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2025 DIGILAW 1181 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Ushaben Visaji Natuji Bihola

2025-10-04

J.C.DOSHI

body2025
JUDGMENT : J. C. Doshi, J. 1. In Sessions Case No. 39 of 2010, the learned Additional Sessions Court, Gandhinagar by judgment and order dated 31.8.2012, acquitted the accused Visaji Natuji Bihola and Ushaben Visaji Natuji Bihola respectively father- in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased, Sonalben Dilipsinh. 2. State of Gujarat being a premier prosecuting agency, being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order in the Sessions Case, choses to file appeal, only against the accused Ushaben Visaji Natuji Bihola under Section 3 78 (1) (3) of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE , by way of this appeal, however, did not choose to assail the judgment and order recording the acquittal of father-in-law Visaji Natuji Bihola . 3. Brief facts of the case are as under : 3.1 The deceased, Sonal Dilipsinh married to her husband and she was living separately with her husband and daughter Khushi in the upper floor of the matrimonial home. She gave her complaint on 13.1.2010 to the Dy. S.P, Gandhinagar in Krishna Hospital, Naroda, alleging that after a span of 4 months of the marriage, her mother-in-law started meting cruelty and harassed her on the grounds that her parents did not give anything as dowry. She had spoken about this to her husband but her husband remained silent and later on the harassment and cruelty was increased. She talked about the harassment and cruelty to her cousin Nitaben but since the harassment and cruelty continued upon Sonalben (deceased), she committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her body on 12.1.2010, as she could not bear harassment cruelty and abuse; the FIR of which has been registered on 13.1.2010. Sonalben, the complainant, died on 17.1.2010 and during the treatment period she had also given a dying declaration. 3.2 The FIR was registered for the offence punishable under Section 498 A, 504, 306 and 114 of IPC read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the father-in- law and mother-in-law namely Visaji Natuji Bihola and Ushaben Natuji Bihola. The usual investigation was carried, conducted and concluded and ultimately it leads to filing of the charge sheet before the learned Judicial Magistrate. Since the offence is exclusively tried by the learned Sessions Court, it was committed by the learned JMFC. The Sessions Case No. 39 of 2010 was registered against the accused. The process was issued. The usual investigation was carried, conducted and concluded and ultimately it leads to filing of the charge sheet before the learned Judicial Magistrate. Since the offence is exclusively tried by the learned Sessions Court, it was committed by the learned JMFC. The Sessions Case No. 39 of 2010 was registered against the accused. The process was issued. The learned Sessions Court has framed the charge against the accused for the ofences punishable under Sections 498 (A), 504, 306 and 114 of the IPC and read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Dowry Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and accordingly case was registered for leading the evidence of the prosecution side. 3.3 In order to bring home all the charge against the accused the prosecution led following oral and documentary evidence. Oral Evidence No No. Exh. Witness Name/Details 1 12 Dr. Manish Javtilal Gampi (P.M. of the body) 2 21 Dr. Kishore Singh Kabhsingh 1st Dr, Kishna Hospital Naroda 3 24 Patel Harishbhai Ramanbhai Ex. Mage State 4 28 Bhagit Vadhela (Panch of panchnama No. 29) 5 Arjun Singh Udesi Solanki, (Panch of the panchnama of Oct -20) 6 36 Nitaben Nareshbhai Bihila (Chitrai Ben, the victim’s sister) 7 37 Lakshman Singh Bhagwan Singh Rajput (father of the victim) 8 38 Pusufbhai Ismailbhai Vohra (father’s friend from Gujarat) 9 39 Hansaben Mahendrabhai Patel (neighbour of expired) 10 42 Dilip Singh Visaji Bihola (husband of expired) 11 45 Indiraben Laxmansinh Raolji (mother of deceased) 12 46 Chhabanbhai Kachrabhai (ASI Dahegam P.O.S) 13 47 Krishnakumarsit Chandrasinh Chudasma (D.y.S.P. Gandhinagar complainant) 14 50 Krishnasingh Harilalsingh Suryavanshi (Investigating Officer PSI) 15 52 Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Chauhan (PSI charge sheeter) Documentary evidence No. Exh. Witness Name 1 14 PM note of the deceased 2 22 Krishna Hospital treatment certificate for the deceased 3 26 Posthumous statement of the deceased 4 27 Inquest Panchanama 5 29 Panchanama of the land to be built 6 48 Complaint 7 51 Shipment note of capital goods and receipt of capital goods 8 53 Telephone number written by Dr. Rathod of Kirana 9 54 Report of Gandhinagar FSI Unit 10 55 Telephone extension of Ahmedabad Civil Hospital 11 56 FSS capital Analysis report 4. Rathod of Kirana 9 54 Report of Gandhinagar FSI Unit 10 55 Telephone extension of Ahmedabad Civil Hospital 11 56 FSS capital Analysis report 4. Further statement of accused under Section 3 13 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE was recorded after prosecution crossed their side of leading evidence whereby the accused denied all the incriminating circumstances against them and claimed that they have not committed any offence.5. Learned advocate for both the sides argued the matter. Learned Sessions Court after appreciating the evidence on record was pleased to acquit both the accused from the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 504, 306 and 114 of the IPC and read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Dowry Act. 6. Being aggrieved the prosecution preferred appeal against Ushaben Visaji Natuji Bihola only and accepted the judgment and order as far as another accused Visaji Natuji Bihola. 7. I have heard learned APP Mr. Rohan Raval appearing for the State, and learned advocate Ms. Alka Vaniya appearing for the accused. Learned advocate Ms. Vaniya has referred to Lalita Vs. Vishwanath & Ors., 2025, INSC 173. 8. Learned APP having referred to the charge leveled against the accused would submit that in the present case FIR as well as dying declaration given by the deceased was totally given go by the learned Sessions Court. He would further submit that in the FIR as well as in the dying declaration the deceased have leveled the allegations against the mother-in-law and stated that she was subjected to cruelty both mental and physical at the instance of her mother-in-law and father-in-law which drew her to commit suicide but this evidence has not been properly appreciated by the learned Court below. It was also submitted that since dying declaration proved baseless and passed through rigours of EVIDENCE ACT it was needed to be believed as relevant and admissible much less reliable to secure conviction of the accused by learned Sessions Court grossly erred in ignoring it. 9. In view of this argument, learned APP Rohan Raval submitted to allow this appeal and to upturn the judgment and order of recording the acquittal and to convict the accused for the offence for which she was charged. 10. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Vaniya, appearing for the accused submits that similar set of evidence was available against the another accused namely Visaji Nathuji Bihola. 10. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Vaniya, appearing for the accused submits that similar set of evidence was available against the another accused namely Visaji Nathuji Bihola. The learned Sessions Court has given similar kind of reasons to acquit both the accused but for the reason best known to the prosecution, they chose to file appeal only against the present respondent and has accepted the judgment and order passed against the accused No.1, acquitting him. She would further submit that the learned Trial Court has comprehensively discussed the evidence on record including the evidence in the form of FIR also and the dying declaration, and believed that there are insufficient evidence to believe the offence under Section 498 A and 306 and other allied offence of the IPC as well as offence under Section 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She would further submit that neither in the FIR nor in the dying declaration, the deceased alleged that a particular positive act of the accused instigated her to commit suicide and therefore, in absence of any particular act being positive and being proximate to the death of the deceased, the accused cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3 06 of the IPC. As far as allegations of offence under Section 498 A of the IPC is concerned, learned advocate Ms. Vaniya submitted that general and vague allegations of throwing tantrums and demanding dowry are leveled in the FIR except that no other evidence which said that the accused have committed the offence under Section 498 (A). Therefore, in view of that she submitted that learned Sessions Court has rightly acquitted the accused and this Court in acquittal Appeal should not interfere. 11. Upon above submissions, she would submit to disallow this Appeal. 12. Heard learned advocate for both the sides and perused the paper book as well as the record and proceedings. At the outset, let us notice the scope of acquittal Appeal, well defined in judgment In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana , reported in AIR 1995 SC 280 , Supreme Court has held as under: "The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal." 13. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned Special Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned Special Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 14. In the instant case, learned APP could not able to point out that how the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Court is patently illegal, perverse or contrary to the material on record or against the settled principles of law or is palpably wrong or manifestly erroneous. Worth to note that the presumption of innocence in a criminal trial operates in favour of the accused till he found guilty. The presumption would be doubled in a case where accused is acquitted after full-fledge trial from the charges levelled against him. 15. In the case on hand, principle charge levelled against accused is for the offence under section 498(A) and 306 of IPC. Section 498(A), 107 and 306 of IPC reads as under :- 498A. The presumption would be doubled in a case where accused is acquitted after full-fledge trial from the charges levelled against him. 15. In the case on hand, principle charge levelled against accused is for the offence under section 498(A) and 306 of IPC. Section 498(A), 107 and 306 of IPC reads as under :- 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 107. Abetment of a thing.— A person abets the doing of a thing, who—(First)— Instigates any person to do that thing; or(Secondly)— Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or(Thirdly)— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 306. Abetment of suicide.— If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 16. In order to establish cruelty defined in section 498A of the IPC, prosecution is required to prove that nature of cruelty was such that it drive women to commit suicide or or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of women and harassment of woman was such where it is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 17. Section 107 of IPC is prime requirement to prove offence under Section 306 of IPC. It requires instigation to any person to do that thing or engage with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to doing that thing, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission for doing that thing. 18. 18. In order to prove prima facie the offence under Section 306 of the IPC, the prosecution is required to show that there is some instigation on the part of the accused which led the deceased to commit suicide as no alternative is left with him except to commit suicide. The word ‘instigation’ is defined in IPC. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh (2001)9 SCC 618 following words as defined the instigation. “Instigation is to goad, urge, forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act” To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.” 19. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by "goading" or urging forward. The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction" (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (see Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.). Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. 20. A strange aspect is coming on perusal of the Appeal, memo vis a vis the impugned judgment and evidence on record. The charge against the accused is framed at Exh. 3. 20. A strange aspect is coming on perusal of the Appeal, memo vis a vis the impugned judgment and evidence on record. The charge against the accused is framed at Exh. 3. It is joint charge framed against the accused Visaji Nathuji Bihola and Ushaji Nathuji Bihola for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 504, and 114 of the IPC and read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Dowry Act as well as for offence punishable under Section 3 06 of the IPC. This charge jointly framed against the accused are on similar set of facts and circumstances. The learned Sessions Court considered the similar kind of allegations against the accused hence, thought it fit to frame the identical charge jointly against both the accused. The trial was also jointly conducted against both the accused. Similar set of evidence was placed appreciated and examined by the learned Sessions Court to acquit both the accused. The appellant-State of Gujarat did not choose to assail the judgment and order passed in favour of the accused Visaji Nathuji Bihola who faced similar kind of charges jointly with the present respondent, however, strongly surprisingly State of Gujarat decided to file the Appeal, challenging the acquittal of the respondent. Learned APP was specifically confronted at this issue, but he could not point out any satisfactory reply. 21. Having noted so, if we examine the impugned judgment an order passed by the learned Trial Court after referring to Section107 of the IPC, the learned Sessions Court has recorded the reasons and findings in para 33 and 34 is read as under . (33) Upon considering the complaint at Exhibit-48 and the oral evidence of witnesses at Exhibits 37, 38, 42 and Exhibit-45 on behalf of the Prosecution, the accused persons began harassing the deceased two to three months after the marriage and after she had a daughter. Thereafter, it is observed that the deceased went to live separately. However, it was observed that since the accused persons and the deceased were living separately on the upper and lower floor of the same house and the accused persons frequently went to her house and harassed her. Upon considering the complaint at Exhibit- 48, it appears that the deceased was not being harassed by her husband. However, it was observed that since the accused persons and the deceased were living separately on the upper and lower floor of the same house and the accused persons frequently went to her house and harassed her. Upon considering the complaint at Exhibit- 48, it appears that the deceased was not being harassed by her husband. Now, when considering that the accused persons are the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the deceased, and upon considering the reason for the harassment and the complaint vide Exhibit-48, it is clear that the deceased was frequently subjected to taunts, and the accused persons stated her that she would not receive any share in the agricultural land. Upon observing the incident dated 12/01/10, it does not appear that no dispute was took place with the accused persons regarding any such matter prior to the incident. However, upon considering the cause stated in the complaint, the dying declaration vide Exhibit-26 and it is clearly observed from the complaint vide Exhibit-48 that the deceased committed suicide because she felt deeply hurt upon an altercation with the accused persons two days prior to the incident, regarding money and rice borrowed from her grandfather-in-law (dada sarsa) and grandmother-in-law (dadi sasu). Now, when an offence under Section 3 06 of the I.P.C. has been registered against the accused persons, it is observed from the complaint vide Exhibit-48 and the dying declaration vide Exhibit-26 that the deceased committed suicide out of frustration due to the harassment done by the accused persons. Along with that Upon considering the elements of Section 498(A) of the I.P.C. and Section 113(A) of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , the harassment cannot be considered merely as ordinary altercations that occur between husband and wife. However, the harassment must be of such nature that it is continuous, and due to such harassment, life becomes difficult to live, leaving no option other than suicide. Only if the accused persons had instigated her to commit suicide, can it be considered ‘abetment’ under Section 107 of the I.P.C. In this case, considering the oral evidence produced of the Prosecution Witnesses vide Exhibit-37, 38, 42, and Exhibit-45, it clearly observed that the deceased was subjected to harassment at her matrimonial home. Only if the accused persons had instigated her to commit suicide, can it be considered ‘abetment’ under Section 107 of the I.P.C. In this case, considering the oral evidence produced of the Prosecution Witnesses vide Exhibit-37, 38, 42, and Exhibit-45, it clearly observed that the deceased was subjected to harassment at her matrimonial home. However, the nature of the harassment meted out by the accused persons to the deceased, the nature of such harassment, and the date on which dispute regarding harassment occurred between the deceased and the accused persons, no detail regarding such continuous harassment is observed from the evidence produced. However, it is merely stated the fact that there was mental harassment. Now, when the offence has been registered under Section 3 , 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the evidence produced merely indicates that the accused persons were demanding dowry from the deceased. However, the evidence does not indicate when, for what reason, and how much amount was demanded by the accused persons. Similarly, upon considering the complaint made by the deceased vide Exhibit-48, it is not observed in the said complaint that any conflict arose on account of dowry. It also does not specify on which date, how much amount, or for what reason any amount of cash was demanded by the accused persons from the deceased prior to the incident. (34) Thus, upon considering the evidence produced, it appears that the deceased committed suicide due to harassment. Therefore, having regard to the duration of the marital life of the deceased and in view of Section 113(A) of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , a presumption can certainly be drawn against the accused persons. However, such presumption can only be said to establish the offence under Section 3 06 of the I.P.C. against the accused persons if the evidence placed on record supports it. In short, as per the chargesheet recorded vide Exhibit-3 against the accused persons in this case, who are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant/victim Sonalben Dilipsinh. The accused persons taunted the deceased by saying, “You have not brought anything from your father's house,” used abusive language with the intent to disturb her peace and humiliated her. They subjected her to mental and physical harassment and made unlawful demands for money from her as dowry. The accused persons taunted the deceased by saying, “You have not brought anything from your father's house,” used abusive language with the intent to disturb her peace and humiliated her. They subjected her to mental and physical harassment and made unlawful demands for money from her as dowry. As the deceased could not tolerate such harassment, the deceased sprinkled kerosene over her body on 12/01/10 at around 21:00 hours and burnt and died during treatment on 17/01/10. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the fact beyond doubt that the accused persons abetted the deceased in committing suicide. Accordingly, the answer to Issue No. 1 is held in the negative, and with regard to Issue No. 2, the final order is passed as under. 22. In the background of aforesaid reasoning, if we examine the FIR and dying declaration both of them could be treated as a dying declaration of the deceased as FIR for incident is also registered by deceased. On 13.1.2010, the deceased recorded the FIR, in FIR after narrating the relationship and how she married to her husband Dilipsinh, She further stated that after passing of 4 month of her marriage, mother-in-law started throwing tantrums and she was confronted with the sayings that she did not bring anything as a dowry from her parental home. According to the FIR the deceased was telling it to her husband but nothing contrast took place. As far as reason for committing the suicide is concerned she stated that three days back she borrowed some grains from grand parents of her husband and once it came to the notice of her mother-in-law, she hurled swear ward, in derogatory language. Accused Visaji also joined and she spoke about the said facts to her cousin Nitaben and thereafter she committed suicide. She stated the same thing in her dying declaration. 23. As far as the evidence of Nitaben is concerned, led by the prosecution she speaks of general allegations of wear and tear of life and she further stated that deceased’s dying declaration was recorded in their presence. All these aspects have been vividly discussed by the learned Trial Court by way of aforesaid reasoning to disbelieve the case against the accused. 24. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sanjay D. Jain and others Vs. All these aspects have been vividly discussed by the learned Trial Court by way of aforesaid reasoning to disbelieve the case against the accused. 24. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sanjay D. Jain and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others , 2025 INSC 1168 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained what could be necessary for establishing the essential ingredients for the offence punishable under Section 498A. (para 10 held as under:) “10. A perusal of the FIR and its consideration in entirety indicates that statements of a general nature have been made therein as against the present appellants. The complainant states that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery. When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members. Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars. There are other omnibus statements made in the complaint without any particulars whatsoever. It is also to be noted that for the purpose of constituting an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, cruelty as indicated in the Explanation to the said provision must be stated to be inflicted. The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case. We do not find that on a complete reading of the complaint, a prima facie case for proceeding under Section 498-A of the Penal Code has been made out against the appellants.” 25. As far as offence under Section 306 of the IPC is concerned, law is no more res integra. It is quite settled that prosecution in order to prove the case against the accused for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC is required to prove that positive proximate act has instigated or goad deceased to commit suicide. There must be mensrea. It is further required to prove that no alternative is left for the deceased but to commit suicide. 26. There must be mensrea. It is further required to prove that no alternative is left for the deceased but to commit suicide. 26. In the context of aforesaid useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Vs State of Gujarat [2024 INSC 960] .Paras 24, 25, 26 are material and relevant and reads as under :- 24. Therefore, for a conviction under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear evidence of direct or indirect acts of incitement to commit suicide. The cause of suicide, especially in the context of abetment, involves complex attributes of human behavior and reactions, requiring the Court to rely on cogent and convincing proof of the accused’s role in instigating the act. Mere allegations of harassment are not enough unless the accused’s actions were so compelling that the victim perceived no alternative but to take their own life. Such actions must also be proximate to the time of the suicide. The Court examines whether the accused’s conduct, including provoking, urging, or tarnishing the victim’s self-esteem, created an unbearable situation. If the accused's actions were intended only to harass or express anger, they might not meet the threshold for abetment or investigation. Each case demands a careful evaluation of facts, considering the accused’s intent and its impact on the victim. 25. This Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [(2019) 7 SCC 301], held that to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the intent or mental state to commit the specific crime must be evident when assessing culpability. It was observed as under: “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions abovereferred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstance person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self- respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, aparticular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.” 26. On a careful and close consideration of the facts and the material on record in the present case of the law laid down by this Court regarding Section 306 , IPC, there appears no proximate link between the alleged facts, instances of harassment and her subsequent death by hanging. The alleged incident of selling of gold ornaments and subsequent physical and mental harassment, as alleged, occurred almost a year before the FIR was registered at the instance of the father of the deceased. Even the statements ofthe deceased’s cousins only mention instances which occurred a year prior to the death of the deceased.Further, selling of gold ornaments and the same was followed by discord and harassment upon their demand, even if true, do not reflect any intention to instigate, incite or provoke the deceased to commit suicide. Mere harassment and such issues between the wife and her husband along with the in-laws do not appear to create a scenario where she was left with no option other than to end her life. There is, therefore, absence of mens rea to instigate suicide of the deceased persons. Therefore, prima facie, it appears that the appellants did not have the requisite mens rea and neither did they commit any positive or direct act or omission to instigate or aid in the commission of suicide by the deceased. 27. One more argument was canvassed by learned APP that in the present case the presumption available under Section 113(a) of the EVIDENCE ACT , 1872 applies as the marriage span was less than 7 years. In the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pyarey Vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015 decided on 9.1.2025 explain the true purport of Section 113 A of the EVIDENCE ACT , more particularly in what manner it shall be applied. In the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pyarey Vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015 decided on 9.1.2025 explain the true purport of Section 113 A of the EVIDENCE ACT , more particularly in what manner it shall be applied. Relevant observation is quoted as under : "It is relevant to note that under Section 1138, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the EVIDENCE ACT , the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form or the court cannot instigating, like aiding straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide." 28. Therefore in absence of any cogent evidence of cruelty and harassment, merely on the basis of presumption, the Court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused committed offence under Section 498 A and 306 of the IPC. 29. In view of above, discussion of rival submissions it is difficult to hold the submission that the deceased has committed suicide because she was mentally and/or physically harassed or abused by the respondent her mother-in-law and she abated her to commit suicide. 30. As seen, prosecution has hopelessly failed to prove that accused were giving mental harassment to the deceased. There is no evidence on record which indicates that deceased was instigated by any proximity act or commission by accused to commit suicide. In absence of specific evidence of harassment and cruelty presumption under section 113(A) of the EVIDENCE ACT does not survive. 31. For the reasons stated herein above the Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 39 of 2010 acquitting the respondent Ushaben Visaji Natuji Bihola stand confirmed and approved. Bail and bond of the accused is hereby discharged. Accused is set at liberty if not required for any other purpose. 32. R & P to be sent to learned Trial Court forthwith.