JUDGMENT : VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J. 1. These three intra court appeals arise out of a common order dated 22.09.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 16605, 16927 and 17076 of 2008. Since the issues involved in all these appeals are substantially common, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The appellants (State) assail the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the impugned proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“the Act”) were set aside on the ground of non-service of mandatory statutory notices and absence of lawful possession having been taken prior to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act 1999 (“Repeal Act”). I. BRIEF FACTS 3. The facts, to the extent relevant, may be briefly recapitulated. The subject lands situated in Survey Nos. 284, 285 and 361/2 of Thumkunta Village, Shamirpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, are undisputedly agricultural lands. The respondents/writ petitioners claim ownership and possession through various registered sale deeds executed between 1989 and 2005 and their names were duly mutated in the revenue records. 4. The details of the writ petitions filed by the petitioners and corresponding writ appeals filed by the State against the common order passed by the learned Single Judge and the details of the survey numbers and the subject lands are tabulated as under: 5. The appellants, however, contend that the subject lands constitute “vacant land” within the meaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act and were held in excess of the ceiling limit. Based on earlier proceedings initiated against the original declarants, the appellants assert that the land had vested in the Government under Section 10(3) of the Act. 6. The core issue before the learned Single Judge was whether the proceedings initiated under the Act could be sustained in the absence of: (i) service of notice under Section 6(2) of the Act upon the respondents/writ petitioners or their predecessors-in-title. (ii) lawful physical possession having been taken under Sections 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act prior to the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. 7. The learned Single Judge, after an extensive analysis of statutory provisions and binding precedents, concluded that the proceedings suffered from fundamental jurisdictional defects and stood vitiated, resulting in their abatement under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. 8. 7. The learned Single Judge, after an extensive analysis of statutory provisions and binding precedents, concluded that the proceedings suffered from fundamental jurisdictional defects and stood vitiated, resulting in their abatement under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. 8. The State has preferred these appeals contending that the learned Single Judge erred both in law and on facts in interfering with concluded proceedings and in accepting the respondents’ claim to title and possession. 9. We have heard the learned Government Pleader for the appellants and Sri E. Madanmohan Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners. We have also carefully examined the record and the findings of the learned Single Judge. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellants (State) 10. Learned Government Pleader for Assignment appearing for the appellants contended that the writ petitioners are subsequent purchasers of the lands in question and, by virtue of Section 5(3) of the Act, their sale deeds are void, as the transactions were effected after the appointed date under the Act. Consequently, it is urged that the writ petitioners are incompetent to question the proceedings initiated under the Act. 11. It is further contended that the expression “commencement of the Act” must be construed to mean the date on which the land became “vacant land” under the provisions of the Act, irrespective of its earlier classification as agricultural land. Hence, the plea of the writ petitioners that their lands are agricultural and therefore, their lands have to be excluded from the purview of the Act, is unsustainable. 12. The learned Government Pleader for Assignment further submitted that non-service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings, particularly when possession has been taken in accordance with law. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bhaskara Jyothi Sharma , (2015) 5 SCC 321 , in support of the proposition that substantial compliance of the procedural requirements is sufficient and that absence of individual notice does not render the entire proceedings void. b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Writ Petitioners 13. b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Writ Petitioners 13. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel Sri E. Madan Mohan Rao, appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners contended that the subject lands are purely agricultural in nature, have been continuously used as such, and therefore, by virtue of Sections 2 (o) and 2 (q) of the Act, they stand excluded from the operation of the Act. 14. It is further urged that the subject lands were never included in any Master Plan as on 17.02.1976, and consequently fall outside the territorial applicability of the Act. Hence, the initiation of proceedings by the competent Authority under the Act, is wholly without jurisdiction. 15. It is further submitted that having acquired title under duly registered sale deeds, obtained mutation in the revenue records, and being in actual possession, and enjoyment of the subject lands, the respondents are “persons interested” within the meaning of Section 6(2) of the Act and were therefore, entitled to be heard before any declaration or possession proceedings could be lawfully undertaken. 16. It is further contended that a failure to serve notices under Sections 6(2) and 10(5) of the Act vitiates the entire proceedings, since issuance of such notices is a mandatory requirement and forms an integral part of the principles of natural justice. 17. Lastly, it is urged that, in any event, by virtue of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short ‘Repeal Act, 1999’), all proceedings, stood automatically abated, since there was no lawful or actual taking of possession prior to the Repeal Act. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decisions of the Honourable Supreme court in State of U.P. v. Hari Ram , (2013) 4 SCC 280 and Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Collector and Competent Authority , (2012) 4 SCC 718 , to emphasize that unless actual, physical possession had been taken before the repeal, all proceedings initiated under the Principal Act would abate and cannot survive thereafter. III. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION: 18. On the basis of the pleadings, rival contentions and the material placed before this Court, the following issues arise for consideration: (i) Whether the subject lands fall within the definition of “vacant land” under the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976? III. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION: 18. On the basis of the pleadings, rival contentions and the material placed before this Court, the following issues arise for consideration: (i) Whether the subject lands fall within the definition of “vacant land” under the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976? (ii) Whether the respondents/writ petitioners, being the purchasers under registered sale deeds, can be regarded as “persons interested” for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section 6(2) of the Act? (iii) Whether the failure to issue notice under Section 6(2) of the Act renders the entire proceedings void and unsustainable in law? (iv) Whether compliance with Section 10(5) of the Act is mandatory, and whether possession of the subject lands was lawfully taken in accordance with law? (v) What is the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 on the proceedings in question and whether the same stood abated by virtue of the repeal? (vi) Whether the learned Single Judge committed any error warranting interference? IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: 19. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both the parties and perused the record. The learned Government Pleader for Assignment appearing for the Appellants/State, at the outset submits that the respondents/writ petitioners have no locus standi to question the proceedings issued under the ULC Act, as they are subsequent purchasers whose sale transactions are void under Section 5 (3) of the Act. It is urged that once the lands are declared surplus, any subsequent purchaser derives no title and consequently, cannot maintain a writ petition against the proceedings. 20. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has invited Court’s attention to the factual foundation demonstrating that the writ petitioners’ transactions were valid and lawful. It is pointed out that in W.A. No. 107 of 2018 the respondents/writ petitioners purchased Acs.2.35 guntas of land in Survey No.284 of Thumkunta Village, Shamirpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, through registered sale deed, dated 10.01.1991 from Manne Sathaiah and others and further got their names mutated in revenue records vide proceedings dated. 06.12.1993 issued by the appellant No.4 and are in physical possession and enjoyment of said extent of land. 06.12.1993 issued by the appellant No.4 and are in physical possession and enjoyment of said extent of land. In W.A. No. 111 of 2018, the respondents/writ petitioners purchased an extent of Acs.3.00 guntas in the same survey number and claim right, title and possession through registered sale deed Nos.4794/05 and 4793/05 for an extent of Ac. 1.20 guntas of land each and further submits that their vendors having acquired title under a registered sale deed dated 12.06.1989. Likewise, in W.A. No.161 of 2018, the respondents/writ petitioners claim ownership and possession over lands in Sy.Nos.284, 285, 201 to 205 and 361/2 of Thumkunta Village through various registered sale deeds, and their names also stand mutated in the revenue records. Therefore, the respondents/writ petitioners cannot be treated as “subsequent purchasers” under Section 5(3) of the Act. 21. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents also pointed out that the appellants, under the guise of alleged surplus land proceedings, had attempted to allot the subject lands belonging to the respondents and others to some other Government organizations for the purpose of selling the same by converting into house site plots. It is submitted that if such actions are permitted, the respondents would stand unlawfully dispossessed from their lands. Therefore, the respondents, being persons directly and substantially affected by the impugned proceedings and facing imminent threat of dispossession, possess the necessary locus standi to challenge the validity of the proceedings under the Act. 22. It is pertinent to note that the issue of locus standi must be examined in the light of the legal position settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra) wherein it was held that even though land may be deemed to vest in the State under Section 10(3) of the Act, such vesting is only de jure and does not automatically amount to de facto possession . Actual physical possession can be taken only in the manner prescribed under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act. In the absence of any proof that physical possession was lawfully taken, the original landholder or his successors cannot be said to have lost their rights or interest in the property. 23. Actual physical possession can be taken only in the manner prescribed under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act. In the absence of any proof that physical possession was lawfully taken, the original landholder or his successors cannot be said to have lost their rights or interest in the property. 23. In the present case, the respondents/writ petitioners assert that they are in lawful and continuous physical possession of the subject lands and that the appellants had initiated steps to allot and dispose of the same under the guise of the alleged surplus land proceedings purportedly initiated under the Act. When a person in lawful possession faces a real and imminent threat of dispossession pursuant to the proceedings alleged to be illegal or void, such person cannot be denied access to the constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the respondents/writ petitioners have sufficient locus standi to maintain the writ petitions and seek redressal against such impugned action, particularly when the threat of dispossession arises from proceedings that are prima facie vitiated in law. 24. The learned Government Pleader, further submits that the learned single Judge failed to take note that the term ‘commencement of the Act’ in relation to vacant land ought to be construed as the date on which such land attains the character of vacant land, for whatever reason. It is contended that such date shall be treated as the commencement of the Act in respect of that particular land. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submits that the very foundation of such a contention is misconceived, since the land in question does not constitute “vacant land” within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the Act. The respondents assert that their land situated in Thumkunta Village, Shamirpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, has been continuously under agricultural use for more than four decades. Agricultural land, they contend, stands expressly excluded from the purview of the Act by virtue of Section 2(o), which defines “urban land” to mean land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration, but specifically excludes the land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. Consequently, as long as the land remains under agricultural use, the concept of “vacant land” as contemplated under Section 2(q) of the Act, can never be attracted. Consequently, as long as the land remains under agricultural use, the concept of “vacant land” as contemplated under Section 2(q) of the Act, can never be attracted. Therefore, the respondents contend that the reliance placed by the appellants on the date of ‘commencement of the Act’ in relation to vacant land is wholly misplaced, as the very premise that subject land is vacant land is legally untenable. 25. The respondents further submit that even otherwise, the entire land admeasuring Ac.48.29 guntas situated in Thumkunta Village was not covered by any master plan as on 17.02.1976, (the date of commencement of the Act), in the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. The statutory definition of “vacant land” under Section 2(q) of the Act, is to be read in conjunction with the requirement of inclusion of such land in the master plan for the purposes of urban agglomeration. In the absence of such inclusion, the proceedings initiated by the first respondent treating the lands as falling within the notified urban agglomeration are without jurisdiction. The respondents therefore, contend that the entire process of treating their agricultural lands as vacant land, and subjecting the same to adjudication under the provisions of the Act, is wholly arbitrary, without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable. 26. The contention of the appellants that the commencement of the Act is to be reckoned from the date, on which the land becomes vacant, for whatever reason, does not hold good, in the present case. Inasmuch as the land in question is admittedly agricultural in nature and, by virtue of the express exclusion contained in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, does not fall within the definition of “vacant land” at all. When the legislature has consciously excluded agricultural land from the purview of the Act, the very premise that such land could subsequently be treated as vacant land so as to attract the provisions of the Act, is wholly untenable. Therefore, the initiation and continuation of proceedings by the authorities treating the subject land as vacant land are unsustainable in law and are liable to be set aside. 27. Further, this Court also finds merit in the submission of the respondents that the subject lands, were not covered by any notified master plan as on 17.02.1976. Therefore, the initiation and continuation of proceedings by the authorities treating the subject land as vacant land are unsustainable in law and are liable to be set aside. 27. Further, this Court also finds merit in the submission of the respondents that the subject lands, were not covered by any notified master plan as on 17.02.1976. The statutory definition of “vacant land” cannot be read in isolation, but must be harmoniously construed with the statutory requirement that the land falls within the limits of an urban agglomeration, as reflected in the relevant master plan. In the absence of any such inclusion, the proceedings initiated under the Act are without jurisdiction, rendering the entire process of treating the respondents’ agricultural lands as vacant land arbitrary, unsustainable, and contrary to law. 28. It is next urged by the appellants that the sale deeds under which the respondents claim title are void by virtue of Section 5(3) of the Act. This contention is fundamentally misconceived. Section 5(3) of the Act does not operate in the abstract; it is attracted only where the land in question is established to be vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit. The appellants, however, have not produced a shred of material to demonstrate that the subject lands ever bore the legal character of “vacant land” within the ambit of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, or that they were included in any notified or extended master plan. The absence of these jurisdictional facts is fatal. A statutory declaration of voidness cannot be invoked in a factual vacuum. When the very edifice of Section 5(3) of the Act rests upon the existence of ceiling-surplus vacant land, failure to prove such foundational facts renders the plea of voidness illusory and devoid of any legal merit. 29. The learned Government Pleader further submits that Special Officer and Competent Authority is empowered to issue notice under Section 6 (2) of the Act. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners points out that under the provisions of the ULC Act, whenever the Competent Authority has knowledge that any person is holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, such authority must serve notice upon that person requiring him to file a statement under Section 6(2) of the Act. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners points out that under the provisions of the ULC Act, whenever the Competent Authority has knowledge that any person is holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, such authority must serve notice upon that person requiring him to file a statement under Section 6(2) of the Act. In the instant case, it is the specific case of the respondents that no such notice under Section 6(2) of the Act was ever served on any of the interested persons, including the respondents/writ petitioners at any point of time. 30. It is pertinent to note that the learned single Judge in the impugned order, had categorically recorded a finding that a notice under Section 6(2) of the Act was issued by the authorities to one Manne Allaiah, S/o. Sivaiah, in File No. G1/903/ORR/06, dated 08.08.2006, covering lands in Sy. Nos. 282/P, 284, 285 and 361/2 of Thumkunta Village. Significantly, the said notice, was addressed only to the said Manne Allaiah, and the records do not disclose service of notice upon the present respondents/writ petitioners or any other interested persons holding various extents covered by the said lands. Further, there is no material available on record to show that any steps were taken by the competent authority to serve notice on all the persons interested or that they were provided an opportunity to file the required declarations in terms of the Act. 31. A comparison of the details in the notices issued under Section 6(2) of the Act with the provisional orders dated 05.05.2007 indicates that notices were neither issued nor served, on all the persons having an interest in the property. Despite having consistent information about the owners or declarants of the total extent of Ac.48.29 guntas, the authorities proceeded to pass orders either on the deceased persons or against the individuals who had no interest in the subject lands. Such action reflects a clear non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Act, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings initiated by the Competent Authority. 32. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to Section 6(2) of the Act, which reads as follows: Section 6 : Persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. 32. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to Section 6(2) of the Act, which reads as follows: Section 6 : Persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement. (2) If the competent authority is of opinion that: (a) in any State to which this Act applies in the first instance, any person held on or after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before the commencement of this Act or holds at such commencement; or (b) in any State which adopts this Act under clause (1) of article 252 of the Constitution, any person holds at the commencement of this Act, vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), it may serve a notice upon such person requiring him to file, within such period as may be specified in the notice, the statement referred to in sub-section (1). 33. A plain reading of the above provision makes it evident that the issuance and service of notice under Section 6 (2) of the Act, is mandatory procedural requirement, intended to afford an opportunity to every person, who holds or is alleged to hold land in excess of the ceiling limit to file his declaration. The failure to serve such notice on all interested or affected persons vitiates the proceedings at their inception, being contrary to the express legislative mandate. In the present case, however, notice dated 08.08.2006 in File No. G1/903/ORR/06 under Section 6(2) of the Act was issued only to said Manne Allaiah, S/o. Sivaiah, covering Sy. Nos. 282/P, 284, 285 and 361/2 of Thumkunta Village. The record does not disclose that such notice was ever served upon the writ petitioners or other owners within the said survey numbers, nor does it reveal that steps were taken to effect service upon all the persons interested. Despite the admitted information regarding multiple declarants over Acs.48.29 guntas, the authority proceeded to pass provisional orders dated 05.05.2007 even against deceased persons including those persons with no subsisting interest in the subject property. Such omission amounts to violation of the mandatory requirement under Section 6(2) of the Act, which is not a mere procedural irregularity. Hence, the proceedings initiated by the Competent Authority without ensuring service of notice as mandated under Section 6 (2) of the Act upon all persons interested, are vitiated in law and cannot be sustained. 34. Such omission amounts to violation of the mandatory requirement under Section 6(2) of the Act, which is not a mere procedural irregularity. Hence, the proceedings initiated by the Competent Authority without ensuring service of notice as mandated under Section 6 (2) of the Act upon all persons interested, are vitiated in law and cannot be sustained. 34. What further aggravates the illegality is the indisputable failure of the competent authority to serve notice upon the respondents, notwithstanding their recorded title and possession. Section 6(2) of the Act mandates notice to every person interested, and this mandate is neither directory nor dispensable. Failure to put the respondents on notice constitutes a jurisdictional error of the highest order. Proceedings undertaken behind the back of persons whose proprietary rights are directly affected violate not only the statute but the most elementary principles of natural justice. 35. It is an enduring and inviolable principle that rights conferred by law and protected by statutory safeguards cannot be annulled by administrative fiat nor sacrificed at the altar of procedural shortcuts. Proceedings initiated without establishing jurisdictional facts, pursued without service of mandatory notices, and culminating without lawful possession are void ab initio. They do not merely suffer from irregularity; they are a nullity in the eye of law. Consequently, the proceedings initiated and pursued by the authorities, shorn of jurisdiction, bereft of statutory compliance, and vitiated by violation of natural justice, are unsustainable and stand liable to be quashed in their entirety. 36. The learned Government Pleader would further submit that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that notice under Section 6 (2) of the Act ought to be served on all the interested persons. It is contended that the persons entitled to such notice must be determined with reference to the date of commencement of the Act, i.e., 17.02.1976 and since the respondents/writ petitioners had no interest over the subject land as on that date, they were not entitled to any notice. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners submits that Section 6(2) of the Act, mandates that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act shall file a statement before the competent authority, and further obligates the competent authority to issue notice to all persons known or believed to be interested in the land. The said provision, it is submitted, does not restrict the issuance of notice only to persons holding title or interest as on 17.02.1976, but extends to any person having a legal or beneficial interest in the property at the relevant stage of proceedings. 37. The learned Single Judge had placed reliance on the ratio laid down in earlier decisions, including K.B. Surendra Kumar v. Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling , 2000 (4) ALD 596 and had categorically observed that the respondents/writ petitioners had purchased the subject land from their predecessors-in-title, who had in turn derived title from the original owners. It was found that the respondents/writ petitioners had come into lawful possession and enjoyment of the subject property from the date of their respective purchases, much prior to the passing of the impugned orders. On that basis, the learned Single Judge held that the respondents/writ petitioners fell within the category of “persons interested” under Section 6(2) of the Act, read with Rule 5 of the Urban Land Ceiling Rules, 1976 (for short ‘ULC Rules’). The learned Single Judge further opined that, since the land purchased by the respondents/writ petitioners was sought to be treated as part of the surplus holding of the original owners, the Competent Authority was under a statutory obligation to serve notices not only upon the writ petitioners but also upon their predecessors-in-title before passing any adverse orders. The absence of such notice was held to constitute a violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act, thereby vitiating the proceedings in so far as they pertained to the land purchased by the writ petitioners. It was also observed that proceedings conducted behind the back of the writ petitioners could not be treated as valid or pressed into service to defeat their rights. Consequently, the learned Single Judge declared the impugned orders, to that extent, as legally unsustainable. 38. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that notices under Section 6(2) of the Act were required to be issued only to those persons who had an interest in the property as on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e., 17.02.1976, cannot be sustained. Inasmuch as Section 6(2) of the Act, read in its plain terms, obligates the competent authority to serve notice upon every person known or believed to be interested in the land before proceeding further. Inasmuch as Section 6(2) of the Act, read in its plain terms, obligates the competent authority to serve notice upon every person known or believed to be interested in the land before proceeding further. The statutory requirement is not confined to the original owners or declarants as on the date of commencement of the Act, but extends equally to all subsequent purchasers or transferees who acquire rights in the property prior to the initiation of proceedings. 39. In the instant case, the record itself discloses that the impugned notices dated 08.08.2006 were issued only in the name of one Manne Allaiah, and were not served upon the respondents/writ petitioners who had purchased the subject land under registered sale deeds well prior thereto. The failure of the competent authority to implead or notify the respondents, despite their established ownership and possession, constitutes a fundamental violation of the principles of natural justice and renders the proceedings wholly unsustainable in law. Once agricultural land stands excluded from the purview of the Act under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, and when the respondents are holders of valid title, the denial of notice cannot be justified on the pretext that they were not interested persons as on 17.02.1976. Accordingly, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the respondents were entitled to notice under Section 6(2) of the Act is legally sound and calls for no interference. 40. Equally untenable is the assertion that possession was taken by the authorities. The record unmistakably reveals that no lawful, actual or physical possession of the lands was ever taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act. No notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued, nor is there any contemporaneous record evidencing voluntary surrender or forcible dispossession. The law on this point is settled beyond dispute. In Hari Ram’s case (supra) , the Supreme Court categorically held that vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act is de jure and does not divest the landholder of physical possession unless the mandatory procedure under Section 10(5) of the Act is followed. This principle has been emphatically reaffirmed in M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar and others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447 , wherein possession without compliance of Section 10(5) of the Act has been condemned as a mere “paper possession,” devoid of legal sanctity. This principle has been emphatically reaffirmed in M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar and others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447 , wherein possession without compliance of Section 10(5) of the Act has been condemned as a mere “paper possession,” devoid of legal sanctity. In the present case, the appellants’ claim of possession stands wholly unsupported and must be rejected outright. In these circumstances, the registered sale deeds executed in favour of the respondents duly registered, acted upon, reflected in the revenue records, and followed by their continued possession cannot be brushed aside in collateral proceedings under the Act. Unless invalidated in appropriate proceedings before a competent forum, such conveyances retain full legal force. A casual invocation of Section 5(3) of the Act, bereft of jurisdictional facts, cannot extinguish vested proprietary rights derived under registered instruments. 41. The learned Government Pleader further submits that as per the judgement in Bhaskara Jyothi Sharma’s case (supra) even if competent authority fails to issue notice to the land owners in terms of Section 10(5) of the Act, such omission by itself would not be sufficient to attract the Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short ‘the Repeal Act’). It is contended that mere failure to issue a notice under Section 10 (5) of the Principal Act would not render the proceedings void or result in automatic abatement under the Repeal Act. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners submits that the requirement under Section 10(5) of the Act is not a mere procedural formality but a mandatory safeguard. It is further urged that unless and until the competent authority issues notice calling upon the landholder to surrender possession, and thereafter lawfully takes possession either voluntarily or under Section 10(6) of the Act, the State cannot claim to have taken over the land. It is further contended that vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act is only a statutory vesting in title and does not dispense with the requirement of actual possession being taken. In the absence of such lawful possession and by virtue of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, all proceedings initiated under the principal Act abate automatically. It is further contended that vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act is only a statutory vesting in title and does not dispense with the requirement of actual possession being taken. In the absence of such lawful possession and by virtue of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, all proceedings initiated under the principal Act abate automatically. Therefore, failure on the part of the authorities to comply with Section 10(5) of the Act goes to the root of the matter and renders the proceedings non est in the eye of law. The appellants, it is contended, cannot rely upon a mere notional vesting to defeat the lawful rights of the respondents. 42. In M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra), while considering the decisions in Hari Ram’s case (supra) and Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma’s case (supra ), the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of adhering to the procedure prescribed under Sections 10(5) and 10 (6) of the Act and made the following pertinent observations: “19. It is trite law that the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) and order under Section 10(6) of the Act is mandatory under law. Refer to: Hari Ram (supra). 32. We should now look into the decision of this Court in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321 . A cursory reading of this decision may at the first blush create an impression that the dictum as laid in Hari Ram (supra) has been diluted. 33. We quote few relevant paras of the said judgment as under: - 15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7th December, 1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word ‘may’ appear in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so.” (Emphasis supplied) 34. We have supplied emphasis on paras 15 and 17 of Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra) referred to above, for the purpose of highlighting that Hari Ram (supra) has not been diluted in any manner. We are of the firm view that Hari Ram (supra) holds the field even as on date. The statements of law in Hari Ram (supra) are absolutely correct.” 43. The Honourable Supreme Court thus, reaffirmed that compliance with Section 10 (5) and 10(6) of the Act is not a mere procedural formality but a condition precedent for the lawful divestment of possession under the Act. The authority must first issue a notice affording an opportunity to the occupant before resorting to forcible possession under Section 10 (6) of the Act. Any act of dispossession undertaken in violation of this requirement cannot be treated as lawful for the purpose of serving proceedings under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. 44. It is relevant to refer to Section 10(5) of the Act, which reads as follows: “Section 10: Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. (5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.” 45. A perusal of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that compliance with Section 10(5) of the Act is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with. A perusal of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that compliance with Section 10(5) of the Act is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that the vesting contemplated under Section 10(3) of the Act is only a notional vesting of title in the State, and such vesting must necessarily be followed by the lawful taking of possession as envisaged under Section 10(5) of the Act, or in cases of resistance, under Section 10(6) of the Act. Mere issuance of a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act without subsequent service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and without actual physical possession being taken, cannot divest the landholder of possession or operate to transfer ownership in fact. 46. The Honourable Supreme Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra) while dealing with mandatory service of notice under section 10 of the Act held as follows: “30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. Voluntary Surrender 31. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155 , while interpreting Section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows: “We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To vest, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To “vest” cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act. 33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub- section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of “possession” which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub- section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub- section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub- section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub- section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub- section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub- section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10. 37. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 47. In the present case, the records reveal that no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was ever served upon the respondents or their predecessors-in-title, and no lawful possession was taken by the competent authority. Consequently, the proceedings must be held to have abated by virtue of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999. The stand of the appellants that non-service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is inconsequential, cannot, therefore, be entertained, and the claim of the respondents that the proceedings stood abated is upheld. 48. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the writ petitions were instituted by the respondents/writ petitioners, only after the proceedings under the Act had culminated up to the stage of Section 10(6) of the Act. It is further contended that the sale deeds relied upon by the respondents/petitioners are void ab initio and, therefore, no valid transfer can be deemed to have been effected in their favour. It is further contended that the sale deeds relied upon by the respondents/petitioners are void ab initio and, therefore, no valid transfer can be deemed to have been effected in their favour. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/Writ petitioners contends that the mere culmination of proceedings under Section 10(6) of the Act does not, by itself, divest persons in settled possession of their right to challenge the legality of the proceedings, particularly where such proceedings are vitiated by non-service of statutory notices and violation of principles of natural justice. It is further urged that the plea of the appellants, that the sale deeds relied upon by the respondents/writ petitioners are void ab initio, is misconceived, inasmuch as the respondents/writ petitioners derived title and possession through their predecessors-in-interest long prior to the passing of the impugned orders. The validity of such transactions cannot be collaterally impeached in proceedings under the Act, especially when the respondents/writ petitioners were admittedly in lawful possession and enjoyment of the land as transferees. The contention that the proceedings had attained finality up to the stage of Section 10(6) of the Act, is equally untenable, since any such proceedings undertaken in contravention of the mandatory statutory requirement of serving notice stand vitiated in law. Consequently, such illegality can always be questioned notwithstanding the stage of the proceedings. 49. It is well-settled that the issuance and service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is a condition precedent for the lawful assumption of possession under Section 10(6) of the Act. In the absence of such compliance, any action purporting to be under Section 10(6), results only in what has been repeatedly characterised by the Courts as “paper possession”, and not actual or lawful possession. The law is clear that possession taken contrary to the mandatory statutory requirement does not divest the landholder or the person in possession of their rights, and such illegality can be questioned at any stage as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra) , which has been consistently followed in subsequent judgments such as Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC) and others , (2014) 12 SCC 523 and Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (Dead) by Legal Representatives and another v. State of Gujarat and others , (2016) 4 SCC 531 . 50. 50. Insofar as the objection of the appellants regarding the sale deeds executed in favour of the respondents/writ petitioners is concerned, this Court finds no merit in the same. Once it is established that the writ petitioners have purchased the land under registered documents and have been in possession and enjoyment thereof, they fall within the ambit of “persons interested” under the Act and are entitled to be put on notice before their rights are adversely affected. Even if the appellants assert that the sale deeds are void or defective, that circumstance cannot justify the denial of notice, nor can it cure the illegality of proceedings conducted behind their back. The mandatory requirement of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act being violated, the subsequent proceedings under Section 10(6) of the Act cannot be countenanced in law, and the so-called possession is liable to be declared non est. 51. The learned Government Pleader would next submit that the learned Single Judge failed to take note of the law laid down by this Court in Paruchuri Ratnakar Rao v. State of A.P . (2006) 5 ALD 132 (DB) . In the said decision, it was categorically held that the purchase of vacant land is null and void under Sections 5(3), 10(4) and 42 of the Act, and that the rights of the original owners/declarants had already been decided and attained finality. It is therefore contended that if, subsequent purchasers, are permitted to challenge the proceedings under the Act, the same would amount to a review of the concluded proceedings. Thus, it is submitted that the writ petition filed by the respondents/writ petitioners was not maintainable, and the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the same. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners submits that the present case stands on a completely different footing as the subject land is agricultural in nature and was not included in any master plan as on the date of commencement of the Act. Consequently, it does not fall within the definition of "vacant land" under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. Further, the rights of the declarants cannot be said to have reached finality inasmuch as the proceedings under the Act stood vitiated due to non-service of notices on the respondents/petitioners and their predecessors-in-title, as mandated under Rule 5 of the ULC Rules. Further, the rights of the declarants cannot be said to have reached finality inasmuch as the proceedings under the Act stood vitiated due to non-service of notices on the respondents/petitioners and their predecessors-in-title, as mandated under Rule 5 of the ULC Rules. Moreover, no lawful possession of the subject land was ever taken under Section 10(6) of the Act. In these circumstances, the challenge made by the respondents/petitioners cannot be equated to a review of concluded proceedings. On the contrary, it is a valid challenge to proceedings which are void ab initio for violation of mandatory statutory requirements. 52. The record clearly discloses that the subject land has been primarily used for agricultural purposes for more than four decades and, therefore, it does not fall within the definition of "vacant land" under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. It is apt to reproduce the relevant statutory definitions: Section: 2(o) "urban land" means, (i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or (ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small-town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture…. (q) "vacant land" means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration…. 53. The Honourable Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and another v. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja , 2013 (2) SCC 300 while dealing with the definition of vacant land, has made the following observation: “44. Under the Act, 1976 while defining ‘vacant land’, the said definition specifically excludes a ‘land’ used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’. The definition of ‘Urban Land’ again makes the position clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’.” 54. Therefore, proceedings initiated by the appellant authorities treating such land as vacant land are wholly unlawful. The definition of ‘Urban Land’ again makes the position clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’.” 54. Therefore, proceedings initiated by the appellant authorities treating such land as vacant land are wholly unlawful. Moreover, it cannot be said that the rights of the declarants or the transferees have reached finality, since there was no service of mandatory notices upon the respondents/petitioners or their predecessors-in-title, nor was actual and lawful possession ever taken under Section 10(6) of the Act. In the absence of compliance with these statutory requirements, the proceedings stand vitiated and cannot be treated as having attained finality. 55. Upon a careful appreciation of the material placed on record and the rival submissions advanced, this Court is not persuaded to accept the contention of the appellants that failure to serve notice under Section 10(5) of the Act does not vitiate the proceedings. It is now well-settled that the vesting contemplated under Section 10(3) of the Act is merely a paper or notional vesting of title in the State, which by itself, does not amount to actual and lawful assumption of possession. Such possession can be lawfully taken only upon strict compliance with the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 10(5) of the Act, and where necessary, Section 10(6) of the Act. V. CASE LAW SUMMARY: 56. Before parting with the discussion, it would be apposite to recapitulate the binding precedents that have authoritatively settled the principles governing the present controversy. The following decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court have delineated the contours of (i) lawful vesting and possession under Sections 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; and (ii) the legal consequence of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, upon proceedings where actual possession had not been taken in accordance with law. 57. In Hari Ram’s case (supra) , the Honourable Supreme Court held that vesting of land under Section 10(3) of the Act is only de jure, not de facto. The Court categorically declared that actual physical possession can be taken only by following the mandatory procedure under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act. 57. In Hari Ram’s case (supra) , the Honourable Supreme Court held that vesting of land under Section 10(3) of the Act is only de jure, not de facto. The Court categorically declared that actual physical possession can be taken only by following the mandatory procedure under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act. It was further clarified that the expression “may” occurring in Section 10(5) of the Act must be construed as “shall”, thereby making service of notice a mandatory precondition before the State can lawfully assume possession. The Court ruled that, in the absence of such compliance, the landholder or his successors cannot be deemed to have lost possession, and any alleged vesting remains a mere paper transaction incapable of conferring de facto control upon the State. 58. In Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar‘s case (supra) , the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated the same principle, holding that mere vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act does not automatically divest the owner of possession. Unless the competent authority establishes that possession was taken in the manner prescribed under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, the proceedings cannot be treated as having attained finality. The Court further held that where possession was not lawfully taken before the coming into force of the Repeal Act, the proceedings automatically abate, and the landholder continues to retain title and possession. 59. In K.B. Surendra Kumar’s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that transferees under registered sale deeds, who are in possession and whose names have been mutated in revenue records, are “ persons interested ” within the meaning of Section 6(2) of the Act and are therefore entitled to notice. Non-service of such notice renders proceedings unsustainable in law. 60. In Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja’s case (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that agricultural land is expressly excluded from the purview of the Act. It was held that any inclusion of such land within the meaning of “vacant land” would defeat the legislative intent. The decision affirms that jurisdiction under the Act extends only to urban vacant land, and not to agricultural holdings. 61. It was held that any inclusion of such land within the meaning of “vacant land” would defeat the legislative intent. The decision affirms that jurisdiction under the Act extends only to urban vacant land, and not to agricultural holdings. 61. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma’s case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court explained that while irregularity in following Section 10(5) of the Act may not, in exceptional factual circumstances, obliterate the act of possession for the limited purpose of the Repeal Act, the dictum in Hari Ram’s case (supra) continues to represent the correct position of law. The decision in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma’s case (supra) cannot be read as diluting the mandatory nature of Section 10(5) of the Act. It merely dealt with a situation where the owner, having been dispossessed decades earlier without protest, could not later claim the benefit of abatement. 62. In M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation’s case (supra) , the Honourable Supreme Court reaffirmed that the procedure contemplated under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act is not directory but imperative. The Court observed that the act of issuing a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and affording an opportunity to surrender possession voluntarily forms the foundation of legality for any subsequent coercive possession under Section 10(6) of the Act. Failure to comply renders the dispossession void and incapable of sustaining proceedings for the purpose of saving them under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The Court thus emphasized that lawful possession can only arise where the statutory requirements are fulfilled in both letter and spirit. 63. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid precedents makes it abundantly clear that: (i) Vesting under Section 10(3) of the Act is not equivalent to physical possession; (ii) Notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and compliance with Section 10(6) of the Act are mandatory; and (iii) In the absence of lawful possession prior to the Repeal Act, all pending proceedings abate automatically. The ratio in Hari Ram’s case (supra) and its progeny, therefore, governs the field and squarely applies to the facts of the present case. VI. CONCLUSION AND RESULT: 64. The ratio in Hari Ram’s case (supra) and its progeny, therefore, governs the field and squarely applies to the facts of the present case. VI. CONCLUSION AND RESULT: 64. In the light of the foregoing discussion and the settled principles of law, this Court is of the considered opinion that the lands in question are agricultural in nature and were never part of any notified Master Plan as of 17.02.1976, the date of commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh (now Telangana). Consequently, the initiation of proceedings by the competent authority under the provisions of the said Act, was wholly without jurisdiction. 65. Further, the respondents, being registered purchasers in lawful possession of the lands and whose names stand recognized in the revenue records clearly fall within the ambit of “persons interested” under Section 6(2) of the Act. The failure of the competent authority to serve mandatory notices under Sections 6(2) and 10(5) of the Act vitiates the entire proceedings. 66. There is also no material on record to show that lawful physical possession of the lands was ever taken by the Government in the manner known to law. In such circumstances, by operation of Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, all proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated. 67. The learned Single Judge, upon a meticulous analysis of the statutory provisions and binding precedents, rightly held that the proceedings initiated by the competent authority were unsustainable in law. Therefore, we find no infirmity or illegality in the reasoning or conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge warranting interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction. 68. Accordingly, all the Writ Appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in these appeals, shall stand closed.