ORDER Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 , [the BNSS] by the Petitioner/Accused No.1 for granting of pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.18 of 2022 of Achanta Police Station, West Godavari District, registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420, 493, 312 and 376 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , [the I.P.C] and Section 3(1)(r) and Section of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 , [the Act] 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the 2 nd respondent and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. In Jahir v. State of Uttar Pradesh , [2024 AHC 135775 (Neutral Citation)] a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad at para Nos.8 to 11 held as under: 8. In Shrikant Upadhyay and others Vs State of Bihar and another, 2024 INSC 202 has observed as under "19. The relief of Anticipatory Bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and rotecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each individual case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome." 9. The power of anticipatory bail is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where the person is falsely implicated. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. 10. The court owes duty that justice is done to all the parties (i,e accused, prosecution, informant, complainant and victim). The citizens in terms of constitutional mandate are required to abide by law. 10. The court owes duty that justice is done to all the parties (i,e accused, prosecution, informant, complainant and victim). The citizens in terms of constitutional mandate are required to abide by law. Where from the material and allegation against an accused, offence is made out, the accused is required to show exceptional circumstances warranting the protection of liberty. No circumstances have been shown by applicant(s) to demonstrate that personal liberty of accused in the facts and circumstances of the case is required to be protected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the grant of anticipatory bail would lead to miscarriage of justice. 11. The Court is required to exercise jurisdiction of anticipatory bail on sound judicial principles. The court should be slow to grant anticipatory bail to an accused who does not abide by law and commits an offence. In the present case, it is not shown by the applicant(s) that the prosecution or complainant has falsely implicated the applicant(s). One cannot lose sight of the fact that unwarranted protection to an accused has adverse effect on the peace and tranquillity of society at large and effects maintenance of law and order in the society. The jurisdiction of anticipatory bail permits the accused to be not produced before the ordinary jurisdictional court although ordinary jurisdictional court at grass root level have greater experience and exposure with regard to situation of maintenance of law and order at the local place. The process of anticipatory bail permits consideration of anticipatory bail by Session Court or High Court and not by Magistrate courts. Facts and circumstance of each case is to be examined at the time of consideration of anticipatory bail”. 4. In Pamarthi Chaitanyeswar Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh , MANU/AP/1626/2024 : 2024 Supreme(AP) 33 ; a learned Single Judge of this Court at para Nos.28 and 29 held as under. Facts and circumstance of each case is to be examined at the time of consideration of anticipatory bail”. 4. In Pamarthi Chaitanyeswar Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh , MANU/AP/1626/2024 : 2024 Supreme(AP) 33 ; a learned Single Judge of this Court at para Nos.28 and 29 held as under. “28...The specific overt acts alleged in the first information report as well as in the statement of victim recorded by police during investigation are the petitioner was after the victim saying that he loves and intending to marry her and made a promise marry: It happened in the year 2020; The petitioner used to visit the house of victim and developed acquaintance also with the parents of the victim; Therefore, the victim believed the promise of the petitioner that he would marry her; Hence, continued the friendship with the petitioner, While so, in the month of July 2021, one day, the victim visited the flat of the petitioner, He was alone in the flat: The petitioner sexually assaulted her saying that he will marry her; The victim believed him. The petitioner continued the friendship with the victim promising that he will marry her, after completing the education; Later, after completion of education, the petitioner went to Vijayawada, promising that he will speak with his parents about marriage. “...29...Therefore, when the above allegations are considered on their face value, prima facie they show that victim consented for the relationship with the petitioner as she sincerely believed his promises to marry, from inception till he left for Vijayawada, as truthful and he marry her. It must be remembered that at relevant point both were co-students in the college and became good friends. Therefore, no reason for the girl to suspect his bona-fides at that time. In fact, it is the contention of the petitioner that he could not marry her due to subsequent unforeseen events which are not under his control. Truth of these allegations cannot be gone into in a quash petition”. 5. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh , MANU/SC/8531/2006 : 2006 8 Supreme 326 , at para No.11 and 12 held as under: “11...In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A reads as under: Section 114A- Presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape .- in a prosecution for rape under Clause (a) or Clause(b) or Clause(c) or Clause (d) or Clause (e) or Clause (g) of Sub- section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutor and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her. 12. In the present case in view of the facts as mentioned above we are satisfied that the consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law”. 6. In Gadapu Ravi Teja v. State of Andhra Pradesh , Crl.P.No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 : 2025 Supreme(AP) 664 a learned Single Judge of this Court, at para No.7 held as under: “7...As seen from the record, the petitioner is aged about 31 years and the de facto complainant/respondent No.2 is aged about 26 years. Both are fully grown, both are working and they are educated. Because of love and affection in between them, they met physically on several occasions. Later, respondent No.2 got pregnancy. Both are fully grown, both are working and they are educated. Because of love and affection in between them, they met physically on several occasions. Later, respondent No.2 got pregnancy. When she informed the same to the petitioner, the petitioner suggested her to get it aborted and gave some tablets. As the respondent No.2 consumed those tablets, the pregnancy got aborted. Even though, the respondent No.2 requested the petitioner to marry her, the petitioner did not oblige her request on the pretext that his mother and sister do not agree formarriage. As mentioned supra in Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no instance of the victim therein got pregnancy and it was aborted at the instance of the petitioner therein. As rightly pointed out by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, the facts and circumstances of Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case and the instant case are distinguishable on facts and the ratio laid down by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court cannot be followed, as there are no merits in this criminal petition for grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner”. 7. In Gudibanda Karteek v. State of Andhra Pradesh , Crl.P.No.2166 of 2025 dated 27.03.2025 a learned Single Judge of this Court, at para No.5 held as under: 5. A perusal of the material on record goes to show that this is a case of stalking, criminalized sexual intercourse committed by deceitful means on the pretext of love and marriage, causing simple hurt and miscarriage without her consent, criminal intimidation and insulting her by naming her caste. As seen from the contents of the FIR, A1, by promising to marry the de facto complainant, had physical contact with her several times. When she became pregnant, A1 introduced his brother A2, who gave tablets to her. Trusting the words of A1 that he would marry her, she took the tablets. Later, her pregnancy was removed. When she asked A1 to marry her, A1 abused her in filthy language by touching her caste and beat her. The offences alleged against A1 are very grave in nature. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigation is under progress and some more witnesses are to be examined”. 8. Later, her pregnancy was removed. When she asked A1 to marry her, A1 abused her in filthy language by touching her caste and beat her. The offences alleged against A1 are very grave in nature. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigation is under progress and some more witnesses are to be examined”. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra , MANU/SC/0787/2025 : (2025) 5 Supreme 365 at para No.9 held as under: “9...In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC”. 9. In Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal , Spl Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7004 of 2025 : 2025 Supreme(SC) 1703 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel appearing for the State has relied upon the definition of 'Rape' and would argue that the consent given by the minor is no consent and it would still be a rape. In our considered opinion, as regarding the rape being committed by the appellant when the prosecutrix was a minor, there is absolutely no evidence, and definitely no forensic evidence with the prosecution. It is only an allegation in the FIR after more than 03 years, in order to make out a case under the POCSO Act, that such an act of rape was committed three years back when she was a minor. She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant”. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi , (2023) SCC Online SC 89 at para No.21 and 22 held as under: “”21... She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant”. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi , (2023) SCC Online SC 89 at para No.21 and 22 held as under: “”21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC”. 11. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC”. 11. In Prithivirajan v. State , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696 : 2025 Supreme(SC) 1382 at para Nos.6 and 7 held as under: “6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied : first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted”. 12. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra , (2019) 9 SCC 608 at para Nos.12, 18, and 21 held under: “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 IPC has occurred”. 13. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand , (2020) 10 SCC 108 at para Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 held as under: “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross-examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999. 12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letters exchanged reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to different communities. 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury. 14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent by the appellant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation, it being spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not to protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her”. 14. The allegation against the petitioner/Accused No.1 is that he maintained physical relationship with the de facto complainant, who is aged about 31 years and belongs to the Scheduled Caste (SC) community. The petitioner did not marry her. When the de facto complainant became pregnant, the petitioner allegedly gave her certain tablets, which resulted in an abortion. The de-facto complainant also implicated the relatives of the petitioner in the case. 15. The petitioner submitted a Telugu written typed complaint running into three pages. The learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court a case in F.I.R. No.154/2024, dated 27.06.2024, wherein the de-facto complainant lodged a report against one Suresh Goddapalli, alleging offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 354, 509 and 506 of the I.P.C., and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 16. The alleged instant offence in the present case occurred while the petitioner and the de facto complainant were in Dubai. It is further alleged that the offence continued even after they returned to India in the year 2018. The petitioner is presently in Dubai. He is aged about 30 years and is working as a Manager in a software company. After thorough investigation, the police filed a charge sheet showing the petitioner as absconding. The alleged offence took place prior to 19.01.2022, and the case was registered as F.I.R. No.18/2022 of Achanta Police Station, West Godavari District. It further appears that after the relationship was severed with the petitioner, the 2 nd respondent married one Suresh Goddapalli and subsequently lodged a complaint even against him in the year 2022. The alleged offence took place prior to 19.01.2022, and the case was registered as F.I.R. No.18/2022 of Achanta Police Station, West Godavari District. It further appears that after the relationship was severed with the petitioner, the 2 nd respondent married one Suresh Goddapalli and subsequently lodged a complaint even against him in the year 2022. 17 Considering the facts and circumstances, the gravity and nature of the allegations levelled the Petitioner, this Court is inclined to grant pre-arrest bail to the Petitioner/Accused No.1. 18 In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following conditions: i. In the event of arrest of the Petitioner/Accused No.1, he shall be enlarged on bail subject to he executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only), with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the arresting police officials; ii. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall make himself available for trial as and when required; iii. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall not cause any threat, inducement or promise to the prosecution witnesses.