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2025 DIGILAW 1156 (GAU)

Upendra Nath Sarmah, S/o- Late Sashidhar Sarmah v. State of Assam

2025-07-22

KAUSHIK GOSWAMI

body2025
JUDGMENT : KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J. Heard Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. J. K. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the State respondents. 2] By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is assailing the order dated 24.05.2000, issued by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, whereby the petitioner was awarded the punishment of stoppage of 2 (two) increments with cumulative effect, and the order dated 20.09.2020, passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR) Diphu, Assam, whereby the appeal preferred against the order dated 24.05.2000 was rejected, thereby upholding the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 3] The brief facts of the case are that while the petitioner was posted at Dhing P.S. as Officer-in-Charge, by letter dated 27.11.1999, the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, issued a show-cause notice along with the statement of allegation under Section 7 of the POLICE ACT (Act-V), 1861, read with Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual, Part-III, and Article 311 of the Constitution of India, for inter-alia allegedly not handing over 16 case diaries to his successor at the time of handing over the charge of Dhing P.S. Accordingly, the petitioner was charged with misconduct and gross negligence of duty. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his written statement on 10.12.1999, wherein he denied the allegation and requested to exonerate him from the charges leveled. Thereafter, a disciplinary proceeding was held by the enquiry officer, and after completion of the same, the enquiry officer submitted its report. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, Assam, after perusing the findings submitted by the enquiry officer, found him guilty of the irregularities charged and accordingly, by order dated 24.05.2000, awarded the penalty of stoppage of 2 (two) annual increments with cumulative effect. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the enquiry was held in his back, and he had no knowledge of the disciplinary proceedings, and that prior to his retirement on 31.01.2020 as Inspector of Police, Border Branch, Assam, upon receiving the letter dated 13.01.2020, issued by the respondent No.5 whereby the annual service increment of the petitioner was regularized with an endorsement in Clause 2 that pay raised from Rs. 5080/- to Rs.5200/- w.e.f., 01.07.2002 instead of Rs.5375/- as he was awarded the subject penalty in connection with Departmental Proceeding No.12/1999 vide D.O. No.1725 dated 24.05.2000, he for the first time learned that he was awarded the aforesaid punishment. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the DIG (CR), Diphu, being the appellate authority against the aforesaid order; however, the same was rejected by order dated 20.09.2020. Situated thus, the present writ petition has been filed. 4] Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order dated 24.05.2000 was never communicated to the petitioner until he received the order dated 13.01.2020 from the Superintendent of Police (Border), wherefrom it had been revealed that penalty was awarded to him way back in the year 2000. He further submits that the procedure stipulated in Clause (e) and (f) of Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual Part-III has completely been violated by the disciplinary authority, and the appellant authority has hardly discussed anything as regards the same in the impugned order. He further submits that no opportunity was given to cross-examine the listed witnesses. By relying on the WT Message dated 03.03.2000, 06.03.2000, and 24.03.2000, he further submits that none of the eyewitnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner. He further submits that since the petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, there has been a complete violation of the principles of natural justice and the rules applicable in the field. He further submits that no presenting officer was appointed, and the enquiry officer himself examined the witnesses and exhibited the documents and, in fact, led the witnesses to prove the charge, as evident from the enquiry report dated 23.05.2000. He further submits that the enquiry officer has acted beyond his jurisdiction, and therefore, the departmental proceeding conducted by the enquiry officer is in violation of the principles of natural justice, and on this score alone, the order dated 24.05.2000 should be interfered with. He further submits that the enquiry report was not served to the petitioner, and the respondent No.6 in her affidavit did not rebut the said pleadings. He further submits that since the petitioner was not provided with the list of documents enclosed to the show-cause notice dated 27.11.1999, the enquiry proceeding is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submits that since the petitioner was not provided with the list of documents enclosed to the show-cause notice dated 27.11.1999, the enquiry proceeding is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submits that the Photostat copy of the handing over of the case diaries by the petitioner to the new O.C. R.K. Dowarah on 28.07.1999, 10.12.1999, and 27.12.1999, along with the enquiry report, was also not furnished to the petitioner by the enquiry officer during the proceeding, and the enquiry officer relied upon the aforesaid documents in order to prove the charge against the petitioner. He further submits that the penalty imposed under the impugned order is not prescribed under Rule 66 of the said Manual, and therefore, the aforesaid penalty could not have been imposed upon the petitioner. 5] In support of his above submissions, he relied upon the following case laws: - (i) Dulu Devi v. State of Assam and Ors. /b>., reported in (2016) 1 SCC 622 (ii) Rahul Kumar v. Union of India , reported in 2018 SCC Online Gau 1620 (iii) State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul , reported in (1999) 4 SCC 759 (iv) State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh , reported in 2024 SCC Online 1908 (v) Anil Baishya v. State of Assam and Ors. , reported in (2014) 4 GLR 111 (vi) Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma , reported in (2018) 7 SCC 670 (vii) Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan , reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 (viii) Management Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar & Ors. , reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 (ix) Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India , reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 518 6] Mr. J. K. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the State respondents, submits in his usual fairness that from the office note and the records of Departmental Proceeding No.12/1999 dated 24.05.2000, drawn up against the petitioner, there is no evidence found to indicate that the order dated 24.05.2000 was communicated to the petitioner. However, he submits that the opportunity to cross-examine the listed witnesses was given to the petitioner during the departmental proceeding. By drawing the attention of this Court to page Nos. However, he submits that the opportunity to cross-examine the listed witnesses was given to the petitioner during the departmental proceeding. By drawing the attention of this Court to page Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the records, he further submits that the statement of the prosecuting witnesses, being recorded by the enquiry officer, the enquiry officer asked the delinquent petitioner, whether he wanted to cross-examine, but the delinquent petitioner denied to cross-examine the said witnesses. He further submits that it is evident from the records that the petitioner was present during the cross- examination of the witnesses during the departmental proceedings. As regards the appointment of the presenting officer, he submits that no appointing officer was appointed for the enquiry of the departmental proceedings. He further submits that the list of documents alleged to have not been provided to the petitioner appears to have been given to the petitioner from the records. 7] I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the contending parties and perused the material, including the record of the departmental proceeding in question, as placed by the learned counsel for the State respondents. I have also considered the written arguments submitted by both the counsels as well as the case laws cited at the bar. 8] Apt to refer to the impugned order dated 24.05.2000, which is annexed as Annexure-A to the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of respondent No.6, which read as under: - “Government of Assam OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE Nagaon Assam-782001 EXTRACT COPY OF D.O. NO.1725 DATED 24.05.2000 The following order passed on the Note sheet page No. 5 & 6 in connection with D.P. No. 12/99 against SI(UB) Upendra Nath Sarmah of this DEF. "Perused the findings submitted by the E.O.Shri K.K. Baishya, APS, Addl. S.P. (S), Nagaon in connection with DP No. 12/99 drawn up against S.I.(UB) Upendra Nath Sarmah of Nagaon DEF and found that he is found guilty of two irregularities. 1. He showed 7 (seven) Cases disposed off but in actually, they were not disposed off and were not sent to the Court, which is highly illegal. He committed this being as O/C of a P.S. 2. He did not hand over various Cases pending with him despite his transfer from Dhing PS. He handed over various cases after five months of his transfer. He committed this being as O/C of a P.S. 2. He did not hand over various Cases pending with him despite his transfer from Dhing PS. He handed over various cases after five months of his transfer. He has not yet handed over 6 (six) Cases even after one year of his transfer from Dhing PS. Hence, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed an unpardonable mistake which not only compromises the discipline of the force but it also defeats the basic purpose of the speedy and impartial trail of the cases before the Court. Hence, S.I (UB) Upendra Nath Sarmah is awarded stoppage of two annual increments with commutative effect. He is also awarded one Black Mark. He is directed to hand over remaining 6 (six) cases still pending with him within 10 (ten) days and report compliance otherwise further punishment will be awarded to him. D.P. No. 12/99 stands disposed off. Sd/- S.N. Singh, IPS Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, Assam.” 9] It appears that the petitioner was charged for committing two irregularities, i.e., “(i) he showed 7 (seven) cases disposed of, but in actuality, they were not disposed of and were not sent to the court, which is highly illegal, and he committed this being O/C of a police station, & (ii) he did not hand over various cases pending with him despite his transfer from Dhing P.S. He handed over various cases after five months of his transfer, and he has not handed over 6 (six) cases even after one year of his transfer from Dhing P.S.”, and the aforesaid charges have been found to be established in the enquiry held by the enquiry officer. It further appears that the disciplinary authority, after perusing the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer, upon being satisfied that the same being an unpardonable mistake, which not only compromises the discipline of the force but also defeats the basic purpose of the speedy and impartial trial of the case before the court, awarded the petitioner with stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect and one Black Mark. It appears that though an appeal against the aforesaid order was passed, the same was rejected by the appellate authority by order dated 20.09.2020. It appears that though an appeal against the aforesaid order was passed, the same was rejected by the appellate authority by order dated 20.09.2020. The order dated 20.09.2020, read as under: - “ OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE: (CENTRAL RANGE) ASSAM:::DIPHU O R D E R Perused the appeal petition vide Memo No. SDGP (B)/R/42/Vol-XV/2020/65 Dtd, 30-01- 2020 of Insp (Ult) Upendra Nath Sarmah (the then SI (UB) of Nagaon DEF) forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, (B), Srimantapur, Guwahati and the connected papers of D.P. No. 12/1999, considering the ground for delay in making the appeal to the undersigned. After carefully observing the relevant papers of D.P No. 12/1909 file, it is seen that the findings submitted by the enquiry officer of the said DP is satisfactory Since the delinquent did not submit 7 (seven) nos, of case diaries to the Hon’ble Court at the time after being shown disposed off. Further he did not submit another 6 (six) nos. of case diaries after 1 (one) year of his transfer which is highly not accepted in a disciplined force. Hence, I stand with the order of the then Superintendent of Police, Nagaon. The appeal petition is disposed off accordingly. Sd/- Deputy Inspector General of Police, (CR) Assam, Diphu” 10] The issues that falls for determination in the instant writ petition are: (i) whether the enquiry report was communicated to the petitioner, and if not, whether the same vitiates the departmental proceedings, and the penalty imposed thereof, and/or, (ii) whether the presenting officer was appointed, and if not, whether the same vitiates the enquiry proceedings, and/or, (iii) whether the impugned penalty order was served to the petitioner, and if not, the consequences thereof, and/or, (iv) whether the petitioner was provided with the list of documents relied by the enquiry officer to hold the petitioner guilty of the charged offence, and if not whether the same is in violation of natural justice, and/or, (v) whether the petitioner was provided opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on behalf of the respondents to prove the charges leveled against the petitioner, and if not, whether the same vitiates the departmental proceedings. 11] As regards the first and second issues, namely non- communication of the enquiry report to the petitioner and non-appointment of the presenting officer, Mr. 11] As regards the first and second issues, namely non- communication of the enquiry report to the petitioner and non-appointment of the presenting officer, Mr. J. K. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the State respondents, has fairly conceded before this Court that there are no evidence in the record to indicate either that the subject enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer was communicated to the petitioner or that a presenting officer was appointed in the enquiry in question held against the petitioner. 12] Apt at this outset to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the affidavit-in-opposition submitted on behalf of the respondent No.6 on 24.03.2023, which read as under: - “6. That with regard to the statements made in paragraphs 5 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that as per record of the District Order Book, in D.O. No. 1725 dated 24/05/2000 the petitioner was found guilty of 2 (two) irregularities :- (i) "He showed 7 (seven) cases disposed off but in actually, they were not sent to the court, which is highly illegal. He committed this being as O/C of a PS. (ii) He did not handover various cases pending with him despite his transfer from Dhing PS. He handed over various cases after 5 (five) month of his transfer. He has not yet handed over 6 (six) cases after one year of his transfer from Dhing PS. Hence it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed an unpardonable mistake which not only compromises the discipline of the force but it also defeats the basic purpose of the speedy and impartial trial of the cases before the case. Hence, SI (UB) Upendra Nath Sarma is awarded stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect. He is also awarded one Black Mark". It is also found that the petitioner submitted an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR), Diphu, Assam, against the award of punishment i.e. award of stoppage of 2 (two) Annual Increments with cumulative effect on 27.01.2020 through the Superintendent of Police (Border), Assam, Srimantapur, Guwahati. However, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR), Diphu, Assam, did not accept his appeal & maintained the Order of the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, vide his order No. CR/57-NGN/2020/1503-06 dated 20th Sept, 2020. 7. However, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR), Diphu, Assam, did not accept his appeal & maintained the Order of the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, vide his order No. CR/57-NGN/2020/1503-06 dated 20th Sept, 2020. 7. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 6 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that as per records as evident in the First Show Cause Notice to the petitioner, issued by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, vide M/No. R/6708/99 dated 27.11.1999, the list of documents & list of witnesses had been served to the petitioner along with the Show Cause Notice which was received by the petitioner on 01.12.1999 by putting his signature. 8. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 7 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that as per record, on 10.12.1999, the petitioner submitted his written statement to the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, in defence requesting him to exonerate him from the charges framed against him. 9. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that as per record, it is found that Sri Chandra Kt. Baruah, the then Inspector of Police, CI (West), Batadrava, Nagaon, was appointed Enquiry Officer of DP No. 12/99 vide DO No. 3806 dated 19.12.1999. However, the DP file was returned by him since he was cited as one of the prosecuting witnesses in the said DP. Hence, the enquiry of the DP was entrusted to Sri K. K. Baishya, APS, the then Addl. SP (S), Nagaon, as Enquiry Officer vide DO No. 259 dated 27.01.2000. Accordingly, the Addl. SP (S), Nagaon, issued 03 (three) notices to the petitioner and the prosecuting witnesses to appear before him in his office chambers to depose their statements in connection with the above mentioned DP on 04.03.2000, 07.03.2000 & 27.03.2000. It may be noted that during this period the petitioner was posted at Police Reserve, Nagaon. On completion of the enquiry, the EO submitted his findings dated. 23rd May 2000. Hence, the question of providing no opportunities to the petitioner does not arise. Further, regarding pressure exerted by Sri K. K. Baishya, APS, the then Addl. SP (S), Nagaon, upon the petitioner is not a fact. 10. On completion of the enquiry, the EO submitted his findings dated. 23rd May 2000. Hence, the question of providing no opportunities to the petitioner does not arise. Further, regarding pressure exerted by Sri K. K. Baishya, APS, the then Addl. SP (S), Nagaon, upon the petitioner is not a fact. 10. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that as per record, the Show Cause Notice along with the lists of documents and prosecuting witnesses proposed were duly received by the petitioner. As per record, the Enquiry Officer of DP No. 12/99 recorded the statements of the prosecuting witnesses in presence of the petitioner. The petitioner was given the opportunity to cross examine the prosecuting witnesses to which the petitioner declined. The statements so recorded by the Enquiry Officer in presence of the petitioner were duly signed by him after he had adduced his reply. 11. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 10 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that no Presenting Officer for enquiry of the DP was appointed. Further, the petitioner was given all opportunities to examine/cross examine the charges, the listed documents, the listed witnesses and present his case as per the rules/ procedure. 12. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 11 of the writ petition the deponent begs to state that the petitioner was found guilty of 2 (two) irregularities as mentioned in the copy of the D.O. No. 1725 dated 24.05.2000 therefore the question of devoid of any reason does not arise. 13. That with regard to the statements made in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the writ petition the deponent has no comments to offer.” 13] Reading the aforesaid paragraphs, it is apparent that the respondent No.6 is silent as regards the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the impugned order of the disciplinary authority was not communicated to him, and also as regards the allegation of non-appointment of presenting officer. 14] Apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. 14] Apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (Supra) , wherein the Apex Court has held that a delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority and to make a representation against it, and non-furnishing of the same to the delinquent would be violative of the principles of natural justice, thereby rendering the final order invalid. Paragraph Nos.13 to 18 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: - “13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one occasion has stated that two phases of the inquiry contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to the Forty-second Amendment were judicial. That perhaps was a little stretching the position. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute that it is a quasi- judicial one. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi- judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. As this Court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case, the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. Prof. Wade has pointed out: ‘The concept of natural justice has existed for many centuries and it has crystallised into two rules: that no man should be judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing.... They (the courts) have been developing and extending the principles of natural justice so as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure, to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this once again, by assuming that Parliament always intends powers to be exercised fairly.’ 14. This Court in Mazharul Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P. pointed out: "Every person must know what he is to meet and he must have opportunity of meeting that case. The legislature, however, can exclude operation of these principles expressly or implicitly. But in the absence of any such exclusion, the principle of natural justice will have to be proved.’ 15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the Forty-second Amendment. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the Forty-second Amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendation, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty- second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position. 16. At the hearing some argument had been advanced on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution, namely, that in one set of cases arising out of disciplinary proceedings furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report would be insisted upon while in the other it would not be. This argument has no foundation inasmuch as where the disciplinary authority is the Inquiry Officer there is no report. He becomes the first assessing authority to consider the evidence directly for finding out whether the delinquent is guilty and liable to be punished. Even otherwise, the inquiries which are directly handled by the disciplinary authority and those which are allowed to be handled by the Inquiry Officer can easily be classified into two separate groups one, where there is no inquiry report on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority is the Inquiry Officer and inquiries where there is a report on account of the fact that an officer other than the disciplinary authority has been constituted as the Inquiry Officer. That itself would be a reasonable classification keeping away the application of Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Forty-second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion the judgments in the different High Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion the judgments in the different High Courts taking the contrary view must be taken to be no longer laying down good law. We have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger bench of this Court taking this view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two Judge bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. 18. We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non- furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.” 15] Reading the aforesaid judgment, it is absolutely clear that in the event the enquiry report is not furnished and the enquiry officer and the departmental authority are not one and the same person, the same shall prejudice the delinquent, and there shall be a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. In other words, if it is established that the enquiry report based on which the departmental authority has awarded the penalty/punishment to the delinquent was not furnished to him in order to give him an opportunity to submit a representation thereof, the final order of penalty/punishment is a nullity, being in violation of the rules of natural justice. In the case in hand, it is apparent that since the report was not provided to the petitioner, the petitioner was not aware of the finding of the enquiry officer, and in fact, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to be represented before imposing the impugned penalty. That being so, the impugned order of penalty is totally illegal and invalid. 16] This takes me to the second issue as regards no presenting officer being appointed in the subject enquiry. That being so, the impugned order of penalty is totally illegal and invalid. 16] This takes me to the second issue as regards no presenting officer being appointed in the subject enquiry. The said allegation is also established, as it is evident from the record that no presenting officer was appointed. 17] Apt at this stage to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma . Paragraph Nos., 24, 26, 27, and 28, of the aforesaid judgment read as under: - “24. The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings and the Enquiry Officer is in the position of an independent adjudicator and is obliged to act fairly, impartially. The authority exercising quasi- judicial power has to act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner. 26. A Constitution Bench of this Court has elaborately considered and explained the principles of natural justice in A.K. Kralpak v. Union of India. This Court held that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Initially recognised as consisting of two principles, that is, no one shall be a judge in his own cause and no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing, various other facets have been recognised. In para 20 the following has been held: (SCC p. 272) ‘20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely, (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and, that is, that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably....’ 27. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and, that is, that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably....’ 27. In State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, this Court had laid down that Enquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority, he has to act as an independent adjudicator and he is not a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. In paras 28 and 30 the following has been held: (SCC p. 782) ‘28. An Enquiry Officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The Enquiry Officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.’ 28. When the statutory rule does not contemplate appointment of Presenting Officer whether non- appointment of Presenting Officer ipso facto vitiates the inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision of Rule 27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that the High Court found breach of principles of natural justice in Enquiry Officer acting as the prosecutor against the respondents. The Enquiry Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceeds to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish an employee, the principle of bias comes into place.” 18] Apt also to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Anil Baishya (Supra) Paragraph No.24 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: - “24. A departmental enquiry is a quasi-judicial proceeding. Principles of natural justice, which includes a fair procedure, is inbuilt in such a proceeding. The Enquiry Officer has to discharge his functions in a quasi-judicial manner. He has to act fairly and impartially. The role of the Presenting Officer is to present the case of the disciplinary authority before the Enquiry Officer. He is the representative of the disciplinary authority. He has to assist the Enquiry Officer by presenting before him the case of the disciplinary authority. He has to marshal the facts and to examine and cross-examine the witnesses produced during the enquiry. It is he who has to produce and prove the listed documents during the enquiry and lead the oral evidence in support of the charge. Therefore, in the absence of the Presenting Officer, it is the Enquiry Officer who will have to produce the documents and present the witnesses. In such a case, he will assume the role of the judge as well as that of the prosecutor, which will be a total negation of the avowed principles of natural justice and fair procedure. Absence of the Presenting Officer will certainly not be a fair procedure.” 19] Apt also to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mutum Shantikumar Singh v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, reported in 2005 Supreme(Gau) 118 . Absence of the Presenting Officer will certainly not be a fair procedure.” 19] Apt also to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mutum Shantikumar Singh v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, reported in 2005 Supreme(Gau) 118 . Paragraph No. 6 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: - “6. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) had discussed the scope and object of natural justice and its applicability to administrative enquiry in A. K Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.. reported in [1970] I SCR 457 held that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made in other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. Para 20 (of AIR) in A.K. Kraipak (supra) is quoted hereunder: ‘20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent year. In the past it was thought that it include just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy Georege v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, dt. 15.7.1968, [1969] 1 SCR 317 the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law, under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.’” 20] Reading the aforesaid judgments, it is absolutely clear that the enquiry proceeding is not a casual formality. Notwithstanding, whether there is statutory provision for applicability of natural justice or not in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings, the same must be read into the statue in question, unless the same is explicitly excluded. In short, the enquiry proceedings cannot be conducted in a biased manner. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. Thus, the enquiry officer has to act fairly and impartially and, therefore, cannot assume the role of the judge as well as that of the prosecutor. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. Thus, the enquiry officer has to act fairly and impartially and, therefore, cannot assume the role of the judge as well as that of the prosecutor. In such a departmental enquiry, the role of the presenting officer is to present the case of the disciplinary authority before the enquiry officer. In other words, the presenting officer is the representative of the disciplinary authority, who, by assisting the enquiry officer presents the case of the disciplinary authority before the enquiry officer. It is the presenting officer who has to marshal the facts and thereby examine and cross- examine the witnesses produced during the enquiry. It is he who has to produce and prove the listed documents during the enquiry and lead the oral evidence in support of the charge. Therefore, in the absence of the presenting officer, it is the enquiry officer who will have to produce the documents and present the witnesses, and while doing so, he assumes the role of the judge as well as that of the prosecutor, which will be a total violation of the principles of natural justice and fair procedure. Hence, the same vitiates the enquiry and the consequential punishment imposed. 21] In the case in hand, it is established from the records that the enquiry officer himself examined the witnesses and exhibited the documents of the disciplinary authority and, in fact, led the witnesses to prove the charge. Therefore, it is clearly established that the enquiry officer in the enquiry in question acted as a judge as well as the prosecutor. Hence, the non-appointment of a presenting officer had clearly prejudiced the petitioner, inasmuch as the enquiry officer undertook the role of the prosecutor; the unfairness and biasness on the part of the enquiry officer cannot be ruled out. Fairness being a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice, any action that is unfair would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. That being so, there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, on this score alone, the enquiry held against the petitioner is totally vitiated. Fairness being a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice, any action that is unfair would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. That being so, there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, on this score alone, the enquiry held against the petitioner is totally vitiated. 22] In view of the fact that this Court has held the first two issues in favour of the petitioner, the enquiry proceeding against the petitioner is illegal, and hence, the entire enquiry proceeding stands vitiated. It is needless to clarify that the enquiry proceeding having been found to be illegal and vitiated, upon determination of the first two issues, the remaining issues are not required to be decided in the instant writ petition. Accordingly, the enquiry proceeding against the writ petitioner is hereby quashed, and in consequence, the impugned penalty order also cannot stand in the eye of law. As such, the impugned order dated 24.05.2000 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, and the order dated 20.09.2020, passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (CR) Diphu, are hereby set aside and quashed. 23] However, the respondent authority is at liberty to initiate fresh de-novo proceeding against the petitioner as per law if so advised within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. 24] It is needless to be clarified that in the event the respondent authorities do not initiate the de-novo enquiry within the time period stipulated hereinabove, the arrear salary as withheld by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaon, vide order dated 24.05.2000, be released to the petitioner within a period of 3 (three) weeks thereof. 25] With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition stands allowed, and is disposed of.