JUDGMENT AND ORDER : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused/appellant. Also heard Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State and Mr. H. Zodinsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the informant/respondent No. 2. 2. This criminal appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 29.09.2021 passed by the learned Fast Track Special Court, Rape & POCSO Act, 2012, arising out of FTSC(CPI) POCSO No. 15/2021 in SC No. 174/2017 in Crl. Trl. No. 1397/2017 dated 29.09.2021, whereby the accused/appellant was convicted under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and sentenced thereof to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 5 years with a fine of Rs. 1000/- and, in default, Simple Imprisonment for another one month. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the i.e. victim’s father the informant/PW-1, on 01.09.2017, lodged an FIR alleging, inter alia, that his daughter, i.e., the victim/PW-2, who is about 15 years old, had been sexually molested on 20.08.2017 by her grandfather, i.e., the accused/appellant, who touched her private part and even performed pelvic thrusts while lying upon her. It is further alleged that the victim/PW-2 informed him that the accused/appellant had sexually assaulted her from the moment she was studying in Class V. Accordingly, the Investigating Officer, i.e., PW-6, took up the investigation and recorded the statement of the victim/PW-2 and the informant and other witnesses and also arrested the accused/appellant and interrogated him. After completion of the investigation, he submitted a charge-sheet by Charge-sheet No. 51/2017 dated 14.09.2017 against the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Thereafter, the Trial Court framed charges against the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act and, accordingly, commenced the trial. During the trial, the prosecution adduced a total number of six witnesses, including the victim/PW-2, wherein the accused/appellant, except for generally denying all the incriminating circumstances put before him under Section 313 Cr.PC, did not adduce any defence witnesses. 4. After completion of the aforesaid trial, the Trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and sentenced thereof accordingly. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the present criminal appeal. 5. Mr. 4. After completion of the aforesaid trial, the Trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and sentenced thereof accordingly. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the present criminal appeal. 5. Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the accused/appellant, submits that though the alleged incident occurred in the year 2012, the FIR had been filed only in 2017, and hence, the delay that occurred in filing the FIR is totally fatal to the prosecution case, and hence, the impugned conviction and sentence is totally erroneous. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Thulia Kali Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393 . 6. He further submits that though in the FIR, the informant/PW-1 stated that the victim/PW-2 first informed to her friend and thereafter to relatives about the alleged incident and it was his sister who had thereafter informed him, however, none of these witnesses who have been reported by the informant to whom the victim/PW-2 has first reported the incident had been examined by the prosecution. He further submits that though the victim/PW-2 in her statement under Section 164 Cr.PC recorded before the Judicial Magistrate has stated that she had told her friend who later on told her mother about the incident, however, during her deposition before the Court, she did not depose the same. He accordingly submits that there are inconsistencies as far as the reporting of the incident by the victim is concerned, and hence, the testimony of the victim/PW-2 cannot be said to be wholly trustworthy and of sterling quality. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Krishan Kumar Malik Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130 . 7. Per contra, Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State respondent, submits that as far as the factum of the allegation of sexual assault is concerned, the victim/PW-2 had reiterated the version right from her initial statement recorded before the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.PC, statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC, and in her deposition made before the Trial Court. Public Prosecutor for the State respondent, submits that as far as the factum of the allegation of sexual assault is concerned, the victim/PW-2 had reiterated the version right from her initial statement recorded before the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.PC, statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC, and in her deposition made before the Trial Court. She further submits that there has been no inconsistency as far as the manner in which she has narrated the entire incident of the alleged sexual assault committed by the accused/appellant right from 2012, since she was studying in Class 5. She further submits that the version of the victim/PW-2 has also been corroborated by PW-1 and the FIR, which was lodged by PW-1. She further submits that the defence has not been able to shake the testimony of both the victim/PW-2 and informant/PW-1. 8. She further draws the attention of this Court to the statement made by the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC examination; she submits that the accused/appellant has categorically confessed before the Investigating Officer as regards his guilt of sexual assault. In support of the aforesaid submission, she relies upon the following decisions: 1) Lok Mal Alias Loku Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2025) 4 SCC 470. 2) Just Rights for Children Alliance & Another Vs. S. Harish & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611. 3) Tulshidas Kanolkar Vs. State of Goa , (2003) 8 SCC 590. 9. Mr. H. Zodinsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel, similarly submitted before this Court in support of the conviction rendered by the Trial Court. 10. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties and also perused the material available on record and also perused the case laws cited at the bar. 11. This criminal appeal being an appeal against conviction, we are apt to analyze and re-appreciate the evidence on record. 12. PW-1, the father of the victim, deposed before this Court that upon being informed by his brother that the victim/PW-2 was sexually assaulted by her maternal grandfather, he enquired the same. He further deposed that since he and his wife had been separated by way of divorce, the victim/PW-2, ever since she was a small child had been living with her mother and the accused/appellant. He further deposed that since he and his wife had been separated by way of divorce, the victim/PW-2, ever since she was a small child had been living with her mother and the accused/appellant. He further deposed that as his wife after divorce remarried another person, the victim/PW-2 continued living with the accused/appellant. He further deposed that the incident of sexual assault came to light some months back when the victim/PW-2 narrated the incident to her friends, who in turn narrated the matter to close relatives of the victim/PW-2. He further deposed that his sister told him about the incident, and as soon as he came to know about the incident, he called the victim/PW-2 and inquired details about the same. He further deposed that the victim/PW-2, upon being inquired, told him that since long back, the accused/appellant used to sexually assault her by touching her vagina and by mounting upon her and thrusting his body against her while sleeping in bed. He further deposed that the victim/PW-2 also told him that the accused/appellant used to take out his penis and rub it against her vagina. He further deposed that since the incident was a serious case of sexual assault, he submitted an FIR as per the statement of the victim/P-2 and that the incident of sexual assault last took place on the night of 20.08.2017. During cross examination, he clarified that the victim/PW-2, upon being inquired, stated to him that since she was studying in Class 5, the accused/appellant had been sexually assaulting her. He further clarified that though the victim/PW-2 came to stay with him 2/3 times while she was staying with the accused/appellant, she never said anything. He further deposed that after the incident, the victim/PW-2 since did not want to stay with him; she was given to the custody and care of the Child Welfare Committee at Champhai. 13. PW-2 is the victim herself, who deposed before the Trial Court that she was born on 03.11.2002, and after her mother and father got divorced, she and her mother returned back to the house of the accused/appellant, and later on her mother married another person. However, she continued living with the accused/appellant. She further deposed that she was reading in Class 5 in the year 2012, and during that period the accused/appellant started assaulting her by touching and playing with her vagina. However, she continued living with the accused/appellant. She further deposed that she was reading in Class 5 in the year 2012, and during that period the accused/appellant started assaulting her by touching and playing with her vagina. She further deposed that whenever he assaulted her in such a way, he would undress her and also take off his pants and that he did such acts of sexual assault many times upon her. She further deposed that on the night of 20.08.2017 at around 11:00 pm, while she was sleeping on her bed, the accused/appellant came to her bed and pulled down her underpants and also pulled down his underpants, and thereafter, he mounted upon her and rubbed his penis against her vagina and then started stroking again and again but never inserted his penis into her vagina. She further deposed that the accused/appellant never inserted his penis or his fingers into her vagina. She further deposed that after she narrated the incident to her father, i.e., PW-1, he submitted an FIR to the Jurisdictional Police Station. During cross examination, she clarified that she did not disclose the matter of the assault to her mother. She further clarified that her parents, including the accused/appellant, took good care of her with love and support and that she is not afraid of the accused/appellant. She further clarified that the accused/appellant never physically hurt her while he rubbed his penis on her vagina or his fingers. 14. PW-3 and PW-4 are the seizure witnesses, out of which PW- 3 did not turn up before the Trial Court to give his evidence. PW-4 during evidence, deposed that he has witnessed the seizing of the Birth Certificate of the victim in which the signature appears as Exhibit P-1. 15. PW-5 is the Doctor, who medically examined the victim/PW- 2 deposed that the victim is 15 years of age when she was brought to her by the Police on 21.08.2017 for medical examination. She further deposed that upon examination, she found her physically healthy and mentally normal with no seminal stains and no marks of violence in her body. She further deposed that pubic are present but seminal stain is absent. She further deposed that there was no bruising nor laceration on her external genital and her hymen was almost completely ruptured. She further deposed that upon examination, she found her physically healthy and mentally normal with no seminal stains and no marks of violence in her body. She further deposed that pubic are present but seminal stain is absent. She further deposed that there was no bruising nor laceration on her external genital and her hymen was almost completely ruptured. She accordingly exhibited the Medical Examination Report of the victim/PW-2 as Exhibit P-3 and exhibited her signature as Exhibit P-3 (a). During cross examination, she deposed that the almost ruptured hymen of the victim could be caused not only by the accused/appellant but also by others. 16. PW-6, who is the Investigating Officer, deposed that he conducted the investigation wherein he recorded the statement of all relevant witnesses. He further deposed that the accused/appellant confessed before him that one night, he touched the thigh and private part of the victim/PW-2, and then he often used to touch and play with the thigh and private part of the victim/PW-2. He further confessed that he used to let his penis touch the private part of the victim, but he stated that he never inserted his penis inside the vagina of the victim/PW-2. 17. He further deposed that the victim/PW-2 also stated before him on 20.08.2017 that while the rest of her family members were away and at around 11:00 pm, the accused/appellant came on her bed and molested her by touching, caressing, and playing with her private part. He mounted upon her and touched her private part with his penis. The victim/PW-2 also added that he further deposed that the victim also disclosed to him that since 2012, while she was studying in Class 5, the accused/appellant started sexually molesting her and outraging her modesty and that he did it often. He further deposed that she also said that since he did it so often, she could not remember how many times she was sexually molested by him. He further deposed that the accused/appellant confessed to him that the accused/appellant had sexually molested her on 28.08.2017 and also stated that the victim/PW-2 told him that since she was studying in Class 5, the accused/appellant used to frequently molest her and outrage her modesty. He thereafter exhibited the Medical Examination Report, Birth Certificate and all the other documents. He further deposed that the accused/appellant confessed to him that the accused/appellant had sexually molested her on 28.08.2017 and also stated that the victim/PW-2 told him that since she was studying in Class 5, the accused/appellant used to frequently molest her and outrage her modesty. He thereafter exhibited the Medical Examination Report, Birth Certificate and all the other documents. During cross-examination, he accepted the suggestion made by the defence counsel that the FIR was not submitted on the date of the incident but was submitted on 01.09.2017. 18. After closure of the prosecution evidence, all the incriminating circumstances were put before the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC, which reads as hereunder:- “FTSC (CPI) C/No POCSO NO: 15/2021 SC No. 174/2017 Crl.Trl.No. 1397/2017 Ref KZL PS.C/No.48/17 Dt.01.09.17 U/S 10 POCSO ACT Q(1) It is alleged that you had sexually assaulted the victim several times since 2012 till 20/08/2017. Do you have anything to say on this? Ans:-While bathing I may touched even her private part. Q(2) The victim stated before the court that in the year 2012 I was reading in class-V and during that period my maternal grandfather started sexually assaulting me touching and playing with my vagina. Whenever he assaulted me in such away he put undress me and put off his pant. Do you like to say something on this? Ans:- It is not a fact. Q(3) The victim further stated before the court that the Accused used to pull down her underpant and also pull down his underpant and then mounted upon her and rub his penis against her vagina but never inserted his penis/finger into her vagina. Have you anything to say on this? Ans:- It is not a fact. Q(4) The Medical Doctor on examination of the victim reported that the hymen of the victim was almost completely ruptured. Have you anything to say on this? Ans:- I do not know anything about it. Q(5) As per the alleged Birth Certificate the victim was born on 03.11.2002. Do you like to say anything on this? Ans:- I do not remember her date of Birth. Q(6) SI. R Lalremruata, Pw-6 deposed before the court that the Accused confessed his guil before him and that the victim is his grand-daughter and they live together under the same house since 2007 till date of complaint. Is it correct? Ans:- Yes, it is correct. Ans:- I do not remember her date of Birth. Q(6) SI. R Lalremruata, Pw-6 deposed before the court that the Accused confessed his guil before him and that the victim is his grand-daughter and they live together under the same house since 2007 till date of complaint. Is it correct? Ans:- Yes, it is correct. Q(7) Do you like to depose before the court for your defence and also examining other witnesses? Ans:- I do not have any defence witness. Illegible Illegible (Signature of mark of the accused (Signature of P.O/Judge)” 19. In a case of sexual assault on a minor girl, what is important to keep in mind is that a minor girl, that too of the age of 15 years at the time of occurrence, would not ordinarily lie about being sexually assaulted. Therefore, the version of the victim/PW-2 has to be considered with utmost care before discerning the same. In fact, if the version of the victim/PW-2 inspires confidence and appears to be trustworthy, credible, unblemished, and of sterling quality, no further corroboration is required for convicting the accused. 20. In Ganesan Vs. State represented by its Inspector of Police , reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573 , the Apex Court has observed and held that where the testimony of the victim is found reliable, trustworthy, and reiterated, conviction on the basis of her testimony is permissible. The Apex Court observed as under:- “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay, it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: "9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.' 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12). '12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.' 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty- bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) '8. ... The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) '8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." (emphasis in original) 12. In State of Orissa v. ThakaraBesra, this Court held that rape not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi). In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) "22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged." 21. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Pankaj Chaudhary reported in (2019) 11 SSC 575 , the Apex Court has held as under:- "29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming." [State of Rajasthan v. N.?.]. 22. In Sham Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Apex Court has observed and held at paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:- "6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. 22. In Sham Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 , the Apex Court has observed and held at paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:- "6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh3 (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self- respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam4.)" 23. Therefore, the test is to take the testimony of the victim/PW-2 in the context of the facts of each case and to ascertain whether her testimony can be said to be trustworthy, reliable, credible, and of sterling quality. In doing so, whether this surrounding circumstance deposed by her is supported by other witnesses or not and the manner in which she has recounted the incident right from the beginning to the end, amongst others, are also to be taken into account. It appears that the victim/PW-2 in the present case has been consistently maintaining her version as regards the accused/appellant touching her thigh with sexual intent, right from her initial statement made before the Investigating Officer till her deposition before the Trial Court. 24. Relevant portion of the victim’s statement made before the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.PC (translated version) as provided by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor reads as under:- “My particulars are as above. I used to live with my maternal grandfather at Lungtan due to the separation of my parents. Presently, I read in Class-X at Lungtan. In the year 2007, my parents were separated. Due to the said separation, my mother and I moved back to my maternal grandparents house at Lungtan. On dt.20.08.2017, during the absence of the other family members, at around 11:00 pm, my grandfather Sh. Laltluanga came to my bed, touching my private part and rubbed his penis against my vagina. Lying on top of me, he thrust himself upon me, being terrified I did not have the nerve to shout, however he did not insert his penis into my vagina. Laltluanga came to my bed, touching my private part and rubbed his penis against my vagina. Lying on top of me, he thrust himself upon me, being terrified I did not have the nerve to shout, however he did not insert his penis into my vagina. My grandfather, from the year 2012, while I was reading in Class-V, used to call/lead me inside the bedroom, took off my underpant, touched my thigh, rubbed his penis against my private part, and those type of incident happened numerous times, the numbers which I cannot recount. My father therefore submitted an FIR at Khawzawl PS in this regard.” 25. Relevant portion of the victim’s statement made before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC reads as under:- “Ref: KZL-P.S C/No.48/17 dated 1.9.2017 u/s 10 POCSO Act Sir, Laltluanga is my maternal grandfather. As my mother re-married another person from Lungtan, I stayed with my grandparents ever since I was very young. My grandfather Laltluanga had been touching my private part from the time I was studying in class-V and he would also let his private part touch mine. Even though I slept on a separate bed, my grandfather would come to my bed and touch me in this manner. I have never told this to anyone however on 20.8.2017, he again touched my private part and he made his private part touch mine. He however would not insert it. I told this to my friends and they in turn told my mother and my father decided to lodge an FIR. My grandfather would usually touch me after I sleep at night and I would then wake up. I dare not resist as I was scared. Q. Does he at least insert his finger? Ans: No, he does not.” 26. Reading of the aforesaid statements by the victim/PW-2 before the Police Officer as well as the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.PC, it appears that she has disclosed that the accused/appellant, since she was studying in Class 5 and living with the accused/appellant, used to touch her private part and also would let his private part touch hers. The core spectrum of the allegation of sexual assault as narrated by her right from the beginning till the end, i.e., in her deposition before the Trial Court, appears to be detailed, natural, reiterated, and consistent. The core spectrum of the allegation of sexual assault as narrated by her right from the beginning till the end, i.e., in her deposition before the Trial Court, appears to be detailed, natural, reiterated, and consistent. In order to bring home an offence under Section 7 for which punishment is given under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, it is essential for the prosecution to establish that the accused/appellant has, amongst others, committed an act with sexual intent that involves physical contact without penetration. 27. Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “7. Sexual assault.—Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.” 28. Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “9. Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “9. Aggravated sexual assault.—(a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits sexual assault on a child— (i) within the limits of the police station or premises where he is appointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or (iv) where he is known as, or identified as a police officer; or (b) whoever, being a member of the armed forces or security forces, commits sexual assault on a child— (i) within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed; or (ii) in any areas under the command of the security or armed forces; or (iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or (iv) where he is known or identified as a member of the security or armed forces; or (c) whoever being a public servant commits sexual assault on a child; or (d) whoever being on the management or on the staff of a jail, or remand home or protection home or observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time being in force commits sexual assault on a child being inmate of such jail or remand home or protection home or observation home or other place of custody or care and protection; or (e) whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or (f) whoever being on the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits sexual assault on a child in that institution; or (g) whoever commits gang sexual assault on a child. Explanation.—when a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance of their common intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone; or (h) whoever commits sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or corrosive substance; or (i) whoever commits sexual assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or (j) whoever commits sexual assault on a child, which— (i) physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l) of section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987) or causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or permanently; or (ii) inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency Virus or any other life threatening disease or infection which may either temporarily or permanently impair the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks; or (k) whoever, taking advantage of a child’s mental or physical disability, commits sexual assault on the child; or (l) whoever commits sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or (m) whoever commits sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n) whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child; or (o) whoever, being in the ownership or management or staff, of any institution providing services to the child, commits sexual assault on the child in such institution; or (p) whoever, being in a position of trust or authority of a child, commits sexual assault on the child in an institution or home of the child or anywhere else; or (q) whoever commits sexual assault on a child knowing the child is pregnant; or (r) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and attempts to murder the child; or (s) whoever commits sexual assault on a child in the course of communal or sectarian violence or during any natural calamity or in any similar situations]; or (t) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and who has been previously convicted of having committed any offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being in force; or (u) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and makes the child to strip or parade naked in public; [(v) whoever persuades, induces, entices or coerces a child to get administered or administers or direct anyone to administer, help in getting administered any drug or hormone or any chemical substance, to a child with the intent that such child attains early sexual maturity,] is said to commit aggravated sexual assault.” 29. Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under:- “10. Punishment for aggravated sexual assault.—Whoever, commits aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 30. In the instant case, the allegation of the accused/appellant touching the vagina of the victim/PW-2 and the accused/appellant rubbing his penis into the vagina of the victim/PW-2 is corroborated with the testimony of PW-1, who clearly in his evidence has deposed that the victim/PW-2 has also told him the same upon being inquired. Thus, keeping in mind the surrounding facts coupled with the victim/PW-2’s consistent recounting of the allegation of physical contact made by the accused/appellant with the victim with sexual intent, this Court is of the unhesitant view that the testimony of the victim/PW-2 is trustworthy, credible, and of sterling quality, and hence, the same is believable. That being so, no further corroboration is required, and a conviction on the basis of such testimony is clearly maintainable. 31. This takes me to the arguments advanced by the learned Amicus Curiae to the fact that there has been delay in lodging the FIR. Admittedly, though the incident occurred in the year 2012, the FIR was lodged only in the year 2017, however, such delay in cases arising out of offences under the POCSO Act is not fatal in every case, and the same has to be examined in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, there is nothing unnatural or unusual about a girl child of 15 years, who is staying with her grandparents after her parents have gotten a divorce, being sexually assaulted by her own grandfather with whom she is residing, keeping silent for a long time and not disclosing the alleged incident to anyone. Thus, this Court cannot disbelief her, only because she gathered her courage to speak of the alleged sexual assault committed by her grandfather after so many years, that too, when the surrounding facts are also supporting her version. 32. It is worthwhile to mention that it appears from the testimony of the Investigating Officer/PW-6 that the accused/appellant has confessed before him that he has committed the sexual assault as alleged by the victim. 32. It is worthwhile to mention that it appears from the testimony of the Investigating Officer/PW-6 that the accused/appellant has confessed before him that he has committed the sexual assault as alleged by the victim. Further, it appears that the accused/appellant has also admitted in his 313 Cr.PC examination that he has confessed the same before the Investigating Officer/PW-6. 33. This takes me now to the next contention of Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae that though the victim/PW-2 has stated in her 164 Cr.PC statement that she first reported the incident to her friends, none of her friends/relatives were examined and that the victim/PW-2 during her deposition before the Court has not mentioned the same, and hence, her version is inconsistent. The aforesaid contention cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, upon a careful perusal of the testimony of the victim made before the Trial Court, it appears that nowhere, has she said that she first reported the incident of the alleged sexual assault committed upon her by her grandfather to her father; rather, she has only said that it was only after she told her father that her father reported the same to the Police Station and in fact, she clarified in her cross-examination that she never told her mother about the alleged incident. Thus, there is no contradiction as far as her reporting of the incident is concerned; rather, she may have omitted to mention during her deposition before the Trial Court that she has also told the incident to her friends. Thus, merely because she has omitted to depose before the Court as regards her informing her friends, that itself cannot be a ground to throw away the testimony of the victim/PW-2 as unbelievable when otherwise her testimony is wholly trustworthy, credible, and unblemished. Hence, such omission is of no consequence. 34. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances of the case, an offence under Section 9 of the POCSO Act, 2012, is clearly made out, for which punishment is prescribed under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 35. Turning now to the Judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has held as under:- “On careful consideration of submissions of both the counsels, all the evidences, materials and documents available in the record it is ascertain that the Accused Laltluanga had aggravated sexually assaulted the victim on the night of 20.08.2017. 35. Turning now to the Judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has held as under:- “On careful consideration of submissions of both the counsels, all the evidences, materials and documents available in the record it is ascertain that the Accused Laltluanga had aggravated sexually assaulted the victim on the night of 20.08.2017. Her statement is corroborated with that of her statement recorded by Magistrate 1st Class at Champhai u/s 164 Cr.P.C. Not only that the statement of the Medical Doctors also corroborated the statement of the victim to the extent of sexual assault. Section 29 of POCSO ACT, 2012 runeth as follows:- "Presumption as to certain offences.-Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under section 3,5,7 and section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved." In this present case there is no any contrary proved against the allegation. Therefore, the statement of the victim inspired confidence and is found reliable. The Apex Court ruled in Ranjit Hazarika Vs State of Assam (1998) 8 SCC. 635 that "the court should find not difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an Accused when her testimony inspired confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a ruled, in such cases amount to adding insult to injury." From the decisions of the Apex Court Supra there is no point to distrust the statement of the victim in this case. Her statement inspired confidence and rely upon. The submissions of Ld.D/L in connection with compounding offence appears not acceptable to this court as there is no provision of law for compounding an offence under Prevention Of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Considering all the available materials, documents, evidences and submissions of Ld.counsels this point is decided in favour of the prosecution by convicting the Accused Laltluanga under the charge section of law. 8. Considering all the available materials, documents, evidences and submissions of Ld.counsels this point is decided in favour of the prosecution by convicting the Accused Laltluanga under the charge section of law. 8. From the points of decisions and the reasons thereof above this court convicted the Accused Laltluanga S/o Khawchhana(L) of Lungtan Village who had violated clause (n) of section 9 of POCSO ACT, 2012 and thereby liable to be convicted u/s 10 of POCSO ACT, 2012 for his aggravated sexually assault upon the victim. Therefore, the Accused Laltluanga is accordingly convicted u/s 10 of POCSO ACT, 2012. On being his conviction the bail-bond stands cancelled and the bailor/surety be discharged from the liability of the bail- bond. Prepare fresh Commitment Warrant for the said convict Laltluanga. 9. As the alleged offence prescribed minimum punishment it is decided that sentence hearing may also be held on the day of Judgment. The punishment prescribed u/s 10 of POCSO Act, 2012 is "with an imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extent to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” The court heard the Accused/Ld.D/L and Spl.pp on the question of sentence as per required under sub-section (2) of section 325 Criminal Procedure Court, 1973. The Accused/D/L prays for leniency views on the term of sentence. Ld.spl.PP prays for a maximum punishment as per law. Considered both the submissions and prayers carefully and decided the convict Laltluanga s/o Khawchhana(L) of Lungtan Village is sentence to R.I for a period of 5(five) years and with a fine of Rs.1000/-(Rupees one thousand) only I.d SI for 1(one) month. Detention period as already undergone by the convict Laltluanga in connection with this case shall be set off from the term of sentence.” 36. Reading the aforesaid Judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim/PW-2 by believing her allegation of sexual assault to be truthful. That being so, this Court finds no legal infirmity or illegality with the judgment and conviction of the Trial Court. Hence, the appeal fails. 37. Accordingly, the criminal appeal stands dismissed and is disposed of. 38. This Court appreciates the service rendered by Mr. That being so, this Court finds no legal infirmity or illegality with the judgment and conviction of the Trial Court. Hence, the appeal fails. 37. Accordingly, the criminal appeal stands dismissed and is disposed of. 38. This Court appreciates the service rendered by Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae, and his fee is fixed at Rs. 7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred) only, and the service rendered by Mr. H. Zodinsanga, Legal Aid Counsel and his requisite fee is to be paid by the State Legal Services Authority as per existing rates. 39. Send back the Trial Court Record.