JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.08.2013 passed by learned Special Judge, Kullu, District Kullu (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 20 read with Section 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act (hereinafter referred to as ND&PS Act) and Section 25 of Arms Act. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 20 read with Section 29 of ND&PS Act and Section 25 of the Arms Act. It was asserted that Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13), ASI Mukesh Kumar (PW11), HC Jawala Singh and Constable Tarsem Lal (PW12) were present at a distance of 2 kms from Chharod Nala bridge towards Manikaran on 08.05.2010 in the official vehicle bearing registration No. HP34A-9986 which was being driven by Constable Baldev Singh. A vehicle bearing registration No. HR-12C-3654 came from Manikaran at about 8:15 PM. Two persons were sitting in the vehicle beside the driver. The police demanded the documents of the vehicle and driving license of the driver. The driver produced the driving license of Anuj Kumar. The driver also revealed his name as Anuj Kumar. The person sitting beside the driver revealed his name as Pardeep Kumar and the person sitting on the rear seat revealed his name as Pradeep Saini. The registration certificate was found to be issued in the name of Naveen Mahanto. The pollution under control certificate and insurance were found to be in the name of Ashok. Accused Pardeep Kumar revealed that he had purchased the vehicle some days ago and had not got the ownership transferred in his name. The occupants appeared to be frightened. The police suspected that they were transporting some contraband. The police checked the vehicle and found two bags on the rear seat which were containing personal belongings. The driver was asked to open the dickey of the vehicle. All the accused said that the dickey was defective and could not be opened. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) tried to open the dickey and the dickey started opening. The police checked the vehicle and found two bags on the rear seat which were containing personal belongings. The driver was asked to open the dickey of the vehicle. All the accused said that the dickey was defective and could not be opened. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) tried to open the dickey and the dickey started opening. The police waited for an independent person but no one arrived on the spot. HC Jawala Singh and Inspector Mukesh Kumar (PW11) were associated as witnesses and the dickey of the car was opened in their presence. The mat in the dickey was found to be disturbed from its original position. The mat was removed and two screws were found to be loose. They were opened and a black bag was recovered. The police checked the bag and found six packets wrapped in a Khaki Cello Tape. The cello tape was removed and 14 packets of transparent polythene containing the black substance were recovered. One packet had black sticks, four packets had black pancakes and nine packets had black substance in the form of Aam Papad. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) smelled the black substance and found it to be charas. Charas was weighed and its weight was found to be 1 kg 880 grams. The charas and cello tape were put in the bag from which they were recovered. The bag was put in a cloth parcel and the parcel was sealed with six impressions of seal ‘A’. The specimen seal was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 Form (Ext.PW5/G) was filled and a seal impression was put on the form. The charas, documents of the vehicle and key were seized wide memo (Ext. PW11/A). The seal was handed over to SI Mukesh Kumar (PW13) after the use. Rukka (Ext.PW7/A) was prepared and handed over to LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) who carried it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW7/B) was registered. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/A). He seized the bags (Ext.P6 and Ext.P7) vide memo (Ext.PW13/B). He arrested the accused vide memos (Ext.PW11/B to Ext.PW11/D). He produced the case property and the accused before Tej Ram (PW7), who resealed the parcels with six seals of impression ‘T’. He filled the relevant columns of the NCB-1 Form in triplicate. He obtained the sample seal on a separate piece of cloth. He arrested the accused vide memos (Ext.PW11/B to Ext.PW11/D). He produced the case property and the accused before Tej Ram (PW7), who resealed the parcels with six seals of impression ‘T’. He filled the relevant columns of the NCB-1 Form in triplicate. He obtained the sample seal on a separate piece of cloth. He handed over the case property to HC Ram Kishan (PW5) who deposited it in Malkhana and made an entry at Sl. No. 77. He sent the parcel along with sample seals, NCB-1 Form in triplicate, photocopy of FIR and seizure memo to SFSL Junga through Constable LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) vide R.C. No. 125/10 (Ext.PW5/F). LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) deposited all the articles at SFSL Junga and handed over the receipt to HC Ram Krishan (PW5) on his return. SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) deposited the bags with HC Ram Krishan (PW5) on 10.05.2010. He entered them in the register of Malkhana at Sl No. 83 and deposited the case property in Malkhana. SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) interrogated the accused, Anuj. Accused Anuj made a disclosure statement (Ext.PW2/A) stating that he could get the weighing scale (Ext.P9) recovered, which was used by Raman Kumar for weighing the charas. He led the police party to Hotel Kamal Palace, Kasol and got one electronic weighing scale (Ext.P9) recovered, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW8/A). SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) prepared the spot map (Ext.PW13/C) showing the place of recovery. He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. DL-1CH-6633 vide memo (Ext.PW6/A). He prepared the special report (Ext.PW4/A) and handed it over to Dy. Superintendent of Police Shiv Chaudhary. On 10.05.2010. Dy. Superintendent of Police Shiv Chaudhary made an endorsement on the special report and handed it over to his reader HC Harbans Kumar (PW4). Accused Raman Kumar made another disclosure statement that he had concealed a revolver in room No. 110 which could be recovered by him. The statement (Ext.PW3/A) was reduced into writing. Accused Anuj Kumar led the police party to room No. 110 of Hotel Kamal Palace, Kasol and got recovered a pistol. Its sketch (Ex.PW3/C) was prepared. The pistol was put in a separate cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with eight seals of impression ‘K’. A spot map of the place of recovery was prepared. The sample seal (Ext.PW3/D) was drawn on a separate piece of cloth. Its sketch (Ex.PW3/C) was prepared. The pistol was put in a separate cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with eight seals of impression ‘K’. A spot map of the place of recovery was prepared. The sample seal (Ext.PW3/D) was drawn on a separate piece of cloth. The case properties were deposited with HC Ram Kishan (PW5), who deposited them in Malakhana. The result of analysis (Ext. PX) was issued in which it was shown that the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas which contained 41.63 % w/w resin in it. Statements of the remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court charged accused Raman Kumar with the commission of offences punishable under Section 20 read with Section 29 of the ND&PS Act and Section 25 of the Arms Act. The learned Trial Court charged accused Pradeep Saini and accused Pardeep Kumar with the commission of offences punishable under Section 20 read with Section 29 of the ND&PS Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Hem Raj Arya (PW1) proved the computerized bank statements. HHG Gurdial (PW2) is the witness to the disclosure statement made by accused Anuj Kumar. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW3) is the witness to the disclosure statement made by accused Raman Kumar and the consequent recovery. HC Harbans Kumar (PW4) was working as the Reader to whom the special report was handed over. HC Ram Krishan (PW5) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Mujmil Chaudhary (PW6) proved that the vehicle of accused Raman Kumar was received for repair. Tej Ram (PW7) signed the FIR and resealed the case property. Constable Krishan Chand (PW8) is the witness to the recovery of the vehicle and the electronic weighing scale. SI Om Chand (PW9) conducted the partial investigation. Inspector Sanjeev Chauhan (PW10) recorded the disclosure statement of accused Raman Kumar and effected the recovery. SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) and LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) are the official witnesses to recovery. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) effected the recovery and conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. Inspector Sanjeev Chauhan (PW10) recorded the disclosure statement of accused Raman Kumar and effected the recovery. SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) and LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) are the official witnesses to recovery. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) effected the recovery and conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. Accused Pradeep Saini stated that he went to Manali in a Taxi with accused Pardeep Kumar which was being driven by accused Anuj. They stayed in Gurudwara Manikaran where police came with accused Anuj and they were falsely implicated. Accused Anuj Kumar left them in Gurudwara and he went with the car. The car was in the possession of accused Anuj Kumar. A similar statement was made by accused Pardeep Kumar. They denied the prosecution case in its entirety and stated that they were falsely implicated. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to provide any evidence to show that accused Pardeep Kumar had purchased the vehicle. The statement of registered owner Naveen Mahanto was not recorded. It was unbelievable that any person would sit in the vehicle of a stranger. It was improbable that the accused would have kept the charas in the dickey, which could have been opened easily by the police. Independent witness was not associated during the investigation, which would cast doubt on the prosecution case. The Investigating Officer had a suspicion regarding the possession of the contraband and the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Section 42 of ND&PS Act. The sample seals were not produced in the Court and this would cast doubt on the prosecution case. There was no evidence showing that the chemical analyst had received the sample seals and the case property. The ownership of room No. 110 was not established. No record from Manikaran Gurudwara was taken into possession. The report of the analysis did not show the presence of cannabinoids including the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol, and it was insufficient to prove that the substance being carried in the car was charas; hence the accused were acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence from its proper perspective and had set unrealistic standards for evaluating the prosecution evidence. Learned Trial Court discarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses for untenable reasons. It was wrongly held that the prosecution had failed to establish how the accused happened to be in the vehicle owned by Naveen Mahanto. This was not an important factor. The view taken by the learned Trial Court that the dickey could not have been opened was also unreasonable. There was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the ND&PS Act in the present case. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were satisfactory and corroborated each other in material particulars. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. We have heard Mr. I.N. Mehta and Mr. Yashwardhan Chauhan, learned Senior Additional Advocates General with Mr. Navlesh Verma, Ms Sharmila Patial, learned Additional Advocates General and Mr Raj Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, Mr Kashmir Singh Thakur learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused No.1 and 2 and Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Tek Chand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused No.3. 9. Mr Yashwardhan Chauhan, learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The learned Trial Court had wrongly held that the prosecution was required to comply with the requirements of Section 42 of the ND&PS Act. It was a case of chance recovery. Therefore, there was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the ND&PS Act. The Police officials categorically stated that they waited for the independent persons but nobody came; hence the search was conducted in the presence of police officials. This was not proved to be wrong. Otherwise, it was a case of chance recovery, and independent witnesses could not have been associated with the investigation. The Police officials categorically stated that they waited for the independent persons but nobody came; hence the search was conducted in the presence of police officials. This was not proved to be wrong. Otherwise, it was a case of chance recovery, and independent witnesses could not have been associated with the investigation. The ownership of the vehicle was not required to be proved and the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the presence of the accused in one vehicle was contrary to the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they admitted their presence in the vehicle with accused Anuj Kumar. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the case property was not proved to be charas is contrary to the judgments of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Kashmir Singh, learned Senior Advocate for respondents No. 2 and 3 supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the police officials admitted in their cross-examination that the Investigating Officer had a suspicion regarding the transportation of the contraband. Therefore, it was essential to comply with the requirements of Section 42 of the ND&PS Act. The incident had taken place on the highway and it is highly unbelievable that no person or vehicle had met the police party. The sample seals were not produced before the Court and there is no evidence that the sample seal was sent to SFSL Junga. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while deciding the matter and this Court should not interfered with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon State of H.P. versus Rajesh Kumar @ Raju 2024:HHC:12713 and State of H.P. versus Raj Kumar @ Raju, 2024:HHC:13853 in support of his submission. 11. Mr. Lovneesh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that the disclosure statement of an accused is not admissible against the co-accused. The prosecution had not sent the pistol to the Forensic Science Laboratory to determine that it would fall within the definition of a firearm. 11. Mr. Lovneesh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that the disclosure statement of an accused is not admissible against the co-accused. The prosecution had not sent the pistol to the Forensic Science Laboratory to determine that it would fall within the definition of a firearm. The prosecution sanction was not sought from the District Magistrate as required under Section 39 of the Arms Act; hence, the prosecution of respondent no. 4 under the Arms Act was bad. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P AIR 2023 SC 3857 and Buta Singh versus State of Punjab AIR 1995 SC 1461 in support of his submission. 12. We have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: “25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The “two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the courts, and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka , (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19] : (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p. 643, para 9) ‘9. … We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view, and even if by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.’” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586 ] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807 ] ). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] ).” 14. This position was reiterated in Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2581, wherein it was observed at page 175: “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , regarding the power of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1977) 2 SCC 205 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 308] , a three-judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the trial court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses, and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the trial court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice.” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) stated that he, SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11), LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12), and HC Jawala Singh had gone on patrolling in the official vehicle bearing registration No. HP34A-9986, which was being driven by LHC Baldev. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13) stated that he, SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11), LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12), and HC Jawala Singh had gone on patrolling in the official vehicle bearing registration No. HP34A-9986, which was being driven by LHC Baldev. They were present 2 Kms ahead of Charod Nala. A vehicle bearing registration No. HR12C-3654 came from Manikaran at 8:15 PM, which was signalled to stop. Two persons were sitting in the vehicle beside the driver. The person sitting in the front seat with the driver revealed his name as Pardeep Kumar and the person sitting in the rear seat revealed his name as Pradeep Saini. The driver revealed his name as Anuj. SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) demanded the driving license and the documents of the vehicle from Anuj. The accused were found perplexed. He searched the vehicle and recovered two bags kept on the rear seat. Nothing incriminating was found during the search of the bags. He asked the accused to open the dickey of the vehicle. The accused disclosed that the dickey was out of order and could not be opened. He tried to open the dickey and it started opening. He suspected that some contraband was being carried in the dickey of the vehicle. He waited for the independent witness or some vehicle. However, no vehicle or the witness arrived on the spot. He associated SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) and HC Jawala Singh as witnesses and opened the dickey. He found that the mat of the dickey was displaced and two nuts of the dickey were partially opened. He opened the nuts and found a black bag inside the dickey below a tin sheet. He opened the bag and found six packets wrapped in Khaki cello tapes. He opened the packets and found 14 packets wrapped in transparent polythene having black substance. One packet had a stick shape, four packets had a pancake shape and nine packets had Aam Papad-shaped black substance. He smelled the substance and found it to be charas. He weighed 14 packets and found their weight to be 1 kg 880 grams. He repacked the 14 packets in the same manner in which they were recovered. He put the bag in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with six seals of seal ‘A’. He smelled the substance and found it to be charas. He weighed 14 packets and found their weight to be 1 kg 880 grams. He repacked the 14 packets in the same manner in which they were recovered. He put the bag in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with six seals of seal ‘A’. He filled the NCB-1 Form in triplicate and obtained the sample seal on a separate piece of cloth. He handed over the seal to ASI Mukesh Kumar (PW11). He seized the parcel and the documents vide memo (Ext.PW11/A). He prepared the rukka and handed it over to LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) who carried it to the Police Station. He prepared the spot map and seized the bags on the spot. He arrested the accused and produced the accused and the case property before SHO Tej Ram (PW7) for resealing. 17. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not given any information under Section 42 of the ND&PS Act to his immediate superior. He volunteered to say that the recovery was a chance recovery. He had not made any enquiry from Naveen Mahanto who was shown the registered owner in the R.C. They left the police station at 7:15 PM and did not stop on the way. It took 10-15 minutes to check the bags of the accused. He waited for about 15 minutes for witnesses. He had not asked for the key of the dickey from the accused. The dickey easily opened when he held the handle of the dickey. He admitted that the dickey of the Esteem car cannot be opened without a key or operating the internal holding system. He conducted the proceedings inside the official jeep. He had not made any enquiry that the car was being used as a taxi or that accused Anuj Kumar used to drive the car in question as a taxi driver. He prepared the memo (Ext.PW2/A). He denied that no recovery was effected and a false case was made against the accused. 18. Sub-Inspector Mukesh Kumar (PW11) made a similar statement as was made by SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) in his examination-in-chief. Therefore, the same is not been re- produced to avoid repetition and prolixity. He stated in his cross- examination that he had misplaced the seal on the next day of the incident. He had not reported this fact to the police. Sub-Inspector Mukesh Kumar (PW11) made a similar statement as was made by SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) in his examination-in-chief. Therefore, the same is not been re- produced to avoid repetition and prolixity. He stated in his cross- examination that he had misplaced the seal on the next day of the incident. He had not reported this fact to the police. No proceedings under Section 42 of the ND&PS Act were carried out. The vehicle of the accused was stopped first. No stone was put on the road. The car reached the spot within two minutes and a search was conducted after 10-15 minutes. No personal search of the accused was conducted on the spot before the search of the vehicle. The seizure memo was prepared within one hour. He had not verified the luggage found in the bags. He had not verified whether the car was being driven as a private taxi or not. The Investigating Officer had not made any enquiry whether accused Anuj used to visit Manikaran, Manali with the vehicle. He was not aware that accused Pardeep Kumar and accused Pradeep Saini were staying in Gurudwara, Manikaran. The dickey of the car was opened by the Investigating Officer with his hand. They waited for 15-20 minutes for a witness to arrive on the spot. They remained on the spot for about 3:15-3:30 hours. Nobody came on the spot during this period. He denied that both accused persons, namely, Pardeep Kumar and Pradeep Saini were falsely implicated. 19. LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) also made a similar statement in his examination-in-chief as was made by SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13). Hence, the same is not reproduced to avoid repetition. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of occurrence was located at a distance of 18-19 kilometres from the police station. They reached the spot at about 8:15 PM. They had not stopped on the way. He saw the vehicle at a distance of 30-40 meters. The vehicle was stopped by giving a signal. The accused were outside the car when it was searched. It took about 10 minutes to search the bags in the car. No person was sent to call the witness as no independent witness was available. He could not say whether the key was used for opening the dickey. It took about 15 minutes to search the entire car. The accused were outside the car when it was searched. It took about 10 minutes to search the bags in the car. No person was sent to call the witness as no independent witness was available. He could not say whether the key was used for opening the dickey. It took about 15 minutes to search the entire car. He admitted that the road had vehicular traffic. He volunteered to say that no vehicle had crossed them. He went to the Police Station, Kullu in a private vehicle which was a truck-type vehicle. He took the lift up to Bhuntar and thereafter in another private vehicle. He reached Police Station, Kullu within an hour. He was not aware whether the bus service was available on Manikaran Road during the night. He was waiting at Dhalpur Chowk when the Investigating Officer met him. Thereafter they went to the Police Station, Kullu by foot within two minutes. No proceedings were conducted by the Investigating Officer at Dhalpur Chowk in his presence. The proceedings were conducted at the spot inside the official vehicle. He denied that no recovery was effected. 20. It was submitted that the testimonies of police officials show that SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13) became suspicious of the possession of the contraband when the accused refused to open the dickey of the Car by saying that it was defective; therefore, he was required to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the ND&PS Act. This submission is not acceptable. The statement that the police had a suspicion about contraband is not equivalent to the suspicion of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances. The term ‘Contraband’, according to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, means goods or merchandise exportation or possession of which is forbidden. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, contraband means goods that are brought into or taken out of the country secretly and illegally. According to the Collins English Dictionary , contraband refers to goods that are taken into or out of the country illegally. According to the Oxford Learner Dictionary, contraband means goods that are illegally taken into or out of the country. Therefore, all the standard dictionaries do not refer to contraband as Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances Act, but to illegal goods. Hence, they include many other things besides narcotics or psychotropic substances, and no advantage can be derived from the statement that the investigating officer suspected the transportation of contraband. Therefore, all the standard dictionaries do not refer to contraband as Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances Act, but to illegal goods. Hence, they include many other things besides narcotics or psychotropic substances, and no advantage can be derived from the statement that the investigating officer suspected the transportation of contraband. 21. The provision of Section 42 of the NDPS Act applies when the police have a reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person that any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance, or controlled substance is kept or concealed. There is a distinction between vague suspicion and definite grounds of belief. The police are required to comply with the requirement of Section 42 of the NDPS Act when it has definite information and not a vague suspicion. It was laid down in Babubhai Odhavji Patel and others Versus State of Gujarat 2005(8) SCC 425 that even when the Investigating Officer admitted that DIG had instructed him about the transportation of the intoxicant from the States of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh through the vehicles passing in his District, it was only general information. It was not required to be reduced to writing. Only specific information is to be recorded by the empowered officer. It was observed: “As regards violation of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, it was contended that PSI, L.U. Pandey had received previous information before going for the search, but he had not recorded this information anywhere, and he had also not informed his superior officers about the proposed seizure. In the present case, the officer who conducted the search was examined as PW-2. What he stated in the evidence was that the D.I.G. had instructed him that intoxicant materials were being transported illegally from the States of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, and the vehicles had been passing through Banaskantha district. This was only general information given by the D.I.G. to PW-2, and such information is not bound to be recorded as a source of information as contemplated under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. Section 42 of the NDPS Act provides that specific information alone needs to be recorded by the officer empowered to conduct a search. Here, PW-2 and the members of the patrol team were doing the usual patrol duty, and they incidentally came across the tanker lorry in question and, on search, recovered the contraband substance from the vehicle. Section 42 of the NDPS Act provides that specific information alone needs to be recorded by the officer empowered to conduct a search. Here, PW-2 and the members of the patrol team were doing the usual patrol duty, and they incidentally came across the tanker lorry in question and, on search, recovered the contraband substance from the vehicle. We do not think that there is any violation of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. 5. The counsel for the appellant further contended that the search was conducted at 5.30 A.M., that is, before sunrise, and the PSI should have obtained a warrant or authorisation for conducting the search of the vehicle. This plea also is without any merit. The contraband substance, namely opium, was recovered from the tanker when the usual search of suspected vehicles carrying such contraband was being conducted by the police officials. The police party had no previous information that any contraband substance was being concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed space, and they had to conduct a search pursuant to such information. Then, only they would require a warrant or authorisation as contemplated under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. If it is a chance recovery, the procedure contemplated under Section 42 cannot be complied with, and the evidence of PW-2 would clearly show that it was a chance recovery.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. Similarly, it was held in Subhas Chandra Jana Versus Ajibar Mirdha 2011 Cri. L.J. 257 that section 42 is applicable only when the police have specific information. When the police had received secret information, which was not specific but vague or non-provable information, there was no requirement to reduce it to writing. It was observed: “The compliance of Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act, 1985 is mandatory. From the facts of the present case, it is very clear that the NCB Officers raided the house of the accused, receiving prior information. But, as per the above- mentioned section, Officers receiving prior information should reduce the same in writing and also record the reasons for the belief. According to the Prosecution, they did not go on the basis of any information but only to work out an intelligence, whereas PW 2, during cross-examination, said that they raided on the basis of secret information. So, according to the defence, non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 42(1) vitiated the trial. According to the Prosecution, they did not go on the basis of any information but only to work out an intelligence, whereas PW 2, during cross-examination, said that they raided on the basis of secret information. So, according to the defence, non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 42(1) vitiated the trial. In the case, Babulal v. State, 1995 Cri LJ 4105 Bombay High Court observed that no vague information is required to be reduced to writing. Thus, where the information received by the Police Officer was that some persons had arrived at a particular place with a large quantity of brown sugar and they were in search of customers, the information so received was not specific, which required the police to reduce it to writing. This was not information as contemplated under Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985. This view was approved by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, 1994 Cal CLR (SC) 121 : (AIR 1994 SC 1872: 1994 Cri LJ 3702) . Paragraph 22 of the said decision is quoted below:— "We have also already noted that the searches under the NDPS Act by virtue of Section 51 have to be carried under the provisions of Cr. P. C., particularly Sections 100 and 165. The irregularities, if any, committed, like independent witnesses not being associated or the witnesses not from the locality while carrying out the searches, etc., under sections 100 and 165, Cr. P. C. would not, as discussed above, vitiate the trial. But a question may still arise: when an empowered officer acting under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act carries out a search under Section 165, Cr. P. C., without recording the grounds of his belief as provided under Section 165, whether such failure also would vitiate the trial, particularly in view of the fact that such a search is connected with offences under the NDPS Act. Neither Section 41(2) nor Section 42( 1) mandates such empowered officers to record the grounds of their beliefs. It is the only proviso to Section 42 (1) read with Section 42(2), which makes it obligatory to record grounds for his belief. To that extent, we have already held the provisions being mandatory. Neither Section 41(2) nor Section 42( 1) mandates such empowered officers to record the grounds of their beliefs. It is the only proviso to Section 42 (1) read with Section 42(2), which makes it obligatory to record grounds for his belief. To that extent, we have already held the provisions being mandatory. A fortiori, the empowered officer, though is expected to record reasons of belief as required under Section 165, failure to do so cannot vitiate the trial, particularly when Section 41 or 42 do not mandate to record reasons while making a search. Section 165 in the context has to be read along with Sections 41(2) and 42(1) whereunder he is not required to record his reasons." In the present case, the NCB officials raided the house of the accused not on any specific information but on vague, uncertain and probable information. The term "Secret" nowhere indicates that the information was reliable. So, on the basis of the above-mentioned judgment, there was no requirement to reduce it to writing as there was no formal or definite complaint as such. Assuming that the NCB Officials had definite information about the Accused, then also the trial cannot be vitiated on this ground. The Apex Court in H. N. Rishbud v. State of Del. AIR 1955 SC 196 : (1955 Cri LJ 526) held that a defect or illegality in the investigation, however serious, has no bearing on the competence of the procedure relating to cognisance or trial. Drug trafficking is equally, if not more, dangerous, as it allures and has allured, a generation of young Indians from Manipur to Gujarat, from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari who is crippled by these drugs and psychotropic substances, whose senses are atrophied, to whom illusion has become a reality, who are beating their marches slowly and painfully Farid Ali v. State, 1994 Cal Cr LR 189 . In the present case, the accused himself voluntarily made a confessional statement stating that he dealt with Heroin for the livelihood of his family. So, after the voluntary admission by the Accused, there remains no scope to acquit the accused on the grounds of mere irregularity of procedural compliance by the prosecution in the interest of justice. It was held in the case In Re: Md. So, after the voluntary admission by the Accused, there remains no scope to acquit the accused on the grounds of mere irregularity of procedural compliance by the prosecution in the interest of justice. It was held in the case In Re: Md. Farid Ali v. State (1994 Cal Cri LR 189) that Recovery of Narcotics from an accused cannot impede the course of justice merely on the ground of procedural lapses when the contraband goods on ultimate analysis are found to be Narcotic by the expert. It, therefore, excludes the plea of technicality, which cannot make any triumph over social legislation.” 23. There is no evidence that police had any prior information and it was rightly submitted on behalf of the prosecution that it was a case of chance recovery. The term chance recovery was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Sunil Kumar, (2014) 4 SCC 780 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 449: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 205 and it was held that chance recovery means a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. When the police were not looking for the drugs nor expected to find the drugs, any recovery is a chance recovery. A positive suspicion of the police official is not sufficient to show that it was not the case of chance recovery. It was observed at page 784: “13. The expression “chance recovery” has not been defined anywhere and its plain and simple meaning seems to be a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. In Mohinder Kumar v. State [ (1998) 8 SCC 655 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 79] this Court considered a chance recovery as one when a police officer “stumbles on” narcotic drugs when he makes a search. In Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 13 SCC 608 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 508] the police officer, while searching for illicit liquor, accidentally found some charas. This was treated as a “chance recovery”. 14. Applying this to the facts of the present appeal, it is clear that the police officers were looking for passengers who were travelling ticketless and nothing more. They accidentally or unexpectedly came across drugs carried by a passenger. This can only be described as a recovery by chance since they were neither looking for drugs nor expecting to find drugs carried by anybody. 15. They accidentally or unexpectedly came across drugs carried by a passenger. This can only be described as a recovery by chance since they were neither looking for drugs nor expecting to find drugs carried by anybody. 15. It is not possible to accept the view of the High Court that since the police officers conducted a random search and had a “positive suspicion” that Sunil Kumar was carrying contraband, the recovery of charas from his person was not a chance recovery. The recovery of contraband may not have been unexpected, but the recovery of charas certainly was unexpected notwithstanding the submission that drugs are easily available in the Chamba area. The police officers had no reason to believe that Sunil Kumar was carrying any drugs and indeed that is also not the case set up in this appeal. It was plainly a chance or accidental or unexpected recovery of charas—Sunil Kumar could well have been carrying any other contraband such as, smuggled gold, stolen property or an illegal firearm or even some other drug. 24. It was held that positive suspicion entertained by the police officer cannot be equated with prior information. It was observed: 19. Similarly, the positive suspicion entertained by the police officers cannot be equated with prior information. [ Bharatbhai Bhagwanjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 8 SCC 327: 2003 SCC (Cri) 4] The procedure to be followed when there is prior information of the carrying of contraband drugs is laid down in the Act and it is nobody's case that that procedure was followed, let alone contemplated. 20. We are not in agreement with the view of the High Court that since the police officers had a positive suspicion that Sunil Kumar was carrying some contraband, therefore, it could be said or assumed that they had reason to believe or prior information that he was carrying charas or some other narcotic substance and so, before his personal or body search was conducted, the provisions of Section 50 of the Act ought to have been complied with. The recovery of charas on the body or personal search of Sunil Kumar was clearly a chance recovery and, in view of Baldev Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 ], the police officer to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. 25. The recovery of charas on the body or personal search of Sunil Kumar was clearly a chance recovery and, in view of Baldev Singh [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080 ], the police officer to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. 25. In the present case also, the police stopped the vehicle of the accused and decided to search it when they found that the accused were perplexed. Therefore, it was a case of chance recovery and there was no reasonable belief and the provisions of Section 42 of ND&PS Act do not apply to the present case. 26. It was submitted that the police had not associated independent witnesses and this is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed: “3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence recorded by the prosecution as also the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. It has come in the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared would not have lent any further credence to the prosecution version.” 27. In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this Court in Chet Ram Vs State Criminal Appeal no. 151/2006 decided on 25.7.2018 that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed: - “(A) appellant was intercepted and search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. 151/2006 decided on 25.7.2018 that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed: - “(A) appellant was intercepted and search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any prior information nor did they have any reason to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched and charas was recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any need to associate any person from the nearby village, because there remained nothing to be witnessed. It is by now well settled that non-association of independent witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version, by independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself is not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinizing the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage, unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed a page 566: “(C) Need for independent witnesses 19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed a page 566: “(C) Need for independent witnesses 19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. [ Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC 201 , para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction.” 29. This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein, it was observed at page 633: “12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses. As observed and held by this Court in catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420] ]. 13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] , while considering somewhat similar submission of non-examination of independent witnesses, while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under : (SCC p. 568) “15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191] , relied on by the counsel for the respondent State also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness, would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. 16. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness, would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. 16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] , it was held as under : (SCC p. 655) ‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.’” 30. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh & Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684 , wherein it was held: - “3. (iii) Learned defence counsel, contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer, therefore, the prosecution case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon titled Krishan Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531 3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.” 31. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223 , wherein it was held at page 204: - “17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent witnesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the accused was found suspicious and a chance recovery from the vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of the courts do not call for interference..” 32. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825 wherein one of us (Tarlok Singh Chauhan J) observed: 16. As regards non-association of the independent witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the independent witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a ground for acquittal of Appellants/accused. It is also well settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses, including police officials carry the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage, unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be material and not trivial one, that alone would assume significance. 17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery, therefore, the police party was under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. Xxxx 19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345 , wherein it was observed as under: — “24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The fact situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at some distance, who got perplexed and started walking back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been apprehended immediately, police could have lost the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of independent witnesses could be there, when such witnesses were immediately available or had already been associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not mandatory conditions and will always depend on the fact situation of each and every case. The reason is that once the person is apprehended and is with police, a subsequent association of independent witnesses, may not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.” Xxxx 22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024 .” 33. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal and the prosecution case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses. However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinize the testimonies of the police officials. 34. It was submitted that there is a major contradiction in the statements of the official witnesses. LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) stated that six packets wrapped in a Khaki Cello Tape were recovered. He did not mention the recovery of the black bag which was asserted by SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) and SI Mahesh Kumar (PW13). This is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. In the present case, the recovery was effected on 08.05.2010. LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) made a statement on 11.04.2013 after the lapse of nearly three years from the date of recovery. The people forget the details with time and the witnesses cannot be expected to behave like a video recorder, who will reproduce the incident in exact detail. 35. In the present case, the recovery was effected on 08.05.2010. LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) made a statement on 11.04.2013 after the lapse of nearly three years from the date of recovery. The people forget the details with time and the witnesses cannot be expected to behave like a video recorder, who will reproduce the incident in exact detail. 35. The principles of appreciation of ocular evidence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 , as under at page 378: - Appreciation of oral evidence “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujara t [Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujara t, (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728: AIR 1983 SC 753 ], Leela Ram v. State of Haryana [Leela Ramv. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 222: AIR 1999 SC 3717 ] and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17: AIR 1959 SC 1012 ]] 36. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “ 38. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “ 38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202] , this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 961] . 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777] .” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the scufÒing and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] , this Court held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 37. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed:- “ [17] It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed with guns and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary &Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 38. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. The Court has to see whether the discrepancies affect the prosecution case adversely or not and whether they are related to the core of the prosecution case or the details. 39. The failure to mention the bag by LHC Tarsem Lal (PW12) will not be fatal because not only the recovery of the bag was mentioned by SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) and Inspector Mahesh Kumar (PW13), but the bag was also mentioned in the recovery memo (Ext.PW11/A) and the rukka (Ext.PW7/A). When the case property was produced before the Court during the examination of SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11), a bag (Ext.P10) was found in the parcel. Therefore, the recovery of the bag is proved by two witnesses, contemporaneous documents and the production of the bag before the Court and cannot be doubted. 40. When the case property was produced before the Court during the examination of SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11), a bag (Ext.P10) was found in the parcel. Therefore, the recovery of the bag is proved by two witnesses, contemporaneous documents and the production of the bag before the Court and cannot be doubted. 40. It was submitted that the result of analysis (Ext.PX) does not mention the bag and this makes the prosecution case regarding the recovery of the bag highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The report of the analysis does not mention the contents of the parcel when it was opened by the chemical analyst but only mentions the description of the parcel. Therefore, the failure to mention the bag by the chemical analyst will not be material in the present case. 41. It was submitted that rukka (Ext.PW7/A) mentions that accused Pardeep Kumar revealed that he had purchased the vehicle but had not got the documents transferred in his name. This version was changed in the Court and SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) stated that the person sitting in the front seat disclosed that the vehicle in question was purchased by the driver (accused Anuj Kumar) but the documents of the vehicle were not transferred in his name. This is contrary to the prosecution case and the statement of this witness recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. This submission will not help the defence. The attention of SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) was not drawn to his previous statement, wherein it was mentioned that accused Pardeep Kumar had revealed that he had purchased the vehicle. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the attention of the witness should be drawn to the previous statement with which, he is sought to be contradicted. The previous statement is also required to be proved as per the law. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Binay Kumar Singh Versus State of Bihar, 1997 (1) SCC 283 , that if it is intended to contradict a witness, his attention must be drawn towards the previous statement. It was observed: - “11. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his evidence in Court. It was observed: - “11. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his evidence in Court. This principle is delineated in S. 155 (3) of the Evidence Act and it must be borne in mind when reading S. 145 which consists of two limbs. It is provided in the first limb of S.145 that a witness may be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him without such writing being shown to him but the second limb provides that "if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must before the writing can be provided, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him." There is thus a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the previous statements made by him. He may at that stage succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such cross-examination even without resorting to the procedure laid down in the second limb. But if the witness disowns having made any statement which is inconsistent with his present stand his testimony in Court on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-examiner proceeds to comply with the procedure prescribed in the second limb of S. 145. 12. In Bhagwan Singh's case ( AIR 1952 SC 214 ) , Vivian Bose, J. pointed out in paragraph 25 that during the cross- examination of the witnesses concerned the formalities prescribed by S. 145 are complied with. The cross- examination, in that case, indicated that every circumstance intended to be used as a contradiction was put to him point by point and passage by passage. Learned Judges were called upon to deal with an argument that witnesses' attention should have been specifically drawn to that passage in addition thereto. Their Lordships were, however, satisfied in that case that the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance with S. 145, and hence held that all that is required is that the witness must be treated fairly and must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. Their Lordships were, however, satisfied in that case that the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance with S. 145, and hence held that all that is required is that the witness must be treated fairly and must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. On the facts of that case, there is no dispute with the proposition laid therein. 13. So long as the attention of PW 32 (Sukhdev Bhagat) was not drawn to the statement attributed to him as recorded by DW-10 (Nawal Kishore Prasad) we are not persuaded to reject the evidence of PW-32 that he gave Ex. 14 statement at the venue of occurrence and that he had not given any other statement earlier thereto.” 42. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760 wherein it was observed: “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub- Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing .—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross- examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved the contradictions can be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act of confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness. 9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “ 155. Impeaching credit of witness. — The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him— (1) ….…………………………………… (2) ……………………………………… (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.” It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each individual case. 10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P . 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875 Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus: “13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradict him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812 ]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act thus at p. 819: Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross- examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross- examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “Yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “Yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross- examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has yet not made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually made before him. In such a case the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.” 43. It was held in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757 that the Courts cannot suo motu take cognizance of the contradiction and the same has to be brought on record as per the law. It was observed: “64. It was held in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757 that the Courts cannot suo motu take cognizance of the contradiction and the same has to be brought on record as per the law. It was observed: “64. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved and ask questions with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The words ‘if duly proved’ used in Section 162 Cr. P.C. clearly show that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway, nor can be looked into, but they must be duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness during cross-examination and also during the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer. The statement before the Investigating Officer can be used for contradiction but only after strict compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction. 65. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as under: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing. — A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 66. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The attention of the witness is drawn to that part and this must be reflected in his cross-examination by reproducing it. The attention of the witness is drawn to that part and this must be reflected in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no need for further proof of contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process, the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter, when the Investigating Officer is examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of contradiction, it will then be proved in the deposition of the Investigating Officer who, again, by referring to the police statement will depose about the witness having made that statement. The process again involves referring to the police statement and culling out the part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.” [See: V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand : ( (2015) 9 SCC 588 ] 44. In the present case, the defence has not complied with the requirements of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act and the testimony of Mukesh Kumar (PW11) cannot be discarded due to previous inconsistent statement. 45. The learned Trial Court held that the presence of three persons in the vehicle was highly doubtful because the prosecution version regarding the sale of the vehicle to accused Pardeep Kumar was not established by examining the original owner. This finding cannot be sustained; first, it overlooks the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C in which they admitted that they have travelled in the vehicle being driven by accused Anuj Kumar to Manali. Hence the fact that accused Pardeep Kumar and Pradeep Saini were traveling with accused Anuj was never in dispute. Secondly, the Court is concerned with the possession of the contraband and the ownership of the vehicle in which the contraband is being transported is immaterial. Hence the fact that accused Pardeep Kumar and Pradeep Saini were traveling with accused Anuj was never in dispute. Secondly, the Court is concerned with the possession of the contraband and the ownership of the vehicle in which the contraband is being transported is immaterial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730 that the prosecution is not required to prove the ownership of the vehicle in which the narcotics are being transported. It was observed at page 635: “17. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that the ownership of the motorcycle (vehicle) has not been established and proved and/or that the vehicle has not been recovered is concerned, it is required to be noted that in the present case, the appellant and the other accused persons were found on the spot with the contraband articles in the vehicle. To prove the case under the NDPS Act, the ownership of the vehicle is not required to be established and proved. It is enough to establish and prove that the contraband articles were found from the accused in the vehicle purchased by the accused. Ownership of the vehicle is immaterial. What is required to be established and proved is the recovery of the contraband articles and the commission of an offence under the NDPS Act. Therefore, merely because the ownership of the vehicle is not established and proved and/or the vehicle is not recovered subsequently, the trial is not vitiated, while the prosecution has been successful in proving and establishing the recovery of the contraband articles from the accused on the spot.” 46. Hence the prosecution case could not have been discarded due to the failure to interrogate the owner of the vehicle. 47. It was submitted that SI Mukesh Kumar (PW11) had not produced the seal before the Court and this is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal before the Court. It was observed at page 4614: “62. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal before the Court. It was observed at page 4614: “62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re-sealing the bulk case property and the samples have not been produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh's case((2001 (2) Cri LJ (CCR) 74) (supra) while dealing with the effect of non-production of the seal, this Court held as under: “In the absence of any mandatory provision in the law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case property, that the seal used in sealing the case property must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether by non-production of the seal at the trial any doubt is raised about the safe custody of the case property or not.” 63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion we have already arrived at hereinabove that there is unchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case property was not tampered with at any stage, the non- production of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the accused.” 48. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed:- “6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At 3.05 P.M. PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness, Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. Each were taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seal ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the two specimen seal impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the seals were found tampered with in any manner.” 49. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the conclusion of the Trial Court that seals were produced before the Court was perverse. 50. In the present case, the seal impression was obtained on the NCB-1 Form and it was produced before the Court. The Court had NCB-1 Form to compare the seal and determine whether the seals were intact or tampered with. Hence the failure to produce the seal in the Court will not affect the prosecution case. 51. The learned Trial Court held that there is no evidence that sample seals were sent to the SFSL and SFSL had nothing to compare the seal impression on the parcel. The learned Trial Court overlooked the fact that as per the result of analysis (Ext. PX), the seals were tallied with the specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority on the NCB-1 Form. NCB-1 Form (Ext.PW5/G) bears the seal impression ‘A’ and ‘T'. It also bears the signatures of the Assistant Chemical Examiner which shows that this Form was in fact received by the Assistant Chemical Examiner. Since the seal impression were visible on the NCB-1 Form, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the chemical analyst did not have the seal impression for comparison is incorrect. 52. The learned Trial Court held that it is highly unlikely that the accused would transport the charas in the dickey which could be opened by just pushing it. This finding is not sustainable. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the accused told them that the dickey was defective which shows that an attempt was made to mislead the police. 52. The learned Trial Court held that it is highly unlikely that the accused would transport the charas in the dickey which could be opened by just pushing it. This finding is not sustainable. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the accused told them that the dickey was defective which shows that an attempt was made to mislead the police. The police did not believe this statement and pushed the dickey which opened. The charas was not lying exposed in the dickey but was concealed beneath the mat with the help of the screws. Hence, the charas was not being transported in a manner in which it could have been found by any person. 53. The statements of the official witnesses are consistent and there is nothing in their cross-examinations to show that they were making a false statement. The accused have also not stated in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C that police had any motive to falsely implicate them. They simply stated that police implicated them because recovery was effected from accused Anuj Kumar. However, no reason was given as to why the police would do so. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC 646 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored because they are police officials. It was observed at page 656: “21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that recovery has not been proved by any independent witness is of no substance for the reason that in the absence of an independent witness to support the recovery in substance cannot be ignored unless proved to the contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the evidence of police officials, unless supported by an independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or the evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.” 54. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had erred in discarding the testimonies of the police officials. 55. The integrity of the case property has also been established. The report of the analysis shows that the seals were found intact and were compared by the chemical analyst with the seals sent with NCB-1 Form. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had erred in discarding the testimonies of the police officials. 55. The integrity of the case property has also been established. The report of the analysis shows that the seals were found intact and were compared by the chemical analyst with the seals sent with NCB-1 Form. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal separately sent tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 56. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557 , wherein it was held: “It has also come on evidence that till the date the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 57. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402 , the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 58. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held:- “10. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 58. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held:- “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3) handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj SHO handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 59. Therefore, the prosecution version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at SFSL, Junga. 60. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 59. Therefore, the prosecution version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at SFSL, Junga. 60. The learned Trial Court held that the report of the analysis did not establish the presence of cannabinoids including tetrahydrocannabinol. Hence, the substance analyzed could not be said to be charas. This finding is not sustainable. It was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in State of H.P. v. Mehboon Khan, 2013 SCC OnLine HP 4080: 2014 Cri LJ 705: (2014) 2 RCR (Cri) 447: (2014) 2 Latest HLJ 900 that it is not essential to mention in the report of the analysis that the sample contained tetrahydrocannabinol to prove that it was charas. It was observed at page 478: 55. This takes us to the Reports in Sunil's case and its connected Appeals reproduced supra. The Reports on the face of it amply demonstrate that the Chemical Examiners- Shri R.S. Verma & Shri A.K. Wasuja, who have analyzed the samples of Charas in all the cases, have made specific mention to various tests they conducted in order to arrive at a conclusion that the samples they analyzed were that of Charas. The Experts, therefore, were well within the legal norms while certifying the samples they analyzed to be that of Charas. Our Opinion: (a) After taking into consideration Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 45 & 46 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Law laid down by the apex Court as well as various High Courts discussed in detail hereinabove, we conclude that on account of non- consideration of the same by the Division Bench, which has rendered the Judgment in Sunil's case, correct law on the Expert Opinion and the Reports assigned by the Scientific Expert after analyzing the exhibit has not been laid down. (b) We further conclude that on account of non- consideration of various Reports of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime including the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 and to the contrary placing reliance on the text books, which basically are on Medical jurisprudence, the Division Bench in Sunil's case failed to assign correct meaning to ‘Charas’ and ‘Cannabis resin’, the necessary constituents of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. (c) In view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, the Division Bench while deciding Sunil's case supra has definitely erred in taking note of the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol in three forms of Cannabis i.e. Bhang, Ganja and Charas and hence, concluded erroneously that without there being no reference of the resin contents in the Reports assigned by the Chemical Examiners in those cases, the contraband recovered is not proved to be Charas, as in our opinion, the Charas is a resinous mass and the presence of resin in the stuff analyzed without there being any evidence qua the nature of the neutral substance, the entire mass has to be taken as Charas. (d) There is no legal requirement of the presence of particular percentage of resin to be there in the sample and the presence of the resin in purified or crude form is sufficient to hold that the sample is that of Charas. The law laid down by the Division Bench in Sunil's case that ‘for want of percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol or resin contents in the samples analyzed, the possibility of the stuff recovered from the Accused persons being only Bhang i.e. the dried leaves of Cannabis plant, possession of which is not an offence, cannot be ruled out’, is not a good nor any such interpretation is legally possible. The percentage of resin contents in the stuff analyzed is not a determinative factor of small quantity, above smaller quantity and less than commercial quantity and the commercial quantity. Rather, if in the entire stuff recovered from the Accused, the resin of Cannabis is found present on analysis, the whole of the stuff is to be taken to determine the quantity i.e. smaller, above smaller but less than commercial and commercial, in terms of the Notification below Section 2 (vii a) & (xxiii a) of the Act. (e) We have discussed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 in detail hereinabove and noted that resin becomes Cannabis resin only when it is separated from the plant. The separated resin is Cannabis resin not only when it is in ‘purified’ form, but also when in ‘crude’ form or still mixed with other parts of the plant. (e) We have discussed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 in detail hereinabove and noted that resin becomes Cannabis resin only when it is separated from the plant. The separated resin is Cannabis resin not only when it is in ‘purified’ form, but also when in ‘crude’ form or still mixed with other parts of the plant. Therefore, the resin mixed with other parts of the plant i.e. in ‘crude’ form is also Charas within the meaning of the Convention and the Legislature in its wisdom has never intended to exclude the weight of the mixture i.e. other parts of the plant in the resin unless or until such mixture proves to be some other neutral substance and not that of other parts of the Cannabis plant. Once the Expert expressed the opinion that after conducting the required tests, he found the resin present in the stuff and as Charas is a resinous mass and after conducting tests if in the opinion of the Expert, the entire mass is a sample of Charas, no fault can be found with the opinion so expressed by the Expert nor would it be appropriate to embark upon the admissibility of the Report on any ground, including non-mentioning of the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol or resin contents in the sample. (f) We are also not in agreement with the findings recorded by the Division Bench in Sunil's case that “the mere presence of tetrahydrocannabinol and cystolithic hair without there being any mention of the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol in a sample of Charas is not an indicator of the entire stuff analyzed to be Charas” for the reason that the statute does not insist for the presence of percentage in the stuff of Charas and the mere presence of tetrahydrocannabinol along with cystolithic hair in sample stuff is an indicator of the same being the resin of Cannabis plant because the cystolithic hair are present only in the Cannabis plant. When after observing the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol and cystolithic hair, the Expert arrives at a conclusion that the sample contains the resin contents, it is more than sufficient to hold that the sample is of Charas and the view so expressed by the Expert normally should be honoured and not called into question. Of course, neutral material which is not obtained from Cannabis plant cannot be treated as the resin of the Cannabis plants. Of course, neutral material which is not obtained from Cannabis plant cannot be treated as the resin of the Cannabis plants. The resin rather must have been obtained from the Cannabis plants and may be in ‘crude’ form or ‘purified’ form. In common parlance, Charas is a handmade drug made from the extract of the Cannabis plant. Therefore, any mixture with or without any neutral material of any of the forms of Cannabis is to be considered as a contraband article. No concentration and percentage of resin is prescribed for ‘Charas’ under the Act. (g) We further hold that in any case the Judgment in Sunil's case is a Judgment in personam and not a Judgment in rem and as such its universal application in later Judgments rendered by this Court and also by the Trial Courts, without appreciation of the given facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence available on record, was not legally permissible.” 61. Thus, the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the substance was not proved to be charas. 62. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the police had intercepted a vehicle in which accused Pardeep Kumar and accused Pradeep Saini were travelling and from which 1.88 kgs of charas was recovered. The accused were travelling together and would be in possession of the charas. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [ (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52 ] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [ (1972) 2 SCC 194 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756 ], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. 27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.” 63. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 that a person is in possession if he is in a position to exercise control over the article. It was observed on page 111: “25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn. The respondent has been accused of an offence under Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under Sections 21, 27-A, 29, 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664 ] this Court held that: (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 & 26) “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038 ] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniform[ly] applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. *** 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.” 26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab [Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431 ], where it was held that the knowledge of possession of contraband has to be gleaned from the facts and circumstances of a case. The standard of conscious possession would be different in the case of a public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to a private vehicle with a few persons known to one another. The standard of conscious possession would be different in the case of a public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to a private vehicle with a few persons known to one another. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 881] , this Court also observed that the term “possession” could mean physical possession with animus; custody over the prohibited substances with animus; exercise of dominion and control as a result of concealment; or personal knowledge as to the existence of the contraband and the intention based on this knowledge.” 64. In the present case, both accused Pradeep Saini and Pradeep Kumar did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption, and they are liable for the conscious possession of 1.88 kgs of charas. 65. The judgments in State of H.P. versus Rajesh Kumar @ Raju 2024:HHC:12713 and State of H.P. versus Raj Kumar @ Raju 2024:HHC:13853 will not help the accused because in Rajesh Kumar @ Raju (supra) the Court had found material contradictions which made the prosecution case doubtful. In the present case, no major contradiction has been found. In Raj Kumar @ Raju (supra) a third option was given and was held to be fatal. In the present case, the recovery was not effected by the personal search and it was a chance recovery. Hence, there was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the ND&PS Act. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgments. 66. The learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused based upon the reasoning which could not have been adopted by any reasonable person. The reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court were untenable and are not supported by the material on record. Therefore, an interference is required with the judgment of the learned Trial Court acquitting both the accused, Pradeep Saini and Pradeep Kumar. 67. Further, the case of the prosecution is that accused Anuj made a disclosure statement and got recovered an electronic weighing scale with which accused Raman had weighed the charas and delivered it to Anuj. Therefore, an interference is required with the judgment of the learned Trial Court acquitting both the accused, Pradeep Saini and Pradeep Kumar. 67. Further, the case of the prosecution is that accused Anuj made a disclosure statement and got recovered an electronic weighing scale with which accused Raman had weighed the charas and delivered it to Anuj. It was laid down in Surendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1991 SCC OnLine Pat 179: (1992) 1 PLJR 647 : (1992) 40 (2) BLJR 978: 1992 Cri LJ 2190: (1993) 1 DMC 200 that the conviction cannot be recorded based on the statement of the co-accused alone. It was observed at page 650: 14. As regards the statement of Ragho Mahto leading to the recovery of the dead body of the deceased is concerned, the Calcutta High Court in the case of Satish Chandra Seal v. Emperor reported in A.I.R. (42) 1945 Cal. 137 has held that the statements admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act are not admissible against a person other than the maker of the statement. It is thus evident that the statement made by Ragho Mahto leading to the recovery of the dead body cannot be used against the appellant. 68. A similar view was taken in Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984: AIR 2023 SC 3857 wherein it was observed: 23. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements under Section 27 of, the Evidence Act made by the accused himself seems to be well-established. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; AIR 1947 PC 67 holds the field even today wherein it was held that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered fact, including details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the accused person's awareness of these aspects. The Privy Council observed: The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. The Privy Council observed: The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of an object, constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in the manner allowed by law. 24. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements of co-accused too is settled; the courts have hesitated to place reliance solely on disclosure statements of co-accused and used them merely to support the conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed in Emperor v.Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559, page 588 , to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused”. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184 , this Court, speaking through the Constitution Bench, elaborated upon the approach to be adopted by courts when dealing with disclosure statements: 13. …In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. 25. In yet another case of discrediting a flawed conviction under Section 411, IPC, this Court, in Shiv Kumar v.State of Madhya Pradesh (2022) 9 SCC 676 overturned the conviction under Section 411, declined to place undue reliance solely on the disclosure statements of the co-accused, and held: 24. …, the disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods. The prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the appellant to believe that the utensils seized from him were stolen articles. …, the disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods. The prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the appellant to believe that the utensils seized from him were stolen articles. The factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles. The essential ingredient of mens rea is clearly not established for the charge under Section 411 IPC. The prosecution's evidence on this aspect, as they would speak of the character Gratiano in Merchant of Venice, can be appropriately described as “you speak an infinite deal of nothing.” [William Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act 1 Scene 1.] 69. Further, in the present case the statement made by accused Anuj Kumar that the electronic weighing scale was the one with which accused Raman Kumar had weighed the charas does not lead to the discovery of any fact and is inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabhoo v. State of U.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 383: (1963) 2 SCR 881 : AIR 1963 SC 1113 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 182 that a statement under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act cannot be used to connect the blood-stained clothes to the accused. It was observed: “9… ..We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the bloodstained shirt and dhoti were his. If these statements are excluded, and we think that they must be excluded, then the only evidence which remains is that the appellant produced from the house a bloodstained axe and some bloodstained clothes. The prosecution gave no evidence to establish whether the axe belonged to the appellant or the bloodstained clothes were his.” 70. This judgment was followed by this Court in Harbans Lal v. State, 1965 SCC OnLine HP 21: AIR 1967 HP 10 : 1967 Cri LJ 62 at it was held at page 13: “15… As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge, there is no evidence that any of the shirts discovered belonged to the appellant. This judgment was followed by this Court in Harbans Lal v. State, 1965 SCC OnLine HP 21: AIR 1967 HP 10 : 1967 Cri LJ 62 at it was held at page 13: “15… As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge, there is no evidence that any of the shirts discovered belonged to the appellant. Mirchu Ram had no doubt, stated in Ex. PH, that one of the shirts belonged to the appellant. But that statement was not admissible in evidence as it did not relate distinctly to the discovery of the shirts within the meaning of section 27, Evidence Act. It was held, in Prabhoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1113 , that a statement made by an accused that the blood-stained shirt and dhoti were his was not admissible in evidence under section 27 Evidence Act. The discovery of the shirts Exs. P. 16 and P. 16, all the instances of Mirchu Ram, could not be used to corroborate the confessional statement Ex. P.W. 12/C.” 71. The prosecution has also relied upon the recovery of the pistol. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 4 SCC 726 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1324 that when the weapon was not tested by the expert, the conviction under Section 25 of the Act cannot be sustained. It was observed at page 726: “2. The only short question which we are required to consider is whether the mere finding of an article described as pistol and cartridges is sufficient to bring home the charge under Section 5 of the Act. That provision states: “5. Possession of certain unauthorised arms, etc., in specified areas.— Where any person is in possession of any arms and ammunition specified in Columns 2 and 3 of Category I or Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, or bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances unauthorisedly in a notified area, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” 3. Revolvers and pistols fall within Category III(a) of Schedule I Arms Rules, 1962. Revolvers and pistols fall within Category III(a) of Schedule I Arms Rules, 1962. However, the prosecution has to establish that the article found from the possession of the appellant is of that description and that the cartridges were in fact live cartridges. Any article with a resemblance of a revolver or a pistol cannot attract the provision. What is necessary is to also show that that revolver or pistol was in fact a lethal weapon in the sense that it was in working order and was not a toy gun or the like. For that it was necessary for the prosecution to lead some evidence and not merely go by the description that the weapon was a .12 bore pistol. The prosecution witnesses were all police personnel who would ordinarily be able to identify a .12 bore pistol but in addition thereto there must also be evidence to show that the weapon was in working order. If there was evidence led by the prosecution to show that these witnesses had tested the weapon, it would have been a different matter. Even in the absence of the evidence of a ballistic expert which would be the most appropriate evidence in such cases, we do not find any evidence on record to show that the prosecution witnesses had tested the weapon and found it to be in working order. The same is the case with the cartridges in question. In the circumstances, we are afraid that the prosecution cannot be said to have brought home the guilt or satisfied the strict test required in such cases for convicting the accused.” 72. A similar view was taken in Buta Singh v. State of Punjab, 1997 SCC (Cri) 1217 wherein it was observed at page 1218: “4. We need not detain ourselves to consider the statements of PW 1 and PW 2, the recovery witnesses, as we find that the prosecution case suffers from a serious infirmity in this case. The objects allegedly seized from the appellant were not sent for any expert opinion either to the ballistic expert or to any armourer. There is no evidence on the record to show that the objects recovered from the appellant satisfied the definition of “arm” and “ammunition” or “firearm” as contained in the Arms Act. In the absence of any such evidence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. There is no evidence on the record to show that the objects recovered from the appellant satisfied the definition of “arm” and “ammunition” or “firearm” as contained in the Arms Act. In the absence of any such evidence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside and he is hereby acquitted.” 73. This position was reiterated in Manoj Kumar Achhelal Brahman v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 2 SCC 354 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 636 wherein it was observed at page 354: “2. The prosecution case in short is that a theft had taken place in Village Kakaduva on 13-6-1988. When the owner of the house and other villagers were in search of the miscreants responsible for such theft, they spotted five persons present near a tea stall and they suspected their involvement in the case of theft. The matter was reported to the local police and on being searched from the possession of one of the persons, two sarees alleged to be stolen and a country-made pistol and some live cartridges were recovered. The appellant and the other accused were, therefore, tried for an offence under Section 3 and Section 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as TADA) and also under Section 25(1)(b)(a) of the Arms Act. The learned Designated Court, however, acquitted the co-accused because nothing was recovered from his possession but considering the evidences adduced in the case, the appellant was convicted for the offence under Sections 3 and 5 of TADA and Section 25 of the Arms Act. In the instant case, there are independent witnesses who have deposed that from the possession of the appellant, an object appearing to be a revolver and live cartridges had been recovered. Such depositions, therefore, appear to be trustworthy and do not deserve to be discarded. But, unfortunately, nobody including the police personnel who had seized the said revolver had deposed that the police officer had himself tested the said weapon and found it to be a pistol in working condition. The learned Designated Court in this case has rightly indicated that it is not always necessary to refer the weapon to the ballistic expert for his opinion. The learned Designated Court in this case has rightly indicated that it is not always necessary to refer the weapon to the ballistic expert for his opinion. In our view, the police personnel who everyday deal with rifles and pistols will be competent to tell whether the weapon in question was in working condition or not provided he tests the same. But unfortunately, that part of the deposition is missing in this case. It will, therefore, not be safe to proceed on the footing that the weapon alleged to have been recovered from the possession of the appellant was really an arm for which either under the Arms Act or under TADA conviction was warranted. We, therefore, allow this appeal by giving the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and set aside his conviction and sentence. The appellant has been released on bail during the pendency of the appeal. His bail bonds will stand discharged. 74. Similar is the judgment in State of A.P. v. S. Appa Rao, (2001) 10 SCC 648: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1037: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1624 wherein it was held at page 650: 6. Regarding A-28 Shafath Ali Khan the evidence is that a PW 65 police officer recovered an 1895 model rifle (MO 357) from the possession of A-28. It is unnecessary for us to delve into the evidence relating to the said recovery, for it is admitted that nobody had tested to know whether it was a toy rifle or an actual one. 7. Evidence of testing the rifle is necessary to prove that it is a weapon falling within any of the categories mentioned in Section 5 (vide Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 4 SCC 726: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1324] and Manoj Kumar Achhelal Brahman v. State of Gujarat [ (1998) 2 SCC 354 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 636] ). 75. Section 39 of the Arms Act provides that no prosecution for the contravention of Section 3 of the Arms Act can be lodged without the sanction of the District Magistrate. 75. Section 39 of the Arms Act provides that no prosecution for the contravention of Section 3 of the Arms Act can be lodged without the sanction of the District Magistrate. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 369 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 143 that the provisions of Section 39 of the Arms Act are mandatory and it is impermissible to prosecute a person for violation of Section 3 of Arms Act without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. It was observed at page 371: “6. The other appeal filed by Harjinder Singh against his conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 read with Section 6 of TADA for unlawful possession of the revolver has got to be allowed for the simple reason that the prosecution did not prove that sanction as required under Section 39 thereof was accorded for prosecuting him for the above offence.” 76. In the present case, no sanction was obtained, therefore the accused could not have been prosecuted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 25(1B) read with Section 3 of the Arms Act. 77. In view of the above the present appeal is partly allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court acquitting accused Pardeep Kumar and accused Pradeep Saini of the charged offences is set aside, while the judgment acquitting accused Raman Kumar of the charged offence is upheld. Accused Pardeep Kumar and Pradeep Saini are convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii) (C) of the ND&PS Act. Let they be produced for hearing on the quantum of the sentence on 13.03.2025 . 78. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) respondent Raman Kumar is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the appellant (Raman Kumar) on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.