JUDGMENT : Sujoy Paul, A.C.J This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution assails the constitutionality of G.O.Ms.No.82, dated 07.11.2015, whereunder amendments are made to The Telangana State and Sand Mining Rules , 2015 (for short, Rules of 2015), issued in G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 08.01.2015. The principal challenge is made to clause (iii) of Rule 10 of Rules of 2015 and it reads thus: “(iii) An amount of Rs.200/- (Rupees two hundred only) per metric Ton towards ‘regulating charges’ shall be paid to Telangana State Mineral Development Corporation by the transporter bringing sand incidentally from other sources and obtain pass for movement in the State to control the sale price of sand.” Factual Background: 2. The petitioner is engaged in the business of supply of sand and other material for construction activity. The petitioner has supply agreement with various companies in the State of Telangana. The Government of Maharashtra granted license for sale and transport of sand from Gadchiroli District. The petitioner transports sand from Maharashtra to Telangana. By way of impugned G.O.Ms.No.82, an amount of Rs.200/- per metric ton is imposed in the name of ‘Regulatory Charges’ which is required to be paid to the Telangana State Mineral Development Corporation (Corporation). By issuing G.O.Ms.NO.82, the previous G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P.1) has been amended. Because of this amendment, price of sand is enhanced in the State of Telangana. Contention of the petitioner: 3. Sri K. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that as per Article 301 of the Constitution, the petitioner has a freedom of trade and commerce. By issuing G.O.Ms.NO.82, the previous G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P.1) has been amended. Because of this amendment, price of sand is enhanced in the State of Telangana. Contention of the petitioner: 3. Sri K. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that as per Article 301 of the Constitution, the petitioner has a freedom of trade and commerce. Although there exists no restriction on movement of sand from one State to another State including Telangana, it is pleaded in the ‘grounds’ that the imposition of Regulatory Charges of Rs.200/- per metric ton is bad in law and liable to be interfered with because (i) it runs contrary to Section 15 (1) of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, Act of 1957), (ii) the impugned Rule 10(iii) of Rules of 2015 is contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution, (iii) Section 15 (1A) (g) of the Act can be invoked only in respect of mines and minerals extracted from the territory of State of Telangana, (iv) the expression ‘other charges’ in Section 15 (1A) (g) means that they can be imposed in respect of mines and mineral extracted from the State of Telangana and not in respect of sand brought from outside the State of Telangana, (v) the expression ‘other charges’ connotes a service by the State as a ‘quid pro quo’ which is non-existent in the case of traders who bring sand into the State of Telangana, (vi) the traders who bring sand do not hold any lease or license from the State of Telangana and hence, Regulatory Charges cannot be levied and (vii) the levy of Regulatory Charges has no nexus with the control of price of sand and, in fact, control of price of sand is not an obligation imposed by any statute on the State of Telangana. 4. To support some of aforesaid ‘grounds’, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that imposition of Rs.200/- per metric ton towards Regulatory Charges is exorbitant. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab , [ (1980) 1 SCC 416 ] and State of U.P. v. VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. , (2004) 1 SCC 225 . In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab , [ (1980) 1 SCC 416 ] and State of U.P. v. VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. , (2004) 1 SCC 225 . Lastly, he placed reliance on another judgment of the Apex Court in Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. , [ (2008) 5 SCC 575 ] . During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that during the pendency of this case, the Regulatory Charges of Rs.200/- per metric ton is reduced to Rs.100/- permetric ton. In support of aforesaid submissions, he filed ‘brief note’ in this case. Contention of the Government: 5. Sri S. Rahul Reddy, Special Government Pleader representing learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents, supported the impugned GO and submits that Article 301 of the Constitution is not attracted because no prohibition is imposed on the movement of sand from one State to another. The impugned amendment is inserted in consonance with rule making power and there is no infirmity in it. He placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.1809 of 2011 and batch, dated 25.04.2024. 6. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. FINDINGS: 8. So far Article 301 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the petitioner himself pleaded in pages 6 and 7 of the writ affidavit that no law is made by the Government of Telangana imposing restrictions on the movement of sand from one State to another including Telangana. Thus, the argument based on Article 301 of the Constitution must fail. 9. It was faintly argued that insertion of impugned rule is against the rule making power flowing from Section 15 (1) of the Act of 1957. Section 15 (1) permits the State Government to make the rules by notifying the same in official gazette. The rule can be made for grant of quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concessions in respect of mines and minerals and for the purposes enacted therewith. Sub-section (1A) became part of statute with effect from 10.02.1987, relevant portion of which reads thus: “ 15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals .? The rule can be made for grant of quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concessions in respect of mines and minerals and for the purposes enacted therewith. Sub-section (1A) became part of statute with effect from 10.02.1987, relevant portion of which reads thus: “ 15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals .? (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for, regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. (1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:? (a) to (f)... (g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable; (h) to (o)...” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. Section 15 (1) of the Act of 1957 is pregnant with the words ‘and for the purpose connected therewith’. This expression used at the end of Section 15 (1) makes it very wide and a conjoint reading of Section 15 (1) and 15(1A) makes it clear that law makers were armed with the power to make rules for the purposes mentioned in clause (g) of Sub-section (1A) of Section 15 . 11. Section 15 (1A) of the Act of 1957 employed the expression ‘in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power’. These words are of utmost significance and makes it clear that law makers intended to enlarge the rule making power and scope by using the words ‘in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power’. The foregoing power denotes the power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15 . 12. The phrase ‘notwithstanding anything in’ is used in contradistinction to the phrase ‘subject to’ the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject (see Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Moudhapara, Rajpur v. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur , [ AIR 1966 SC 1318 ] and South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secy., Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, AIR 1964 SC 207 ). A non obstante clause must also be distinguished from the phrase ‘without prejudice’. A non obstante clause must also be distinguished from the phrase ‘without prejudice’. Aprovision enacted ‘without prejudice’ to another provision has not the effect of affecting the operation of the other provision and any action taken under it must not be inconsistent with such other provision. 13. The text and context both are important while interpreting the statute. The legislative intent is of utmost important. ‘Deha’ and ‘Dehi’ both are important (see Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee , (1977) 2 SCC 256 , RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., , [ (1987) 1 SCC 424 ] and Ajay Maken v. Adesh Kumar Gupta , (2013) 3 SCC 489 ). 14. The above provision makes it clear that the rule can be framed for fixation and collection of rent, royalty fees, etc., and further empowers to impose ‘other charges’. Thus, a conjoint reading of Sections 15 (1), 15(1A) and clause (g) makes it clear that the law makers have not travelled beyond the scope of the rule making power. The constitutional validity of clause (g) of Section 15 (1A) of the Act of 1957 is not questioned. Thus, there exists a power to ‘impose other charges’. In absence of challenge to the enabling provision, the exercise of power under the said provisionor insertion of another provision in the rules is in consonance with enabling provision and cannot be interfered with. Thus, first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be and accordingly rejected. 15. In the writ affidavit, a ground is taken that impugned rule is contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution. However, no amount of oral argument was advanced to substantiate the same. 16. A microscopic reading of Section 15 (1A)(g) of the Act of 1957 makes it clear that it does not confine the power of imposition of other charges on the minerals extracted from the territory of Telangana State only. Sub-section (1A) makes the provision much wider and there is nothing to suggest that the other charges can be imposed on the minerals extracted only from the State of Telangana. 17. It is pleaded that regulatory charges so imposed have no nexus with the contrary of price of sand, but no amount of argument is also advanced in this regard. 18. 17. It is pleaded that regulatory charges so imposed have no nexus with the contrary of price of sand, but no amount of argument is also advanced in this regard. 18. This is trite that any statutory provision can be called in question on limited ground. In a recent judgment in Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 114] , the Apex Court considered previous judgments and culled out the principles as under: “22... 15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognized that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules)” 19. As discussed above, the impugned rule cannot be interfered with for lack of legislative competence. Sub-section (1A) and clause (g) of Section 15 of the Act of 1957 make the provision very wide and we are unable to hold that the impugned rule is inserted exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling provision. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not advanced any argument that the petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are infringed. As per the petitioner’s own saying, Article 301 of the Constitution has not been infringed because no restriction is imposed on movement of sand from one State to another. Thus, impugned rule cannot be said to be arbitrary, without jurisdiction or unconstitutional on the above parameters. 21. The judgments of the Apex Court in Kewal Krishan Puri (supra), VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee (supra) were cited to establish that imposition of impugned charges are exorbitant in nature. 22. Thus, impugned rule cannot be said to be arbitrary, without jurisdiction or unconstitutional on the above parameters. 21. The judgments of the Apex Court in Kewal Krishan Puri (supra), VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee (supra) were cited to establish that imposition of impugned charges are exorbitant in nature. 22. A plain reading of judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri (supra) shows that in that case ‘on the basis of facts and figures placed before it’, the Apex Court opined that there was no justification in raising the fee from Rs.2 to Rs.3/-. Para 54 of this judgment in no uncertain terms makes it clear that in the given facts of the said case, the Apex Court came to hold that enhancement of fee is bad in law. The said matter relates to Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 and the Apex Court dealt with the concept of fee. In the instant case, the said judgment and judgment in VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) cannot be pressed into service. Even otherwise, in our opinion, the amount of Rs.200/- per metric ton cannot be said to be exorbitant or arbitrary. The power of fixation of such amount is within the province of the law makers and this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to take a different view unless such imposition or fixation of amount is so exorbitant and disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court. 23. Coming to other judgment of the Apex Court in VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the said matter relates to imposition of license fee on industrial alcohol. Considering the statute in hand, the Apex Court gave certain findings which are of no assistance to the petitioner because it deals with a different entity, different statute and altogether different product. Thus, impugned rule cannot be interfered with on the ground that amount of regulating charge of Rs.200/- per metric ton is exorbitant. 24. In view of foregoing discussion, the petition deserves to be and accordingly dismissed . There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.