ORDER : ANANDA SEN, J. The petitioner in this writ application has prayed to quash Resolution dated 04.03.2024 contained in Memo No. 1066(S) whereby proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules have been instituted. Further he prays for declaration that the departmental proceeding which was not concluded within the time frame as fixed by the Court vide order dated 03.11.2020 passed in WP(S) No. 1599 of 2014 be declared nonest in the eye of law and any proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules would be time barred and hit by law of limitation. He also prays for payment of arrears of salary. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Resolution dated 04.03.2024 is bad and the departmental proceeding could not have been converted to the proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules. It is his case once the Hon’ble High Court in WP(S) No. 1599 of 2014 vide order dated 03.11.2020 had fixed the time frame to conclude the department proceeding, no proceeding would have been continued beyond the said time frame nor the said could have been converted into that of one under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules. He relied upon the judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court in “ Yamuna Ram vs. State of Jharkhand and Others ” reported in 2002 (1) JLJR 407 . He further argues that on the facts, none of the conditions as laid down under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules is fulfilled. Thus no proceeding can be initiated. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that admittedly there was time framed by the High Court but the said could not be complied with but still then in a bonafide manner the proceeding proceeded and after superannuation of the petitioner the same is being converted and there is no illegality in the same. 4. From the arguments of the parties, I find that the petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer on 05.01.1988 and was promoted in January 1993 as Assistant Engineer. A departmental proceeding was instituted against the petitioner on the allegation of a road being defective designed. A criminal proceeding was also instituted. 4. From the arguments of the parties, I find that the petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer on 05.01.1988 and was promoted in January 1993 as Assistant Engineer. A departmental proceeding was instituted against the petitioner on the allegation of a road being defective designed. A criminal proceeding was also instituted. The departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner under Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 vide Memo No. 2516 dated 12.05.2010 and article of charge and imputation in Schedule-Ka was issued to the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner is as follows: “(a) The G.S.B. component work for the 6-Lane Approach Road has not been in consonance with the specification. (b) The W.B.M. Grade-II and Grade-III work and the B.M . Work had also not been done in accordance with the specification as there are deficiencies in the same. (c) The various components of the road beneath the bituminous layer had not been in accordance with the specification. (d) The bills for payment to the Contractor had been forwarded by the petitioner negligently. (e) The petitioner has been acting in violation to the Government Servants Conduct Rules 1976 and had been favouring the Contractor.” 5. The petitioner claimed that relevant documents were not supplied to him which caused prejudice to him and the entire process was in violation of principle of natural justice. On 20.04.2011 the petitioner was served with a copy of the inquiry report and the second show cause notice seeking reply as to why not punishment of dismissal be imposed upon him. The petitioner replied that he was not given proper opportunity to defend himself in absence of the papers and was not afforded sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witness. Ultimately on 14.12.2011 vide Memo No. 8328(s) the petitioner was imposed punishment. The petitioner was demoted to the basic pay-scale and it was held that he is entitled only to subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. Ultimately on 14.12.2011 vide Memo No. 8328(s) the petitioner was imposed punishment. The petitioner was demoted to the basic pay-scale and it was held that he is entitled only to subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. His departmental appeal was also rejected on 17.06.2013 the petitioner thereafter moved the Hon’ble High Court by filing a writ petition vide WP(S) No. 1599 of 2014 and ultimately vide order dated 03.11.2020 the punishment order was quashed and the departmental proceeding was revived and remanded to the Authorities with the direction to conclude the same within the period of four months from the date of the receipt of the production of the copy of the order. The petitioner on 30.08.2021 and 08.12.2021 made a representation along with the copy of the order. A Latters Patent Appeal being LPA No. 612 of 2022 was filed by the department which ultimately stood dismissed on 26.09.2023 though on the technical ground of non-compliance of peremptory order. In the meantime, since the petitioner superannuated from service w.e.f. 30.09.2022, the respondents converted the departmental proceeding which was remanded to that of proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules. By it mentioned that a criminal case which was filed against the petitioner ended in acquittal of the petitioner. 6. From the admitted facts which has been narrated above, it is clear that the petitioner was punished in the departmental proceeding and the Hon’ble High Court in writ jurisdiction has set-aside the same and remanded the matter to the departmental Authority. The said order dated 03.11.2020 has been brought on record by the petitioner as Annexure-18, while going through the said order of this Court, I find that while considering the several judgments the learned coordinate Bench of this Court had held that the orders are non-speaking and there is violation of the principle of natural justice while dealing with the petitioner departmentally. The learned Single Judge quashed the order by which penalty was imposed and also quashed the appellate order passed against the petitioner and remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority with a direction to start the proceeding from the stage of supply of the documents to the petitioner and proceeded in accordance with the law. The learned Single Judge quashed the order by which penalty was imposed and also quashed the appellate order passed against the petitioner and remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority with a direction to start the proceeding from the stage of supply of the documents to the petitioner and proceeded in accordance with the law. Further it was made clear that the remaining departmental proceeding must be concluded within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order with the direction to the petitioner to cooperate. It is necessary to quote paragraph nos. 8 and 9 : “8. Consequently, the impugned order as contained in Memo no.8328(s) dated 14.12.2011, whereby the petitioner has been imposed penalty of demotion on the basic pay scale and appellate order as contained in Memo no.5710(S) dated 17.06.2013, whereby the Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of penalty has been rejected, are hereby, quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to start the proceeding from the stage of supply the documents to the petitioner and proceed in accordance with law. 9. It is made clear that the remaining departmental proceeding must be concluded within a period of four months from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order. It goes without saying that the petitioner shall fully co-operate in the departmental proceeding.” 7. From the pleadings and the order which has been challenged in this writ petition it is clear that the departmental proceeding did not conclude but in the meantime the petitioner got superannuated so the proceeding got converted into that of one Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules which is also pending. 8. The admitted fact is that a time frame was given to the respondents to conclude the departmental proceeding. As per the said direction the respondents had to conclude the proceeding within four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order dated 03.11.2020 passed in WP(S) No. 1599 of 2014. The said order was communicated to the respondents on 30.08.2021 and thereafter a reminder was given on 08.12.2021. Thus the respondents should have concluded the proceeding at best by December 2021 but they failed to do so. The said order was communicated to the respondents on 30.08.2021 and thereafter a reminder was given on 08.12.2021. Thus the respondents should have concluded the proceeding at best by December 2021 but they failed to do so. There is nothing on record to suggest that the respondents have prayed to extend the time which was fixed by the Court to conclude the departmental proceeding. Further the Letters Patent Appeal of the respondents have also got dismissed. 9. What would be the fate of the departmental proceeding, if the said is not concluded within the time so framed by the Court has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the very recent judgment in the case of “State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v s. Ram Prakash Singh” reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 891 . In the aforesaid case the Hon’ble Supreme Court framed several issues and the issues in paragraph no. 7 are as follows: Issues “ 7. The present case tasks us to decide the following issues:— (i) Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there was none to present the case of the department, no witness was examined in support of the charges and no document was formally proved, any order of punishment could validly be made? (ii) Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in placing reliance on a report of enquiry prepared by the Enquiry Officer who had looked into documents which were not provided to the respondent and had arrived at findings of guilt only on the basis of the charge-sheet, the reply thereto of the respondent and such documents? (iii) Whether failure or omission or neglect of the disciplinary authority to furnish the enquiry report had the effect of vitiating the enquiry? (iv) Whether the enquiry not having been completed within the time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January, 2014, the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued beyond May, 2014? And (v) Whether, and if at all, the appellant should be granted one more opportunity to conclude the enquiry against the respondent within the time to be stipulated by us?” 10. The said issues have been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. And (v) Whether, and if at all, the appellant should be granted one more opportunity to conclude the enquiry against the respondent within the time to be stipulated by us?” 10. The said issues have been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that without an extension of time not order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondents could have been made. Further it has held that continuation of disciplinary proceeding beyond the time stipulated by the Tribunal/Court could invite interdiction if no bonafide attempt is shown to have been made to seek extension of time. It is necessary to quote paragraph nos. 63 and 64: "63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances. 64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further in the aforesaid case did not grant any relief to the department nor granted the time nor extended the time for concluding the departmental proceeding. In this case also there is no extension of time sought for by the department at any stage before the Court prior to period lapsed. 12. The judgment which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of “ Yamuna Ram ” (supra) has also held that if the departmental inquiry is not concluded within the time so framed by the Court punishment cannot be awarded. Thus, what has been held above, I find that this case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the coordinate Bench of this Court in “ Yamuna Ram ” (supra) and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “ Ram Prakash Singh ” (supra). Thus, what has been held above, I find that this case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the coordinate Bench of this Court in “ Yamuna Ram ” (supra) and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “ Ram Prakash Singh ” (supra). 13. Thus in view of what has been held above, I find that this case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Ram Prakash Singh ” (supra). 14. Since the departmental proceeding could not have been continued after four months, the conversion of the departmental proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules is also bad. Thus in view of the aforesaid judgment laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, interim order is set aside, the petitioner is entitle of all the consequential monetary benefit which should be paid to him within four months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 15. This writ petition stands allowed.