ORDER : PRANAY VERMA, J. 01. This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by defendants No.1 and 2, being aggrieved by the order dated 11.07.2023 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.14/2023 by the District Judge, Tarana, District Ujjain setting aside the judgement and decree dated 03.08.2021 passed in RCS No.32-A/2021 by the Second Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Tarana, District Ujjain and remanding the matter back to it for decision on merits. 02. The facts of the case in brief are that defendants No.1 and 2 had filed an application under Section 131 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) before the Tehsildar in respect of right of way. By order dated 18.03.2020, the said application was allowed by the Tehsildar being aggrieved by which the plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 44 (1) of the Code before the Sub Divisional Officer, Tarana which was dismissed by him by order dated 01.03.2021. Challenging these orders, suit was filed by the plaintiff for permanent injunction restraining defendants No.1 and 2 from interfering with his possession over his lands and for declaration that the order dated 01.03.2021 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer and the order dated 18.03.2020 passed by the Tehsildar are illegal and deserve to be set aside. 03. Upon entering appearance, defendants No.1 and 2 filed an application under Section 80 of the CPC read with Sections 131, 257 of the Code for rejection of the plaint on the ground of the same being barred by law. It was submitted that the revenue authorities have exclusive jurisdiction to decide dispute as regards a right of way under Section 131 of the Code and the decision rendered therein cannot be challenged by way of a civil suit in view of the bar contained in Section 257 of the Code. The suit challenging such orders passed by the revenue authorities is hence clearly barred. It was also submitted that no notice was issued by the plaintiff under Section 80 of the CPC prior to filing of the suit which was necessary since orders passed by the revenue authorities were being challenged. 04. The suit challenging such orders passed by the revenue authorities is hence clearly barred. It was also submitted that no notice was issued by the plaintiff under Section 80 of the CPC prior to filing of the suit which was necessary since orders passed by the revenue authorities were being challenged. 04. The aforesaid objections found favour with the trial Court which observed that the suit instituted for challenging orders passed by the revenue authorities under Section 131 of the Code is barred by virtue of Section 257 thereof. The plaintiff has not complied with the provisions of Section 80 of the CPC either by issuing notice prior to filing of the suit or taking leave from the Court to institute the suit. The revenue authorities whose orders have been challenged in the suit have also not been impleaded as parties which hence suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. Consequently, finding the suit to be barred by law, the plaint was rejected. 05. In appeal preferred by the plaintiff, by the impugned order, the appellate Court has held that an order passed under Section 131 of the Code can very well be challenged before the Civil Court despite the bar contained under Section 257 thereof. Since the suit was not filed in respect of any Government land, it was not necessary to implead either the State Government as a party or any of its Revenue Officers and to issue a notice under Section 80 of the CPC prior to filing of the suit or taking permission from the Court. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has been set aside and the matter has been remanded back to it for decision on merits. 06. By order dated 03.12.2024, the appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: “A) Whether the suit instituted by plaintiff challenging orders passed by the revenue authorities under Section 131 (1) of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 is barred by virtue of provisions of Section 257 thereof? B) Whether the suit is bad for non-compliance by plaintiff of provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and for not impleading the State Government and the Revenue Authorities who passed the orders as parties to the suit?” 07. B) Whether the suit is bad for non-compliance by plaintiff of provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and for not impleading the State Government and the Revenue Authorities who passed the orders as parties to the suit?” 07. Learned senior counsel for defendants No.1 and 2 has submitted that the appellate Court has erred in setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court and in remanding the matter back to it. The suit has been filed by plaintiff for challenging orders passed by revenue authorities under Section 131 of the Code. The same is not permissible in view of the bar contained in Section 257 of the Code which bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board or any Revenue Officer is by the Code empowered to determine, decide and dispose off. The orders passed by the revenue authorities were under express provision of the Code hence the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon their legality. The suit was for challenging orders passed by the revenue authorities hence it was necessary for the State Government to have been impleaded as a party whereas the plaintiff has only impleaded the Collector, District Ujjain as a party. Prior to filing of the suit, notice ought to have been issued by plaintiff under Section 80 of the CPC but that has not been done nor has any permission been taken from the Court under Sub-Section (2) of Section 80 for institution of the suit. The authorities who had passed the orders are necessary parties to the suit hence ought to have been impleaded which has not been done. The plaint had hence rightly been rejected by the trial Court. 08. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that despite the bar contained under Section 257 of the Code, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to have been ousted. The orders passed by the revenue authorities can very well be challenged before the Civil Court as has rightly been done by the plaintiff. Since dispute is not in respect of any Government land, but is in respect of private land, there was no necessity for impleading State of M.P. as a party to the suit. The orders passed by the revenue authorities can very well be challenged before the Civil Court as has rightly been done by the plaintiff. Since dispute is not in respect of any Government land, but is in respect of private land, there was no necessity for impleading State of M.P. as a party to the suit. Consequently, there was no requirement of issuance of any notice under Section 80 of the CPC or for impleading the revenue authorities, whose orders are under challenge, as parties to the suit. The appellate Court has hence rightly passed its order in which no interference is called for. 09. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 10. Section 131 of the Code was substituted by M.P. Act No.23 of 2018 with effect from 25.09.2018. The same prior and subsequent to its substitution is as under: OLD “131. Rights of way and other private easements.-(1) In the event of a dispute arising as to the route by which a cultivator shall have access to his fields or to the waste or pasture lands of the village, otherwise than by the recognised roads, paths or common land, including those road and paths recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under section 242 or as to the source from or course by which he may avail himself of water, a Tahsildar may, after local enquiry, decide the matter with reference to the previous custom in each case and with due regard to the conveniences of all the parties concerned. (2) No order passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing such rights of easement as he may acclaim by a civil suit.” NEW “131. Rights of way and other private easements. (2) No order passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing such rights of easement as he may acclaim by a civil suit.” NEW “131. Rights of way and other private easements. (1) In the event of a dispute arising as to the route by which a cultivator shall have access to his fields or to the unoccupied lands or pasture lands of the village, otherwise than by the recognised roads, paths or common land, including those road and paths recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under section 242 or as to the source from or course by which he may avail himself of water or as to the course by which he may drain water from his fields, a Tahsildar may, after local enquiry, decide, the matter with reference to the previous custom in each case and with due regard to the conveniences of all the parties concerned. (2) The Tahsildar may, at any stage of the enquiry, pass an interim order to grant immediate relief in respect of any matter under dispute in sub-section (1) if he is of the opinion that grant of such relief is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case : Provided that such interim order shall stand vacated on the expiry of ninety days from the date of the order unless vacated earlier.” 11. Section 131 of the Code as it stood prior to its substitution with effect from 25.09.2018 was the subject matter of consideration by the Apex Court in Ramkanya Bai and Another Vs. Jagdish and Others, 2011 (7) SCC 452 . The question therein was whether Section 257 of the Code bars a civil suit subsequent to determination of easementary rights under Section 131 (1) by the Tehsildar. While answering the said question in the negative, it was held by the Apex Court as under: "8. On the contentions urged by the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration: (a) Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for declaration or injunction, claiming a customary easement of right of way or right to take water, through the land of a servient owner, is barred by Section 257 of the Code, on the ground that it is a matter which the Revenue Officer (Tahsildar) is empowered to decide under Section 131 of the Code? (b) Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the owner of a land for a declaration that the defendant does not have an easementary right, customary or otherwise, over his property and the order of the Tahsildar under Section 131 of the Code recognising such right, is illegal and erroneous? ******* 10. Section 257 deals with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities in regard to revenue matters under the Code, and bar of jurisdiction of the civil courts in regard to such matters. The relevant portion thereof is extracted below: “257. Exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Authorities.—Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is, by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no civil court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters: (a)-(z-2)*** 11. An analysis of Section 131 of the Code shows that it provides for the adjudication by the Tahsildar, in respect of disputes raised by a cultivator, relating to any of the following three private easementary rights: (a) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to his fields; (b) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to waste or pasture lands of the village; and (c) the route by which a cultivator shall have access to the source from which, or the course by which, he may avail himself of water.” 12. Section 131 provides that such disputes shall be decided in each case, by the Tahsildar, after a local enquiry, with reference to the previous custom and with due regard to the convenience of all parties concerned. The disputes relating to recognised roads, paths or common land including those roads and paths recorded in the village wajib-ul-arz prepared under Section 242 of the Code are expressly excluded from the scope of Section 131 of the Code. 13. The disputes relating to recognised roads, paths or common land including those roads and paths recorded in the village wajib-ul-arz prepared under Section 242 of the Code are expressly excluded from the scope of Section 131 of the Code. 13. It is thus clear that what could be decided under Section 131 of the Code is a dispute relating to a claim for a customary easement over a private land, relating to a right of way or right to take water, which is not recognised and recorded as a customary easement in the village wajib-ul-arz. 14. The definition of different easements, the manner of imposition and acquisition of easementary rights, the incidents of easements and the remedies in case of interference or disturbance with easements are governed by the provisions of the Easements Act, 1882. The Easements Act refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired or imposed, namely, easements by grant, easements of necessity, easements by prescription and customary easements. Acquisition of an easementary right, by any of the aforesaid methods, requires fulfilment of the conditions prescribed under the Easements Act. A private easement, including a right of way to a person's land or right to take water from a source to his land, cannot be acquired in a manner not contemplated or prescribed by the Easements Act. Easements by grant require a grant by the owner of the servient heritage. Easements of necessity are based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage, at the time of disposition such as transfers and partitions. Easements by prescription can be acquired only by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years. Customary easement can be acquired by virtue of a local custom. 15. Having regard to Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a civil court can entertain any suit of civil nature except those, cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1965 SC 1942 ] this Court held: (AIR pp. 1946-47 & 1952, paras 13 & 32) “13. … the normal rule prescribed by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the courts shall [subject to the provisions contained in the Code] have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. … 32. 1946-47 & 1952, paras 13 & 32) “13. … the normal rule prescribed by Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the courts shall [subject to the provisions contained in the Code] have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. … 32. … Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts' jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.” ***** 17. The Code nowhere bars the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide upon easementary rights relating to agricultural or other lands. The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code neither creates nor recognises any new category of private easementary rights either by way of right of way or right to take water, which is not covered by the provisions of the Easements Act or which is not required to fulfil the requirements prescribed by the Easements Act. An easement cannot be acquired otherwise than in the manner provided in the Easements Act. 18. Section 131 of the Code does not provide for or recognise a new type of easement which is not contemplated or recognised in the Easements Act, but merely deals with customary easements covered by Section 18 of the Easements Act. An easement cannot be acquired otherwise than in the manner provided in the Easements Act. 18. Section 131 of the Code does not provide for or recognise a new type of easement which is not contemplated or recognised in the Easements Act, but merely deals with customary easements covered by Section 18 of the Easements Act. Nor can it be said that the elements of an easement required to be fulfilled under the Easements Act are not required in respect of a private easement under Section 131 of the Code. 20. When a person (dominant owner) has an easementary right, and the servient owner disturbs, obstructs or interferes with his easementary right, or denies his easementary right, the remedy of the dominant owner is to approach the civil court for the relief of declaration and/or injunction. Similarly, when a person who does not have an easementary right, tries to assert or exercise any easementary right over another's land, the owner of such land can resist such assertion or obstruct the exercise of the easementary right and also approach the civil court to declare that the defendant has no easementary right of the nature claimed, over his land and/or that the defendant should be prevented from asserting such right or interfering with his possession and enjoyment. 21. Section 257 relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities. Any statutory provision ousting the jurisdiction of the civil courts should be strictly construed. A suit for enforcement of an easementary right or for a declaration that the defendant does not have any easementary right over the plaintiff's property or a suit for injunction to restrain a defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff or exercising any easementary right over the plaintiff's property, is not barred by the Code. Such suits do not fall under any of the excluded matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (z-2) of Section 257 of the Code." 12. In the aforesaid decision, it was held that Section 131 of the Code provides for adjudication by the Tehsildar disputes raised by a cultivator, relating to private easementary rights. What would be decided under Section 131 of the Code would inter alia be a dispute relating to a claim for a customary easement over a private land relating to a right of way. What would be decided under Section 131 of the Code would inter alia be a dispute relating to a claim for a customary easement over a private land relating to a right of way. Definition of different easements, the manner of imposition and acquisition and the incidents and remedies in case of interference or disturbance with easement are governed by the provisions of Indian Easements Act, 1882. Easements Act refers to different methods by which easements are acquired or imposed. A private easement including a right of way to a person's land cannot be acquired in a manner not contemplated or prescribed by the Easements Act. The Code nowhere bars jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide upon easementary rights relating to agricultural or other lands. It neither creates nor recognizes any new category of private easementary rights not covered by the provisions of the Easements Act or which are not required to fulfil the requirements prescribed by the Easements Act. When the dominant owner has an easementary right and the servient owner disturbs, obstructs or interferes with or denies it, the remedy of the dominant owner is to approach the Civil Court for relief of declaration and/or injunction. When a person who does not have any easementary right tries to assert or exercise any easementary right over other person's land, the owner of such land can resist such assertion or obstruct exercise of easementary right and also approach the Civil Court to declare that the defendant has no easementary right of the nature claimed. It was specifically held that a suit for enforcement of any easementary right or for a declaration that the defendant does not have any easementary right or a suit for injunction to restrain defendant from exercising any easementary right is not barred by the Code. Such suits do not fall under any of the excluded matters enumerated in clauses (a) - (z-2) of Section 250 of the Code. 13. Such suits do not fall under any of the excluded matters enumerated in clauses (a) - (z-2) of Section 250 of the Code. 13. In addition to the fact that Section 131 of the Code does not deal with acquisition of any special easement by some method which is not referred to in the Easement Act, Sub-Section (2) of Section 131 of the Code as it then existed was also taken into consideration for holding that despite a decision under Section 131(1) of the Code a civil suit against finding of the Tehsildar would be maintainable since Sub-Section (2) provided that no order passed under Sub-Section (1) shall debar any person from establishing such rights of easement as he may claim by a civil suit but that was only an additional ground or factor, which was taken into consideration. Sub-Section (2) of the then existing Section 131 of the Code was not the only reason for holding that a civil suit for enforcement of any easementary right or for a declaration that defendant does not have any easementary right or a suit for injunction to restrain a defendant from interfering with exercise of easementary right over plaintiff’s property is not barred by the Code. Thus the principle as has been laid down in the aforesaid decision that despite passing of an order under Section 131 of the Code the aggrieved person can still approach the Civil Court by instituting a civil suit based upon easementary rights would still continue to hold the field regardless of omission of Sub-Section (2) of Section 131 of the Code providing for express remedy of instituting a civil suit in respect of an order passed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 131 of the Code. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court would still not be barred merely by virtue of Section 257 of the Code. 14. Thus, substantial question of law No. (A) is answered holding that the jurisdiction of the trial Court is not barred by virtue of provisions of Section 257 of the Code for challenging the orders passed by the revenue authorities under Section 131 thereof. 15. Admittedly, the disputed land is not Government land but is private land. The dispute between the parties is as regards a right of way. Orders have been passed by the revenue authorities in exercise of their quasi judicial authority. 15. Admittedly, the disputed land is not Government land but is private land. The dispute between the parties is as regards a right of way. Orders have been passed by the revenue authorities in exercise of their quasi judicial authority. The suit is not in respect of any act purporting to be done by any public officer in his official capacity. There was hence no necessity for impleading the authorities whose orders are under challenge in the suit as parties thereto. Since it is their orders which are challenged and not any act done by them in their official capacity and the suit is against private persons and not against the Government, there was no requirement of compliance with the provisions of Section 80 of the CPC. 16. It may be noticed that the disputed land is agricultural land. In view of amendment to Order 1 Rule 3A of the CPC in the State of M.P. State government would be a necessary party to the same even though a formal party. Plaintiff was enjoined to implead State of M.P. as a party to the suit. However, merely for him not doing so the suit cannot be said to be bad in law and instead the plaintiff ought to be directed to implead State of M.P. as a party which can still be done. 17. The substantial question of law (B) is hence answered to the effect that State of M.P. is a necessary party to the suit and plaintiff is required to implead it as a party. However, the authorities who had passed the orders which have been challenged in the suit are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. There was no requirement of compliance with provisions of Section 80 of the CPC by the plaintiff. 18. Thus, in view of answer to the substantial questions of law as aforesaid, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merits and is hereby dismissed.