Judgment: This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the decree and judgment, dated 03.08.2012 in A.S.No.75 of 2006, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, allowing the appeal in part the decree and judgment, dated 21.01.2016 in O.S.No.47 of 1995, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Puttur. 2. The appellant herein is the 7 th defendant; the 1 st respondent herein is plaintiff and the respondent Nos.2 to 7 herein are defendant Nos.2 to 6 and 8 in O.S.No.47 of 1995, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Puttur. It is to be noted herein that during the pendency of this appeal, the 3 rd respondent died and her legal representatives were already on record as respondent Nos.2, 4 and5. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.47 of 1995, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, with a prayer for specific performance of agreement of sale by receiving the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed for the suit properties in favour of plaintiff and get it register and deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. 4. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, decreed the suit without costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the 7 th defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.75 of 2006, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati. The learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, partly allowed the appeal directing the defendants to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of plaint item No.1 of schedule properties and dismissed the appeal in so far as item Nos.2 and 3 of the plaint schedule property by modifying the decree and judgment passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful 7 th defendant approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.47 of 2006, is as follows: The 1 st defendant was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.47 of 2006, is as follows: The 1 st defendant was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. She had agreed to sell away the schedule mentioned properties in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.54,000/- for her family necessities, court expenses and to discharge her old debts. On 19.05.1990 the 1 st defendant had received a sum of Rs.45,000/- from the plaintiff as advance for the said sale consideration and she had executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff, agreeing to receive the balance of sale consideration after the civil litigations, which are pending in O.S.No.98/1989 on the file of District Munsif, Nagari and O.S.No.200/1990, on the file of Sub-Ordinate Judge Court, Puttur, are over and execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and get it registered. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract due to the said litigation. The plaintiff recently came to know that the said civil litigations are collusive litigations between the 1 st defendant and defendant Nos.2 to 5 and also came to know that the 2 nd defendant had fraudulently alienated the schedule mentioned properties in collusion, dated 16.08.1995. The plaintiff further came to know that the defendant Nos.2 to 5 within three days had fraudulently alienated the schedule mentioned properties in favour of 7 th defendant in collusion with him under a fraudulent, sham, nominal, null and void sale deed, dated 19.08.1995. The defendant Nos.2 to 7 are well aware of the suit agreement of sale. The 1 st defendant filed written statement before the trial Court by denying the averments in the plaint. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: There is no cause of action to file this suit. The plaintiff is not entitled for any of the relief much less the relief of specific performance of contract and for delivery of possession of the suit properties. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: There is no cause of action to file this suit. The plaintiff is not entitled for any of the relief much less the relief of specific performance of contract and for delivery of possession of the suit properties. The 1 st defendant neither agreed to sell the schedule property in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.54,000/- for her family necessities, court expenses and to discharge her debts nor executed agreement of sale, dated 19.05.1990 in favour of the plaintiff for the suit properties. The 1 st defendant has no right, title or possession over the suit schedule property and hence the question of execution of suit agreement of sale does not arise at all. She filed a suit in O.S.No.98/1989 on the file of District Munsif Court, Nagari for permanent injunction on the basis of unregistered relinquishment deed. Prior to that there was proceedings between the 1 st defendant and Elumalai Reddy in O.S.No.10/1965 on the file of Sub Court, Chittoor. The 1 st defendant was given Ac.0-71 cents of land in Sy.No.33/2 i.e., item No.1 of the plaint schedule property herein towards her maintenance. After lifetime of the 1 st defendant, the said Elumalai Reddy will get right, title, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The said Elumalai Reddy was declared the owner of the lands in Sy.No.33/4 for an extent of Ac.0-20 cents, Sy.No.37/1 for an extent of Ac.1-72 cents as well as in Sy.No.33/2 of Nagari Village Accounts i.e., item Nos.2 and 3, etc. of the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.10/1965 on the file of Sub Court, Chittoor. In fact, the defendant filed an appeal in A.S.No.106 of 1971 on the file of Additional District Judge, Chittoor against the judgment in O.S.No.10/1965 of Sub Court, Chittoor. During the pendency of the appeal, the 1 st defendant and Elumalai Reddy compromised the matter and the 1 st defendant delivered possession of land in Sy.No.33/4 for an extent of Ac.0-22 cents, Sy.No.37/1 for an extent of Ac.1-72 cents of Nagari village accounts and subsequently compromise petition was filed in the appeal and the appeal was dismissed in the year 1989. The defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.98 of 1989 on the basis of unregistered relinquishment deed and obtained interim injunction. The 1 st defendant had been in possession of the said property. The defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.98 of 1989 on the basis of unregistered relinquishment deed and obtained interim injunction. The 1 st defendant had been in possession of the said property. The 1 st defendant approached the 2 nd defendant for compromise in O.S.No.98 of 1989, the 1 st defendant agreed to relinquish her maintenance right in lands in Sy.No.33/2 for an extent of Ac.0-71 cents by receiving an amount of Rs.40,000/-, dated 16.08.1995 and executed a registered maintenance relinquishment deed, dated 16.08.1995. She also executed a registered delivery deed in favour of 2 nd defendant on 16.08.1995 for the land of Ac.0-22 cents in Sy.No.33/2 and Ac.1-72 cents in Sy.No.37/1 and delivered possession of the said property in favour of 2 nd defendant. The 1 st defendant also filed memo in O.S.No.98 of 1989, on the file of District Munsif Court, Nagari, for not pressing that the suit, as the 1 st defendant executed registered maintenance relinquishment deed and registered delivery deed for the suit property and delivered possession of the same to the 2 nd defendant and 2 nd defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties from 16.08.1995. The 1 st defendant never executed suit agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff and the said agreement is forged document and the same is not binding on the 1 st defendant. The 7 th defendant filed written statement before the trial Court by denying the averments in the plaint which was adopted by the defendant Nos.2 to 6. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: The 1 st defendant did not execute any sale deed in favour of plaintiff. The 1 st defendant has no right, title or interest or possession over the suit schedule property. He entered into an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff. The 1 st defendant has executed registered maintenance relinquishment deed in favour of 2 nd defendant on 16.08.1995 for Ac.0-72 cents in Sy.No.33/2 and delivered possession of the same on that day. She also executed a registered delivery deed in favour of 2 nd defendant on 16.08.1995 for the land of Ac.0-22 cents in Sy.No.33/2 and Ac.1-72 cents in Sy.No.37/1 and delivered possession of the said property in favour of 2 nd defendant. She also executed a registered delivery deed in favour of 2 nd defendant on 16.08.1995 for the land of Ac.0-22 cents in Sy.No.33/2 and Ac.1-72 cents in Sy.No.37/1 and delivered possession of the said property in favour of 2 nd defendant. The 1 st defendant also filed memo in O.S.No.98/1989 on the file if District Munsif Court, Nagari for not pressing that the suit, as the 1 st defendant executed registered maintenance relinquishment deed and registered delivery deed for the suit property and delivered possession of the same to the 2 nd defendant and 2 nd defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties from 16.08.1995. The 2 nd defendant and his family members i.e., defendant Nos.3 to 6 have agreed to sell the schedule mentioned property and other properties in favour of 7 th defendant and accordingly defendant Nos.2 to 6 executed registered sale deeds, dated 19.08.1995 in favour of 7 th defendant for valid consideration and delivered possession of the suit properties and other properties in favour of 7 th defendant. Since the date of purchase, the 7 th defendant is in possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. During the pendency of the suit, the 1 st defendant died and her legal representative bought on record as 8 th defendant. The 8 th defendant filed a memo by adopting the written statement already filed by the 1 st defendant. 7. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the agreement of sale, dated 19.05.1990 executed in favour of the plaintiff by the 1 st defendant is true, valid and binding on the defendants? (2) Whether the sale deed, dated 19.08.1995 executed by the defendant Nos.2 to 6 in favour of 7 th defendant is collusive and fraudulent? (3) Whether the civil litigation between 1 st defendant and defendant Nos.2 to 5 are collusive litigation and compromised for the purpose of registered sale deed, dated 19.08.1995? (4) Whether the deed of delivery of possession, dated 16.08.1995 executed by the 1 st defendant in favour of the 2 nd defendant is collusive and fraudulent one? (5) Whether the 1 st defendant has executed registered maintenance relinquishment deed, dated 16.08.1995 in favour of 2 nd defendant for an extent of Ac.0-71 cents in Sy.No.33/2 is true and correct? (4) Whether the deed of delivery of possession, dated 16.08.1995 executed by the 1 st defendant in favour of the 2 nd defendant is collusive and fraudulent one? (5) Whether the 1 st defendant has executed registered maintenance relinquishment deed, dated 16.08.1995 in favour of 2 nd defendant for an extent of Ac.0-71 cents in Sy.No.33/2 is true and correct? (6) Whether the 7 th defendant is bonafide purchaser for valid consideration? (7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for regular sale deed through 8 th defendant in pursuance of the agreement of sale executed by the 1 st defendant? (8) Whether the suit is barred by res-judicata? (9) Whether the suit agreement of sale is antedated, forged document and created for the purpose of this litigation? (10) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of specific performance of contract against the defendants or not? (11) To what relief? 8. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.4 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.6 were examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.24 were marked. Apart from the above, C.W.1 was examined and Ex.C.1 to Ex.C.4 were marked. 9. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is decreed in respect of plaint item Nos.1 to 3 schedule properties. Felt aggrieved thereby, the 7 th defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.75 of 2006, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, wherein, the following point came up for consideration: 1) Whether Ex.A.1, agreement of sale was duly executed by 1 st defendant in favour of plaintiff? 2) Whether limited right of 1 st defendant over item No.1 of plaint schedule property was enlarged into absolute right in view of Section14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act? 3) Whether Bachu Narayana Chetty, father of defendant Nos.2 to 6 purchased the plaint schedule properties from Markondaiah Naidu, Muddukrishna and Raniamma who are vendees of Kuppam Elumalai Reddy under Ex.B.8 and Ex.B.7 respectively? 4) Whether the non-examination of plaintiff disentitle the plaintiff for the relief of specific performance? 5) Whether the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of contract? 4) Whether the non-examination of plaintiff disentitle the plaintiff for the relief of specific performance? 5) Whether the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of contract? 6) Whether Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.3 are sham, collusive and nominal documents? 7) Whether 7 th defendant/appellant is a bonafide purchaser for valuable sale consideration? 8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance? 9) To what relief? 10. The learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the point, as above, partly allowed the appeal by modifying the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court as the plaintiff is not entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of item Nos.2 and 3 of the schedule properties and the plaintiff is entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Felt aggrieved of the same, the plaintiff filed second appeal in S.A.No.1381 of 2012 before this Court and the said second appeal was dismissed at the stage of admission itself. Aggrieved against the 1 st appellate Court judgment in respect of the plaint item No.1 of the schedule property, the 7 th defendant filed this second appeal. Therefore, the subject matter of the present second appeal is concerned only item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. 11. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the appeal, on 08.12.2017, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, framed the following substantial questions of law: 1) Whether a suit for specific performance is not maintainable without issuing a prior notice as contemplated under Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A of CPC? 2) Whether the suit against D2 to D7 who are not parties to the agreement of sale – Ex.A.1 is maintainable? 12. Heard Sri P.V. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for the appellant and heard Sri A.V. Sivaiah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant/7 th defendant would contend that while dismissing the appeal, the First Appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record, as a result, the First Appellate Court erroneously held that the plaintiff is entitled a relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant/7 th defendant would contend that while dismissing the appeal, the First Appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record, as a result, the First Appellate Court erroneously held that the plaintiff is entitled a relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. He would further contend that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is contrary to law. He would further contend that the First Appellate Court ought to have held that in terms of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the deceased 1 st defendant is having limited rights in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that there are no merits in the second appeal filed by the appellant/ 7 th defendant and that the second appeal may be dismissed by confirming the findings given by the learned First Appellate Judge. 15. The suit is based on Ex.A.1 agreement of sale said to have been executed by the 1 st defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The 1 st defendant denied execution of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. The learned trial Judge on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, came to a conclusion that Ex.A.1 agreement of sale is genuine document. The learned First Appellate Judge also came to a same conclusion that the execution of agreement of sale under Ex.A.1 is genuine document and the same is proved by the plaintiff. Another important point is that Ex.A.1 agreement of sale was sent to the Fingerprint Expert for comparison of the thumb marks of the 1 st defendant and the expert sent a report stating that Ex.A.1 is genuine one and thumb marks on Ex.A.1 belong to 1 st defendant and the said expert was also examined as C.W.1, through him Ex.C.1 to Ex.C.4 documents were marked. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, both the Courts below came to a concurrent finding that Ex.A.1 agreement of sale is proved by the plaintiff and Ex.A.1 agreement of sale is genuine document. 16. In a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is normally not expected to re-appreciate the evidence on record. 16. In a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is normally not expected to re-appreciate the evidence on record. It shall not reverse the findings of both the Courts below except under few situations. If it is found that the material and relevant evidence are not considered by the First Appellate Court and if considered it would have lead to an opposite conclusion, is one instance where this Court is entitled to interfere. The other situation is when the findings of the facts were arrived by the First Appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence, which if it was omitted, an appropriate conclusion was possible. It is on such occasions also this Court can interfere. It is also relevant to say that if the judgment of both the Courts below are contrary to mandatory provisions of the law applicable to the case, then also an interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is permissible. 17. Admittedly, item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is self-acquired property of Govinda Reddy i.e., father of Elumalai Reddy has got two wives. Sanjeevamma i.e., 1 st defendant is first wife of Govinda Reddy and Venkatamma is the second wife of Govinda Reddy. Rajamma is the only daughter of Govinda Reddy and 1 st defendant herein. It is also further clear that Govinda Reddy filed a suit in O.S.No.10 of 1965 before Additional Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor against his first wife/1 st defendant herein, second wife and his daughter for declaration of title and permanent injunction or in alternative relief directing the defendant Nos.2 and 3 to deliver possession to him. The material on record further reveals that the trial Court passed Ex.B.4 decree in O.S.No.10 of 1965 and item No.1 of the plaint schedule property herein is item No.2 of schedule property in O.S.No.10 of 1965. In the said decree and judgment, it was declared that Elumalai Reddy was having title for all the schedule properties and there was a finding in the said decree that the1 st defendant herein and her daughter have to deliver possession of item Nos.4, 5, 6 and 8 in O.S.No.10 of 1965 and half share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to Elumalai Reddy, but the said suit is concerned with reference to item Nos.2, 4 and 5 of the schedule property. The recitals of the said decree and judgment clearly goes to show that in view of the arrangement, 1 st defendant herein was given possession of Ac.0-71 cents of land in Sy.No.33/2 i.e., item No.1 of the plaint schedule property herein which is equivalent to item No.2 of the schedule property in O.S.No.10 of 1965 towards her maintenance. D.W.1 i.e., 7 th defendant also admits in his evidence in cross examination itself that item No.1 of the plaint schedule property herein i.e., Ac.0-71 cents was given for maintenance to the 1 st defendant till her lifetime and later it was reverted to Elumalai Reddy, her stepson. In view of the admissions of appellant herein and in view of the recitals of Ex.B.4 certified copy of decree in O.S.No.10 of 1965, item No.1 of the plaint schedule property herein was given to the 1 st defendant towards her maintenance in lieu of her pre-existing right. 18. The material on record further reveals that the 1 st defendant executed Ex.B.2 on 16.08.1995 relinquishing her maintenance rights in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property by receiving Rs.45,000/- in favour of 2 nd defendant. It clearly goes to show item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was given to the 1 st defendant towards her maintenance. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that the limited rights given to the 1 st defendant enlarges into absolute rights in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is also relevant to say that the defendant Nos.2 to 7 are claiming item No.1 of the plaint schedule property only through the 1 st defendant and Elumalai Reddy. It is the specific case of the appellant that Elumalai Reddy sold away item No.1 of the suit schedule property to Markondaiah Naidu and others under a registered sale deed and they in turn sold the property to one B. Narayana Chetty under registered a sale deed and after the death of Narayana Chetty, his legal heirs i.e., defendant Nos.2 to 6 become owners of item No.1 of plaint schedule property and they sold the same to the 7 th defendant/appellant under Ex.B.1 registered sale deed. On appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Judge and the learned First Appellate Judge came to a conclusion that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act applicable to the case in respect of item No.1 of the schedule property. 19. In a case of Nazar Singh and others vs. Jagjit Kaur and others, [AIR 1996 Supreme Court 855] the Apex Court held as follows: “According to sub-section(1) any property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner irrespective of the fact whether the said property was acquired by her before the commencement of the Act. Explanation to sub-section (1) elaborates the meaning and content of the expression “property” in sub-section (1). It includes property given in lieu of maintenance.” In a case of Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs, [AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944] , the Apex Court held as follows: “It is, therefore, clear that the compromise by which the properties were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre- existing right and, therefore, the case of the appellant would be taken out of the ambit of Sec.14(2) and would fall squarely within Section 14(1) read with the Explanation thereto.” In the case on hand, the material on record further reveals that item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was given to the 1 st defendant towards her maintenance. As seen from recitals of Ex.B.2 and Ex.B.3, on account of compromise between defendant Nos.1 and 2, 1 st defendant has executed Ex.B.2 and Ex.B.2 by receiving certain money. In fact, the 1 st defendant has no right to execute Ex.B.2 and Ex.B.3 on 19.08.1995 she executed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale on 19.05.1990 in favour of plaintiff. To defeat Ex.A.1 document, Ex.B.2 and Ex.B.3 are brought into existence. 20. The 1 st defendant was conferred with the rights in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property towards her maintenance, though she has made an attempt to dispute execution of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff, a concurrent finding was recorded to the effect that Ex.A.1 agreement of sale was proved as stated supra. 20. The 1 st defendant was conferred with the rights in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property towards her maintenance, though she has made an attempt to dispute execution of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff, a concurrent finding was recorded to the effect that Ex.A.1 agreement of sale was proved as stated supra. As regards the title of the 1 st defendant, vis-à-vis item No.1 of the schedule property, limited rights of 1 st defendant conferred under the decree in O.S.No.10 of 1965 under Ex.B.4 enlarges into absolute rights by operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The said finding arrived by both the Courts below have given the said finding on appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record. Therefore, the said finding need not be disturbed. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the said finding given by the learned trial Judge as well as the learned First Appellate Judge. 21. Furthermore, Elumalai Reddy has no right in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property since item No.1 of the plaint schedule property become absolute property of 1 st defendant in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. As stated supra, a life interest is granted in favour of 1 st defendant in recognition of pre-existing right, only a limited right was given in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, which enlarges into absolute right. 22. As stated supra, as per the case of the appellant, Elumalai Reddy sold away item No.1 of the suit schedule property to Markondaiah Naidu and others under a registered sale deed and they in turn sold the property to one B. Narayana Chetty under registered a sale deed and after the death of Narayana Chetty, his legal heirs i.e., defendant Nos.2 to 6 become owners of item No.1 of plaint schedule property and they sold the same to the 7 th defendant/appellant under Ex.B.1 registered sale deed. It is relevant to say after passing decree and judgment in O.S.No.10 of 1965, it was confirmed in the appeal by the First Appellate Court. As stated supra, as per Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is absolute property of the 1 st defendant and her limited rights were converted into absolute rights. As stated supra, as per Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is absolute property of the 1 st defendant and her limited rights were converted into absolute rights. It is also relevant to say during lifetime of the 1 st defendant, Elumalai Reddy executed a registered sale deed in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property in favour of third parties. As noticed supra, Elumalai Reddy has no right to sell item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to third parties since item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was given to 1 st defendant towards her maintenance with life interest. As noticed supra, Elumalai Reddy alienated the said property during the lifetime of 1 st defendant and subsequent to the alienation made by Elumalai Reddy in favour of Narayana Chetty, the children of Narayana Chetty i.e., defendant Nos.2 to 6 alienated item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the 7 th defendant under a registered sale deed. The trial Court as well as First Appellate Court gave concurrent finding that the vendor of 7 th defendant has no right to alienate item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the 7 th defendant and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.3 were brought into existence to defeat rights of agreement holder under Ex.A.1. 23. The specific recital in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale is after clearing of the Court cases, the plaintiff has to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.9,000/- and to obtain a registered sale deed. It is not in dispute that the number of suit and nature of suit is not mentioned in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. The material on record reveals that by the date of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, O.S.No.98 of 1989 filed by the 1 st defendant against the 2 nd defendant and others was pending in District Munsif Court at Nagari. 24. It was represented by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff did not enter into witness box and P.W.1 is not competent to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiff. P.W.1 is no other than the husband of plaintiff. Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act enables the plaintiff to examine her husband as a witness on her behalf. P.W.1 is no other than the husband of plaintiff. Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act enables the plaintiff to examine her husband as a witness on her behalf. P.W.1 is not a third party and he is no other than the husband of the plaintiff and he is having knowledge about the suit transaction. In cross examination when elicited P.W.1 admits himself and his wife are having knowledge in respect of the suit transaction. It was not suggested to P.W.1 in cross examination by the learned counsel for the defendants that P.W.1 is incompetent to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiff. As stated supra, in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is normally not expected to re- appreciate the evidence on record. It is relevant to say there was a specific recital in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale that after clearing of court cases, the plaintiff has to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.9,000/- to the 1 st defendant. It is not the case of the defendants that the pending suits were cleared and the same was informed to the plaintiff. 25. The appellant has taken a plea that he is a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration. The present appeal is confined to in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. In so far as item No.1 of the plaint schedule property is concerned, Elumalai Reddy has no right to alienate the same in favour of Markondaiah Naidu under Ex.B.7 in view of the right conferred under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act in favour of 1 st defendant. As stated supra, Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.3 were brought into existence to defeat the rights of agreement holder under Ex.A.1. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that without issuing any notice, the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is filed by the plaintiff, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled the main relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that without issuing any notice, the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is filed by the plaintiff, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled the main relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant placed a reliance of M. Rangaiah vs. T.V. Satyanarayana Rao and another, 2009 (5) ALD 663 Learned counsel for the appellant placed another reliance of Baddam Prathap Reddy vs. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy and another, [ 2008 (5) ALD 200 ], wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows: "This court, however, hastens to add that, in law, oral demand by the buyer of immovable property, as such, being sufficient compliance with requirements of Form Nos.47 and 48 cannot be totally ruled out. In such circumstances, the proof of oral demand should be strong and unimpeachable and mere allegation, that too, in a passing manner would not be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. This aspect of the mater, however, has to be gone into a little deeper in an appropriate case, but it would be sufficient to leave the issue with the observations as made hereinabove.” In the aforesaid case law the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad further held as follows: “A study of four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant namely, Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai, (1989) 4SCC 313 = AIR 1990 SC 683, Syed Dastagir (supra), Pushparani S. Sundaram (supra) and Manjunath Anandappa (supra), would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of sale deed is not complied with prior to filing of the suit, it would weaken the case of plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of contract in respect of immovable property. If a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would - to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S. Sundarm’s case (supra) it was held: …Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. Mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S. Sundarm’s case (supra) it was held: …Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may b\not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court. But in the present case, not only the plaintiff has not come in the witness box, but not even sent any communication or notice to the defendant about his willingness to perform his part of the contract. In fact no evidence is led to prove the same.” In the aforesaid case law the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad also held as follows: “In this case plaintiff alleged that since one year prior to filing of the suit he has been demanding first defendant to receive the balance of consideration and register sale deed. The suit was filed on 23.11.1994. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, he had been demanding first defendant since November 1993. However, in his chief-examination he admits that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract since 20.05.1995. This would certainly belie allegation that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. P.Ws.2 and 3 are silent on this aspect. Therefore, even oral demand has not been proved, and the plea of oral demand does not carry the case of the plaintiff any further. Therefore, this Court holds that the suit is barred, and the same is liable to be dismissed.” Admittedly, in the case on hand, there was a specific recital in the plaint itself that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract, but the 1 st defendant was not ready and willing to perform her part of contract. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of contract. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of contract. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that when he demanded 1 st defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed as per the terms of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, the 1 st defendant told him that she will execute sale deed after disposal of the suits filed by her and also 2 nd defendant’s father against her. It was not at all suggested to P.W.1 by the learned counsel for the appellant in cross examination that P.W.1 did not make any demand to the 1 st defendant to execute a registered sale deed. The agreement was executed in between plaintiff and 1 st defendant, the appellant/7 th defendant is not a party to the said agreement. The 1 st defendant did not enter into the witness box. The 1 st defendant died during the pendency of the suit proceedings. The appellant/ 7 th defendant admits in his evidence in cross examination that when he asked, the 1 st defendant told him that she has not executed any agreement of sale except Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and 1 st defendant told him that Ex.A.1 is a forged one and she did not receive any consideration. The above admission of appellant in his evidence in cross examination clearly goes to show that on knowing fully well about Ex.A.1 agreement of sale transaction, the appellant herein purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Another crucial admission made by the 7 th defendant in his evidence in cross examination is that item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was given to the 1 st defendant towards maintenance till her lifetime. 27. Learned counsel for the appellant placed a reliance of Padmakumari and others vs. Dasayyan and others, [(2015) 8 Supreme Court Cases 695] In the case on hand, there was a specific recital in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale after clearing of court cases, the plaintiff has to pay the remaining balance sale consideration. Admittedly, the clearing of court cases was not at all informed to the plaintiff by the 1 st defendant. The 1 st defendant executed a document in favour of 2 nd defendant to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, on knowing the same, the plaintiff rushed to the civil Court and filed a suit. Admittedly, the clearing of court cases was not at all informed to the plaintiff by the 1 st defendant. The 1 st defendant executed a document in favour of 2 nd defendant to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, on knowing the same, the plaintiff rushed to the civil Court and filed a suit. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that the plaintiff has no knowledge about the clearing of court cases of 1 st defendant. It is not the specific case of the 1 st defendant in the written statement that she informed the plaintiff about the clearing of court cases. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) Thr. Lrs. (S) v. A.M. Krishnamurthy (S), [2022 SCC OnLine SC 840] wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” 29. In a case of Sita Ram and others vs. Radhey Shyam, [2007 (6) ALT 34 (SC)], the Apex Court held as follows: “The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) is that any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should not be denied the relief.” 30. In a case of Shenbagam and others vs. K.K. Rathinavel, [2022 SCC OnLine SC 71], the Apex Court held as follows: “True enough, generally speaking, time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immoveable property. In a case of Shenbagam and others vs. K.K. Rathinavel, [2022 SCC OnLine SC 71], the Apex Court held as follows: “True enough, generally speaking, time is not of the essence in an agreement for the sale of immoveable property. In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific performance, specifically in suits relating to sale of immovable property, the courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties, the escalation of the price of the suit property, and whether one party will unfairly benefit from the decree. The remedy provided must not cause injustice to a party, specifically when they are not at fault.” Admittedly, in the case on hand, the 1 st defendant did not inform the plaintiff about the clearing of court cases and also settlement of cases in between both parties. Therefore, the same cannot be ignored and the same is not blamishless. 31. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge as well as the learned First Appellate Judge gave concurrent finding that the plaintiff is entitled the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. I do not find any illegality in the finding given by the learned First Appellate Court that the plaintiff is entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 32. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment, dated 03.08.2012 in A.S.No.75 of 2006, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati. Each party do bear their own costs in the appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed.