JUDGMENT : The common prayers in these writ petitions are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ order or direction, in the nature of a declaration quashing Ext.P11 order in ECIR/KCZO/04/2021 issued by the 2 nd respondent against the petitioner freezing the accounts enumerated in paragraph 14. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ order or direction, in the nature of a declaration quashing Ext.P12 and the proceedings in ECIR/KCZO/04/2021 now pending before the 3 rd respondent. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ order or direction, in the nature of a declaration quashing Ext.P14 order and the proceedings in ECIR/KCZO/04/2021 now pending before the 3 rd respondent.” 2. The petitioner in W.P(Crl) No.595/2024 was a non-shareholding CEO and consultant of a family owned private limited company by name 'Vipul Shipyard Pvt. Ltd' (VSPL), having its shipyard in Vasco Da Gama, Goa. Petitioner in W.P(Crl) No.731/2024 is 'Vipul Shipping Engineering Works' and petitioner No.2 is a partner of the company. The petitioner in W.P(Crl) No.601/2024 was also a partner of the company. The petitioner in W.P(Crl) No.721/2024 is 'Vipul Shipyard Pvt. Ltd.', represented by its Director. 3. The Union Territory of Lakshadweep Administration (UTLA), headed by its Administrator, is responsible for procurement and construction of water vessels for the use of UTLA. The landing barges are used to transport passengers and cargoes between the Lakshadweep Islands and the mainland. The Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, in 2006 accorded sanction to UTLA for acquisition of two landing barges through open tender process. Pursuant to this, the Shipping Corporation of India floated a tender bearing No.T&S/NB/UTLA/2000PAS/LB/2006 dated 04.04.2006, on behalf of UTLA inviting offers from experienced shipyards for constructing Six, 200 PAX Passenger Landing Barges. In response to the tender four firms submitted their bids, and two were shortlisted and after technical scrutiny, VSPL turned out to be L-1. The construction agreement with M/s VSPL, Surat was not executed till 20.10.2007. In July 2007, VSPL informed the Shipping Corporation of India that their Surat yard was being taken over by a company named 'ABG Shipyard Pvt.Ltd,' but, they could fulfil the contract with UTLA in their Goa yard. In August 2007, the acquisition process was completed and VSPL, Surat yard was taken over by ABG Shipyard. The company started the building of the vessels in terms of the contract. In August 2007, the acquisition process was completed and VSPL, Surat yard was taken over by ABG Shipyard. The company started the building of the vessels in terms of the contract. Payments were made in instalments. 4. In 2010, a team of UTLA officials conducted inspection on the vessels under construction at VSPL, Goa and found that the dimensions of the vessels were not acceptable to UTLA. 5. Based on a letter received from Sri. Vadodaria Karanjeet, Director of Lakshadweep Administration, the CBI ACB, Cochin conducted a preliminary enquiry vide PE No.2/2014, dated 17.10.2014. The letter received from Sri. Vadodaria Karanjeet alleged criminal negligence and strong suspicion of malpractices and corruption by the officials of Lakshadweep Administration, Shipping Corporation of India Limited (SCIL) and M/s VSPL in the matter of construction of two landing barges. The CBI submitted FIR alleging offences under Sections 120B, 420 and 471 of IPC, and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. An Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) No.ECIR/KCZO/04/2021 was recorded for investigation under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (for short 'the Act'). After completing the investigation, the CBI submitted final report in the matter. In the final report, CBI levelled the following charges: “1. SRII invited M/s Vipul shipyard, Surat to sign the ship building contract. Shri Mohan Rao (Petitioner), CEO of M/s. Vipul Shipyard Surat, and Shri Vipul Amin, Authorized Director of M/s. Vipul Shipyard Private Limited, Goa, hatched a conspiracy to cheat UTL in the matter of constructing and delivering the barges and to obtain a ship building contract for constructing the barges in the name of M/s Vipul Shipyard Private Limited, which was otherwise not eligible to get the contract. In pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, Shri Mohan Rao fraudulently and dishonestly submitted a letter No VS/BOM/UTLA/200 PAX dated 16.07.2007 to SCIL, Mumbai, making SCIL Mumbai Officials believe that M/s Vipul Shipyard Surat and M/s Vipul Shipyard Private Limited, Goa are one and the same with two different working places, one is at Mumbai and another is at Goa. Based on the misrepresentation made by Shri Mohan Rao (petitioner), the contract was awarded to M/s Vipul Shipyard Private Limited, Goa, and the ship building contract for constructing and delivering of 06 landing barges for UTL was signed on 17.11.2007 at New Delhi. Based on the misrepresentation made by Shri Mohan Rao (petitioner), the contract was awarded to M/s Vipul Shipyard Private Limited, Goa, and the ship building contract for constructing and delivering of 06 landing barges for UTL was signed on 17.11.2007 at New Delhi. On 17.11.10, an inspection was conducted on two vessels, Hull No.165 and 166, by Engineer Shri Thomas John, following the expiry of BGs issued against the second stage payment of Hull No. 165, first stage payment of Hull No. 166, second stage payment of Hull No.166, and 5" stage payment of Hull No. 166. The inspection revealed that the vessels were not constructed according to the technical specifications and requirements of UTLA. Shri Mohan Rao (petitioner) and Shri Vipul Amin realized that the constructed vessels did not meet technical specifications, and they fraudulently and dishonestly did not renew the BGs, which should have been renewed until the delivery of the vessels. This wrongful loss of Rs. 12,20,60,000/- was caused by the fraudulent acts committed by Shri Vipul Amin and Shri Mohan Rao (petitioner), who knew that the act would cause wrongful loss to UTA. The accused persons were found to have committed an offense punishable under Sec. 120-B r/w 420 IPC. 2. During the period between July 2007 to November 2010, Shri Mohan Rao (petitioner) and Shri Vipul Amin, in furtherance of the above said conspiracy, as mentioned in Charge-1 above, cheated the UTLA in the matter of construction and delivery of landing barges. The above said accused persons dishonestly and fraudulently induced the SCIL, Mumbai, to award the contract for construction and delivery of 6 Nos, of landing barges for UTLA, to M/s. Vipul Shipyard, Goa, which did not participate in the tender process and thereby they committed the offence punishable u/s 420 IPC. 3. That during November 2010, Shri Vipul Amin (A-1) in furtherance of the above said conspiracy, as mentioned in Charge 1, cheated UTLA in the matter of non-renewal of BGs, which were issued for securing the advances paid to M/s. Vipul Shipyard Pvt. Ltd., Goa. Shri Vipul Amin fraudulently and dishonestly did not renew the BGS, which are otherwise should have been renewed till the delivery of the vessels and thereby Shri Vipul Amin committed the offence punishable u/s 420 IPC.” 6. Shri Vipul Amin fraudulently and dishonestly did not renew the BGS, which are otherwise should have been renewed till the delivery of the vessels and thereby Shri Vipul Amin committed the offence punishable u/s 420 IPC.” 6. In the investigation under the Act, the agency alleged that the accused, by commission of scheduled offences and other relatable offences, derived/obtained the proceeds of crime in the form of immovable properties of land, houses etc., and movable properties in the form of landing barges, bank accounts, securities, deposits etc,. The competent authority in the Enforcement Directorate initiated proceedings under Section 5 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Issuance of Provisional Attachment Order) Rules, 2013. As per order dated 10.05.2024 (Ext.P14), the Deputy Director of Enforcement Directorate ordered provisional attachment of the properties of the petitioners. 7. The relevant portion of the order reads thus: “Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering (issuance of Provisional Attachment Order) Rules, 2013 and in terms of authorization to act as statutory authority under PMLA, vide Tech Circular No 03/2011 amended vide Tech Circular No 08/2015 and the Tech Circular No. 02/2022 issued by the Director, Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi, I, hereby order provisional attachment of the properties worth Rs.12,20,48,611/- (Rupees Twelve Crores Twenty Lakhs Forty Eight Thousand Six Hundred & Eleven only) as detailed and described in the Table Nos. 1 to 5 given under the Paras 5.3 & 5.6 supra, for a period of 180 days (one Hundred and eighty days) and further order that the same shall not be transferred, disposed, removed, parted with or otherwise dealt with unless or until, specifically permitted to do so by the undersigned. This order of attachment made under Section 5 (1) of the PMLA shall cease to have effect after the expiry of 180 days or on the date of an order of the Hon'ble Adjudicating Authority made under Section 8 (3) of the PMLA, whichever is earlier.” Essentially, this order is impugned in this proceedings. 8. I have heard Sri. Paul Jacob, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri. Jaishankar V. Nair, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3. 9. 8. I have heard Sri. Paul Jacob, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri. Jaishankar V. Nair, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions: (i) A civil/commercial claim is being prosecuted illegally by the respondents. (ii) The Writ Petitions are maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (iii) As the predicate offences/scheduled offences stand stayed by the order of this Court as per Ext.P10, the proceedings could not have been initiated against the petitioners unless the stay is vacated. (iv) The Enforcement Directorate failed to comply with the safeguard provided under Section 5(5) of the Act. (v) As the predicate offences allegedly occurred during 2007, the offences cannot be prosecuted under the Act. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted the following: (i) The Writ Petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners have not invoked statutory remedies. (ii) The stay of scheduled offences is inconsequential for the proceedings under the Act. (iii) The period of violation of the provisions of the Act commenced in 2007 and extended through 2010. 11. The writ petitioners have approached this Court immediately on the issuance of the provisional attachment order (Ext.P14). Admittedly, they have not invoked statutory remedies. Therefore, the essential question to be considered is that whether the writ petitions are maintainable. 12. The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was enacted as a statute to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 13. Chapter III of the Act deals with attachment, adjudication and confiscation. The order passed under Section 5(1) of the Act is only provisional in nature. The life of the provisional attachment order is only for 180 days subject to confirmation by an independent Adjudicating Authority. Under Section 5(2) of the Act, the officer passing provisional attachment order has to immediately forward a copy of it to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Under sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, the competent officer shall file a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days from the order of provisional attachment. Under Section 5(2) of the Act, the officer passing provisional attachment order has to immediately forward a copy of it to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Under sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, the competent officer shall file a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days from the order of provisional attachment. Under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act, once the officer who passed the provisional attachment order files a complaint and if the Adjudicating Authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under Section 3 or is in possession of proceeds of crime, the authority may serve a show cause notice calling upon such person to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, or by means of which he has acquired the property provisionally attached under Section 5(1) of the Act. Such person (noticee) could be required to produce evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars to show cause why all or any of the properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money-laundering and confiscated by the Central Government. 14. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act mandates the Adjudicating Authority to consider the reply to the notice and hear the aggrieved person as well as the officer issuing the order of the provisional attachment and also take into account all relevant materials placed on record before the Adjudicating Authority. 15. It is after following all the procedures referred to above the Adjudicating Authority records its finding whether all the properties referred to in the notice are involved in money-laundering or not. In the order, the Adjudicating Authority may confirm the provisional attachment order or may disagree and not confirm the provisional attachment order. 16. Under sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, upon confirmation of the order of provisional attachment, the authorised officer shall take the possession of the property attached. Under sub-section (5) of Section 8, on the conclusion of a trial of an offence under the Act if the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has been committed, it will order that the property involved in money-laundering or the property which has been involved in the commission of the offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government. If the Special Court finds that no offence of money-laundering has taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering under Section 8(6) of the Act, the Court will release the property. 17. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority is also subject to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 25 of the Act. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority is not the final authority under the Act as far as the attachment of proceeds of crime or property involved in money-laundering is concerned in the sense that a person aggrieved by an order confirming the provisional attachment can file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26(1) of the Act. Moreover, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is further appealable before the High Court under Section 42 of the Act on any question of fact or question of law arising out of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. 18. The crux of the discussion based on the statutory provisions is that the relevant provisions in the Act form a self-contained Code. The provisions in the statute provide for a balancing arrangements to secure the interest of the aggrieved person as well as to ensure that the proceeds of crime remain available for being dealt with in the manner provided in the Act. The Honourable Apex Court has considered the scope of the procedural safeguards provided in this aspect and observed that there is sufficient safeguard to the invocation of the powers under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India , [ (2023) 12 SCC 1 ] , the Supreme Court observed thus: “175. It is, thus, clear that the provision in the form of Section 5 provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interest of the person as well as to ensure that the proceeds of crime remain available for being dealt with in the manner provided by the 2002 Act. This provision, in our opinion, has reasonable nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act in preventing and regulating money laundering effectively. This provision, in our opinion, has reasonable nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act in preventing and regulating money laundering effectively. The constitutional validity including interpretation of Section 5 has already been answered against the petitioners by different High Courts [ (1) Bombay High Court in Radha Mohan Lakhotia v. Enforcement Directorate, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1116; (2) High Court of Andhra Pradesh in B. Rama Raju v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine AP 152; (3) High Court of Gujarat in Alive Hospitality and Food (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 3909; (4) High Court of Karnataka in K. Sowbaghya v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 282; (5) High Court of Sikkim at Gangtok in Usha Agarwal v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Sikk 146; and Delhi High Court in J. Sekar v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6523] . We do not wish to dilate on those decisions for the view already expressed hitherto.” 19. The maintainability of the writ petitions is to be considered in the light of the efficacious remedy provided by the statute as detailed above. 20. In Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. [ (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] , the Supreme Court observed thus: 27. The principles of law which emerge are that:: “ 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” 21. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa , [ (1983) 2 SCC 433 ] , the Supreme Court observed that when the statute itself provides an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal and a second appeal and thereafter to the High Court, it is not proper to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring the complete statutory machinery. After terming the approach to the High Court for judicial review as a measure of tragic concern, the court observed that Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations should recourse be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. 22. One of the exceptional reasons highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the proceedings dealing with the predicate offence/scheduled offence have been stayed by this Court as per Ext.P10 order. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the stay of scheduled offence is inconsequential for a proceeding under the Act. 24. As per Ext.P10, this Court has not passed any order affecting the very existence of the scheduled offence alleged. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the stay of scheduled offence is inconsequential for a proceeding under the Act. 24. As per Ext.P10, this Court has not passed any order affecting the very existence of the scheduled offence alleged. This Court only passed an order deferring the framing of charges against the accused, which is, therefore, inconsequential for the proceedings under the Act. 25. Yet another ground highlighted is that the Enforcement Directorate failed to comply with the safeguard under Section 5(5) of the Act and the predicate offences allegedly happened in 2007 cannot be prosecuted under the Act. These are disputed questions of fact and the High Court cannot decide the same exercising its jurisdiction. These are matters to be considered by the statutory authority. 26. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that the objection raised by the respondents on the maintainability of the writ petitions is to be upheld. Therefore, the writ petitions are held to be not maintainable based on the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies. 27. The petitioners are at liberty to challenge the impugned order before the statutory authorities, which will consider the objections and claims raised by them untrammelled by any of the observations made in this judgment. The Writ Petitions are dismissed as not maintainable.