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2025 DIGILAW 1144 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Rahimuddin

2025-04-22

AVNEESH JHINGAN, BHUWAN GOYAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. The State has filed this appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 06.10.1997. 2. The case set up by the prosecution is that on 04.01.1994 upon receiving an information of a dead body lying near Stock Exchange on JLN Marg, Jaipur, the FIR was registered and body recovered. The body was of 15-16 year old boy whose neck was slitted. The deceased was identified as Sitaram s/o Ramphool Meena of Chaksu (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’). On basis of the statement recorded during investigation respondent was nominated as accused and charge-sheet was filed under section 302, 201 and 379 IPC. In a statement under section 313 Cr.PC, the accused stated it to be a case of false implication. The prosecution to prove its case, examined fifteen witnesses and produced 41 exhibits. The trial court considering that it was not proved that the accused was last seen with the dead body of deceased and the recoveries made at the instance of the accused could not be co-related to the deceased, the impugned judgment was passed. 3. Learned counsel for the State submits that PW-11-Sehja Singh identified the accused in the identification parade as well as in the court during the trial. PW-3 Rajendra Singh identified the accused in the court proceedings. The argument is that PW-10 Mahaveer Singh had also identified accused in the identification parade. The recovery made at the instance of the accused of blood stained clothes, knife proved the case of the prosecution. Contention is that the blood stained chappal of the deceased and blood-stained earth collected from spot had human blood. 4. Learned counsel for the accused submits that the identification parade for failure to follow the procedure cannot be relied upon. The argument is that the accused was present in Police Station on 05.01.1994 when the statement of Sehja Singh was recorded. Further that Sehaj Singh was working as a deed writer in court campus and had earlier also appeared as witness at the instance of the police officials. The argument is that testimony of PW-3 and PW-10 being of police officials is not reliable. It is contended that the last seen theory of the prosecution is baseless as none of the witnesses had seen the accused with the dead body of deceased. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record with their able assistance. 6. The argument is that testimony of PW-3 and PW-10 being of police officials is not reliable. It is contended that the last seen theory of the prosecution is baseless as none of the witnesses had seen the accused with the dead body of deceased. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record with their able assistance. 6. The scope of interference in the appeal against the judgment of the acquittal is enunciated by the Supreme Court in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragouda Vs. State of Karnataka [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] held: “40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 7. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 7. As per the prosecution on 03.01.1994 PW-3 Rajendra Singh, PW-10 Mahaveer Singh two police officials had seen the accused taking a blood stained bundle on scooter. To similar effect is the testimony of PW-11 Sehja Singh. PW-3 and PW-10 inspite being police officials had not reported to police station the incident of a dead body being carried in a bundle on scooter. The FIR was registered on receiving an information on 04.01.1994 that a dead body was lying on JLN Marg. Moreover, there was no document produced to establish that PW-3 and PW-10 were on duty at JLN Marg on the relevant day and time. 8. It would be apposite to mention that apart from the reliability on the testimonies of PW-3, PW-10 and PW-11, the angle to be considered is that none of these witnesses stated that they had seen the dead body of the deceased being carried on the scooter by the accused. 9. PW-3 Rajendra Singh was not part of the identification parade. Mahaveer Singh identified accused in the identification parade but faltered while identifying the accused during trial. The reliability of statement of Sehja Singh PW-11 is doubtful. When the statement of PW-11 was recorded in the police station on 05.01.1994, in presence of accused. Further, it cannot be lost site that as per the statement of Investigating Officer PW-14 accused was not kept Bapardah prior to the identification parade. 10. The recoveries of clothes, knife (churri) and the goat skins were affected at the instance of the accused. So far as knife (chhuri) is concerned, same was recovered from the meat shop of the accused and it was not established from FSL Report (Ex.P/36) that blood stains found on knife (chhuri) was human blood. With regard to clothes and goat skins are concerned, witness to recovery of the articles were not produced. As per FSL Report (Ex.P/36), samples on clothes of deceased got disintegrated and blood group could not be determined. The goat skins at the instance of the accused were recovered from open place. With regard to clothes and goat skins are concerned, witness to recovery of the articles were not produced. As per FSL Report (Ex.P/36), samples on clothes of deceased got disintegrated and blood group could not be determined. The goat skins at the instance of the accused were recovered from open place. In other words, the recovery of the blood stained articles, clothes and knife (chhuri) could not be related to the incident or that the blood found on them was of the deceased. 11. The recovery of the blood stained chappal and blood stained earth from the spot of recovery of the dead body does not enhance the case of the prosecution. Albeit, as per the FSL report stains were of human blood but the blood group could not be determined. 12. The evidence revealed that though the blood stained scooter was recovered at the instance of the accused but as per the FSL report it was not possible to determine that the stains were of human blood. This fact gains importance in the back drop that accused was a butcher. 13. The law is well settled that for conviction on the basis of the circumstantial evidence the chain should be completed and one missing link in the chain is fatal for the case of the prosecution. 14. Reference be made to the decision of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , wherein it was held: “152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 Cri LJ 1783 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 15. In the case in hand the prosecution failed at the threshold to set up a case the theory of last seen as there was no witness or evidence to substantiate that the accused on 03.01.1994 was carrying on scooter the dead body of the deceased in a bundle. The failure to co-relate the recovered items with the incident and the deceased proved fatal for the case of the prosecution. 16. The view adopted by the trial Court is plausible. There is no legal or factual error much less perversity. 17. The appeal is dismissed. The judgment dated 06.10.1997 passed by the trial court is upheld. 18. The original record of the trial court be remitted back forthwith.