JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. All the appeals are since arising out of the common order and as such directed to be heard together and accordingly listed together for its analogous hearing. 2. The matter has been heard together with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 3. All the appeals are under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal directed against the common order dated 18.06.2024 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1164 of 2021 with W.P.(S) No. 2892 of 2021 and W.P.(S) No. 3542 of 2021, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for consideration of continuation in service of the writ petitioners-appellants has been denied by dismissing the writ petitions. 4. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading are that under the aegis of 14th Finance Commission launched by the Government of India, the Government of Jharkhand in its Department of Rural Development (Panchayati Raj), sanctioned various posts of Accounts Clerk-cum Computer Operator, Junior Engineers, Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineers. By notification contained in Memo No. 80 dated 28.4.2016, the State Government laid down the requisite qualifications for appointment and examination process as well as service conditions. Thereafter, the concerned Deputy Commissioners of the district issued a press release on 30.5.2016 inviting applications for the posts of Junior Engineers/Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operator. Similar advertisements for appointment on various posts were also published by other districts of the State. Being eligible in all respects, the petitioners applied for appointment on the post of Junior Engineers/Accounts Clerk-cum Computer Operators. All the petitioners were called for efficiency test and computer test and after being found successful in all the tests, they were appointed on the post of Junior Engineers/Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operators. Thereafter, all the petitioners were posted in different blocks and were discharging their duties with full satisfaction of the authorities. It is specific case of the petitioners that though they were appointed under the 14th Finance Commission for a period of five years, which was supposed to come to an end on 31.03.2020, but their services were extended till 31.12.2020 with assurance that they shall further be continued. It is specific case of the petitioners that though they were appointed under the 14th Finance Commission for a period of five years, which was supposed to come to an end on 31.03.2020, but their services were extended till 31.12.2020 with assurance that they shall further be continued. However, the State Government vide notification dated 19.2.2021 initiated fresh selection process on the posts against which the petitioners are continuing on contractual basis for implementation, monitoring and execution of the works related to scheme under 15th Finance Commission on same set of eligibility criterion. Hence, the petitioners were constrained to knock the door of this Court with utmost apprehension that their services might be discontinued. 5. It is evident from the factual aspect, as per the pleading made as referred hereinabove, is that the appellants had been appointed as Junior Engineers/Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operators, on contractual basis, on the basis of the decision taken in the 14 th Finance Commission. 6. The appellants had started discharging their duties, based upon the contract entered in between the employer, the state functionary and the one or the other appellants. 7. After expiry of the tenure of the 14 th Finance Commission, which was replaced by 15 th Finance Commission the services of the appellants were not continued, rather an advertisement has been floated to engage another appointee, however, the appellants had been granted an opportunity to participate in the process of selection in terms of the aforesaid advertisement, but they have not been selected finally. Hence, they have raised the grievance by filing writ petitions. 8. The learned writ court has considered the issues. The State has filed counter-affidavit and on consideration of the stand, inter alia, taken in the counter-affidavit to the effect that there cannot be any continuation in service once the tenure of the 14th Finance Commission has expired and replaced by 15 th Finance Commission wherein so many changes have been brought, particularly the number of appointees which have been remarkably reduced. 9. The ground has also been taken that the appointment being contractual in nature which was in subsistence only during the subsistence period of the 14 th Finance Commission at the moment the period of 14th Finance Commission has ended, the appointment so made on the basis of 14 th Finance Commission, will have to go in terms of the contract. 10. 10. The learned Single Judge has considered the stand, inter alia, taken by the State in the counter-affidavit and particularly considering the nature of the appointment which is contractual in nature has dismissed the writ petitions against which the present appeals. Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants: 11. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has taken the following grounds: (i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the appellants are having the eligibility criteria having the educational qualification which has been year-marked for selecting the persons concerned in different capacity and as such they ought to have been continued even in the period of 15th Finance Commission on the principle that if they are eligible to hold the post, the contractual appointment cannot be allowed to be replaced by another set of contractual appointment. (ii) The ground has been taken that the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration that the appellants have discharged their duties to the utmost satisfaction of the employer having no complaint from any quarter and as such it is very harsh for the appellants to go out of service and in their place, the new set of appointees have been considered. (iii) The ground has also been raised that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right perspective rather has taken the issue on the pretext of the appointment said to be contractual in nature but the appointment cannot be said to be contractual in nature rather the case of the appellant all along was before the learned writ court that the contract was based upon the policy decision as contained in 14 th Finance Commission and the same has been carried over to the 15th Finance Commission having made no change in the educational qualification or any eligibility criteria. Hence, dispensing with the services of the present appellants by replacing them through new set of appointees is contrary to the principle that one ad hoc arrangement is not allowed to be replaced by another ad hoc appointees. (iv) The learned counsel has submitted that to fortify the aforesaid argument as has been settled in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. (iv) The learned counsel has submitted that to fortify the aforesaid argument as has been settled in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors., by the Hon’ble Apex Court (1992) 4 SCC 118 has been relied, but the same has not been considered by the learned writ court in right perspective holding therein that the judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) is not applicable in view of the fact that the appointment of the appellants is not contractual, rather the contract is based upon the 14th Finance Commission and the moment the 14th Finance Commission has been replaced by another Finance Commission, the principle applicable for replacing the ad hoc arrangement cannot be said to be applicable. 12. The learned Senior Counsel, based upon the aforesaid submission, has submitted that therefore it is a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with. Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents: 13. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while defending the impugned order, has taken the following grounds: (i) The learned Single Judge has not erred in passing the impugned order due to the reason that the appointment cannot be said to be ad hoc, rather it is contractual and as such the contractual appointment is to be based upon the terms and conditions of the contract which is valid only for the period of one year and after expiry of the period of one year, the force of the contract will automatically go and in view thereof, even after coming into effect of 15 th Finance Commission, the appellants will have no right to claim their services by getting a direction from the High Court to enter into the contract. (ii) The High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not to command the State to enter into a contract since it is the domain of the State to enter into a contract with another party and there cannot be any command for the aforesaid purpose. Therefore, the submission has been made that the learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid legal issues and by considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ petitions have been dismissed which therefore has got no error. Therefore, the submission has been made that the learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid legal issues and by considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ petitions have been dismissed which therefore has got no error. (iii) The case of the appellants cannot be said to be of ad hoc appointees, rather it is appointment made on contract which was during the course of the 14 th Finance Commission and the moment when the period of 14 th Finance Commission has expired, the contract will also be of no existence in the eye of law. (iv) The appellants had appeared in the process of selection on the basis of advertisement wherein the specific consideration has been given by giving relaxation in age of such appointees who have worked in the tenure of the 14 th Finance Commission as also the benefit of experience has also been decided to be given to the extent of 30 per cent, but the appellants herein have not been selected in the process of selection and hence it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the appellants, rather, it is a case wherein the appellants have not found to be selected due to their performance since they have came below in the merit list than the other selected candidates. 14. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has considered all these aspects of the matter and as such, the same cannot be said to be suffer from any error. Analysis: 15. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, gone through the pleadings made in the petition as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 16. This Court needs to refer herein the admitted facts that the appellants have been appointed on contractual basis based upon the terms and conditions of the contract which was valid for a period of one year during the subsistence period of 14 th Finance Commission. 17. The appellants, after being appointed, have started discharging their duties. The tenure of the 14th Finance Commission was replaced by 15 th Finance Commission. 18. After the end of the tenure of 14 th Finance Commission, the service of the appellants has been rescinded due to rescinding of the contract. 17. The appellants, after being appointed, have started discharging their duties. The tenure of the 14th Finance Commission was replaced by 15 th Finance Commission. 18. After the end of the tenure of 14 th Finance Commission, the service of the appellants has been rescinded due to rescinding of the contract. When the 15 th Finance Commission has come, the State Government has come out with the advertisement being Advertisement No. 01/2021 to fill up the vacancies of 20 Junior Engineers and 39 Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operators. The number of vacancies which were being held by the appellants, i.e., of the post of Junior Engineers/Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operators, had been reduced. 19. The advertisement has been floated to fill up the post of 20 Junior Engineers and 39 Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operators. It is evident from the said advertisement that due care has been given to consider the candidature of the candidates who were in service during the course of 14 th Finance Commission by giving relaxation of three years in age. The relevant condition of the advertisement is being referred herein which reads as under: ¼[k½ mez lhek%& duh; vfHk;ark ds fy, mez lhek vf/kdre 40 o"kZ gksxhA me~ lhek dh x.kuk 01-01-2021 ds vk/kkj ij dh tk;sxhA oSls vH;FkhZ ftUgsa xzke iapk;rks esa 14 os foŸk vk;ksx ls lacf/kr dk;ksZ dk vuqHko gks mUgsa vf/kdre mez lhek esa vf/kdre rhu o"kZ dh NwV iznku dh tk;sxhA 20. Further, the decision has also been taken to give weightage of 30 per cent marks on experience head who had performed their duties in 14 th Finance Commission. The relevant condition of the advertisement is being referred herein which reads as under: ¼?k½ ewY;kadu %& ¼1½ vH;fFkZ;ksa dk ewY;kadu 100 vadks ij fd;k tk;sxk] tks fuEu [k.Mks esa foHkkftr jgsxkA vfuok;Z 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk okafNr ;ksX;rk vuqHko fo"k; Kku ;ksx 50 10 30 10 100 (ii) fo"k; Kku laca/kh tkWp ijh{kk esa mŸkh.kZrk dk Lrj 40 izfr'kr jgsxk ;kfu 10 es ls 4 vad ykuk vfuok;Z gksxkA (iii) p;u dh ik=rk gsrq dqy fu/kkZfjr 100 vadks es ls lkekU; Js.kh ds mEehnokjks dks U;wure 50 vad ,oa vuqlwfpr tkfr ,oa vuwlwfpr tutkfr ds mEehnokjks dks U;wure 40 vada ykuk vfuok;Z gksxkA blls de vad ykus ij p;u gsrq v;ksX; ekus tk;saxsA (iv) vuqHko dk rkRi;Z gS 14 ,Qlh es dk;Z djus dk vuqHkoA ftldk izek.k ekuns; Hkqxrku laca/kh fooj.kh ds vk/kkj ij gksxkA 21. The writ petitioners/appellants in terms of said advertisement had participated in the process of selection, but they have not been found to be suitable since they are not come in the merit list even after giving the benefit of relaxation in age and weightage of 30 per cent marks. The appellants, being aggrieved with their non-selection, had approached this Court by filing writ petitions which having been dismissed, therefore, the present appeals have been filed. 22. The issue which requires consideration herein in the backdrop of the aforesaid fact is that: (i) Whether the appellants have got any accrued right for selection after rescinding of the contract. (ii) Whether the appellants can claim any positive direction from this Court once they have been allowed to participate in the process of selection after giving benefit of relaxation of age and experience to the extent of 30 per cent marks on the basis of the service rendered during the course of the 14 th Finance Commission. 23. Both the issues since are interlinked, as such, are being taken together for its consideration. 24. The law is well-settled that the accrued right will only be available to such appointees who have been appointed against the substantive post being protected by the principle as carved out under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 25. The cases of such appointees, who have been appointed on contract will have right to hold the post subject to fulfillment of the conditions as available in contract only during the period of contract. 26. One or the other persons cannot claim the engagement, as a matter of right, after expiry of the period of contract, since the contract binds both the parties and if any condition has been inserted in the contract, as agreed in between the parties, the same is strictly to be adhered to any condition contained therein, if allowed to be flouted, the same to be contrary to the terms and conditions and will amount to re-writing the terms and conditions of the contract. 27. The aforesaid preposition will be said to be contrary to the settled position of law, as has been held in the case of Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors Vs. 27. The aforesaid preposition will be said to be contrary to the settled position of law, as has been held in the case of Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors Vs. P.V. Suresh and by the Hon’ble Apex Court Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 70 at paragraph 11 wherein it was held that the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or re-write the contract between the parties. For ready reference, the said paragraph is being quoted hereunder: “11. In the circumstances of this case, our inquiry is limited to the question whether the contract was so constructed that loss was inherent and implicit in it; if so, it ought to be modified. Otherwise, the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or rewrite the contract between the parties.” 28. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, it is admitted case of the appellants that they had been appointed on contract basis, on the basis of the advertisement floated in course of 14th Finance Commission period. One of the conditions of contract was that the contract will be valid for a period of one year as would be evident from the condition No. 5(i) of the Advertisement No. 01 of 2016, as annexed at page 360 of the petition. 29. The contract was during the course of the 14 th Finance Commission period and after expiry of the period of 14 th Finance Commission, the 15 th Finance Commission period has come, therefore, the normal consequence as has been followed was of rescinding the contract which was entered in between one or the other appellants and the State functionary. 30. The State Government, in order to execute the work as was under the 15 th Finance Commission period, has floated advertisement to fulfil the post of Junior Engineer and Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operator. The number of posts for Accounts Clerk-cum-Computer Operator has been reduced from 14 th Finance Commission to 15 th Finance Commission from 1467 to 869 The arrangement has been made to give weightage to the candidates who had been engaged during the course of 14 th Finance Commission by giving relaxation in age and also weightage of 30 per cent marks under the experience head who had worked during the 14 th Finance Commission period. 31. The appellants had applied but having not been declared to be successful, as such they have not been selected. 31. The appellants had applied but having not been declared to be successful, as such they have not been selected. 32. Since, we are dealing with the issue of contractual engagee, who after expiry of the period of contract had participated in the process of selection but had not been selected, in such circumstances, when the appellants themselves are admitting the legal position of expiry of period of contract and thereby the validity of their engagement in terms of the said contract, then how they claim their engagement by way of accrued right on the basis of the new advertisement which was floated in course of 15 th Finance Commission. 33. The accrued right has been defined and interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh Hon’ble [ (2014) 13 SCC 583 ] at paragraph 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as: “11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “ Vested .—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.” 12. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed. 34. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph-24, which reads hereunder as follows:— “24. 34. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph-24, which reads hereunder as follows:— “24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 ], B.S. Vedera [ AIR 1969 SC 118 ] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [ (1983) 2 SCC 33 ].” 35. The position of law is well-settled that if an appointment is made on contractual basis, such contractual engagee is having no right to be retained in service if the employer is not willing to extend the contract. 36. It is also not a case of the appellants that the cases of the appellants had not been considered, rather, the State Government has formulated a policy wherein due care has been taken to consider the candidature of the candidates by giving age relaxation of three years as also weightage of 30 per cent marks on the experience head of the period of service which has been rendered by one or the other appellants during the course of 14th Finance Commission. But the appellants although had participated in the process of selection in terms of the new advertisement but they have not been found to be meritorious candidates in comparison to that of the others based upon the merit. 37. But the appellants although had participated in the process of selection in terms of the new advertisement but they have not been found to be meritorious candidates in comparison to that of the others based upon the merit. 37. The ground which has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that one contractual appointee cannot be replaced by another and to that effect, the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) has been relied upon. 38. We have considered the factual aspect of the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) wherein the issue of ad hoc appointment was the subject-matter and in that context, it has been held that one ad hoc arrangement cannot be allowed to be replaced by another. 39. Herein, it needs to refer that there is difference in between the ad hoc and contractual appointment. The ad hoc appointment is known as the appointment which is purely on the stopgap arrangement. The e Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) while considering the appointment Hon’bl made on ad hoc basis has considered the nature of appointment which is without reference to the Public Service Commission or the Subordinate Selection Board and without adhering to employment exchange requirements and were being appointed for a period of six months or so but were continued for years together under the order passed from time to time. 40. But the contractual appointment is quite different to that of the ad hoc appointment since the contractual appointees are to be governed by the terms and conditions of the contract and there cannot be any deviation therefrom. 41. However, if the Government thinks it proper, then depending upon the condition, if available in terms of contract, the period of contract can be extended. 42. The judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) is having no concern with the issue of contractual appointment, rather it was related to ad hoc appointment. 43. 42. The judgment rendered in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) is having no concern with the issue of contractual appointment, rather it was related to ad hoc appointment. 43. This Court, therefore, is of the view that what has been argued by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants by relying upon the judgment x Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V. Piara Singh and Ors. (supra) is not passed by the Hon’ble Ape applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, since, we are dealing with the case of contractual engagees and not ad hoc appointees. Even in the case of ad hoc appointment, there cannot be any direction by the learned writ court by way of command to grant extension in service. 44. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the argument to the effect that one contractual engagement cannot be replaced by another is having no force in view of the fact that the contractual appointments always depend upon the terms and conditions of the contract and if once contract has lost its force, the authority concerned cannot be restricted to go for another contract. 45. The aforesaid argument is also not sustainable on other count since the appellants have been provided an opportunity to participate in the process of selection for their consideration of candidature in terms of the condition No. 1 ( [k ) and 1( ?k½ (i), (iv) of the advertisement, but they have not been found to be meritorious in merit in comparison to others. 46. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the issue which has been formulated as above are being answered against the appellants. 47. Adverting to the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, this Court, after going through the same, has found that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the nature of contractual appointment, the effect after the expiry of the period of contract and the issue of accrued right and thereafter has refused to pass positive direction in favour of the appellants. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any error, as such, the instant appeals deserve to be dismissed. 48. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the impugned order cannot be said to suffer from any error, as such, the instant appeals deserve to be dismissed. 48. Accordingly, all the instant appeals are hereby dismissed. 49. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.