JUDGMENT : S.K. Medhi, J. The instant appeal has been preferred from jail against the judgment and order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari in Sessions Case No. 266(S-C)/17 (GR Case No.373/17) convicting and sentencing the appellant u/s-302 IPC with imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/-. 2. The criminal law was set into motion by lodging of an Ejahar on 03.07.2017 by the brother of the deceased (PW-9), wherein it was stated that on the previous day i.e., 02.07.2017 at about 7.00 pm, the appellant had caused the death of his wife by hacking with a sharp weapon and when he had brought the body to the nearby forest to bury the same on 03.07.2017 at about 7.30 am, the public had noticed and accordingly, the appellant was apprehended. Based on the aforesaid Ejahar, the case was registered and investigation was made in which the statements of the witnesses were recorded, inquest made, sketch maps prepared which led to laying of the charge sheet before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Court had accordingly framed the charges and on denial of the same, the trial had begun in which the prosecution had adduced evidence through 10 nos. of prosecution witnesses. 4. PW-1 is a co-villager who had deposed of hearing that the appellant had killed his wife and had gone to bury the body. Upon such news, he had gone to the place of occurrence and saw cut injury on the neck of the deceased. He is a seizure witness so far as Ext- 1 concerning a dao. It may however be mentioned that though the signature of PW-1 appears in Ext.- 2, the same was not proved. It has also been noticed that Ext. 1 pertains to a hoe and not a dao. 5. PW-2 is the President of the VDP who had narrated that one Rajiv had informed him about the incident and he had accordingly gone to the place of occurrence and saw the appellant with a hoe. He has also narrated that the appellant had made an extrajudicial confession. Subsequently, he had gone to the residence of the appellant and found a dao and an axe with hair and blood stuck on those. He has proved Ext. 1 - seizure list. He had however stated that the police did not obtain signature when they had seized the dao and axe. Subsequently, he had gone to the residence of the appellant and found a dao and an axe with hair and blood stuck on those. He has proved Ext. 1 - seizure list. He had however stated that the police did not obtain signature when they had seized the dao and axe. In the cross-examination, PW-2 had stated that the extrajudicial confession was not made before the police. 6. PW-3 is the aunt of the appellant, who had deposed that she was informed by the village Headman and also heard that the public had caught the appellant. She had accordingly gone to the house of the appellant along with the police and found the dao and axe with blood stains. She is a witness to Ext- 2- Seizure List. It may be mentioned that PW-3 had not stated anything about noticing blood in the house. 7. PW-4 is the brother of the appellant who had stated that the VDP Secretary had called him while he was ploughing and told him about the incident. He is a seizure witness so far as Ext. 2 is concerned the spade. In the cross-examination, however, he had stated that the relationship of the accused and the deceased was good. 8. PW- 5 is a co-villager who had narrated that on the said date at about 7.30 am, he had seen the deceased being taken out by the appellant on his shoulder with a spade and he had accordingly informed the fact to the VDP Secretary and police came. He had also deposed about an extrajudicial confession made by the appellant. In the cross-examination, he had, however, mentioned that the paddy field where he was ploughing is about half a kilometre. However, he had made a change in the narration by stating that the distance was about 150 metres. He had, however, stated that the confession was made by the appellant before the police. 9. PW-6 is another co-villager who had stated that he was ploughing in the paddy field nearby and had seen the appellant carrying the wife on his shoulder with a spade and had accordingly informed the VDP. In his cross-examination, PW-6 had stated that his house was in front of the house of the appellant which was in a hearing distance. He had stated that he did not hear any shouts in the earlier night. 10. In his cross-examination, PW-6 had stated that his house was in front of the house of the appellant which was in a hearing distance. He had stated that he did not hear any shouts in the earlier night. 10. PW-7 is a co-villager who had stated that the VDP Secretary, one Rajiv Buragohain, had informed the incident and he had accordingly telephoned the police. He had stated that he had come to the house of the appellant with the police and saw blood all over. He had also stated that the appellant had confessed before the police. 11. PW-8 is the I.O. who had stated that VDP secretary, Rajiv Buragohain had informed the matter over telephone. He had stated that he had arrested the appellant after going to the place of occurrence and had seized the spade which was smeared with blood. He had accordingly exhibited the Seizure List as Ext. 1. He had also stated that the appellant had led them to the house wherein blood- stained dao and blood-stained axe was recovered and those were seized as per Ext. 2. He had also deposed of seizing the blood-stained cloth of the appellant. He had stated that the aforesaid exhibits were sent for forensic examination. In the cross-examination, he had referred to the forensic report and had stated that with regard to the blood stain on the dao, it was stated to be negative report for human blood. He had also stated that there were several houses nearby the house of the appellant and there was no hue and cry which were reported by anyone. 12. PW-9 is the brother of the deceased who had stated that he was informed about the incident by one Hiren Chetia. In his cross-examination, he had stated that the deceased- who was his sister did not tell anything to him and no injuries were seen by him. The evidence of PW-9 appears to be hearsay. 13. PW-10 is the Doctor who had conducted the post-mortem upon the deceased. According to the opinion rendered, the death was due to multiple cut injuries and the PM report was proved as Ext -8. The opinion given by the doctor reads as follows. “On examination detected clotted blood present around neck and chest. Rigor mortis present. Wound position -1) Neck completely detached just above clavical, only skin is attached, size - 7" length, 6" depth. The opinion given by the doctor reads as follows. “On examination detected clotted blood present around neck and chest. Rigor mortis present. Wound position -1) Neck completely detached just above clavical, only skin is attached, size - 7" length, 6" depth. Muscles, vessels all were detached. Injury no. 2-Frontal head left side, cut injury, 6 inch length, 5 inch depth, bone matter came out. Bone detached. Injury no. 3 Chest reason, left side, size of injury 4 inch length, 2 inch depth. Penetrating injury by sharp weapon. Injury 4- Left hand area around wrist joint size- 3 inch length and 2 inch depth. Vessels were cut. Injury no. 4- Back side of occipital region, size of injury 4 inch in length, 3 inch in depth. Vessels cut. Above injury no. 2 was also related to scalp area also. Haemorrhage present in membrane. Brain and spinal cord - Brain matter came out from side of injury. Thorax - wall, ribs and cartilage- left side of chest, 3rd, 4th and 5th ribs are fractured and penetrating injury found. Left lung, clotted blood present due to penetrating injury. Size is 2 inch length and 3 inch deep. All vessels of neck are decepted due to cut injury. Internal vessels also detached. All injuries caused severe haemorrhage and patient died due to shock and haemorrhage. Duration of injury 14/18 hours. Opinion -Patient expired due to multiple cut injury and shock and haemorrhage. Ext. 8 Post Mortem Report. Ext. 8(1) is my signature.” 14. After completion of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the incriminating materials were put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which he had denied the truthfulness and veracity of the deposition. The appellant had however declined to give any defence witness. 15. Based on the aforesaid materials, the learned Trial Court has passed the impugned judgment which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 16. We have heard Shri A. Dhar, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. We have also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Advocate and Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam assisted by Ms. R. Das, Advocate. 17. Shri Dhar, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that there is no direct evidence in the form of eyewitness in the present case and the evidence is circumstantial in nature. We have also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Advocate and Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam assisted by Ms. R. Das, Advocate. 17. Shri Dhar, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that there is no direct evidence in the form of eyewitness in the present case and the evidence is circumstantial in nature. He has submitted that the chain of circumstances has not been able to be proved in a conclusive manner by the prosecution and therefore, the conviction and sentencing is not justified. He has submitted that the FSL report has not been proved and in any case, the IO who had deposed as PW-8 had stated in his cross-examination that the blood stain in the dao gave negative report for human blood. 18. On the other hand, Ms. B Bhuyan, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam has submitted that the circumstances in the instant case are complete and lead to only one conclusion which is towards the guilt of the appellant. She has submitted that the PM report would state that the incident had occurred about 14 to 18 hours from the time of the examination which is consistent with the case of the prosecution that the death was caused sometime in the midnight of 02.07.2017. She has also drawn the attention of this Court to Section 106 of the EVIDENCE ACT and has submitted that the appellant has not discharged his burden which he is required to do. It is submitted that apart from the appellant and the deceased, there is no evidence of the availability of any third person in the house and therefore, a duty was cast upon the appellant to explain the occurrence. 19. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials, including the TCRs placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 20. Admittedly, the present case hinges upon circumstantial evidence and therefore, there is a burden cast upon the prosecution to prove the circumstances in an unbroken chain which leads to the only conclusion of guilt of the appellant and no other hypothesis is possible. 21. As per the prosecution, the death was caused by hacking by the appellant by the dao and / or by the axe which were found in the house of the appellant which were also blood stained. 21. As per the prosecution, the death was caused by hacking by the appellant by the dao and / or by the axe which were found in the house of the appellant which were also blood stained. So far the dao is concerned, the evidence of the IO as PW-8 is that the blood stains found gave negative report of human blood. Though it appears that the murder weapons along with the blood stained cloth of the appellant were sent for forensic examination and there is also a report, such report was not proved in the trial and therefore, it cannot be said that any conclusion can be reached from the same. 22. This Court has also noted that with regard to the seizure, there are lots of discrepancies. There are two exhibits regarding the seizure being Ext.- 1 and Ext.- 2. While Ext.- 1 pertains to the hoe / spade, Ext.- 2 pertains to the dao and the axe. PW-1, who is a co-villager had deposed that he is a seizure witness of the dao which however was not proved by him. As noted above, Ext.-2 would show that the signature of PW-1 appears which however was not proved and in that manner the veracity of Ext.-2 so far as PW1’s deposition is concerned cannot be stated to be conclusive. 23. This Court had also noticed that from the evidence of the IO, it appears that a GD Entry was recorded on 03.07.2017 at 9.30 am. A perusal of the GD Entry which was proved as Ext. 6 would show that telephonic information was received from the VDP Secretary - Rajiv. It however appears that the said VDP Secretary was not examined. Though one Rajiv Buragohain has been examined as PW-4, he is not the VDP Secretary and rather he is the brother of the appellant and in fact had narrated that the VDP Secretary had called him while he was ploughing. 24. Be that as it may, going to the facts of the case, it is not in doubt that the death was the result of the multiple cut injuries on the body of the deceased. There is no endeavor made by the prosecution to link the alleged murder weapons with the appellant as no effort was made to match the fingerprints on the murder weapons. There is no endeavor made by the prosecution to link the alleged murder weapons with the appellant as no effort was made to match the fingerprints on the murder weapons. As stated above, though an examination by the FSL was done, the report was not proved. There is nothing on record that any serological test was done. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, this Court has looked into the original records which contains the FSL report in which however it has been stated that the grouping of the blood could not be done because of disintegration of blood. It may be mentioned that the subject of examination also included the wearing apparels of the appellant. From the above, it is not conclusive that it is the blood of the deceased which were in the axe and the clothes. So far as the dao is concerned, it is on record that the blood which was found was not human blood. 25. It would however be required to look into the evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 who are co-villagers and who had narrated of witnessing the appellant carrying the body of the deceased -wife in the morning with a spade. So far as PW-5 is concerned, in his cross-examination, he had stated that the paddy field in which he was working is at a distance of half a kilometer which he had later on improved to be 150 metres. Though the aspect as to whether the PW-5 could have clearly witnessed the fact of carrying the body of the deceased by the appellant from a distance of 150 metres may not be doubted, the said aspect cannot be a conclusive one so far as causing the death of the deceased by the appellant is concerned. Similarly, PW-6 who had made a similar claim, in his cross-examination he had stated that his house was in front of the house of the appellant which was in a hearing distance and he did not hear any shout or hue and cry in the earlier evening. The death was caused by cut injuries by sharp weapons and therefore, not hearing any shouts or raising of hue and cry would be a crucial factor in determining the present case. 26. As regards the extrajudicial confession, it is a settled position of law that such extrajudicial confession are weak pieces of evidence and are required to be corroborated. The death was caused by cut injuries by sharp weapons and therefore, not hearing any shouts or raising of hue and cry would be a crucial factor in determining the present case. 26. As regards the extrajudicial confession, it is a settled position of law that such extrajudicial confession are weak pieces of evidence and are required to be corroborated. In the instant case however, the aspect of extrajudicial confession has been made by PW-2 and PW-5 and it clearly appears that such confession was made before the police and therefore under Section 25 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , such confession will not have any evidentiary value. 27. To examine the said aspect, it would be apposite to remind us the five golden principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein the following observations were made. “151. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1091 . This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) 3 SCC 198 and Ramgopal v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 656 . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant's case (at pp. 345-46 of AIR) (supra) : "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consisent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 7. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made : "certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 8. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 28. 8. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 28. We have seen that apart from the circumstance of witnessing the appellant carrying the body of the deceased by PW-5 and PW-6, there are no other clinching evidence which would form an unbroken link to the chain starting from the inception of the offence till the completion. 29. It appears that the impugned conviction is based more on suspicion than on strict legal proof. In the case of Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406 , it has been laid down that suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof. For ready reference, the relevant observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is extracted herein below. “13. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be’ proved, and something that `will be proved’. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between `may be’ and `must be’ is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be’ true and `must be’ true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be’ true and `must be’ true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 30. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the materials in this case would not be sufficient to come to a conclusion of guilt and that the same has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. We are of the opinion that the benefit of doubt is to be given to the appellant. 31. Accordingly, we set-aside the impugned judgment and order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari in Sessions Case No. 266(S-C)/17 (GR Case No.373/17) convicting and sentencing the appellant u/s-302 IPC with imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/-and acquit the appellant. The appellant is accordingly directed to be released forthwith unless he is wanted in any other case. 32. Send back the TCRs. 33. For the valuable assistance rendered by Shri A. Dhar, the learned Amicus Curiae, we record our appreciation and he would be entitled to the prescribed fee.