ORDER : Ananda Sen, J. By filing this writ petition, petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: - A) The office order dated 29.03.2014 issued by the General Manager (P&IR) C.C. (Annexure 6) be quashed. B) The office order dated 10.04.2014 issued by the Staff Officer (P&A) whereby and whereunder the application of the petitioner for retirement under Medical Ground has been rejected (Annexure 7) be quashed. C) The Respondents be directed not to give effect to the office orders dated 10.04.2014 and 29.03.2014 issued by the staff Officer and General Manager (P&IR) C.C.L. Ranchi and to pass a fresh order according to Para-9.4.0(I). D) The Respondents be directed to consider the case of the petitioner afresh under the provision of Para 9.4.0(I) which is applicable in the case of the petitioner and to pass a final order within a stipulated period. E) The Respondents be directed to accept the application of his resignation under Medical ground under 9.4.0(I) of the NCWA as the disablement of the petitioner arises from injury consequent upon an accident which is permanent in nature resulting into loss of employment. F) The Respondents be directed to treat the petitioner as retired under Medical ground under Para 9.4.0(I) NCWA and to extend all consequential benefits thereon. G) The Respondents be directed to consider the case of the petitioner under Para 9.4.0(I) and to provide employment to his dependent/son under the scheme. H) The Respondents be directed not to discriminate the petitioner and to extend the same benefits of retirement vis-à-vis employment to his dependent at par with the same and similar situated person. I) The Respondents be directed to refer the cause of the petitioner again before the Medical Board for its report as required for retirement under Medical ground under Para 9.4.0(I) NCWA. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Loader. While he was posted as Senior Lineman in N.K. Area, on 29.04.2013, in course of returning from duty, he met with an accident. He sustained compound fractures because of the said accident. He was admitted in the CCL Hospital on 29.04.2013 and was referred to Apollo Hospital for further treatment on 02.05.2013. On 19.05.2013, he was discharged from the Apollo Hospital, but was again admitted to the CCL Hospital on 20.05.2013. In the Apollo Hospital, he had undergone surgery as there were several injuries including abdomen injuries, chest injuries and multiple fractures. He was admitted in the CCL Hospital on 29.04.2013 and was referred to Apollo Hospital for further treatment on 02.05.2013. On 19.05.2013, he was discharged from the Apollo Hospital, but was again admitted to the CCL Hospital on 20.05.2013. In the Apollo Hospital, he had undergone surgery as there were several injuries including abdomen injuries, chest injuries and multiple fractures. Often as a result of the said injuries, he had to be hospitalized. It is the case of the petitioner that since he was seriously injured and injury was permanent in nature, he was not in a position to stand and move, which is a permanent disability. He is medically unfit to perform his duties. On 31.07.2013, he made an application before the Project Officer, N.K. Area, Central Coalfields Limited mentioning that as he was not in a position to perform his duties due to serious injuries. He invoked Clause 9.4.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) and sought employment for his dependent son under the said scheme. No action was taken on his application. Petitioner was directed to submit an application in proper format. His application was referred to the General Manager. The Area Screening Committee consulted the petitioner and found that he is not able to perform the duties due to the said accident and his case is fit for reference. Vide letter dated 29.03.2014, the matter was referred to the Medical Department, but the same was returned with a remark that the petitioner has left with less than two years of service on the date of his application, therefore, in terms of Clause 9.4.0 of NCWA, he is not entitled for any relief. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the rejection of petitioner’s application is absolutely bad as the case of the petitioner should have been considered under Clause 9.4.0(i) of NCWA and not in terms of Clause 9.4.0(ii) of NCWA. Since there is a provision that one of the dependents should be employed in place of the employee, if he is medically unfit, the benefit should have been extended to the petitioner and his son should have been appointed in terms of the provisions of NCWA. Since the injury resulting in disablement is permanent and had resulted in loss of employment, he is governed by Clause 9.4.0(i) of NCWA. Since the injury resulting in disablement is permanent and had resulted in loss of employment, he is governed by Clause 9.4.0(i) of NCWA. The respondents erroneously considered his case in terms of Clause 9.4.0(ii), which is absolutely not applicable. Admittedly, he was returning from duty when the accident had occurred. Thus, rejection of the application by the respondents is bad. 4. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, by referring to the Counter Affidavit, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the petitioner met with an accident and sustained injuries on his leg on 29.04.2013. The respondents admitted that the petitioner remained under treatment in CCL Hospital and other hospital. He applied for his retirement on medical ground on 31.04.2013 and claimed employment of his son. The Board found that he had less than two years of service left, thus, as per NCWA, he is not entitled for the said benefit. It has been further stated that for the entire period the petitioner was paid the salary in terms of Clause 9.4.2 of NCWA, which is the salary paid on account of injury on duty (IOD). The petitioner did not claim the said amount only for the last three months of his service, i.e., for July 2014 to September 2014 and he superannuated in September 2014, thus, there is no loss of employment. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that since there is no loss of employment, petitioner is not entitled for any relief. 5. After going through the pleadings of the parties, I find that the petitioner had sustained injuries after meeting with an accident, while he was returning from duty. Clause 9.4.0 of NCWA provides for employment to one dependent of worker, who is permanently disabled, in his place. Clause 9.4.0 reads as under: - “9.4.0 Employment to one dependant of a worker who is permanently disabled in his place. i) The disablement of the worker concerned should arise from injury or disease, be of a permanent nature resulting into loss of employment and it should be so certified by the Coal Company concerned. ii) In case of disablement arising out of general physical debility so certified by the Coal Company, the employee concerned will be eligible for the benefit under this clause if he/she is upto the age of 58 years. ii) In case of disablement arising out of general physical debility so certified by the Coal Company, the employee concerned will be eligible for the benefit under this clause if he/she is upto the age of 58 years. The term ‘general physical debility’ would mean deficiency of a workman due to any disease or other health reason leading to his/her duties regularly and/or efficiently. iii) The dependant for this purpose means the wife/ husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter, widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the employee and almost wholly dependent on the earning of the employee may be considered. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment would be governed by the provisions of Clause 9.5.0. iv) The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” 6. In this case, the petitioner claims that he is entitled for the benefit as prescribed in Clause 9.4.0(i). To get the benefit in terms of Clause 9.4.0(i), three conditions are inadvertently to be fulfilled, which are: - (i) The worker should suffer disablement arising out of injury or disease; (ii) Such disablement or injury should be permanent in nature; (iii) Such permanent disablement must result in loss of employment and it should be so certified by the Coal company concerned. 7. Though this clause does not provide that a person entitled for benefit in terms of Clause 9.4.0(i) should be less than 58 years, but the aforesaid conditions must be fulfilled. 8. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner was in the rolls of the Company and got superannuated on attaining the age of superannuation. Till his date of superannuation, he has been paid the wages, which was applicable for him, i.e., the wages for injury on duty. 8. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner was in the rolls of the Company and got superannuated on attaining the age of superannuation. Till his date of superannuation, he has been paid the wages, which was applicable for him, i.e., the wages for injury on duty. As per Clause 9.2.3 of NCWA, an employee, who is disable due to accident and during course of employment, is entitled to get full basic wages and D.A. from the date of his accident till he is declared medically fit by the Company’s Medical Officer. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioner has received the aforesaid amount for the period which he remained in service, except for the last three months, which he chose not to receive. 9. One of the very important conditions to get the benefit is there should be loss of employment. In this case, I find that there was no loss of employment as the petitioner was in the rolls of the Company till the last date of superannuation and received monthly wages, which he is entitled to as per the NCWA. Since he was in the rolls of the Company till his last date of superannuation, Clause 9.4.0 of the NCWA cannot be invoked, as it cannot be said that there was any loss of employment. 10. Another issue, which is to be dealt with in this case is whether an appointment can be granted on hereditary basis on whatsoever ground it may be. In this case, it has been placed before this Court that NCWA, which is an agreement between the Coal Companies and the Workers Union provides for appointment to dependent of injured where the employee injured is permanently disabled. This appointment is by way of nomination. Respondent Company is a Public Sector Undertaking and a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Every authority which is a “State” must strictly follow the constitutional provisions and mandate in respect of public employment. Withdrawing oneself from employment for any reason whatsoever and thereafter nominating his dependent for employment is not envisaged as a mode of appointment in the Constitution of India. This violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Every authority which is a “State” must strictly follow the constitutional provisions and mandate in respect of public employment. Withdrawing oneself from employment for any reason whatsoever and thereafter nominating his dependent for employment is not envisaged as a mode of appointment in the Constitution of India. This violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though there is an agreement, but if any agreement or any clause thereof is in direct conflict with the constitutional provisions in respect of public employment, the said agreement or clause thereof cannot get preference over the constitutional mandate. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat (Magadh Division) versus State of Bihar & Others [Special Leave Petition (C) No.18983 of 2023], at paragraphs 18, 26 and 27 thereof, while referring to an earlier decision in the case of Yogender Pal Singh versus Union of India [ (1987) 1 SCC 631 ] has held as under: - 18. In Yogender Pal Singh v. Union of India, this Court succinctly observed that rules whereby appointment was to be made from sons/near relatives of the persons already serving in the police force is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. The relevant observation reads thus: “18. We are of opinion that the claim made by the appellants for the relaxation of the Rules in their cases only because they happen to be the wards or children or relatives of the police officers has got to be negative since their claim is based on ‘descent’ only, and others will thereby be discriminated against as they do not happen to be the sons of police officers. Any preference shown in the matter of public employment on the grounds of descent only has to be declared as unconstitutional. The appellants have not shown that they were otherwise eligible to be recruited as Constables in the absence of the order of relaxation on which they relied. Hence they cannot succeed.” 26. It would, therefore, appear from the above that this Court has consistently deprecated the practice of appointment in public service as if public offices are heritable and has also upheld a law which abolished village officers being appointed on hereditary basis. Hence they cannot succeed.” 26. It would, therefore, appear from the above that this Court has consistently deprecated the practice of appointment in public service as if public offices are heritable and has also upheld a law which abolished village officers being appointed on hereditary basis. Importantly, the observation made in B.R. Shankarnarayana (supra) regarding the extent of the powers of a court to put a law to scrutiny which, in form, appears to be within the power of the legislature but, in substance, exceeds its reach has to be borne in mind while deciding whether the Division Bench could have struck down the offending proviso. 27. It is indeed surprising that despite the aforesaid precedents of the sixties of the past century declaring the law authoritatively and the decision in Surender Paswan (supra), which emerged from Bihar, as late as in 2014, the respondent no.1 again sought to make appointment on the post of chaukidar a heritable right in favour of the dependent kin of the chaukidar in service. The offending proviso being in the teeth of the precedents noted above, the same was rightly struck down by the Division Bench and the impugned judgment and order is unexceptionable on this score. 12. In view of what has been held herein before and also in consonance with the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case referred to above, I find no merit in this writ petition. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.