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2025 DIGILAW 1147 (RAJ)

Vyavasthapak Murliwala Agro. Ltd. v. Kanhaiya Lal

2025-04-23

BIRENDRA KUMAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. A brief background leading to this civil revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is that the petitioners jointly moved an application before the “Authority” on 15.07.1999 under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (the Act) claiming wages for overtime work done by them in view of the provisions under Section 15 (2) read with 16 of the said Act. The said petition was registered as PW-38 of 99 (ALC) and by judgment dated 31.03.2006, prayer of the petitioners was allowed. 3. The said order was challenged in appeal under Section 17 of the said Act before the Civil Court and by the impugned judgment dated 13.02.2007 passed in Civil Misc. Appeal No.44/2006, the learned District Judge, Udaipur set aside the judgment of the Authority. 4. The case and claim of the petitioners is that they were employed as wagers with respondent factory M/s Murliwala Agrotek Limited for the period 01.07.1998 to 30.06.1999. The petitioners asserted that petitioner-Bhagwati Lal was getting Rs.1466/- for 12 hours work and other petitioners were getting Rs.1250/- for their 12 hours work. As per law, the employer could take 8 hours work only. Hence, the aforesaid wage was for 8 hours work and the petitioners were entitled for overtime of 4 hours, which would be double the amount payable for 8 hours work. 5. The respondent contested the claim of the petitioners by asserting that the petitioners were not engaged by the factory ever. Rather they were working with contractor-Ramswaroop and Ramswaroop had engaged them for work of the factory and only Ramswaroop knows that which of the petitioner did work on which date and for what hour. Moreover, there was no agreement for overtime payment hence, the petitioners cannot claim wages for overtime. 6. The authority under the Act found that in Case No.68/1999, the Civil Court, Mavli had held that the petitioners were regular worker of the respondent, as such, they were entitled for payment of wages for overtime work done by them. The aforesaid judgment got finality hence, the Authority took the view that the petitioners were regular worker of the respondent. Moreover, the petitioners had produced some of the registers and provident fund receipts as well as identity card issued by the Employees State Insurance Company to support that they were regular worker of the respondent. The aforesaid judgment got finality hence, the Authority took the view that the petitioners were regular worker of the respondent. Moreover, the petitioners had produced some of the registers and provident fund receipts as well as identity card issued by the Employees State Insurance Company to support that they were regular worker of the respondent. The petitioners had filed application before the Authority asking the respondent to produce certain documents in possession of the respondent, which would prove the claim of the petitioners to be regular wager of the respondent, but the respondent did not produce the same, hence, adverse inference was drawn. 7. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal on two grounds, first that payment of overtime was not part of the service contract and second that since the wages claimed by the petitioners exceeded the ceiling of Rs.1600/- as provided under Section 1(6) of the said Act, hence, the claim cannot be allowed. 8. Mr. Harish Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that as per the definition of “wages” under Section 2(vi) of the Act, the overtime work done and the wages payable is also covered under the definition of the wages. Hence, the Appellate Court erred in law in going against the mandate of law and acting on conjectures and surmises that there was no contract between the parties for overtime. 9. Learned counsel contends that it was established by evidence that the petitioners and others were working in two shifts in a day and each shift was divided by 12 hours. 10. Learned counsel contends that under Section 48 of the Factories Act , if the worker works in a factory for more than 48 hours in any week, then he shall be entitled to receive the wages on the head “overtime”. 11. Mr. Pankaj Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent contends that it was burden of the petitioners to prove the facts pleaded and they cannot claim benefit of the weakness of the case of the respondent. Even if the respondent had not produced any document on being asked, the petitioners were bound to prove those facts beyond doubt. 12. 11. Mr. Pankaj Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent contends that it was burden of the petitioners to prove the facts pleaded and they cannot claim benefit of the weakness of the case of the respondent. Even if the respondent had not produced any document on being asked, the petitioners were bound to prove those facts beyond doubt. 12. On perusal of the statutory provisions and evidence on the record, this Court finds substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners had performed overtime work with the respondent for which they were entitled for overtime wages irrespective of the fact that there was no specific stipulation in the agreement between the parties. It is worth to notice that no copy of agreement was produced on the record. 13. It is worth to notice that no copy of agreement was produced on the record. 13. Section 2(vi) of the Act reads as follows : (vi) "wages" means all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances, or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes- (a) any remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court; (b) any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of overtime work or holidays or any leave period; (c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name); (d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum, whether with or without deductions, but does not provide for the time within which the payment is to be made; (e) any sum to which the person emploved is entitled under any scheme framed under any law for the time being in force, but does not include: (1) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not form part of the remuneration payable under the terms of employment or which is not payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court; (2) the value of any house-accommodation, or of the supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service excluded from the computation of wages by a general or special order of the appropriate Government]; (3) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension or provident fund, and the interest which may have accrued thereon; (4) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; (5) any sum paid to the employed person to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or (6) any gratuity payable on the termination of employment in cases other than those specified in sub-clause (d).]” 14. Evidently, the case is covered under Clause (b). As such for overtime work done, the wages of the petitioners remain due with the respondent. Evidently, the case is covered under Clause (b). As such for overtime work done, the wages of the petitioners remain due with the respondent. In view of the statutory provision, the Appellate Court exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity inasmuch as it did not meet with the reasons of the “Authority” nor acted consistent with the statutory provision aforesaid. The statutory provisions under the Payment of Wages Act as well as Factories Act are to protect the interest of the workmen engaged in the factory. It is not disputed that the petitioners had worked everyday for 12 hours. It is also not controverted that provisions of Section 48 of the Factories Act require that if the worker works in a factory for more than 48 hours in a week, then he shall be entitled to receive wages on the head “overtime”. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners filed applications claiming overtime wages on 15.07.1999. The Authority passed the judgment on 31.03.2006. In the meantime, amended provisions under Section 1(6) came into force with effect from 09.11.2005. 16. Provision 1(6) of the Act read as follows : “1(6) This Act applies to wages payable to an employed person in respect of a wage period if such wages for that wage period do not exceed [eighteen thousand rupees] per month or such other higher sum which, on the basis of figures of the Consumer Expenditure Survey published by the National Sample Survey Organisation, the Central Government may, after every five years, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.” 17. Learned counsel submits that purpose of determining the wages of the petitioners is just to ensure the applicability of the Act and the learned Appellate Court wrongly included the claim of overtime with the wages earned by the petitioners. The Appellate Court was of the view that the petitioners had demanded Rs.2500 and Rs.2932 respectively. Hence, their claim was not entertainable in view of the statutory provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act. Since, the amended provision of Section 1(6) was already there on the date of order by the Authority, as such, the claim of the petitioners could not have been rejected for the aforesaid reason. 18. Hence, their claim was not entertainable in view of the statutory provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act. Since, the amended provision of Section 1(6) was already there on the date of order by the Authority, as such, the claim of the petitioners could not have been rejected for the aforesaid reason. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent simply supports the finding of the Appellate Court on the aforesaid count but does not dispute the legal position that amended provision was already there when the Authority passed the order. 19. Since, the Appellate Court has acted contrary to law, the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court stands hereby set aside and the order of the Authority is hereby affirmed. 20. Accordingly, the civil revision stands allowed. 21. Since, a cross-objection is not permissible in a civil revision petition, hence, S.B. Civil Cross-objection No.1/2011 stands dismissed as not maintainable.