceased Khurshid Khan, filed a report stating that the incident was not an accident. He claimed to have been informed by one Ashraf Ali Khan, son of Mahbood Ali, resident of Ghaziabad, that Khurshid Khan had been murdered by Javed, Jisad, and Sabbu, and that the accident scene was created to cover up the murder. Matloob Khan also reported that Javed Khan was infuriated by the alleged illicit relationship between Khurshid Khan and Javed's sister Ida. It was further alleged in the report that Javed, Jisad, Sabbu, and Khurshid, all four of them, were taking the truck from Delhi to Ahmedabad when they stopped, whereupon Sabbu caught hold of Khurshid while Jisad pressed his neck, and Javed inflicted an injury with a Tyre Lever (iron rod) on the rear side of Khurshid's neck. Though Javed himself suffered injuries to his legs, the accident report was allegedly created. 6. Though Javed himself suffered injuries to his legs, the accident report was allegedly created. 6. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet under Sections 302/34 of IPC against the accused persons, and the trial commenced accordingly and thereafter, the charges were framed against the accused respondents for the offence under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of IPC . 7. During the course of trial, the evidence of 18 prosecution witnesses (PW 1 to 18) were recorded and 44 documents (Ex.P. 1 to 44) were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C ., in which, the accused respondents pleaded innocence and alleged false implication in the criminal case in question, however, no defence witnesses were brought forward. 8. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused persons, as above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 25.06.2011, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the evidence of PW-15 Ashraf Ali Khan is critical, as he is related to both parties and has stated that when he went to see Javed, Javed told him that the three of them had committed the murder of Khurshid Khan, whereas Sabbu caught him and Jisad pressed his neck and Javed himself hit Khurshid on the neck with Tyre Lever (iron rod), after which they created the accident scene to cover up the crime. 9.1. Learned counsel for the appellant-State has taken this Court to the statement of PW-15 and submits that information coming from a person who had direct knowledge from the accused himself in the form of an extra-judicial confession cannot be brushed aside. 9.2. Learned counsel for the appellant-State further submits that the motive of illicit relationship has been clearly specified and the chain of events constituting the crime seems plausible. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused respondent while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the chronology of events itself creates significant doubt regarding the entire incident. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused respondent while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the chronology of events itself creates significant doubt regarding the entire incident. The incident that occurred on 10.07.2009, initially reported as an accident on NH-8 between Ahmedabad and Delhi, for which an FIR was lodged and investigation commenced, later transformed into a murder case following a report by the father of Khurshid Khan on 20.08.2009, at a belated stage. 10.1 Learned counsel further submits that PW-15, the sole critical witness for the prosecution, who allegedly went to meet Javed and who in an extra judicial confession confessed that he, along with Jisad and Sabbu, had murdered Khurshid Khan, cannot be believed, because in the cross-examination, he admitted that he went to meet Javed about 20-22 days after the incident and immediately informed Khurshid Khan's father by telephone, but did not inform the police. This witness also submitted in his testimony that he visited the police station only 12-14 days after receiving information regarding the murder. 10.2 Learned counsel further submits that evidence led by the prosecution witness is doubtful and is not supported by the medical evidence. She further submits that the two complaints were contradictory, and it is not possible to rely on one set of allegations to reach at the result of conviction, and that the learned trial court rightly acquitted the accused. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 12. This Court finds that the incident was initially reported as an accident occurring on 10.07.2009 on the Ahmedabad-Delhi National Highway No.8 near Village Melyathedi at about 7:00 AM, where truck bearing registration no.HR-55-G-7384 was said to have met with an accident causing the death of Khurshid Khan. It was only at a belated stage, i.e., on 20.08.2009, on the report of the deceased's father, that the case was converted into a murder investigation. The allegation of the deceased's father was based on information provided by PW-15 Ashraf Ali Khan, who claimed that Javed had confessed to him that the murder was committed by Javed along with Jisad and Sabbu due to an illicit relationship between the deceased and Javed's sister. The allegation of the deceased's father was based on information provided by PW-15 Ashraf Ali Khan, who claimed that Javed had confessed to him that the murder was committed by Javed along with Jisad and Sabbu due to an illicit relationship between the deceased and Javed's sister. 12.1 This Court finds that the learned trial court thoroughly examined the medical evidence and did not find any conclusive evidence indicating an attack upon the deceased as alleged. 12.2 This Court also notes the significant timeline issues in PW-15 Ashraf Ali's evidence, particularly that he met Javed 20-22 days after the incident and communicated this information to the deceased's father, who further delayed lodging the complaint for approximately 4 to 5 days after the incident. 12.3 This Court is conscious of the fact that Javed himself was injured in the accident, sustaining a fracture to his right thigh. If he had staged the accident, the likelihood of him suffering such a serious injury would be questionable. 12.4 This Court finds that the allegation of murder committed by Javed, Jisad, and Sabbu, which contradicts the original report of an accident, makes it difficult to arrive at a conclusion of murder. The tyre lever (iron rod) mentioned is not clearly established as the murder weapon, and its recovery from the accident site is of no evidentiary consequence. This Court also finds that the learned trial court could not place confidence in Ashraf Ali's statement, which was recorded after considerable delay, and the two sets of facts presenting contradictory versions of events does not induce confidence of this Court. 12.5 This Court finds that the information allegedly received by Ashraf Khan 20-22 days after the incident, which he then conveyed to the deceased's father, was further delayed by the father, who only reported it 4 to 5 days thereafter. If the information was received in time and further delayed by father of deceased for 4 to 5 days regarding a heinous offence like murder, does not seem to be trustworthy. 13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 decided on 12.02.2024 ) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. 13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 decided on 12.02.2024 ) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024 ), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused- respondents under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of IPC , which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 15. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 16. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 17. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 18. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C . / 481 B.N.S.S., the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- each and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 19. All pending applications stand disposed of. 19. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.