J UDGMENT & O RDER : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. F. Lalengliana, learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellant. Also heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor, Mizoram appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2/informant. 2. This instant criminal appeal is directed against the judgment & sentence order passed on 21.03.2024 by the learned Special Judge, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”) in S.C no. 185/2017 arising out of Crl. Trl. No. 1492/2017, whereby the accused/appellant was convicted under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced thereof to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a term of 5 (five) years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (rupees five thousand) only, in default of payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of 1 (one) week. 3. The brief fact of the prosecution case in a nutshell is that PW-1, being the mother of the victim, lodged an FIR on 16.08.2017, alleging inter alia, that she has realized that her husband, i.e., the accused/appellant, had sexual intercourse with her daughter, i.e., the victim at her residence from the year 2016 till August, 2017 on numerous occasions. Accordingly, a case was registered under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 being P.S. Case No. 92/2017. Thereafter, PW-8, the Investigating Officer investigated the case, wherein he examined the victim and also sent her for recording her statement before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC and has also recorded the statement of the other witnesses including the mother/complainant/PW-1 and thereafter arrested the accused/appellant and interrogated him as well. Upon completion of the investigation, he submitted Charge-sheet on 08.09.2017 vide Charge-sheet No. 79/2017 against the accused/appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Thereafter, the Trial Court framed charge against the accused/appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and commenced the trial. Before the Trial Court, the prosecution, in order to bring home the charges, adduced the evidence of 6 Prosecution Witnesses out of the 8 listed Prosecution Witnesses and the accused/appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.PC and after such examination, he adduced the evidence of 2 Defence Witnesses including himself. Before the Trial Court, the prosecution, in order to bring home the charges, adduced the evidence of 6 Prosecution Witnesses out of the 8 listed Prosecution Witnesses and the accused/appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.PC and after such examination, he adduced the evidence of 2 Defence Witnesses including himself. Upon completion of the trial, the Trial Court was pleased to convict the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 instead of Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, in view of the fact that no case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was made out and accordingly sentenced thereof. Against such conviction and sentence, the present appeal has been filed. 4. Mr. F. Lalengliana, learned counsel for the accused/appellant submits that the conviction under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is solely based on the testimony of the victim child, however, the Trial Court failed to appreciate that such testimony of the victim child as regards her allegation of the accused/appellant touching her thigh with sexual intent is inconsistent with her initial statement given before the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.PC as well as her statement recorded by the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC. He further submits that in view of the aforesaid inconsistencies, the testimony of the victim child cannot be said to be wholly trustworthy and of sterling quality and therefore, the impugned conviction and sentence based on such testimony is totally erroneous and perverse. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the following decisions of the Apex Court in the case of:- (i) Ganesan Vs. State represented by its Inspector of Police , reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573 (ii) Suryanarayana Vs. State of Karnataka , reported in (2001) 9 SCC 129 5. Per contra, Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the victim having clearly deposed before the Court that the accused/appellant had touched her thigh under her pants by sleeping with her under the blanket clearly establishes the ingredients of Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and therefore, the conviction and sentence impugned in this appeal warrants no interference from this Court. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that it is clearly discernable from the record that the victim has consistently accounted for the allegation of the accused/appellant touching her thigh with sexual intent right from her initial statement made before the Investigating Officer, the statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC and her deposition before the Trial Court. He further submits that the defence has not been able to shaken such testimony of the victim and therefore, such testimony of the victim child cannot be thrown away. He further submits that the testimony of the victim of a tender age cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age but the same ought to be scrutinized with care and caution. By relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suryanarayana (supra), he submits that if the victim child is shown to have stood the test of cross- examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. 7. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the contending parties and have perused the material available on record including the records of the Trial Court and have also considered the case laws cited at the bar. 8. The present appeal being against the conviction, let me now analyze and re-appreciate the evidence available on record. 9. PW-1 , who is the mother of the victim child and also the informant in the case, deposed that she married the accused/appellant in 2016 while she was living as a single mother and he came to stay with them but they separated in August, 2017 after having a child. She further deposed that the victim was born on 28.09.2009 from her previous marriage and she has 2 older siblings. She further deposed that she had shouted at the accused/appellant twice earlier on suspicion that he was misbehaving with the victim child and that the final separation came after she caught him assaulting her in August, 2017. She described the incident as follows:- “X was lying on a long chair and I went to the toilet. She further deposed that she had shouted at the accused/appellant twice earlier on suspicion that he was misbehaving with the victim child and that the final separation came after she caught him assaulting her in August, 2017. She described the incident as follows:- “X was lying on a long chair and I went to the toilet. I looked out from the toilet and saw that the accused had got onto the long chair with X and was sharing a blanket with her. I shouted with him. X told me later that the accused used to promise her money and then sexually assault her. I left the house with X and went to the house of X’s paternal grandmother. Later on, we went to the CWC and then I filed an FIR on 18.8.2017.” She further produced the FIR in evidence as Ext.P-3. She further deposed that the Police seized the victim’s Birth Certificate and that she accompanied the victim to Civil Hospital, Aizawl where she was taken for a medical examination. During cross-examination, she clarified that she did not see the accused/appellant actually assaulting the victim sexually but only saw him lying down with her and sharing a blanket. She further clarified that the victim did not tell her that night about the sexual assault. 10 . PW-2 , is the worker working with the District Child Protection Unit, Aizawl, who disposed that on 16.08.2017, upon being called by the Child Welfare Committee, Aizawl, he took the victim to the Aizawl Police Station to file the FIR. He further disposed that the victim’s mother also accompanied them who eventually lodged the FIR. 11 . PW-3, who is the victim herself aged about 8 years deposed as under:- “I used to live in Hlimen Vengthlang, but we have now shifted to Zuangtui. I was born on 28.9.2009. The accused Vanlaltluanga is my stepfather. I was very young when he married my mother. I now go to Class- 5. I was sleeping on a long chair in the sitting room in our house at Hlimen Vengthlang in the night of 16.8.2017. The accused, Vanlaltluanga, came and said that he wanted to take rest too. I said I didn’t want him to be in the same chair with me but he lay down next to me anyway. He touched me on my right thigh by inserting his hands into my pants. The accused, Vanlaltluanga, came and said that he wanted to take rest too. I said I didn’t want him to be in the same chair with me but he lay down next to me anyway. He touched me on my right thigh by inserting his hands into my pants. I told him I did not like it and shouted out, “I don’t like this.” My mother heard my cries and came into the sitting room. She shouted at Vanlaltluanga who only kept quiet. We then went to the house of my paternal grandmother and told her about what happened. My mother filed a report with the police. I was taken to the Civil Hospital Aizawl for a medical examination. I was also brought to this Court building and made a statement.” She further produced her statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC as Ext.P-2 and her Birth Certificate as Ext.M-1. During cross-examination, she clarified that she was sleeping in the long chair in the night of 16.08.2017 as her mother wanted to use the toilet and she herself did not want to sleep in the bedroom alone. She further clarified that the accused/appellant is her stepfather and that he was kind and affectionate to her. She further clarified that the accused/appellant did not joke with her much and she did not believe that he was joking when he touched her on her thigh. 12. PW-4, though was listed as seizure witness, however did not turn up to adduce his evidence before the Trial Court. 13. PW-5 , is the Doctor who examined the victim child. He deposed that there were no marks of violence on her body and from a genital examination, there was no bruising or laceration on the organ, however, her hymen was ruptured and perforated and there were only remnants of it present. He accordingly produced the Medical Report containing his findings as Ext.P-1. During cross-examination, he clarified that the hymen could be perforated or ruptured by reasons other than sexual intercourse. 14. PW-6 , though a listed witness did not turn up to adduce his evidence before the Trial Court. 15. PW-7, who is Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aizawl deposed that he had recorded the victim’s statement on 17.08.2017 under Sections 164 Cr.PC/25 of the POCSO Act in the course of the investigation and produced the aforesaid statement as Ext.P-2. 16. 14. PW-6 , though a listed witness did not turn up to adduce his evidence before the Trial Court. 15. PW-7, who is Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aizawl deposed that he had recorded the victim’s statement on 17.08.2017 under Sections 164 Cr.PC/25 of the POCSO Act in the course of the investigation and produced the aforesaid statement as Ext.P-2. 16. PW-8, is the Investigating Officer who investigated the case. He deposed that he recorded the statement of the victim and that the victim in her statement stated that she was sexually assaulted by the accused/appellant by having penetrative sexual assault at their residence and that the accused/appellant also sometimes inserted his penis by making her lie down and sometimes by making her sit on top of him. He further deposed that the victim also stated that the accused/appellant had threatened her not to speak about the incident to anyone. He further deposed that the statement of the victim child is available in the Charge- sheet. He further deposed that he also examined the complainant/PW-1 and other witnesses and forwarded the victim for medical examination and also received the Medical Report. He further deposed that he also forwarded the victim to the learned Judicial Magistrate for recording her statement under Section 164 Cr.PC. He further deposed that he also seized the Birth Certificate of the victim child and thereafter, arrested the accused/appellant on 16.08.2017. He further deposed that after thorough investigation, he submitted Charge-sheet against the accused/appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Thereafter, he exhibited the Charge-sheet, Seizure Memo, Birth Certificate as Ext.P-4, Ext.P-5 and Ext.M-1 respectively. During cross-examination , he clarified that the mother of the victim told him that the victim was sexually molested by another person in the year 2015 but at that time the medical examination of the victim, the hymen was found intact. 17. Upon closure of the prosecution evidences, all the incriminating circumstances were put to the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC, wherein the accused/appellant had generally denied all the incriminating circumstances, however, he adduced 2 witnesses as Defence Witnesses including himself. 18. DW-1, who is a neighbour deposed that he know that the victim was sexually molested in the year 2015 by one person named Tluanga and that most of the locality people knew about the incident. 18. DW-1, who is a neighbour deposed that he know that the victim was sexually molested in the year 2015 by one person named Tluanga and that most of the locality people knew about the incident. He further deposed that the mother of the victim is very possessive about the accused/appellant and that on one day when the victim came home having an allergy on her whole body, she asked the accused/appellant to give her a bath and to apply powder on her full body including her private parts and that the accused/appellant made the victim stand and sprinkled powder all over her body and that DW-1 witnessed the whole incident. He further deposed that however, later on, PW-1 spread the news that the accused/appellant has sexually assaulted the victim by making her sit in his lap which she totally lied. 19. DW-3, who is the accused/appellant himself deposed as under:- “1. I am the accused in this case. I am innocent. My wife is a flirtatious type of woman and she is also very jealous, creating issues if I am a bit late to return home. She used to suspect me unnecessarily of being involved with other woman. We separated and she went home. I did not call her back and that was the reason she filed the FIR. She said that she would not have filed the FIR if I had called her back from her parent’s house. 2. The allegation that I had slept with X while my wife was in the bathroom is not true. There was no bathroom door and only a curtain across the passage to the bathroom. If I had assaulted X, she would surely have made some noise but there was no noise whatsoever and it is clear therefore that I did not assault her. The floor in which I lived was shared with another family and there was only a plywood partition between the two residences. 3. I had a urinary tract infection and it was being treated. As a result, I could not perform any sexual activity at the time I was alleged to have sexually assaulted X. This medical condition had started from long before the allegation of sexual assault. My wife was aware of the situation and she had assisted me in taking treatment. 4. I treated X as my own daughter. As a result, I could not perform any sexual activity at the time I was alleged to have sexually assaulted X. This medical condition had started from long before the allegation of sexual assault. My wife was aware of the situation and she had assisted me in taking treatment. 4. I treated X as my own daughter. I used to bathe and apply powder on her body.” 20. In a case of sexual assault on a minor girl, what is important to keep in mind is that a minor girl, that too of the age of 8 years at the time of occurrence, would not ordinarily lie about being sexually assaulted. Therefore, the version of the victim has to be considered with utmost care before discerning the same. In fact, if the version of the victim inspires confidence and appears to be trustworthy, credible, unblemished and of sterling quality, no further corroboration is required for convicting the accused. 21. In Ganesan Vs. State (supra) , relied by the accused/appellant, the Apex Court has observed and held that where the testimony of the victim is found reliable and trustworthy, reiterated conviction on the basis of her testimony is permissible. The Apex Court observed as under:- “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay, it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: "9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.' 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12). '12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.' 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) '8. ... The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) '8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." (emphasis in original) 12. In State of Orissa v. ThakaraBesra, this Court held that rape not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi). In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) "22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged." 22. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Pankaj Chaudhary reported in ( 2019) 11 SSC 575 , the Apex Court has held as under:- "29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming." [State of Rajasthan v. N.?.]. 23. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Apex Court has observed and held at para 6 and 7 as under; "6. 23. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Apex Court has observed and held at para 6 and 7 as under; "6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam.)" Therefore, the test is to take the testimony of the victim in the context of the facts of each case and to ascertain whether her testimony can be said to be trustworthy, reliable, credible and is of sterling quality. In doing so, whether this surrounding circumstances deposed by her is supported by other witnesses or not and the manner in which she has recounted the incident right from the beginning to the end also amongst others to be taken into account. It appears that the victim has been consistently maintaining her version as regards the accused/appellant touching her thigh with sexual intact right from her initial statement made before the Investigating Officer till her deposition before the Trial Court. 24. Relevant portion of the victim’s statement made before the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.PC reads as under:- “Q 6. What did your father do before touching you? Ans: He pulled down my pants till my knee, sometimes below my knee, he then pulled his pants, took out his penis, lay on top of me and insert his penis inside my vagina, and then raped me. Then he got up after that. Q 7. How else does he behave with you? Ans: Sometimes he would let me stay on top of him, take off my underpant, sometimes he would let me sit on top of him without taking off my underpant. Q 8. Did he ever touch you without sexual penetration? Ans: Yes, he used to caress my arms, my thighs, he even used to touch my vagina.” 25. Relevant portion of the victim’s statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC reads as under:- “My father Vanlaltluanga had sexual intercourse with me during the end of the year 2016 at our own residence at Hlimen Vengthlang. Ans: Yes, he used to caress my arms, my thighs, he even used to touch my vagina.” 25. Relevant portion of the victim’s statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC reads as under:- “My father Vanlaltluanga had sexual intercourse with me during the end of the year 2016 at our own residence at Hlimen Vengthlang. This happened in our own bedroom while I was baby-sitting and our other relatives were in the sitting room. My father occasionally started touching me hereafter and he would have sexual intercourse with me at our own residence. I never told anyone else as he instructed me not to tell anyone about it. The above statements are all true.” 26. Reading of the aforesaid statements by the victim before the Police Officer as well as the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC, it appears that she has disclosed that the accused/appellant after having sexual intercourse with her during the end of the year 2016 started touching her hereafter and would have sexual intercourse with her at her residence. She further stated before the Investigating Officer that the accused/appellant used to caress her arms, thighs and even used to touch her vagina. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid evidence are not substantial evidence. However, in her deposition before the Court, she has clearly stated that the accused/appellant touched her on her right thigh by inserting his hand into her pants and though she told him that she does not like it and shouted out, he did not stop until and unless her mother shouted at him. Thus, it is apparent that the victim has repeatedly disclosed right from the beginning till the end that the accused/appellant has touched her thigh with sexual intent. In order to bring home an offense under Section 7 for which punishment is given under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, it is essential for the prosecution to establish that the accused/appellant has amongst others committed an act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration. 27. Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “7. 27. Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “7. Sexual assault.—Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.” 28. Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “9. Aggravated sexual assault.—(a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits sexual assault on a child— (i) within the limits of the police station or premises where he is appointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or (iv) where he is known as, or identified as a police officer; or (b) whoever, being a member of the armed forces or security forces, commits sexual assault on a child— (i) within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed; or (ii) in any areas under the command of the security or armed forces; or (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or (iv) where he is known or identified as a member of the security or armed forces; or (c) whoever being a public servant commits sexual assault on a child; or (d) whoever being on the management or on the staff of a jail, or remand home or protection home or observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time being in force commits sexual assault on a child being inmate of such jail or remand home or protection home or observation home or other place of custody or care and protection; or (e) whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or (f) whoever being on the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits sexual assault on a child in that institution; or (g) whoever commits gang sexual assault on a child. Explanation.—when a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance of their common intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone; or (h) whoever commits sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or corrosive substance; or (i) whoever commits sexual assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or (j) whoever commits sexual assault on a child, which— (i) physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l) of section 2of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987) or causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or permanently; or (ii) inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency Virus or any other life threatening disease or infection which may either temporarily or permanently impair the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks; or (k) whoever, taking advantage of a child’s mental or physical disability, commits sexual assault on the child; or (l) whoever commits sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or (m) whoever commits sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n) whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child; or (o) whoever, being in the ownership or management or staff, of any institution providing services to the child, commits sexual assault on the child in such institution; or (p) whoever, being in a position of trust or authority of a child, commits sexual assault on the child in an institution or home of the child or anywhere else; or (q) whoever commits sexual assault on a child knowing the child is pregnant; or (r) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and attempts to murder the child; or (s) whoever commits sexual assault on a child in the course of 1[ communal or sectarian violence or during any natural calamity or in any similar situations]; or (t) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and who has been previously convicted of having committed any offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being in force; or (u) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and makes the child to strip or parade naked in public; [(v) whoever persuades, induces, entices or coerces a child to get administered or administers or direct anyone to administer, help in getting administered any drug or hormone or any chemical substance, to a child with the intent that such child attains early sexual maturity,] is said to commit aggravated sexual assault.” 29. Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “10. Punishment for aggravated sexual assault.— Whoever, commits aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 30. In the instant case, the allegation of the accused/appellant touching the body of the victim with sexual intact is corroborated with the testimony of the mother/PW-1 who clearly in her evidence has deposed that she saw from the toilet that the accused/appellant had got on to the long chair with the victim and was sharing a blanket with her and upon seeing so, she shouted at him. The surrounding facts coupled with the reiterated version of the physical contact made by the accused/appellant with the victim with sexual intact stated by the victim herself, this Court has no hesitation to accept the testimony of the victim/PW-2 as trustworthy, credible, and of sterling quality. That being so no further corroboration is required and a conviction on the basis of such testimony is clearly maintainable. 31. Reference is made to paragraph No. 5 & 6 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suryanarayana (supra), which reads as under:- “5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not. 6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P.; Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra). In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances of the case, an offence under Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is clearly made out, for which punishment is prescribed under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 32. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances of the case, an offence under Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is clearly made out, for which punishment is prescribed under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 32. Turning now to the judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court held as under:- “(ix) It is not possible to arrive at a finding on the reason why the alleged victim's trial deposition differed materially from her pretrial statement, but it would be necessary to give the accused the benefit and acquit him in respect of the more serious charge of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The evidence of the alleged victim as PW-2 would nevertheless establish without reasonable doubt that he had committed a sexual assault against her by putting his hand into her pants and touching her thigh. The finding being also that X was below 12 (twelve) years of age at the time of the offence [Paragraph 6(vi) above], in terms of Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, the offence would take the aggravated form and the accused would accordingly be liable on the evidence adduced for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. 7. The accused, Vanlaltluanga, 52, S/o Thangseia (L), R/o Hlimen Vengthlang, Aizawl, is accordingly convicted under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. His bail is cancelled and he is remanded to judicial custody till 21.3.2024, fixed for hearing on sentence.” 33. Reading of the aforesaid judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, upon being fully inspired with the testimony of the victim/PW-2 as regards her version of the ingredients attracting the offense of Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. That being so, this Court finds no infirmity with the judgment and conviction of the Trial Court. Hence, the appeal fails. 34. This Court appreciates the service rendered by Mr. C. Tlanthianghlima, Legal Aid Counsel and his requisite fee is to be paid by the State Legal Services Authority as per existing rates. 35. Accordingly, the criminal appeal stands dismissed and is disposed of. 36. Send back the Trial Court Record.