ORDER : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. This appeal is filed aggrieved of order dated 17.08.2019 dismissing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘1996 Act’) being time barred. 2. The relevant facts are that the appellant availed credit facility from the respondent. On default of the repayment, the arbitration proceedings were initiated which culminated into the award dated 25.05.2018. The application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was dismissed on 09.08.2019 on ground of limitation having been filed beyond one hundred twenty days from 29.03.2019. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that copy of the award was not served as per Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. The award was sent by the arbitrator to the address where the appellant was not residing. The contention is that the respondent was aware of the change of address, yet the arbitrator was not informed. Submission is that on receiving the notice dated 29.03.2019 issued by the executing court, after appearing in court and on gaining of the knowledge of the award the objections were filed. Further that the JCB was taken away by the respondent and the loan account was cleared, yet an ex-parte award has been passed against the appellant. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the application filed u/s 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be entertained beyond period of one hundred twenty days, as the power to condone the delay is restricted upto thirty days. The contention is that the award was sent to the last known address. Learned counsel relies upon Section 3(1)(b) of the 1996 Act to contend that copy of the award was sent to the last known address and shall be deemed to have been received by the appellant. 5. U/s 31(5) of the 1996 Act, the arbitrator is obligated to deliver a signed copy of the award to each of the party. U/s 34(3) of the 1996 Act, the limitation starts running from the date of receipt of arbitral award. The Court has power to condone only the delay upto thirty days. 6. Section 3 of the 1996 Act raises a presumption of communication having been received on the date of delivery. While passing the impugned order, it has not been considered that the limitation starts running from the date of receipt of the award. The Court has power to condone only the delay upto thirty days. 6. Section 3 of the 1996 Act raises a presumption of communication having been received on the date of delivery. While passing the impugned order, it has not been considered that the limitation starts running from the date of receipt of the award. There is no finding recorded as to when the award was delivered to the appellant or what was the deemed date of receipt of the award. The date from which limitation is calculated i.e. 29.03.2019 is date of notice issued by executing court not even the date of service of notice whereas relevant date would be the date of receipt of award. 7. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The matter is remitted back to the Court concerned to decide the matter afresh including the issue of limitation. 8. In order to avoid further delay and complications, let the parties through their representatives appear before the Court concerned on 26.05.2025.