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2025 DIGILAW 1172 (GAU)

Vanlalhriata, S/o Lalthanmawia v. State of Mizoram, Represented by the Public Prosecutor, Mizoram

2025-07-23

KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, MARLI VANKUNG

body2025
JUDGMENT & ORDER : Kaushik Goswami, J. Heard Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused/appellant. Also heard Mrs. Vanneihsiami, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State and Ms. Emily L. Khiangte, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent No. 2/informant. 2] This appeal is presented against the Judgment & Order dated 13.08.2024 , passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Special Court, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, (hereinafter referred to as the “Trial Court”), in Session Case No. 76/2023 , arising out of Criminal Trial No. 1444/2023 , whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 , (hereinafter referred to as the 'POCSO Act'), and sentenced thereof to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 (twenty) years and fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine to suffer further Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 (three) months. 3] The brief facts of the case are that the President of Mizo Hmeichhe Insuihkhawm Pawl (MHIP), Sakawrtuichhun Branch, i.e., the informant/PW-1, lodged an F.I.R., on 08.06.2023, alleging, inter alia, that the victim, i.e., PW-2, who is aged about 13 years, was sexually molested from January 2020 to March 2020 by her own father, i.e., the accused/appellant. It is further alleged that the accused/appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim/PW-2 in their home around four times while she was just about 10 years old. Accordingly, a case was received and registered under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, read with 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). 4] Thereafter, the Investigating Officer, i.e., PW-9, upon being endorsed to investigate the case, examined the informant/PW-1, the victim/PW-2, and other witnesses, and also seized the Birth Certificate and produced the victim/PW-2 for medical examination as well as for recording her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Cr.P.C.”). Thereafter, she also arrested the accused/appellant, and after informing him of the grounds of his arrest, forwarded him for medical examination and also interrogated him. After completion of the investigation, she submitted chargesheet against the accused/appellant vide Chargesheet No.28/2023 dated 28.07.2023 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, read with Section 376 AB of the IPC. Thereafter, she also arrested the accused/appellant, and after informing him of the grounds of his arrest, forwarded him for medical examination and also interrogated him. After completion of the investigation, she submitted chargesheet against the accused/appellant vide Chargesheet No.28/2023 dated 28.07.2023 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, read with Section 376 AB of the IPC. Thereafter, the Trial Court framed the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, against the accused/appellant on 06.09.2023, and upon the accused/appellant pleading not guilty, the trial commenced. 5] During trial, the prosecution examined nine (9) prosecution witnesses, including the informant/PW-1, the victim/PW-2, and the Investigating Officer. After completion of the investigation, all the incriminating circumstances were put before the accused/appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein the accused/appellant simply stated that he does not remember whether he had sexual intercourse with the victim/PW-2 four times, as he was fully drunk during that time. However, the accused/appellant did not adduce any evidence. 6] After completion of the evidence and hearing, the Trial Court rendered its Judgment & Order, which is under appeal before this Court, whereunder the accused/appellant was held guilty of the offence charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced thereof. Situated thus, the present criminal appeal has been preferred. 7] Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae, submits that there is inconsistency as regards the time of the alleged occurrence. Though before the Judicial Magistrate, the victim/PW-2, during her 164 Cr.P.C., examination, said that it was from March 2020 to June 2020 when the alleged incident occurred; however, in her deposition before the Trial Court, she deposed that it was in the year 2020 in the months of January to March. He thus submits that in view of the aforesaid inconsistencies, the testimony of the victim/PW-2 cannot be said to be wholly trustworthy, credible, and unblemished, and therefore her testimony requires corroboration. He further submits that the medical report that has been exhibited was not done in accordance with law and therefore, is not admissible and could not have been relied upon by the Trial Court. He further submits that there being no corroboration to the alleged offence as narrated by the victim/PW-2, the impugned conviction cannot sustain the eye of the law. He further submits that there being no corroboration to the alleged offence as narrated by the victim/PW-2, the impugned conviction cannot sustain the eye of the law. He further submits that since the accused/appellant was drunk and not in his senses during the alleged sexual assault, no offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is established against him. 8] Per contra, Mrs. Vanneihsiami, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mizoram, submits that there is no inconsistency as far as the alleged incident is concerned. She further submits that the victim/PW-2 has recounted the core spectrum of the alleged offence consistently from the beginning to the end of the trial. She accordingly submits that the testimony of the victim/PW-2 is wholly trustworthy and unblemished, and her evidence is of sterling quality, and hence, conviction on the basis of such sole testimony is justified. In support of the aforesaid submission, she relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ganesan Vs. State represented by its Inspector of Police , reported in (2020) 10 SSC 573. 9] Ms. Emily L. Khiangte, learned Legal Aid Counsel, while adopting the arguments made by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mizoram, further submits that the explanation of the accused/appellant as regards not remembering the alleged incident at the time of occurrence as he was drunk does not discharge him for commission of a crime. She further submits that under Section 85 of the IPC, in order for a person to take a benefit under Section 85 of the said Act, he has to prove that the drink that intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. She further submits that in the case in hand, the accused/appellant has not taken any such plea. She further submits that the victim, who is staying with her father after her parents got divorced, has no reason for falsely implicating him in an offence that destroys her own life and makes her homeless, and therefore, her evidence ought not to be looked at with suspicion. In support of her aforesaid submission, she relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Santhosh Moolya & Another Vs. State of Karnataka , reported in (2010) 5 SCC 445 . In support of her aforesaid submission, she relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Santhosh Moolya & Another Vs. State of Karnataka , reported in (2010) 5 SCC 445 . 10] We have given our prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing for all the parties and have also perused the materials available on record. We have also considered carefully the case laws cited at the bar. 11] The instant criminal appeal being against the conviction, we shall now analyze and re-appreciate the evidence on record to satisfy ourselves as to whether the accused/appellant is guilty of the charged offence. 12] PW-1/informant deposed that on 07.06.2023, the office of Mizo Hmeichhe Insuihkhawm Pawl (MHIP), Sakawrtuichhun Branch, of which she is the President, received information from a teacher of Government Middle School, Sakawrtuichhun, that one of their students, i.e., victim/PW-2, who is about 13 years old, was raped by her biological father. She further deposed that accordingly, after holding meetings with all NGOs in their locality, including YMA, MUP, and the Village Council, they questioned the victim/PW-2, and upon being asked, she stated that she was raped by her father around four times during January 2020, when she was only 10 years old. She further deposed that the victim/PW-2 was living with her father. She further deposed that thereafter they lodged an FIR, which she exhibited as Exhibit P-1, and further exhibited her signature as Exhibit P-1(a). During cross-examination, she clarified that she knows the accused/appellant has a drinking habit. She further clarified that the victim/PW-2 mentioned to the police personal that her father was mostly drunk while allegedly touching her sexually. 13] Victim/PW-2 deposed as under:- “On S/A My particulars are above. Accused Vanlalhriata is my biological father. My parents were divorced when I was only 3 yrs old and I was living with my father and we were sleeping together on the same bed before he was arrested by the Police. In the year 2020 in the month of January to March my father raped me around 4 times while he was drunk but he inserted his penis inside my vagina only once. My father is an alcoholic sometimes he drinks alcohol without mixing it with water. I have told the incident to my friend Nutei and she told the incident to our teachers. My father is an alcoholic sometimes he drinks alcohol without mixing it with water. I have told the incident to my friend Nutei and she told the incident to our teachers. My Judicial Statement was recorded by Magistrate with my own volition. Exbt P-2-Is my Judicial Statement recorded by Magistrate. Exbt P-2(a) - sis my signature.” During cross-examination, she further clarified that her father, i.e., the accused/appellant, is a heavy drinker, and when he is drunk, he loses his senses. She further clarified that when the accused/appellant is sober, he does not recollect his behavior while he was drunk. She further clarified that the accused/appellant had no knowledge of sexually assaulting her, as he was mostly drunk during the alleged incident. 14] PW-3 , who is a teacher at the Government Middle School, Sakawrtuichhun, deposed that on 07.06.2023, one of their students, i.e., the victim/PW-2, had a stomach pain and came to the staff office with her friend/PW-4, and while they were taking care of the victim/PW-2, PW-4 stated to her that the victim/PW-2 was sexually assaulted by her father, i.e., the accused/appellant. She further deposed that when they asked the victim/PW-2 about the incident, she revealed to them that the incident took place when she was about 10 years old. She further deposed that thereafter, they forwarded the case to the NGO at Sakawrtuichhun. During cross-examination, she clarified that the victim/PW-2 was about 13 years of age when she told them about the incident that occurred to her when she was about 10 years old. She further clarified that the victim/PW-2 only complained of her stomach pain and not of any other part of her body. She further clarified that it was not the victim who came forward on her own regarding the alleged incident, but it was her friend, i.e., PW 4, who brought the alleged incident to their notice. 15] PW-4 , who is the friend of the victim/PW-2, deposed that they studied together in Class VI in the Government Middle School, Sakawrtuichhun, and also were together in the Beginner Department (Church Service). She further deposed that the victim/PW-2 was living only with her father since her parents were divorced. She further deposed that the victim did not appear normal and talked less and even sometimes wanted to drink liquor. She further deposed that the victim/PW-2 was living only with her father since her parents were divorced. She further deposed that the victim did not appear normal and talked less and even sometimes wanted to drink liquor. She further deposed that the victim expressed to her that she wished that her father would come home late and that sometimes she was hoping that her father would sleep early. She further deposed that she accordingly suspected something had happened to her, and on 07.06.2023, when they were in school and when the victim/PW-2 said that her stomach was paining and her behavior was also not normal, she asked her if her father sexually assaulted her, and upon being asked, she immediately replied to her in the positive. Thereafter, she further deposed that accordingly, they went to the teachers? room and disclosed the incident to their teachers. During cross-examination, she clarified that the victim/PW-2 only on 07.06.2023 told her about the alleged incident. She further clarified that the victim?s father is a heavy drinker and all that she knew is what she heard from the victim/PW-2. 16] PW-5 and PW-6 are the seizure witnesses, who have witnessed the seizure of the Birth Certificate by the Investigating Officer. 17] PW-7 is the doctor, who medically examined the victim/PW-2 and deposed that on 08.06.2023, when the victim/PW-2 was produced before him, upon examination he found that her hymen was ruptured (old), and accordingly exhibited the medical examination report as Exhibit P-5 and further exhibited his own signature as Exhibit P-5(a). 18] PW-8 is the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement of the victim/PW-2 under Section 164 Cr.P.C., but did not turn up before the Trial Court to adduce evidence. 19] PW-9 is the Investigating Officer, who investigated the case and exhibited the documents as under:- “Exbt P6- is the charge sheet submitted by me. ExbtP6(a)- is my signature. Exbt P7- is an intimation given to the Chairperson CWC, Aizawl. Exbt P8- is an intimation given to the Special Judge POCSO, Aizawl ExbtP2- is the Judicial Statement of victim x recorded by Julie Lalhlupuii JMFC, Aizawl. Exbt P3- is the Judicial Statement of witness Lalruattluangi recorded by Julie LalhlupuiiJMFC, Aizawl. Exbt P4- is the seizure memo Exbt P4(c)- is my signature. Exbt P9- is the medical examination report of accused. Exbt P8- is an intimation given to the Special Judge POCSO, Aizawl ExbtP2- is the Judicial Statement of victim x recorded by Julie Lalhlupuii JMFC, Aizawl. Exbt P3- is the Judicial Statement of witness Lalruattluangi recorded by Julie LalhlupuiiJMFC, Aizawl. Exbt P4- is the seizure memo Exbt P4(c)- is my signature. Exbt P9- is the medical examination report of accused. Exbt P5- is the medical examination report of victim.” During cross-examination, he clarified that the doctor who medically examined the victim stated in the medical examination report that there were no marks of violence on the body of the victim, but there was an old rupture in her hymen. He further clarified that the accused/appellant, while giving a statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., stated to him that he was never sober when the alleged incident took place and that he was never aware of his actions as claimed by the victim. 20] The examination of the accused/appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., reads as under: “The court examined the accused Vanlalhriata S/o Lalthanmawia of Sakawrtuichhun, Aizawl under section 313 Cr.P.C. The following are the questions put upon the accused and his answers to the questions. Q It is evidence that you know the victim. What do you have anything to say in explanation? Ans: Yes, I know the victim as she is my daughter. Q It is evidence that the victim is your biological daughter. What do you have anything to say in explanation? Ans: It is true that the victim is my daughter. Q It is also evidence that you had committed sexual assault upon the victim aged about 13 years old. What have you got to say in explanation? Ans: I do not remember whether I had sexual intercourse with the victim as I was fully drunk on that night. Q. It is also evidence that you had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault during the year 2020 of January to March upon the victim. What do you have to say in explanation? Ans: I do not remember whether I had sexual intercourse with the victim during the year 2020 of January to March. Q. It is also evidence that you had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault for 4(four) times upon the victim. What do you have to say in explanation? What do you have to say in explanation? Ans: I do not remember whether I had sexual intercourse with the victim during the year 2020 of January to March. Q. It is also evidence that you had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault for 4(four) times upon the victim. What do you have to say in explanation? Ans: I do not remember whether I had sexual intercourse with the victim for 4(four) times. (SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED) (P.SINGTHANGA) PRESIDING OFFICER” 21] It is thus clear from the above examination of the accused/appellant that he does not remember anything as regards the allegation of sexual intercourse, as he used to be drunk during the night. In a case of sexual assault for a minor girl, what is important to keep in mind is that a minor girl, and that too, of the age of 10 years at the time of occurrence, would not ordinarily lie about being sexually assaulted. Therefore, the version of the informant victim has to be considered with utmost care before discerning the same. In fact, if the version of the informant victim inspires confidence and appears to be trustworthy, credible, unblemished, and of sterling quality, no further corroboration is required. 22] Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ganesan Vs. State (Supra), relied on by the appellant, wherein the Apex Court has observed and held that where the testimony of the victim is found reliable and trustworthy, and reiterated conviction on the basis of her testimony is permissible. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are extracted hereunder for ready reference: - “10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay, it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: ‘9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) '16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.' 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12). '12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.' 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 &403, paras 8 &21) '8. ... The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 &403, paras 8 &21) '8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." (emphasis in original) 12. In State of Orissa v. ThakaraBesra, this Court held that rape not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan. 14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 10.3. Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi). In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29) ‘22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.’" 23] What transpires from the above is that in order for a witness to qualify as a sterling witness, what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. In short, it should be natural, realistic, and consistent right from the starting point till the end. Thus, if a witness withstands the cross-examination and under no circumstance there arises any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the Court considering the version of such witness is in a position to accept the same for its face value without any hesitation. 24] Therefore, the test is to take the testimony of the victim in the context of the facts of each case and to ascertain whether such testimony can be said to be trustworthy, reliable, credible, and of sterling quality. In doing so, whether the surrounding circumstances deposed by the victim/witness are supported by other witnesses or not, and the manner in which the victim has recounted the incident right from the beginning to the end, amongst others, to be taken into account. 25] Keeping the aforesaid position of law in mind, we shall now test the veracity of the testimony of the victim/PW-2. 25] Keeping the aforesaid position of law in mind, we shall now test the veracity of the testimony of the victim/PW-2. It appears from the victim/PW-2?s testimony that she has recounted the alleged incident of sexual intercourse committed upon her by her father, i.e., the accused/appellant, after being drunk in a very natural and realistic manner. There doesn't appear to be anything suspicious or unusual as regards the manner in which she has narrated the alleged incident of the sexual intercourse committed repeatedly upon her while she was about 10 years of age living with her father alone, as her mother left them after being divorced. Perusing the initial statement of the victim/PW-2 made before the Investigating Officer/PW-9, it appears that she has recounted the core spectrum of the alleged sexual assault consistently till her deposition in the Trial Court. It further appears that she has reiterated her version of the core spectrum of the alleged incident in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., as well. There appears to be no inconsistency or contradiction in her testimony as regards the factum of the occurrence. Thus, victim/PW-2 has remained intact in recounting the alleged incident from the starting point till her deposition before the Trial Court. That apart, PW-1, PW-3, PW- 4/friend, PW-6, and the PW-7/Doctor, have also supported the surrounding circumstances deposed by her. Thus, there is no doubt arising in our mind as to the alleged factum of the occurrence, and we are in a position to accept the same for its face value without any hesitation. 26] We are therefore of the unhesitant view that the testimony of the victim/PW-2 is wholly trustworthy, credible, and unblemished and is that of a sterling quality, and hence such testimony is truthful and honest. 27] In order to bring home an offence under Section 5 for which punishment is given under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, it is essential for the prosecution to establish that the accused/appellant has, amongst others, committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child. 28] Apt at this stage to refer to Section 3 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under: - 3. 28] Apt at this stage to refer to Section 3 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under: - 3. Penetrative sexual assault .—A person is said to commit 'penetrative sexual assault' if— (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person. 29] Apt also to refer to sub-section (l), (m) and (n) of Section 5 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under:- 5. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault. — (a) Whoever, being a police….. (b)….. (l) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or (m) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n) whoever being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care or having a domestic relationship with a parent of the child or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits penetrative sexual assault on such child; or (o) whoever being,…… ….., is said to commit aggravated penetrative sexual assault. 30] Apt also to refer to section 6 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under: - 6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault .—(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. (2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim. 31] Reading the aforesaid provision of law, it is apparent that a person is said to commit “aggravated penetrative sexual assault,” inter alia, if he penetrates his penis to any extent into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a child below 12 years, amongst others, or makes such child to do so with him or any other person. In the present case, it is established that the accused/appellant had repeatedly inserted his penis into the vagina of the victim/PW-2 after being drunk, while she was about 10 years of age and living with him after his wife left them. Hence, an offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is made out against the accused/appellant. 32] As regards the contention of learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant that the victim, i.e., PW-2, has not been consistent as far as the month of the alleged occurrence of the incident is concerned, even assuming the same to be correct, it is of no consequence as it is a settled law that a minor contradiction or insignificant discrepancy in the statement of the victim cannot be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Be that as it may, we find that the victim/PW-2 has consistently recounted that during the year 2020, when she was about 10 years old, the accused/appellant repeatedly committed sexual assault almost four times in his house. It is worthwhile to mention that the accused/appellant has also admitted in his 313 examination that since he used to be drunk on the night of the alleged incident, he does not remember or recollect whether he had sexual intercourse with his daughter, i.e., the victim/PW-2. Apropos that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for the commission of a crime. That being so, since we have already accepted the testimony of the victim/PW-2 to be believable, no further corroboration is required. Hence, the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused/appellant for committing aggravated sexual penetrative assault upon the victim/PW-2 beyond a reasonable doubt. 33] In view of the above, we do not find any legal infirmity or illegality in the Judgment & Order of the Trial Court, and hence the appeal is bereft of any merit whatsoever. Accordingly, the appeal fails. 33] In view of the above, we do not find any legal infirmity or illegality in the Judgment & Order of the Trial Court, and hence the appeal is bereft of any merit whatsoever. Accordingly, the appeal fails. 34] This Court appreciates the service rendered by Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned Amicus Curiae and his fee is fixed at Rs. 9,000/- (Rupees nine thousand) only, and the service rendered by Ms. Emily L. Khiangte, Legal Aid Counsel and her requisite fee is to be paid by the State Legal Services Authority as per existing rates. 35] Resultantly, the criminal appeal stands dismissed and is disposed of. 36] Return back the Trial Court Record (TCR).