JUDGMENT : This writ petition has been filed for quashing the Award dated 09.09.2009 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad (Hereinafter to be referred to as “The Tribunal”) in Ref No. 159 of 1994 (i.e. Annexure-4), whereby the Tribunal has answered the Reference in favour of the concerned Respondent-Workman Sri Kalachand Das directing the Petitioner-Management to reinstate the concerned Respondent-Workman in service with 50% back wages. 2. The case of the Petitioner-Management, as it transpires from the pleadings in the writ petition as well as the Award is that the Respondent-Workman, namely Kalachand Das was a Loader and a permanent employee of Lohapatti Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited One Mahesh Chandra Mishra, a Clerk of CMPF Section of Bhattdih Colliery under Mohuda Area, devised a fraudulent method of withdrawing Provident Fund amount deposited in the names of different workmen of the colliery in the Coal Mines Provident Fund and in that connection, the concerned Respondent-Workman- Kalachand Das became a party in aiding and abetting Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra in commission of fraud and dishonesty in withdrawing the amount lying in the names of different workmen Shri Mahesh Chandra Mishra manipulated documents and applied before Bhatdih colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited for advancing loan for the purpose of marriage from the C.M.P.F. A/c in the name of Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia, Mining Sirdar of Bhattdih Colliery and got a loan of Rs.18,000/- sanctioned from the office of the Commissioner, C.M.P.F. and a cross cheque bearing No. 872642 dated 28.08.1990 was deposited in the Bank of India, Chas Branch for payment of Rs.18,000/- to Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra opened a Savings Bank A/c No. 14351 in the Bank of India, Chas Branch and the concerned Respondent-Workman Kalachand Das identified Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra as Khagendra Nath Chattia in order to facilitate Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra to withdraw the amount of Rs.18,000/-deposited in the name of Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia. Shri Khagendra Nath Chattia had never applied for any loan nor he was knowing anything relating to the transaction, but as soon as he came to know about the fraudulent transaction, he reported the matter and the act of the concerned Respondent-Workman in cheating him by withdrawing the amount of Rs. 18,000/- from his C.M.P.F. Account. Shri Khagendra Nath Chattia had never applied for any loan nor he was knowing anything relating to the transaction, but as soon as he came to know about the fraudulent transaction, he reported the matter and the act of the concerned Respondent-Workman in cheating him by withdrawing the amount of Rs. 18,000/- from his C.M.P.F. Account. When this fact came to the knowledge of the Petitioner-Management, the concerned Respondent- Workman gave in writing to the Petitioner-Management that he had introduced Mahesh Chandra Mishra as Khagendra Nath Chattia for opening a Pass Book in the Chas Branch of Bank of India. From the aforesaid act on the part of the concerned Respondent-Workman, a prima-facie case of misconduct was revealed and accordingly a chargesheet bearing Ref. No. LC/C. Sheet/92/2579 dated 19.09.1992 (Ext.M-1) was served upon the Respondent-Workman. The Respondent-Workman replied that sometime in the year 1990, Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra approached him to introduce a person whom he introduced to the Respondent-Workman as his friend to open a Bank Account in the Bank of India, Chas Branch in which the Respondent-Workman had also his Bank A/c. Since such introduction is a general formality of the Banking system, the Respondent-Workman introduced the friend of Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra in good faith and without any motive. However, as the reply of the concerned Respondent-Workman was not found satisfactory, Sri J.U.Khan, Sr. Personnel Officer, Bhurungia Project of M/s B.C.C.L. was appointed the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. The Enquiry Officer conducted the domestic enquiry fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice and submitted his enquiry report dated12.06.1993. The enquiry report was minutely examined by the Disciplinary Authority, who by his order dated 16.06.1993 has dismissed the concerned Respondent-Workman from service. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, an Industrial Dispute was raised and the same was referred for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. 3. Heard Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner, however, none appeared on behalf of the Respondent-Workman even after repeated calls, although one S.K. Upadhaya has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the Respondent. 4. 3. Heard Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner, however, none appeared on behalf of the Respondent-Workman even after repeated calls, although one S.K. Upadhaya has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the Respondent. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Award passed by the learned Tribunal below is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law It is submitted that the learned Tribunal, in Paragraph 5 of the Award, has stated that the Enquiry was fit and proper. It is submitted that once the Domestic Enquiry is held to be fair and proper, a contrary finding could not be recorded by the learned Tribunal in Paragraph9 of the Award. It is further submitted that the finding recorded in Criminal Case are not binding on the Disciplinary Authority in the Domestic Enquiry on the ground that in Domestic Enquiry, the standard of proof depends upon the preponderance of probability. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention, placed reliance upon certain judgments, which are as follows: (i) West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729 at Para 16 and 17 (ii) Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha , reported in (2010) 3 SCC 556 at Para 37 and 38 (iii) Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Versus N. Balakrishnan reported in (2007) 9 SCC 755 , at Para 7, 8 and 9. 6. It is further submitted that in view of the fact that by an Award dated 09.9.2009, the Tribunal has held that the Domestic Enquiry was held fairly and properly and hence, the learned Tribunal in exercise of its power conferred to it under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act could not have set aside the order of dismissal and hence, the W.P.(L) No. 149 of 2010 may be allowed. 7. It is submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, reported in U.P. SRTC v. Vinod Kumar reported in [(2008) 1 SCC 115 , West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729 as also a Division Bench judgment of this Hon’ble Court reported in Dilip Kumar Ghosh & Ors vs. Chairman & Ors. reported in 2005 SCC (L&S) 986 , the learned Tribunal is not justified in law in interfering with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer or the punishment awarded in absence of challenge to the legality or fairness of the domestic enquiry. 8. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal is not justified in rewarding the Respondent-Workman with the award of reinstatement in service with 50% Back wages in the case where the Respondent-Workman had connived actively with one Mahesh Chandra Mishra. 9. It is submitted that reliance placed by the learned Tribunal in the case of Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar , reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 and in the case of Union of India Vs. Md. Ramjan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 is illegal. 10. The Case of the Respondent-Workman, in brief, is that he had been working as a permanent Loader at Lohapatti colliery since long with an unblemished record of service. The Management issued a false and frivolous chargesheet dated 19.09.1992 to the concerned Respondent-Workman for allegedly introducing one Mahesh Chandra Mishra, who was a dismissed C.M.P.F. Clerk of Bhatdih Colliery, in the Bank of India as Khagendra Nath Chattia. The Respondent-Workman replied to the charge-sheet denying the charges emphatically. The Respondent-Workman submitted before the Management that the allegation as levelled in the charge-sheet does not constitute any misconduct. So the Management has got no power to issue charge-sheet or to suspend him from service. The chargesheet was issued by Dy. CME, Lohapati colliery who has got no authority to issue charge-sheet or to suspend an employee under the provisions of certified Standing Orders of M/s. BCCL. On that score alone the charge-sheet and suspension order was illegal, arbitrary and void-ab-initio. The Respondent- Workman represented before the Management against the illegal and arbitrary charge-sheet and the suspension order but without any effect. So the Union raised an industrial dispute before the ALC (C), Dhanbad against the illegal and arbitrary suspension order. During the pendency of the conciliation proceeding the Management dismissed the Respondent- Workman by conducting an invalid and irregular enquiry. Even in the invalid and irregular enquiry the Respondent- Workman was not afforded full opportunity to represent his case or to cross-examine the Management’s witnesses. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by an unauthorized person who has got no authority under the provisions of Standing Order to appoint an Enquiry Officer. Even in the invalid and irregular enquiry the Respondent- Workman was not afforded full opportunity to represent his case or to cross-examine the Management’s witnesses. The Enquiry Officer was appointed by an unauthorized person who has got no authority under the provisions of Standing Order to appoint an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer was biased and prejudiced against the Respondent-Workman and he completed the empty formalities at the back of the Respondent-Workman. Even in the invalid and irregular enquiry the charges against the Respondent-Workman were not established. Still the Respondent-Workman was dismissed from service by an unauthorized person. After failure of conciliation proceeding the dispute has been referred to the Tribunal for its adjudication. It is further submitted that the dismissal of the concerned Respondent-Workman was against the provisions of the certified Standing Orders and against the settled law of the land and his dismissal was too harsh and disproportionate to the alleged offence. Hence, the W.P.(L) No. 149 of 2010 may be dismissed. 11. Perused the Lower Court Record and considered the submission of both the sides. 12. It transpires that one Mahesh Chandra Mishra was the main person, who was identified as Khagendra Nath Chattia, in the Bank of India by the Respondent-Workman, allegedly for opening Bank account No. 14351 in Bank of India and has fraudulently withdrawn marriage loan advance of Rs.18,000/- with respect of Khagendra Nath Chattia from Bank of India, Chas Branch. 13. It reveals from the record that the proceeding of said Mahesh Chandra Mishra was a different proceeding and after dismissal of Mahesh Chandra Mishra, the present proceeding was initiated against the Respondent-Workman. 14. Thereafter, one conciliation proceeding was held and on failure of the conciliation proceeding, an industrial dispute was raised under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, giving rise to Reference Case No.159 of 1994. 15. It transpires that the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act on 25.07.1994 with the following Reference: “Whether the action of the General Manager, Mohuda Area No.II M/s. BCCL, P.O. Mohuda (Dhanbad) in dismissing Shri Kala Chand Das, Loader w.e.f. 16.6.1993 is justified? If not, to what relief is the concerned Respondent-Workman entitled?” 16. Thereafter, learned Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T., Dhanbad had passed the Award dated 09.09.2009 in favour of the Respondent-Workman for his reinstatement in service with 50% back wages and other consequential benefits. 17. If not, to what relief is the concerned Respondent-Workman entitled?” 16. Thereafter, learned Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T., Dhanbad had passed the Award dated 09.09.2009 in favour of the Respondent-Workman for his reinstatement in service with 50% back wages and other consequential benefits. 17. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and from perusal of the Lower Court Record, it transpires that a Domestic Enquiry was conducted by the Petitioner- Management of BCCL Company by issuing chargesheet dated 19.09.1992 (i.e. Ext.M-1) against the petitioner to the effect that it has come to the notice of the authority issuing chargesheet that the Respondent-Workman had got introduced Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra, the dismissed CMPF Clerk of Bhatidih Colliery in the name of Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia and fraudulently opened a S/B Account bearing Pass Book No. 14351 in the Bank of India, Chas Branch. It is alleged that by opening the above pass Book in a fraudulent manner, the Respondent-Workman, in connivance with said Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra, withdrew Rs.18,000/- as the Cheque bearing no. 872642 dt. 28.8.1990 was sent by CMPF Office to Bank of India, Chas Branch in the name of Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia, Mining Sirdar of Bhatidih Colliery and the Respondent-Workman had also given in writing to the Management that he had introduced Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra as Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia for opening the above pass Book in Bank of India, Chas Branch. It is further alleged that from the above, it was evident that Respondent-Workman intentionally and willfully introduced Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra as Sri Khagendra Nath Chattia and the Respondent-Workman was fully involved and connived in a fraudulent manner for the withdrawal of Rs.18,000/- (Rupees Eighteen thousand only) by Sri Mahesh Chandra Mishra as Sri Khagendra Nath Chatia when Sri Khagendra Chattia, Mining Sirdar had never applied for marriage advance from CMPF. 18. It is further alleged that the above acts of the Respondent-Workman amounted to serious mis-conduct under the following clauses of the certified Standing Orders, which read as under: 26.1.2011: Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with company’s business or property. 26.1.12: Giving false information regarding one’s particular 26.1.13: Indulging in corrupt practices. 26.1.15: Causing wilful damage to work in progress or to the property of the employer. 19. The Respondent-Workman had filed his reply on 22.09.1992. 20. 26.1.12: Giving false information regarding one’s particular 26.1.13: Indulging in corrupt practices. 26.1.15: Causing wilful damage to work in progress or to the property of the employer. 19. The Respondent-Workman had filed his reply on 22.09.1992. 20. Thereafter, the Management-Petitioner had got proved certain documents in support of its case through R.S. Mahapatra, Management’s representative., which are as follows:- (i) M-1 is the Charge-sheet dated 19.09.1992, issued by the Management-Petitioner to the Respondent-Workman (ii) M-2 is the Reply dated 22.09.1992 of the Respondent-Workman to the Chargesheet dated 19.09.1992. (iii) M-3 is the letter dated 20.11.1992 issued by the Management-Petitioner appointing the Enquiry Officer. (iv) M-4 is the hand written minutes of the proceeding of enquiry with respect to the chargesheet issued against the Respondent-Workman starting from 30.01.1993 to05.06.1993. (v) M-5 is the hand written Enquiry Report dated12.06.1993 (vi) M-6 is the Noting sheet dated 14.06.1993, for recommendation of dismissal from the service of Sri K.C.Das, Miner/loader of Lohapati Colliery, i.e. the Respondent-Workman. 21. However, neither any witness was examined on behalf of the Respondent-Workman nor any document was proved. 22. It transpires from the record received from the C.G.I.T. along with records of the Disciplinary Proceeding/Departmental Proceeding that chargesheet dated 19.09.1992 was issued to the Respondent-Workman, namely Kalachand Das and after his reply was not found satisfactory, then a Departmental proceeding was initiated against him. Thereafter, J.U. Khan, Senior Personnel Officer, Bhurungia Project of M/s B.C.C.L. was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Shri R.S. Mahapatra, Sr. Personnel Officer (E) , Mahuda was appointed as the Presenting Officer vide Letter dated 16.11.1992, issued by then Deputy Chief Personnel Manager, Mahuda Area. 23. It reveals that the Departmental Proceeding was conducted in ‘Ruling Paper’ by the Enquiry Officer and the first date of appearance of the Respondent-Workman was shown in the Departmental Proceeding on 30.01.1993 and thereafter, it was fixed on 12.02.1993, 10.03.1923 and 18.03.1993. The Respondent-Workman denied his charges on 18.03.1993. Thereafter, the statement of R.S. Mahapatra, Management’s representative was recorded on 18.03.1993 and he had proved Ext.M-1, M-2, M-3, M-4, M-5, M-6, M-7 respectively and had supported that the Respondent- Workman in connivance with Mahesh Chandra Mishra had allowed said Mahesh Chandra Mishra, C.M.P.F. Clerk to withdraw the amount of Rs.18,000/- (Rupees Eighteen thousand) from the account of one Khagendra Nath Chatiya. Thereafter, the Management examined Khagendra Nath Chatiya on 18.03.1993 itself, who stated that Rs.18,000/- (Rupees Eighteen thousand) was deducted from his account, however, during cross-examination, he admitted that he is not aware of Respondent-Workman-Kalachand Das, rather he had stated that Mahesh Chandra Mishra is suspected to have withdrawn the amount of the complainant Khagendra Nath Chattia. Thereafter, the Management had recorded the statement of B.K. Singh, Deputy Personnel Manager, Mahuda in the Enquiry Proceeding on 27.03.1993. 24. However, on 27.05.1993, the Respondent- Workman was absent and the next date was fixed on 29.05.1993 and Respondent-Workman, namely Kalachand was present on 29.05.1993. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 05.06.1993, but the Respondent-Workman was not present. 25. It has been recorded in the Enquiry Proceeding that the Respondent-Workman was asked to enter into his evidence, but he has refused and as such, the enquiry was disposed of as Ex-parte on 05.06.1993. 26. It reveals that the Enquiry Report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer along with the papers of Enquiry Proceeding before the Superintendent, Lohapatti Colliery, which finds place at Page 39 to 49 and Page 50. Page 39 to 49 are the Enquiry Report, whereas Ruled paper- Page 6 to 38 are the papers of Enquiry Proceeding. Page 50 is the Noting sheet of the authorities of BCCL, such as Superintendent, Deputy Chief Personnel Manager, General Manager, Mahuda Area. 27. Page 50, i.e. the Noting Sheet reveals that the Enquiry Officer had submitted the Enquiry Report and opined that charges were proved against the Respondent-Workman. Thereafter, the Superintendent, Lohapatti Colliery concurred with the views of the Enquiry Officer on 14.06.1993 and the Superintendent further recommended dismissal from service of Shri Kalachand Das, Loader, Lohapatti Colliery, i.e. the Respondent-Workman. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager, Mahuda Area on 15.06.1993 itself, who opined that charges are of grievous nature and placed the matter before the General Manager to prove dismissal. Thereafter, the General Manager also concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the recommendation of the Controlling Officer and his Noting sheet reveals that he had proved the dismissal of the Respondent-Workman from the service. The later part of the page is torn, due to which the date of signature of the General Manager is found torn. 28. The later part of the page is torn, due to which the date of signature of the General Manager is found torn. 28. Thus, it is evident that the enquiry was concluded on 05.06.1993 by the Enquiry Officer without waiting for the statement of the Respondent-Workman and he had merely recorded his version that the Respondent- Workman has shown Inability on few dates to record his statement. No notice has been shown to be issued to the Respondent-Workman after recording his statement by the Enquiry Officer. On completion of the Enquiry on 05.06.1993, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Superintendent, Lohapatti Colliery, though the date is not mentioned, but it reveals from the Noting Sheet of the Superintendent, Lohapatti Colliery that the Enquiry Officer has submitted the Enquiry Report as well as proceedings of the Domestic Enquiry before him and he had recommended for the dismissal of the Respondent-Workman on 14.06.1993 itself. It is no where stated that copy of the Enquiry Report may be given to the Respondent-Workman and thus, it is evident that Enquiry Report and even the second show-cause Notice was not even served upon the Respondent-Workman and the Superintendent had directly recommended for dismissal of the Respondent-Workman without serving him the Enquiry Report as well as Second Show-cause Notice. Even the General Manager had not shown the Enquiry Report and Show-Cause Notice to the Respondent-Workman before terminating him from services. 29. It further transpires that even the second show-cause Notice was not served upon the Respondent- Workman. Thereafter, vide order dated 16.06.1993, the Respondent-Workman was dismissed from service. 30. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. , reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , at Para 61 , 62 and 63 as follows: “ Para 61:- It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along with the final order is like a post-mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice. The contention on behalf of the Government/management that the report is not evidence adduced during such inquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311(2) is also devoid of substance. It is settled law that the Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evidence Act, though the essential principles of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by ‘evidence’ in the proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality of the material collected during the inquiry including the report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material. Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed by the disciplinary authority, on the report of the enquiry officer for proof of the charge or for imposition of the penalty, then it is incumbent that the copy thereof should be supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the proved charge or on both. Para 62:- Shri P.P. Rao obviously realising this effect, contended that the enquiry officer being a delegate of the disciplinary authority is not bound by the delegatee’s recommendations and it is not a material unless it is used by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/Respondent-Workman had opportunity at the inquiry. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/Respondent-Workman had opportunity at the inquiry. In support thereof he placed strong reliance on Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] ; Shadi Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab [ (1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637 ] ; Hira Nath Misra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi [ (1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260 ] ; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India [ (1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555 ] ; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] . I am unable to agree with his contentions. Doubtless that the enquiry officer is a delegate of the disciplinary authority, he conducts the inquiry into the misconduct and submits his report, but his findings or conclusions on the proof of charges and his recommendations on the penalty would create formidable impressions almost to be believed and acceptable unless they are controverted vehemently by the delinquent officer. At this stage non-supply of the copy of the report to the delinquent would cause him grave prejudice. S.K. George case [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] renders no assistance. It is only an inquiry against malpractice at an examination conducted by the University under executive instruction. Therein the students were given an opportunity of hearing and they were supplied with all the material, the foundation for the report. The observations of the Bench of two Judges with regard to the theory of two stages in the Inquiry under Article 311 also bears little importance for the foregoing consideration in this case. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge-sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22 ] is also of no avail. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge-sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22 ] is also of no avail. Therein it was pointed out that under Section 18-A of the I.D.R. Act there was no scope of enquiry at two stages and the omission to supply enquiry report, before taking the action, did not vitiate the ultimate decision taken. In Shadi Lal case [ (1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637 ] Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules did not provide for the supply of copy of the report of an inquiry conducted by the fact finding authority before inquiry. It was held that the delinquent officer was supplied with all the materials and was given opportunity to make representation and the same was considered. The report did not indicate anything in addition to what was already supplied to him. Under those circumstances it was held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into an iron cast or a strait-jacket formula. Each case has to be considered and the principles applied in the light of the facts in each case. The effect of the violation of the principles of natural justice on the facts of the case on hand needs to be considered and visualised. The effect of Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio was considered by my brother Sawant, J. and it needs no reiteration. The reliance on S.K. George case [ (1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198 ] in Tulsiram Patel [ (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio renders no assistance in the light of the above discussion. Since Mahalingam case [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show-cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Since Mahalingam case [ (1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show-cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Hira Nath Misra case [ (1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260 ] also is of no avail since the inquiry was conducted relating to misbehaviour with the girl students by the erring boys. The security of the girls was of paramount consideration and therefore, the disclosure of the names of the girl students given in the report or their evidence would jeopardise their safety and so was withheld. Accordingly this Court on the fact situation upheld the action of the Medical College. Satyavir Singh [ (1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555 ] ratio also is of no assistance as the action was taken under proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 199 of the CCA Rules. The inquiry into insubordination by police force was dispensed with as the offending acts of the police force would generate deleterious effect on the discipline of the service. Asthana case [ (1988) 3 SCC 600 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 869] was considered by my brother Sawant, J. in which the report was not supplied and it was upheld. It should, thus be concluded that the supply of the copy of the enquiry report is an integral part of the penultimate stage of the inquiry before the disciplinary authority considers the material and the report on the proof of the charge and the nature of the punishment to be imposed. Non-compliance is denial of reasonable opportunity, violating Article 311(2) and unfair, unjust and illegal procedure offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. Para 63: The emerging effect of our holding that the delinquent is entitled to the supply of the copy of the report would generate yearning for hearing before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which Forty-second Amendment Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. Prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act the delinquent had no right of hearing before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after Forty- second Amendment Act it would not be put on higher pedestal. The Gujarat High Court’s decision is, therefore, not good law. However, the disciplinary authority has an objective duty and adjudicatory responsibility to consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. The statute or statutory rules gave graded power and authority to the disciplinary authority to impose either of the penalties enumerated in the relevant provisions. It is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum. Based on the facts, circumstances, the nature of imputation, the gravity of misconduct, the indelible effect or impact on the discipline or morale of the employees, the previous record or conduct of the delinquent and the severity to which the delinquent will be subjected to, may be some of the factors to be considered. They cannot be eulogised but could be visualised. Each case must be considered in the light of its own scenario. Therefore, a duty and responsibility has been cast on the disciplinary authority to weigh the pros and cons, consider the case and impose appropriate punishment. In a given case if the penalty was proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges proved or the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 31. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 31. Learned counsel for the Petitioner- Management has raised several arguments on the point of non-supply of Enquiry Report and has submitted that the supply of Enquiry Report is not required in each and every case unless the non-supply of the enquiry report has caused prejudice to the Respondent-Workman and in support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment in the case of Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010) 3 SCC 556 , at Para 37 and 38. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that in view of the judgment in the case of West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729 at Para 16 and 17, the learned Tribunal could not have ordered for reinstatement of the services of the Respondent-Workman, once it has been held in Paragraph 5 of the Award that Domestic Enquiry was fair and proper. 33. It has been held in the case of West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 729 at Paragraph 16 and 17 as follows “ Para 16:- In U.P. SRTC v. Vinod Kumar [ (2008) 1 SCC 115 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 1 : (2007) 13 Scale 690 ] this Court again observed that in the absence of a challenge to the legality or fairness of the domestic enquiry, the Court should be reluctant to either interfere with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer or the punishment awarded by the punishing authority. Para 17:- After going through the order of the Industrial Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has interfered with the findings recorded by the domestic tribunal as if it was the Appellate Tribunal. There was evidence present on record regarding indecent, riotous and disorderly behaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. The Management witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence have unequivocally deposed about the misbehaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. There was evidence present on record regarding indecent, riotous and disorderly behaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. The Management witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence have unequivocally deposed about the misbehaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses were not produced.” 34. This Court finds the judgment sited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the present case. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the case of Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Versus N. Balakrishnan reported in (2007) 9 SCC 755 and submitted that the effect of acquittal in criminal case is not binding in Domestic Enquiry as in domestic enquiry standard of proof is preponderance of probability. It is submitted that the Respondent-Workman has caused loss to the Petitioner-Management and was in connivance with one Mahesh Chandra Mishra and hence, he was rightly dismissed and as such, Award passed by the learned Tribunal may be set aside and the writ petition may be allowed. 36. However, so far as the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner-Management regarding effect of acquittal in criminal case is not binding in Disciplinary Proceeding is concerned, it is well settled that when there are same set of charges in the criminal case as well as domestic enquiry, and if there is an acquittal in the criminal case, the departmental Proceeding can be set aside. 37. It has been held in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 890 at Para 47 as follows :- “ Para 47:- While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well- established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G.M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan.” 38. From perusal of the Record it transpires that copy of Enquiry Report was not served to the Respondent- Workman and it is admitted by the Petitioner-Company even during course of argument and it has been mentioned in the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal. 39. It is further evident that even the Respondent-Workman has already been acquitted in the criminal case by the learned Trial Court and against which no appeal or revision was preferred by the Petitioner. 40. It is well settled that the Writ Court will not interfere in the Award passed by the learned Tribunal, if there is no illegality, perversity and impropriety in the impugned Award. 41. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477 at Paragraph no.7 as follows:- “ Para 7:- The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 42. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 42. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors ., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233 , at Paragraph no.21 as follows : “ Para 21:- With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 43. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 at Paragraph nos.12 and 13 as follows :- “ Para 12:- Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob’s case (supra) Para 13:- In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 44. Therefore, this Court finds that there is no merit in this writ petition and the Workman has been dragged unnecessarily in a prolonged litigation. The Petitioner- Management have passed the dismissal order against the Respondent-Workman in complete violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. 45. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court an in view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that there is no illegality and perversity in the impugned Award dated 09.09.2009 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. 46. Thus, this W.P.(L) No. 149 of 2010 is, hereby, dismissed.