ORDER : Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy, J. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioners aggrieved by the order dated 05.02.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Nalgonda, in I.A. No.1146 of 2016 in O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016. By the Impugned Order, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioners’ application filed under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the Act”), wherein they had sought condonation of delay of twenty-seven (27) days in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act, for setting aside the arbitral award passed under the National Highways Act, 1956. 2. This case raises questions concerning the commencement of limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act, the scope of delivery of signed copy of the award under Section 31 (5) of the Act, and the approach to be adopted by Courts while considering applications for condonation of delay in challenging arbitral awards. I. BRIEF FACTS 3. The factual backdrop to the present revision is as follows: (a) The petitioners’ agricultural lands were acquired for widening of National Highway No.65 (earlier No.9) at Suryapet. (b) Pursuant thereto, an award dated 03.06.2010 in Case No.C/3125/2009 was passed, awarding compensation which, according to the petitioners, was grossly inadequate. (c) Being dissatisfied, the petitioners sought reference, whereupon the Arbitrator (respondent No.3) passed Award No. G2/6452/2010 dated 27.04.2015, marginally enhancing the compensation. (d) The petitioners contend that despite the award having been passed in April 2015, they were never served a signed copy until 04.05.2016. (e) On receipt of the signed copy, the petitioners filed O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 under Section 34 of the Act, on 30.08.2016, accompanied by I.A. No.1146 of 2016 for condonation of 27 days’ delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act. (f) The Trial Court, however, dismissed the condonation application, holding that since the award had been dispatched to the petitioners’ advocate in May 2015, limitation commenced from that date. On that basis and by presumption of service, the Trial Court concluded that the petition was hopelessly time-barred. (g) Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, the petitioners have approached this Court in the present Revision. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the petitioners: 4. On that basis and by presumption of service, the Trial Court concluded that the petition was hopelessly time-barred. (g) Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, the petitioners have approached this Court in the present Revision. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the petitioners: 4. The following arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioners: i) The petitioners emphasize that limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act is triggered only upon delivery of a signed copy of the Award to the party himself, as mandated by Section 31 (5) of the Act. Further, service upon counsel does not satisfy this statutory requirement. ii) The petitioners assert that they received the signed copy of the Award only on 04.05.2016. Thus, the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed within the permissible extended or condonable period. iii) The petitioners contend that the delay of 27 days in presenting the petition under Section 34 of the Act, is minimal, which is explained credibly, and that the Trial Court ought to have condoned the delay in the interest of substantial justice. iv) The learned counsel for the petitioners while praying for allowing the Civil Revision Petition placed reliance on the following binding precedents of the Honourable Supreme Court: a) State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Private Limited , [ (2011) 4 SCC 616 ] b) Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited , [ (2012) 9 SCC 496 ] v) In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that there being merit in their Revision, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Trial Court may be set aside, while restoring the O.P.S.R.No.3456/2016 to the file of Trial Court by condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act b) Submissions on behalf of the respondents: 5. The following arguments have been advanced before us on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2: i) The respondents maintain that the arbitral award had been duly dispatched to the petitioners’ advocate on record in May 2015, and by presumption of service, limitation commenced on 12.05.2015 itself. ii) The respondents contend that service upon the advocate is sufficient service, as he represents the party in all legal proceedings and therefore, petitioners cannot plead ignorance of the Award until May, 2016. ii) The respondents contend that service upon the advocate is sufficient service, as he represents the party in all legal proceedings and therefore, petitioners cannot plead ignorance of the Award until May, 2016. iii) Finally, the respondents point out that the petitioners’ explanation for delay lacks bonafides and credibility. It is the specific contention of the respondents that Courts must enforce limitation provisions strictly in arbitral matters in order to ensure finality and certainty, and no latitude can be granted under Section 34 (3) of the Act, beyond the statutorily permissible period. iv) In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents prayed that there being no merit in the Revision, the same may be dismissed. III . ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 6. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced and the material on record, we find that essentially, the following key issues arise for consideration: (a) Whether limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act, commences from the date of dispatch to or receipt by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the award, as contemplated under Section 31 (5) of the Act? (b) Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause for condonation of 27 days’ delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act? IV. STATUTORY SCHEME 7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is appropriate first to extract relevant provisions of the Act: i) Section 2(1)(h) defines a “party” to mean a party to the arbitration agreement, which is extracted hereunder: ‘“party” means a party to an arbitration agreement.’ ii) Section 31 (5) mandates that after an award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party, which is reproduced below: “(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.” iii) Section 34 (3) provides for the period of limitation within which an application to set aside an arbitral award is to be filed. It reads thus: “(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” V. JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS: 8. Before examining the rival contentions in detail, it would be useful to refer to certain authoritative pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court which directly deal with the issue of commencement of limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act. These precedents lay down the governing principles and provide clarity on the statutory requirements under Section 31 (5) and 34(3) of the Act. 9. The Honourable Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others v. ARK Builders Private Limited , [ (2011) 4 SCC 616 ] , held that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy is delivered to the party. The relevant observations read as under: “13. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party making the application for setting it aside under section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law.” 10. Similarly, in Benarsi Krishna Committee’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held as under: “15. Similarly, in Benarsi Krishna Committee’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held as under: “15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31 (5) and 34(3) of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” has been amply dealt with in Tecco Trechy Engineers’s case (supra) and also in ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an Advocate to Act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an Advocate to Act as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31 (5) and Section 34 (2) of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his or her agent, or Advocate empowered to Act on the basis of a Vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31 (5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of the Arbitral Award on the party himself and not on his Advocate, which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under Section 34 (3) of the aforesaid Act. 16. The view taken in Pushpa Devi Bhagat’s case (supra) is in relation to the authority given to an Advocate to Act on behalf of a party to a proceeding in the proceedings itself, which cannot stand satisfied where a provision such as Section 31 (5) of the 1996 Act is concerned. The said provision clearly indicates that a signed copy of the Award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed Award is not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to compliance with the provisions of Section 31 (5) of the Act. The other decision cited by Mr. The said provision clearly indicates that a signed copy of the Award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed Award is not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to compliance with the provisions of Section 31 (5) of the Act. The other decision cited by Mr. Ranjit Kumar in Nilakantha Sidramappa Ningshetti’s case (supra) was rendered under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not have a provision similar to the provisions of Section 31 (5) of the 1996 Act. The said decision would, therefore, not be applicable to the fActs of this case also. 17. In the instant case, since a signed copy of the Award had not been delivered to the party itself and the party obtained the same on 15th December, 2004, and the Petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on 3rd February, 2005, it has to be held that the said petition was filed within the stipulated period of three months as contemplated under Section 34 (3) of the aforesaid Act. Consequently, the objection taken on behalf of the Petitioner herein cannot be sustained and, in our view, was rightly rejected by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.” 11. In Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors , (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 239, the Honourable Supreme Court, while specifically holding that delivery of Award under Section 31 (5) of the Act is not a mere formality, observed as under: “The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-Section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be "received" by the party. This delivery by the arbitral tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34 (3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.” 12. Recently, in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Private Limited , , [(2021) 7 Supreme Court Cases 657] the Honourable Supreme Court followed the earlier judgments in Tecco Trichy’s case (supra) and ARK Builders’ case (supra) and held that the period of limitation prescribed for filing objections would commence only from the date when the signed copy of the Award is delivered to the party making the application for setting aside the Award. The relevant observations read as under: “The judgment in Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra) was followed in State of Maharashtra v. Ark Builders,8 wherein this Court held that Section 31 (1) obliges the members of the arbitral tribunal to make the award in writing and sign it. The legal requirement under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is the delivery of a copy of the award signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal / arbitrator, and not any copy of the award. On a harmonious construction of Section 31 (5) read with Section 34 (3), the period of limitation prescribed for filing objections would commence only from the date when the signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for setting aside the award. If the law prescribes that a copy of the award is to be communicated, delivered, despatched, forwarded, rendered, or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way, and since the law sets a period of limitation for challenging the award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the award was received by the concerned party in the manner prescribed by law. The judgment in Tecco Trichy has been recently followed in Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel.” 13. The judgment in Tecco Trichy has been recently followed in Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel.” 13. In State of West Bengal v. R.K.B.K. Limited , AIR 2015 Supreme Court 3411 , the Honourable Supreme Court considered as to when the order is effective so as to challenge the same and held that an uncommunicated order cannot be challenged. The relevant observations read as under: “….. ….. …. the words used in Paragraph 10 are “date of the order”. In the scheme of the Control Order, the order comes into effect from the date of receipt by the agent or the dealer. Once that becomes the decision, the commencement of limitation of 30 days for the purpose of Paragraph 10 would be the date when the order is effective. The High Court in Rani Sati Kerosene Supply Company and Others (supra) has opined that if the order of cancellation is not served on the affected person and the appeal period expires, there is the possibility that the adverse order would become unassailable. The reasoning is totally fallacious. An appeal can only be preferred when the order is effective. The ineffective order, that is to say, uncommunicated order cannot be challenged. Therefore, the reasoning given by the court in earlier judgment is erroneous and hence, the reliance thereupon by the impugned order is faulty. There has to be a purposive construction of the words “from the date of order”. To place a construction that the date of an order would mean passing of the order, though not made effective would lead to an absurdity.” VI. ANALYSIS: “ Issue (a): Whether limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act, commences from the date of dispatch to or receipt by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the award, as contemplated under Section 31 (5) of the Act?” 14. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether limitation commences from the date of dispatch or receipt of the Award by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the Award in terms of Section 31 (5) of the Act. 15. The statutory mandate under Section 31 (5) of the Act leaves no room for ambiguity. The provision specifically requires that a signed copy of the Award shall be delivered “to each party”. 15. The statutory mandate under Section 31 (5) of the Act leaves no room for ambiguity. The provision specifically requires that a signed copy of the Award shall be delivered “to each party”. The language employed by the legislature is deliberate and unequivocal, underscoring that service on counsel or any other agent is not a substitute for service on the party himself. 16. The Honourable Supreme Court, in ARK Builders’s case (supra), authoritatively laid down that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 (3) would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application, in compliance with Section 31 (5) of the Act. The Court reasoned that the scheme of the Act contemplates a formal and authenticated communication of the Award to the party, and only upon such communication does the period of limitation commence. 17. This principle was reiterated in Benarsi Krishna’s case (supra), wherein it was emphasized that proper compliance with Section 31 (5) would mean that a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party concerned himself, and mere dispatch or service on his advocate is not sufficient to trigger limitation. 18. Earlier, in Tecco Trichy’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court had emphasized that limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act beings to run only upon delivery of signed copy to the party concerned. The Court observed that since the delivery of the award is a matter of substance and not a mere formality, limitation cannot be reckoned from any date anterior to such delivery. 19. More recently, in Dakshin Haryana’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court reaffirmed that the requirement under Section 31 (5) of the Act is mandatory, and limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act does not commence unless and until a signed copy of the award is served on the party. The court further clarified that mere knowledge of the award or access to an unsigned copy does not suffice for computing limitation. 20. Likewise, in Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA v. Bharat Electronics Limited , [ (2012) 6 SCC 384 ] , it was held that an order or award, takes effect, only upon its communication to the party in the manner prescribed by law and limitation for challenge must necessarily be reckoned from such communication. 21. 20. Likewise, in Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA v. Bharat Electronics Limited , [ (2012) 6 SCC 384 ] , it was held that an order or award, takes effect, only upon its communication to the party in the manner prescribed by law and limitation for challenge must necessarily be reckoned from such communication. 21. Further, in State of West Bengal v. R.K.B.K. Limited , , [ AIR 2015 SC 3411 ] it was held that an ineffective order, that is to say, an uncommunicated order cannot be challenged. 22. The legislative scheme, reinforced by authoritative precedents, makes it clear that delivery of the award to the party is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive requirement. The trial Court’s presumption that dispatch of award to counsel on record is sufficient, is nothing but ignoring Section 31 (5) and the authoritative interpretation in ARK Builders’ case (supra) and Benarsi Krishna’s case (supra), so also various other similar judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. These judgments affirm that limitation cannot run against a party until a signed copy reaches him personally. 23. Further, Bipromasz’s case (supra) and R.K.B.K.Limited’s case (supra) highlight a foundational principle of administrative law that an order has no legal efficacy until communicated to the person affected. By analogy, the arbitral award could not bind the petitioners until communicated to them. Mere dispatch to counsel without proof of receipt by the party is legally insufficient. 24. In view of the principle laid down in the above said decisions, it is clear that the limitation starts from the date of receipt of award by the party and award copy signed by the arbitral tribunal shall be served on the party himself. 25. This Court would emphasize that the very object of Section 31 (5) of the Act is to ensure fairness, clarity, and certainty. If courts were to treat service on counsel as equivalent to service on the party, it would dilute this safeguard, leaving litigants at the mercy of presumptions and defeating the legislative intent. The right to challenge an award is a substantive right; it cannot be curtailed except strictly in accordance with statute. 26. Applying these settled principles to the present case, it is clear that dispatch of the award to the petitioners’ counsel in May, 2015 cannot be treated as commencement of limitation. The right to challenge an award is a substantive right; it cannot be curtailed except strictly in accordance with statute. 26. Applying these settled principles to the present case, it is clear that dispatch of the award to the petitioners’ counsel in May, 2015 cannot be treated as commencement of limitation. The statutory requirement was satisfied only on 04.05.2016, when a signed copy was delivered to the petitioners’ themselves. Therefore, the trial Court erred in holding that limitation had commenced in May, 2015. “Issue (b): Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause for condonation of 27 days delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act?” 27. Having determined that limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act commenced only upon delivery of a signed copy of the Award to the petitioners on 04.05.2016, the next question is whether the delay of 27 days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act can be condoned. 28. Section 34 (3) of the Act prescribes a period of three months from the date of receipt of the award, with a further grace period of thirty days if the applicant demonstrates sufficient cause. The provision is couched in strict terms and sets and absolute out limit of three months and thirty days (90 days + 30 days), beyond which delay cannot be condoned. 29. The Honourble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Constructions Company , [ (2001) 8 SCC 470 ] held that Section 34 (3) of the Act is a self contained code, and that while delay beyond the period of three months is condonable to the next thirty days, no further extension is permissible. The Court explained that the legislative intent was to provide finality to arbitral award, and therefore, only a narrow window of condonation is available. 30. This principle was reaffirmed in Simplex Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India , [ (2019) 2 SCC 455 ] , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court declined to condone a delay of 131 days beyond the three months and thirty days limit, reiterating that the outer boundary prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Act is inflexible. 31. At the same time, the discretion to condone delay within the grace period of thirty days has been recognized as one that must be exercised to advance the course of substantial justice where bonafide explanation is offered. 31. At the same time, the discretion to condone delay within the grace period of thirty days has been recognized as one that must be exercised to advance the course of substantial justice where bonafide explanation is offered. As observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal , [ (2020) 10 SCC 654 ] , the approach of the Courts ought to balance strict adherence to limitation with the need to prevent miscarriage of justice in cases of short, bonafide delays. 32. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji , [ (1987) 2 SCC 107 ] , it was observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that “The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which sub-serves the ends of justice. A liberal approach is to be adopted in condoning short delays.” 33. More recently, the Honourable Supreme Court in Raheem Shah and another v. Govind Singh and others , 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 572 , has reiterated the principle laid down in Katijis case (supra), the relevant observations read as under: “4. This Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held as hereunder: “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enActing Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial 2 justice to parties by disposing of matters on `merits’. The expression `sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.” 5. The above decision expressing the intention of justice oriented approach percolating down to all the courts was rendered nearly three decades ago but unfortunately the case on hand demonstrates the pervading insensitive approach, which apart from continuing the agony of the litigants concerned has also unnecessarily burdened the judicial hierarchy which after going through the entire process will have to set the clock back, at this distant point in time and prolong their agony. If only the court concerned had been sensitive to the justice oriented approach rather than the iron- cast technical approach, the litigation between the parties probably would have come to an end much earlier after decision on the merits of their rival contention.” 34. This principle squarely supports the petitioners’ contention that the Trial Court ought to have condoned the marginal delay of twenty-seven (27) days. 35. This principle squarely supports the petitioners’ contention that the Trial Court ought to have condoned the marginal delay of twenty-seven (27) days. 35. Thus, it is settled law that a ‘lis’ has to be disposed of on merits rather than denying the applicant to contest the case on technical grounds. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition under Section 34 of the Act on 30.08.2016 i.e., within three months and twenty seven (27) days from the date of receipt of signed copy of the award. The delay of 27 days, thus, falls squarely within the statutory grace period. The explanation advanced by the petitioners that they could not approach the Court earlier as no signed copy had been served until May, 2016 is not only credible but also supported by record. 36. In these circumstances, the refusal order of the Trial Court to condone the delay reflects an unduly rigid approach. Once the delay is minimal, properly explained and within the statutory thirty days margin, the courts are enjoined to adopt a justice-oriented approach rather than a hyper-technical one. Denial of condonation in such a case would amount to foreclosing judicial review of the arbitral award on technical grounds, thereby defeating the very object of the statute. More so, in arbitration cases arising out of land acquisition, where land owners already suffer compulsory deprivation of property, technicalities of limitation shold not operate as instruments of injustice. 37. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the petitioners have established “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 34 (3) of the Act, for condonation of 27 days delay and the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application. VII. FINDINGS & CONCLUSION: 38. From the foregoing discussion, this Court arrives at the following conclusions: i) On Issue (a): Limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act commences only upon delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party himself, as mandated under Section 31 (5) of the Act. Service on counsel or dispatch without proof of such delivery to the party cannot be treated as commencement of limitation. In the present case, the petitioners received the signed copy of the award only on 04.05.2016 and therefore, limitation commenced from that date. ii) On Issue (b): The delay of 27 days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act has been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners. In the present case, the petitioners received the signed copy of the award only on 04.05.2016 and therefore, limitation commenced from that date. ii) On Issue (b): The delay of 27 days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act has been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners. The delay falls within the statutory grace period of thirty (30) days provided under Section 34 (3) of the Act. Consistent with the principles laid down in the cases of Katiji’s case (supra), Raheen Shah’s case (supra) and other binding precedents, the delay being marginal bonafide and credibly explained, ought to have been condoned by the Trial Court. 39. The Trial Court, in dismissing the condonation application, adopted an unduly rigid and hyper-technical approach, overlooking the settled law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court and the larger principle that adjudication on merits is preferable to non-suiting a party on technical grounds. VIII. CONCLUSION: 40. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order of the Trial Court cannot be sustained and accordingly liable to be set aside. The Civil Revision Petition deserves to be allowed. IX. RESULT & DIRECTIONS: 41. (a) In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. (b) The Impugned Order dated 05.02.2018 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Nalgonda, in I.A. No.1146 of 2016 in O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 is hereby set aside. (c) I.A. No.1146 of 2016 stands allowed. The delay of 27 days in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act is condoned. (d) The application made by the petitioners under Section 34 of the Act vide O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 shall be restored to the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Nalgonda. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the said O.P. on its own merits and in accordance with law. Given that the matter pertains to 2016, the Trial Court shall endeavor to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six (6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (e) There shall be no order as to costs.