JUDGMENT : Amit Rawal, J. 1. Present appeal is directed against the order of the Single Bench whereby the discharge of the appellant – petitioner vide order dated 18.10.2014, Ext.P5, has been upheld. 2. The facts relevant for adjudication of the present intra court appeal are given hereunder: Appellant – petitioner was initially appointed as Apprentice Development Officer on 29.05.2013, joined the duty on 01.06.2013 and thereafter, as Probationary Development Officer, on 02.12.2013. The appointment letter contains several conditions including the one with regard to discharge from the service during the probation period without complying the principles of natural justice or holding any enquiry. Concededly, probation period was for a period of twelve(12) months which can be extended upto twenty four(24) months from the date of commencement of the probationary appointment. Without complying with the principles of natural justice, was discharged vide order dated 18.10.2014 Ext.P5, the same reads as under: “Your attention is invited to the Appointment letter Ref: Sales dated 30.11.2013. appointing you as Probationary Development Officer w.e.f 01.12.2013 and also to the various performance review letters dtd 15.01.2014, 19.02.2014, 04.03.2014. 05.03.2014, 16.4.2014, 08.05.2014, 06.06.2014, 06.05.2014, 05.07.2014, 06.08.2014. 11.09.2014 & 04.10.2014 issued to you by your Branch Manager, reviewing your monthly business performance. Your attention is also invited to the monthly review letters dtd 08.01.2014, 10.02.2014, 13.03.2014, 19.04.2014, 13.05.2014, 14.06.2014, 14.07.2014, 12.08.2014 & 12.09.2014 issued to you by the Marketing Manager, reviewing your performance and also to the official review meeting held at STC Kozhikode on 20th February 2014. Kindly recall the compliance given by you vide your reply letter dtd 21.07.2014 in response to the show cause notice issued to you by Manager Sales vide his letter dtd 09.06.2014. Your performances were also reviewed by the Divisional Marketing Officials during their official visit to the branch office. The following are the stipulated performance parameters for the period from 01.12.2013 to 30.11.2014 as per the Appointment letter Ref: Sales dated 30.11.2013: Norms Performance as on 15.10.2014 Minimum No. of lives 300 12 Minimum Scheduled First Year premium Income Rs.13,92,400/- Rs.86917/- Minimum No.of Agents to be recruited 15 10 Due to poor performance in all the three performance parameters, you are here by terminated from the Service of the Life Insurance Corporation of India as Probationary Development Officer with immediate effect, as outlined in Sl.No.6(A) of our Appointment letter Ref: No.Sales/ADO-2012-13 dated 29.05.2013. As per the terms of the aforesaid condition, you are advised to remit the liquidated damages and other dues, if any to your Branch Office.” 3. On perusal of the above, it is evident that the order is based upon his character of inefficiency which is stigmatic as per the ratio decidendi culled out in V.P.Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Others [ (2000) 3 SCC 239 ] as well as Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [ AIR 1958 SC 36 ]. Learned Single Bench, though noticed the judgment of V.P.Ahuja (supra), dismissed the matter vide judgment impugned, wherein in paragraphs 9 and 10, it has been held as under: “9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in V.P.Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Others: [ (2000) 3 SCC 239 ] in support of the contention that there cannot be an order of termination which casts a stigma and such orders cannot be passed without holding a regular enquiry and without giving opportunity of hearing to the employee. However, I find that the petitioner's services were not terminated on the basis of any complaint or any allegation relating to any misconduct, for which an enquiry was required. Ext.P2 order of appointment refers to the target to be achieved; petitioner does not have a case that he had reached anywhere near the target or minimum requirement mentioned in Ext.P2 order. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in D. Jeevan Lal v LIC of India, Secunderabad [(2010) SCC Online AP 765]. The said judgment was also one relating to the termination of service of a Probationary Development Officer during the period of probation. It was found that certain development officers were granted extension of probation while the petitioner therein was not granted. It was held that even though Corporation had the right to terminate the probation without assigning any reason, it cannot discriminate between the persons. The learned Judge found that the petitioner therein ought to have been accorded the very same treatment which was given to others who had not achieved the target, but granted extension of probation. In the present case petitioner refers to the case of one Muralimohan and Vipin. The respondents have explained the circumstances under which their probation were extended. The learned Judge found that the petitioner therein ought to have been accorded the very same treatment which was given to others who had not achieved the target, but granted extension of probation. In the present case petitioner refers to the case of one Muralimohan and Vipin. The respondents have explained the circumstances under which their probation were extended. It is also clear from the order Ext.P8 issued in the case of Shri Muralimohan, that he had only 3 more agents to be recruited; he had secured 232 polices. In the light of the contentions raised by the respondents in the counter affidavit in paragraphs 9 and 10, which explains the difference in the performance of the persons, who were granted extension of probation, it is clear that their performance is incomparable to that of the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any discriminatory treatment towards petitioner just because he was not allowed to complete the period of probation or that he was not granted extension of probation. Even on completion of 10 months the petitioner could achieve only 2.6 of his allotted target, 3.77% of number of polices and 3.6% of the agents to be recruited.” 4. Sri.Kaleeswaram Raj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that there is no quarrel to the fact that a probationer can be discharged from the service but, if it affects his future service prospects while looking at the nature of the order, there has to be compliance of principles of natural justice, in view of the judgments referred above. This fact has totally been ignored by the learned Single Bench, as per the findings noticed by this Court. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya and Another [ (2021) 13 SCC 151 ] to contend that there is tangible difference between confirmed and permanent employees. The provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are not attracted for probationers whereas permanent employees can be either under aforementioned provisions or through the disciplinary proceedings, as provided in the applicable rules. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book. 7. The provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are not attracted for probationers whereas permanent employees can be either under aforementioned provisions or through the disciplinary proceedings, as provided in the applicable rules. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book. 7. The question raised before us is that when the order of such nature is passed, whether the person should be granted an opportunity of hearing or not. The answer would be ‘yes’ by noticing the findings in paragraph Nos.5 of V.P.Ahuja as well as paragraph No.19 in Rajasthan High Court (supra). On perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it is evident that the Supreme Court had noticed the fact that the removal or discharge from the service during probation period casts aspersion on their character or violate their constitutional rights much less, is stigmatic and reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be granted. However, in the instant case before ordering the discharge, there was no such compliance. The aforementioned issue has totally been brushed aside much less not addressed while dealing with the contentions. 8. Accordingly, we set aside the order under challenge and allow the writ petition. Consequently writ appeal is also allowed and the discharge order is quashed with direction to the respondents to take a call in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two(2) months.