JUDGMENT : SANJAY PRASAD, J. This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing the Award dated 30 th March, 2009 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad (Hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Ref. No. 57 of 1999 (i.e. Annexure-3), whereby and whereunder the said Tribunal has been pleased to answer the reference in favour of the concerned workman directing regularization of Sri Birendra Prasad in Clerical Grade-II with effect from 11.06.1981 and holding further that the workman is entitled to be promoted in the higher grade with all fringe benefits with retrospective effect and for other ancillary reliefs. 2. By Order No.L-20012/390/98- I.R.(C-I) dated 17.4.1999, the Central Government in the Ministry of Labour has, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub- section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred the following dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal: “ Whether the demand of the union from the management of Chandan Open Cast Project of Sudamdih Area of M/s. BCCL for regularization of Sri Birendra Prasad in Clerical Grade-II w.e.f. 11.6.1981 and further promotions in higher grade with all fringe benefits is justified? If so, to what relief the workman is entitled ?” 3. Heard Mr. A.K. Mehta learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the Respondent. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned Award dated 30.03.2009 passed by the learned C.G.I.T.-1, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 57 of 1999 is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the Tribunal has erred in law in answering the Reference in favour of the Respondent Union. It is submitted that the Tribunal is not justified in law in rendering its Award holding that the concerned workman-Respondent is entitled for regularization in Clerical Grade-II with effect from 11.06.1981. It is submitted that the Award of the Tribunal is illegal and liable to be set aside in view of the cadre scheme applicable to the Ministerial staff as also the Cadre scheme/promotional channel of Lamp Issue & Return Clerk of E & M Personnel (Operational Lamp Room Personnel). It is submitted that the Award of the Tribunal is illegal and liable to be set aside in view of the cadre scheme applicable to the Ministerial staff as also the Cadre scheme/promotional channel of Lamp Issue & Return Clerk of E & M Personnel (Operational Lamp Room Personnel). It is submitted that the Tribunal has erred in directing regularization of the concerned workman-Respondent with retrospective effect since 11.06.1981 in Clerical Grade-II without taking into consideration that the same would result in supersession of several persons working in the cadre. It is submitted that the demand of the Union for regularization of the concerned workman- Respondent with effect from 11.06.1981 was stale and therefore, no industrial dispute existed or was apprehended and as such the reference made to the Tribunal itself was liable to be struck down having been raised and referred for adjudication by an order dated 17.04.1999 by the Central Government. It is submitted that the Workman-Respondent was in a separate cadre relating to Cap Lamp Issue Clerk and Sri Achuta Prasad was in the General Clerical Cadre and therefore, there was no possibility for considering the case of the concerned Workman-Respondent with the Clerks in the General cadre and therefore, Sri Achuta Prasad was allowed promotion on completion of one year which did not result in supersession of the concerned Workman- Respondent. It was also submitted that there are several persons in the Clerical Cadre, who would be adversely affected in the event relief is granted to the concerned workman-Respondent and therefore, without hearing such persons, the reference ought not to have proceeded. It is submitted that the said Achuta Prasad was appointed on 01.4.1973 as Time Rated Worker and he was regularized in Clerk Grade III with effect from 18.10.1981 and promoted to Grade II with effect from 23.12.1982 on completion of one year period as Coal Mines Provident Fund Clerk, i.e. C.M.P.F. Clerk, which is a job of Clerical Grade II, whereas the concerned Workman-Respondent had never worked as P.F Clerk in Sudamdih Shaft Mines. It is submitted that there was no Cadre Scheme formulated for Cap Lamp Issue Clerk for further promotion in next higher grade and as such he could not be promoted. It is submitted that there was no Cadre Scheme formulated for Cap Lamp Issue Clerk for further promotion in next higher grade and as such he could not be promoted. However, in the year 1983 when the cadre scheme was formulated by J.B.C.C.I., then the concerned Workman-Respondent was promoted as Clerk Grade II in the year 1990, but he was given notional seniority with effect from01.03.1984. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission, has relied upon the judgment passed in Prabhakar Versus Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another reported in 2015 (15) SCC Page 1 and hence the Award may be set aside and this Court may hold that the Workman-Respondent is not entitled to relief. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Workman-Respondent submitted that the Award passed by the learned Tribunal is proper and fit and no illegality has been committed by the learned Tribunal by passing the impugned Award. It is submitted that though the said Achuta Prasad was senior in service to the Workman-Respondent, but the Workman-Respondent was regularized as Grade III Clerk on 11.06.1980 from the post of Daily Rated Workman, whereas the said Achuta Prasad was regularized in Clerk Grade III with effect from 18.10.1981 from the post of Daily Rated Workman and thus, the Workman-Respondent became senior to said Achuta Prasad while the Management granted the promotion. It is submitted that the Workman-Respondent was regularized in Clerk Grade II in the year 1990 and he was given merely notional promotion with effect from 01.3.1984 without any monetary benefit and as such the Workman-Respondent was compelled to raise industrial dispute. It is submitted that even the Workman-Respondent has done the work of the post of C.M.P.F. Clerk, i.e. Coal Mines Provident Fund Clerk and as such the Management cannot deny the fact that the Workman-Respondent was also a P.F. Clerk and similarly situated in work with said Achuta Prasad. It is submitted that even the Workman-Respondent has done the work of the post of C.M.P.F. Clerk, i.e. Coal Mines Provident Fund Clerk and as such the Management cannot deny the fact that the Workman-Respondent was also a P.F. Clerk and similarly situated in work with said Achuta Prasad. It is submitted that the Union has raised dispute on 16.08.1991 and it was due to approach of the Petitioner-Management as well as the authorities of Union of India, the reference was made effective with effect from 17.04.1999 in the year 1999 and hence, the Workman-Respondent cannot be blamed for delay in raising Industrial Dispute and hence, it is submitted that the Tribunal has well considered the written statement of both the sides and has rightly appreciated the documents filed by both the sides and hence, there is no illegality in the impugned Award and as such, this writ petition may be dismissed. 6. Perused the Lower Court Record and considered the submission of both the sides. 7. It transpires that the Workman- Respondent had raised Industrial Dispute in the year 1991 through the Union (i.e. Their Workman being represented by the General Secretary, Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Rajendra Path, Dhanbad, P.O. P.S. and district-Dhanbad Pin-826001) 8. It transpires from the written statement filed by the Management-Company enclosed with the Lower Court Record that one Achuta Prasad was appointed as Time Rated Worker from 10.4.1973 and regularized as Clerk Grade III with effect from 18.10.1981 and thereafter he was made Grade II Clerk with effect from 23.12.1982 on completion of one year period as P.F. Clerk. 9. It transpires that the Workman- Respondent was initially appointed as Time Rated Worker from 17.9.1977 and he was regularized as Clerk Grade III with effect from 11.06.1980 as Cap Lamp Issue Clerk and he was further regularized as Clerk Grade II in 1990 with notional seniority with effect from 01.03.1984. 10. It has been pointed out by the Petitioner-Company that the Workman-Respondent, namely Birendra Prasad never worked as P.F. Clerk in Sudamdih mines. 11. It transpires from the Written Statement filed by the Workman-Respondent that he was brought in Clerical Cadre by the Management in Clerk Grade III of National Coal Wage Agreement (in short N.C.W.A.) with effect from 11.6.1980, whereas one Achuta Prasad of the said mine was placed in Clerical Grade III of N.C.W.A. with effect from 18.10.1981. 11. It transpires from the Written Statement filed by the Workman-Respondent that he was brought in Clerical Cadre by the Management in Clerk Grade III of National Coal Wage Agreement (in short N.C.W.A.) with effect from 11.6.1980, whereas one Achuta Prasad of the said mine was placed in Clerical Grade III of N.C.W.A. with effect from 18.10.1981. The Management used to follow the practice to put a person in Clerical Cadre III initially and after completion of one year service in Clerical Cadre III, it used to regularize him, i.e. the workman in Clerical Grade II. However, the Management regularized said Achuta Prasad in Clerical Grade II with effect from 23.12.1982, but the same principle was not deliberately followed by the Management in the case of the Workman-Respondent, namely Birendra Prasad and as such the Workman- Respondent became junior to said Shri Achyuta Prasad although said Achuta Prasad was a junior colleague of the Workman-Respondent in Clerical Grade III. Therefore, the Workman-Respondent is entitled to regularization in Clerical Grade II with effect from 11.06.1981 and hence, the Workman- Respondent is entitled to promotion in the higher grade and also for further promotion and other consequential benefits. 12. The Workman-Respondent, in support of his case, got himself examined as WW 1. 13. The Workman-Respondent, in support of his case, got marked certain documents as the Exhibits, which are as follows:- (i) Ext.W-1 is the Biodata in respect of Sri Achuta Prasad and Sri Birendra Prasad, Clerk, (ii) Ext.W-2 is the Office Order dated 03.04.1990 of the Management regularizing the Respondent-Workman in Clerical Grade II. (iii) Ext.W-3 is the letter dated 13.06.1980 of the Management appointing the Respondent-Workman as Gr.III Clerk, (iv) Ext.W-4 is the noting sheet dated 10.06.1991 of the Petitioner-Management forwarding the claim of the Respondent-Workman for regularizing him to the post of Clerk, Gr.II with notional seniority w.e.f. 23.12.1982 for consideration. 14. The Management in support of its case has got examined one witness as MW-1. 15. The Management, in support of its case, got marked certain documents as Exhibits, which are as follows. (i) Ext.M-1 is the photocopy of Office Order dared 01/02.09.2004 (In Three sheets) in regard to the promotion of workers working in different units under E.J. Area. (ii) Ext.M-2 is the Office Order of the Petitioner- Management dated 01/ 02.09.2004, i.e. the list of Grade II Clerks (Non-financial) promoted to Grade I Clerk. 16. (i) Ext.M-1 is the photocopy of Office Order dared 01/02.09.2004 (In Three sheets) in regard to the promotion of workers working in different units under E.J. Area. (ii) Ext.M-2 is the Office Order of the Petitioner- Management dated 01/ 02.09.2004, i.e. the list of Grade II Clerks (Non-financial) promoted to Grade I Clerk. 16. Thereafter, the Award has been passed by the learned Tribunal in favour of the Workman by adjudicating that the demand of the Union from the Management of Chandan Open Cast Project of Sudamdih area of M/s B.C.C.L. for regularization of Birendra Prasad in Clerical Grade II with effect from 11.6.1981 and the concerned Workman is entitled to be promoted in higher grade with all fringe benefits with retrospective effect is justified and the Management was directed to implement the Award within 30 days from the date of publication of the Award. 17. So far as oral evidence is concerned, MW 1 is Sheo Prasad Sharma, who was working with the Management Company and had stated that the Workman- Respondent was appointed on 19.7.1977 as General Mazdoor category in Shaft Mine, Sudamdih and he was regularized in Clerical Grade III on 11.06.1980 as Cap Lamp Issue Clerk. Thereafter, he was promoted to Clerk Grade II in the year 1990 with notional seniority from 01.03.1984. Then, he was also given promotion to Clerk Grade I as S.L.U. on 17.7.1994 and also S.L.U. in Special Grade on 01.2.2003. From 02.9.2004, he was promoted in Clerk Grade-I. 18. He also stated that Cadre Scheme of the Cap Lamp Issue Clerk was prepared in the year 1983 and the Workman-Respondent was promoted according to Cadre Scheme of 1983. He has proved the Cadre Scheme of Coal Wage Board which was marked as Ext. M-1. He also proved the Office Order dated 01/02.9.2004, which was marked as Ext. M-2 and by which the concerned Workman was given promotion. He denied the suggestion that Achuta Prasad was junior to the concerned Workman and he was given promotion earlier than the concerned workman. He further stated that said Achuta Prasad was appointed on 01.04.1973 and he used to work as P.F. Clerk and he was promoted in Clerical Grade II in the year 1982, whereas the concerned Workman never worked as P.F. Clerk. It is further stated that the concerned workman was posted in the Weigh Bridge Section and then he was transferred. He further stated that said Achuta Prasad was appointed on 01.04.1973 and he used to work as P.F. Clerk and he was promoted in Clerical Grade II in the year 1982, whereas the concerned Workman never worked as P.F. Clerk. It is further stated that the concerned workman was posted in the Weigh Bridge Section and then he was transferred. He further stated that the demand of the Workman-Respondent was not justified. 19. However, during cross-examination, he admitted that vide Office Order the Workman-Respondent was promoted on 11.4.1980. He also admitted that vide this Office Order dated 16.6.1980, which was marked as Ext.W-3, the concerned Workman was posted as C.M.P.F. Clerk on temporary basis. He also admitted that he had not produced any paper to show that the Workman-Respondent had worked as Lamp Issue Clerk. He also could not say the specific job of the concerned Workman in the Weigh Bridge Section before coming to the place. He also admitted that the concerned Workman worked in the Personnel Department and then as Attendance Clerk and Personnel Officer’s Clerk and Attendance Clerk are both in Clerk Grade-II. He also admitted that the C.M.P.F. Clerk is also in Clerk Grade II. He also admitted that a person, who works in Clerk Grade III and he is subsequently promoted and regularized in Clerk Grade II. He further admitted that a promotion from Clerk Grade II to Clerk Grade I is given after three years and so on. He had denied the suggestion that the concerned Workman has not been regularized in Clerk Grade II on 11.6.1981. He had further denied the suggestion that after one year person in Clerical Grade-III should be regularized in Clerk Grade-II. However, he stated that it is not a fact that had the concerned Workman-Respondent been regularized in Clerk Grade II on 11.6.1981, he would have been promoted in Technical Grade A by now. However, he further stated that no demand from concerned workman was made for his regularization since 11.6.1981. He has proved the Original notesheet of the Management dated 16.08.1991, which was marked as Ext. W-4 (with objection by the representative of the Management) 20. Thus, from the evidence of MW 1, it is evident that Workman-Respondent was regularised in Clerical Grade-III on 11.06.1980, whereas said Achuta Prasad was promoted to Clerical Grade II in the year 1982. He has proved the Original notesheet of the Management dated 16.08.1991, which was marked as Ext. W-4 (with objection by the representative of the Management) 20. Thus, from the evidence of MW 1, it is evident that Workman-Respondent was regularised in Clerical Grade-III on 11.06.1980, whereas said Achuta Prasad was promoted to Clerical Grade II in the year 1982. Therefore, the evidence of MW 1 is not reliable as he has suppressed deliberately the fact that the Workman-Respondent was regularised in Clerical Grade III with effect from 11.06.1980 and was posted in the C.M.P.F. Department and he was also posted in the Personnel Department and he also worked as an Attendance Clerk. He also admitted that the C.M.P.F. Clerk on the one hand and Personnel Clerk as well as Attendance Clerk on the other hand are all in the category of Clerical Grade II. Thus, it is evident that the Workman-Respondent, namely Birendra Prasad was similarly situated with said Achuta Prasad in Grade II. 21. So far as documents marked by the Management- Petitioner in support of its case is concerned, Ext.M-1 is the photocopy of Office Order dared 01/02.09.2004 (In Three sheets) in regard to the promotion of workers working in different units under E.J. Area. It is the cadre scheme formulated for Cap lamp Issue Clerk for further promotion in the next higher grade and this exhibit has been proved by the M.W.1. 22. Ext.M-2 is the Office Order of the Petitioner- Management dated 01/ 02.09.2004, i.e. the list of Grade II Clerks (Non-financial) promoted to Grade I Clerk, which shows that by Office Order dated 01/02.09.2004 the concerned workman was promoted to Grade-I. This Exhibit has been proved by the M.W.1. 23. It is the own case of the Management from the Written Statement that the Workman-Respondent was regularized as Clerk Grade III on 11.06.1980, whereas similarly situated person Achuta Prasad was regularized as Clerical Grade III with effect from 18.10.1981 and thus, it is evident that the Tribunal has rightly held that a junior to the Workman-Respondent has been given promotion before the Workman-Respondent. 24. It is further evident that though the Workman-Respondent was promoted in the year 1990 as Clerical Grade II, but he was given notional seniority with effect from 01.03.1984 and therefore, the action of the Petitioner-Management is clearly illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. 25. 24. It is further evident that though the Workman-Respondent was promoted in the year 1990 as Clerical Grade II, but he was given notional seniority with effect from 01.03.1984 and therefore, the action of the Petitioner-Management is clearly illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. 25. It is further noticed that even the Workman- Respondent was given promotion on different date, lastly on 02.09.2004 in Clerk Grade-I as evident from the evidence of MW-1, who is the witness on behalf of the Management. Thus, there is no complaint, whatsoever, against the concerned Workman-Respondent while he was denied promotion and Achuta Prasad, who was junior to the workman was promoted. 26. The W-1 is the Workman-Respondent himself, in his Examination-in-Chief, has stated that he was appointed at Sudamdih Shaft Mine as Cat.I Mazdoor. He was brought in clerical cadre w.e.f. 11.6.1960 and was placed in Gr.III. He was posted in C.M.P.F. Deptt. After his appointment as Clerk Sri Achyuta Prasad was appointed as Clerk and posted as C.M.P.F. Clerk. Before appointment as Clerk Sri Achyuta Prasad was not in clerical cadre. Said Achyuta Prasad was brought in clerical cadre on 18.10.1981. The Workman-Respondent proved the seniority list of the Management and stated that he was promoted in Clerk Gr.II w.e.f. 01.03.1984 but Achyuta Prasad Promoted in Cr.II w.e.f. 23.12.1982. He further stated that there was no D.P.F. either in the year 1982 to 1984. It is further stated that said Achyuta Prasas was regularized in Gr.II. according to the nature of job performed by him and the Workman- Respondent was also doing the same nature of job from the year 1980 and he was regularized in Gr.II in the year 1984. He also proved Ext. W-2, i.e. the letter, by which he was deputed to work as Clerk in C.M.P.F. in the year 1980. He further proved another letter of the Management (marked Ext.W-3) regarding regularizing him from the year 1984. He further stated that he had raised this dispute for the discrepancies mentioned above and his claim is justified. 27. During his Cross-examination, he stated that as per the rules, a Clerk in Grade-III is entitled to Grade-II only when he completes one year job in Grade-III. Said Achyuta Prasad was granted Grade-III on 18.10.1981 and he was given Grade-II from 23.12.1982. 27. During his Cross-examination, he stated that as per the rules, a Clerk in Grade-III is entitled to Grade-II only when he completes one year job in Grade-III. Said Achyuta Prasad was granted Grade-III on 18.10.1981 and he was given Grade-II from 23.12.1982. He further admitted that he was appointed in time rated job on 17.09.1977 as Loading Supervisor in Rly. Siding. He further admitted that he was given Grade-III on 11.06.1980 but it is incorrect to say that he was given that grade as Cap Lamp Issue Clerk. He further stated that he was promoted in Gr.II in the year 1990 but he was given notional seniority w.e.f. 01.03.1984. 28. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar Versus Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 at Para 19, 20, 26, 28, 42, 42.1 to 42.5, 43 and 45 as follows :- “Para 19: - The position in law was summarised as under in Ajit Kumar Barat (SCC pp. 96-97, para 7) "(1) The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference. (2) The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order. (3) An order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (4) If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus. (5) It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. (5) It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. Para 20:- At this stage it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of Judgments of this Court." Para 26:- Even in Sapan Kumar Pandir, the Court emphasised that limitation period for making the reference is co-extensive with the existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. In the facts of that case, the Court found that dispute remained alive and, therefore, reference was legally made. What is significant is that the Court in that judgment interpreted the words "at any time" occurring in Section 10 of the Act and clarified that though these words, prima facie, indicate that there is no time-limit for making the reference, but such a meaning cannot be assigned to these words and the real test is the existence of a dispute on the date of reference for adjudication. We would like to reproduce paras 8 and 9 elaborating this principle: (SCC p. 226) "8. The above section is almost in tune with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the difference between these two provisions does not relate to the points at issue in this case. Though no time-limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindle by making a reference of it to adjudication? The words ’at any time as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words ’where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended’ have to be read in conjunction with the words ’at any time’. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words ’where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended’ have to be read in conjunction with the words ’at any time’. They are, in a way, complementary to each other. The Government’s power to refer an industrial dispute for 9 adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression ’at any time’ terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government, it is idle (sic ideal) to ascertain the number of years which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. 9. Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Government’s power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which elapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility of what another party would think, whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference, there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government, there existed such a dispute." Para 28:- The aforesaid case law depicts the following: 28.1. The law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 28.2. The words "at any time" used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference. 28.3. The law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 28.2. The words "at any time" used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference. 28.3. At the same time, the appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become a stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be refused. 28.4. Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/non- existent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there Cannot be any hard-and-fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference. Para 42:- On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2- A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking referenc reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the civil court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived a his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. Pare 43:- We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. Para 45: -On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute.” 29. It appears from the above judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 that though the Hon’ble Supreme Court had set aside the Award on the ground of delay of 14 years on the ground that the Reference was raised after 14 years of termination of service of the Delinquent Workman-Respondent, but in the present case the Workman-Respondent had raised Industrial Dispute while he was in service and after getting promotion from Grade-III to Grade-II, he challenged his seniority vis-à-vis one Achyuta Prasad, who was junior to him and who was given promotion in the year 1983 itself, whereas the Workman-Respondent was given notional promotion with effect from 1990 without any financial benefit. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent had raised the reference in the year 1991 through the Union before the Central Government. However, the Central Government had referred the matter for reference on 17.04.1999, i.e. after a delay of Eight (08) years and thus, for the delay on the part of the Central Government, the Workman-Respondent cannot be found at fault with. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent had raised the reference in the year 1991 through the Union before the Central Government. However, the Central Government had referred the matter for reference on 17.04.1999, i.e. after a delay of Eight (08) years and thus, for the delay on the part of the Central Government, the Workman-Respondent cannot be found at fault with. Therefore, in view of the delay made by the Central Government the Workman-Respondent cannot be denied his right to be barred by law of limitation, thus, the above judgment is not in favour of the Petitioner-Manager on the facts and circumstances of this case. 30. In the above judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 also the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that there is no limitation in the matter of Industrial Dispute Act and each case has to be seen on its own merit. 31. It is further evident that the Workman- Responden was in job while raising the Industrial dispute and as such it cannot be barred by law of limitation and the only question the Management has placed reliance upon is that the Award has been challenged after certain years only after getting promotion by the Workman-Respondent. However, this Court finds that the Workman-Respondent is a poor fellow and he can not dare to fight the mighty Management at the first instance and he had raised the industrial dispute after getting promotion. Therefore, the Management cannot challenge the same on the ground that it was barred by limitation as they had found the Workman-Respondent competent and fit to be promoted. 32. Thus, the above judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 is not fully applicable and it is evident from the discussions made above that the above judgment actually supports the case of the Workman- Respondent. There is no delay of 14 years in this case like the case decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 33. It is a settled law that the Court need not interfere into the Award passed by the learned Tribunal or by the learned Labour Court below if it is demonstrably not illegal, without jurisdiction and based on no evidence. 34. It is well settled that the Writ Court will not interfere in the Award passed by the learned Tribunal if there is no illegality, perversity and impropriety in the impugned Award. 35. 34. It is well settled that the Writ Court will not interfere in the Award passed by the learned Tribunal if there is no illegality, perversity and impropriety in the impugned Award. 35. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477 at Paragraph no.7 as follows:- “ Para 7:- The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 36. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors ., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233 , at Paragraph no.21 as follows : “ Para 21:- With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 37. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. , reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 at Paragraph nos.12 and 13 as follows :- “ Para 12:- Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob’s case (supra) Para 13:- In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 38. In the present case, it is evident that the learned Court below has passed the Award considering the evidences on record and there is no jurisdictional error and illegality in the Award passed by the learned Court below. 39. In the present case, it is evident that the learned Court below has passed the Award considering the evidences on record and there is no jurisdictional error and illegality in the Award passed by the learned Court below. 39. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that there is no illegality and perversity in the impugned Award dated 30 th March, 2009 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in Ref. No. 57 of 1999 (i.e. Annexure-3). Thus, this W.P.(L) No. 751 of 2010 is, hereby, dismissed.