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2025 DIGILAW 119 (KER)

Baiju @ Porinchu Baiju Kunju v. State of Kerala

2025-01-28

P.V.BALAKRISHNAN, RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V.

body2025
JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.8.2008 in S.C.No.558 of 2010 passed by the Court of Sessions, Thrissur, finding the appellant guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 326 and 302 of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo - a) imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2 lakhs for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC; b) imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50000/- for the offence under Section 326 of the IPC; c) imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 324 of the IPC. 2. Before delving into the contentions raised in this appeal, it would be apposite to first set out the sequence of events, as established by the evidence presented through the prosecution witnesses. a. The accused (Baiju), the deceased (Vinu), and PW2 (Rajan) were friends and associates. Divya (PW4) is the wife of the deceased. On 14.04.2008, ‘Vishu’ festival was celebrated across Kerala. In the morning, while Divya, along with the deceased and their son, was on their way to the house of Bindu, her sister, they encountered the accused. Vinu stopped the bike and informed the accused that they could meet later. The accused, the deceased, and PW2 (Rajan) went to the market at Varapuzha, where they consumed liquor before eventually parting ways for the time being. b. PW2 was then asked by the deceased to buy alcohol and he bought the same and went to the house of the deceased. He sat there and drank alcohol alone for a couple of hours. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Vinu and his wife returned home. Thereafter, the accused, the deceased, and PW2 proceeded to the house of PW1 (Thankamani), the mother-in-law of the accused, in an auto rickshaw driven by PW3 (Manoj). PW5 (Bindu), along with her brother (Biju) and PW1, were present in the house. c. The accused, the deceased and PW2 consumed alcohol. Under the apparent influence of alcohol, the deceased began making inappropriate advances towards the wife of the accused. PW1 and her son strongly disapproved of Vinu’s behaviour and PW1 questioned the accused for inviting him in. The accused, in response, asked Vinu to leave the house, pushed him outside, and closed the door. Under the apparent influence of alcohol, the deceased began making inappropriate advances towards the wife of the accused. PW1 and her son strongly disapproved of Vinu’s behaviour and PW1 questioned the accused for inviting him in. The accused, in response, asked Vinu to leave the house, pushed him outside, and closed the door. Meantime, PW2 had stepped out of the house to smoke a cigarette and he overheard the hue and cry. When he got back, he found that Vinu and the accused were engaged in a physical altercation. Vinu, who was shut out of the door, insisted on re-entering. The accused, in a fit of anger, pushed him down. As Vinu attempted to get up, the accused picked up a piece of firewood lying outside the house and struck him on the head multiple times. Vinu collapsed to the ground, bleeding profusely from the head. d. PW2 Rajan, aghast at the happenings, did not go to the rescue of his friend or take him to the hospital. Instead, he fled from the scene in the auto rickshaw driven by PW3 leaving Vinu in the hands of the accused and PW1. e. PW1 promptly dialed for an ambulance, to which PW6 responded. The injured was immediately shifted to St. James Hospital, Chalakkudy. He was examined by PW10, the Chief Medical Officer of the hospital, at 7:55 p.m. on 14.04.2008. The examination revealed a lacerated wound over the right supraorbital region, a fracture of the supraorbital bone, and a lacerated wound extending from the occipital area to the left parietal region. The doctor also noted bleeding from the mouth, nose, and ears. 3. On 15.04.2008, at 1.45 a.m., while Vinu was undergoing treatment, the statement of PW1, the mother-in-law of the accused, was recorded and Ext.P9 crime was registered as Crime No. 189 of 2008 of the Mala Police Station for the offences under Sections 324, 326 and 307 of the IPC. 4. On the same day at 4.20 p.m., the injured succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. 5. On 16.04.2008, Ext.P5 inquest over the dead body was prepared by the Circle Inspector of Police, Mala Police Station who had taken over the investigation. He prepared Ext.P6 scene mahazar and seized the firewood which was allegedly used to inflict the injuries. 4. On the same day at 4.20 p.m., the injured succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. 5. On 16.04.2008, Ext.P5 inquest over the dead body was prepared by the Circle Inspector of Police, Mala Police Station who had taken over the investigation. He prepared Ext.P6 scene mahazar and seized the firewood which was allegedly used to inflict the injuries. The body of the deceased was handed over for autopsy and Ext.P8 report was prepared by PW11, the Professor and Head of Forensic Medicine, Medical College Hospital, Thrissur. He opined that the injuries noted as 3, 4, 14, and 15 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the course of the investigation, 164 statement of PWs 1 and 5 were recorded by PW14, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kodungalloor. On 17.04.2008, the accused was arrested as per Ext.P15 arrest memo. Ext.P20 report was submitted adding Section 302 of the IPC. After completing the investigation, the final report was laid before the Court. 6. The prosecution allegation as per the court charge is that the accused with an intention to cause the death of Vinu, on 14.04.2008 at about 5.30 p.m., attacked him with firewood on his head knowing fully well that his act would cause the death of Vinu and thereby committed the offences. 7. In order to prove its case, 16 witnesses were examined by the prosecution as PWs 1 to 16 and through them, Exts.P1 to P24 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 7 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising from the evidence were put to the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He emphatically denied the circumstances. Exts.D1 to D5 case diary contradictions were marked by the defence while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the defence. 8. The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully established that the appellant had committed the offences under Sections 324, 326, and 302 of the IPC and was convicted accordingly. 9. Smt. Sajitha, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge arrived at the finding of guilt without properly appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective. 9. Smt. Sajitha, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge arrived at the finding of guilt without properly appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective. She pointed out that a thorough evaluation of the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 5 would reveal that the deceased, under the influence of alcohol, had made advances towards the wife of the appellant. She contended that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment due to the grave and sudden provocation by the deceased, which led to the infliction of injuries by the accused on the deceased using a stick that was lying in the courtyard. According to the learned counsel, the case does not amount to premeditated murder. It was further urged that, even if the prosecution case is accepted as such, the offence under Section 302 of the IPC is not made out. The learned counsel submitted that the case would only fall within the ambit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC, and as the facts made out do not reveal that the accused had no intention to kill, the offence made out can only be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling under Part II of Section 304 of the IPC. To bolster her submissions, reliance is placed on State of A.P v. Rayavarapu Punnayya , (1976) 4 SCC 382 , Mangesh v. State Of Maharashtra , (2011) 2 SCC 123 , Devku Bhikha v. State Of Gujarat, (1996) 11 SCC 641 , Bonda Devesu v. State Of A.P., (1996) 7 SCC 115 , and Budhi Singh V. State of Himachal Pradesh, [(2012) 13 SCC 663]. 10. While refuting the contentions of the appellant, Smt. T.V. Neema, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that there was a clear intention on the part of the accused to kill the deceased. She pointed out that the Doctor who conducted the autopsy had clearly opined that injuries Nos. 3, 4, 14, and 15 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that the said injuries could have been caused by MO1 firewood stick. She pointed out that the Doctor who conducted the autopsy had clearly opined that injuries Nos. 3, 4, 14, and 15 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that the said injuries could have been caused by MO1 firewood stick. It is urged that the accused had inflicted injuries on the vital part of the body of the deceased with a heavy weapon and he has to be attributed with the intention to cause bodily injury to the deceased and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. She submitted that the appellant could not be absolved of the liabilities and consequences of committing the offence of murder. 11. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have gone through the prosecution records. We have also perused the judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge. 12. We shall now evaluate the evidence let in by the prosecution. 13. PW1 (Thankamani) is the mother-in-law of the accused. She along with her daughter, her son, and the appellant have been residing in the house at Annamanada. She stated that about 10 years back, on a ‘Vishu’ day, at about 5.30 p.m., Vinu and his friends had come to her house. She, however, pleaded ignorance as to the manner in which Vinu had sustained injuries. She was confronted with her previous statement to the police as well as to the learned Magistrate. She denied that she had seen her son-in-law attacking the deceased with the firewood. 14. PW2 (Rajan), a friend of both the deceased and the accused, stated that on 14.05.2008, as suggested by the accused, he went to the house of PW1 in an auto rickshaw driven by PW3 (Manoj). PWs 1 and 5, along with the accused’s brother-in-law, were present in the house. All of them had consumed alcohol before reaching the house. After some time, PW2 stepped out to smoke a cigarette, and then he heard a hue and cry. He found the accused and the deceased engaged in a scuffle and he intervened and separated them by pushing them outside the home. However, while standing in the courtyard, the deceased and the accused engaged in another physical altercation. After some time, PW2 stepped out to smoke a cigarette, and then he heard a hue and cry. He found the accused and the deceased engaged in a scuffle and he intervened and separated them by pushing them outside the home. However, while standing in the courtyard, the deceased and the accused engaged in another physical altercation. The accused pushed Vinu to the ground, and when he attempted to get up, the accused picked up a piece of firewood lying in the courtyard and struck him two to three times. Upon seeing Vinu bleeding, PW2 left the scene in the autorickshaw. During cross-examination, PW2 stated that he had seen the deceased at 8:00 a.m. and later met him at the Varapuzha market and they consumed alcohol. After lunch, they proceeded to the house of the accused. He admitted that he had consumed alcohol at Vinu’s house earlier in the day and that it was as suggested by Vinu that he had brought alcohol. He further stated that they consumed alcohol again on the way to the accused’s house. When confronted with his earlier statements to the police, PW2 denied having stated to the police that Vinu misbehaved with PW5, the wife of the accused, and attempted to stand close to her and that Biju, the brother of PW5, intervened and when Vinu went at him, Biju blocked him. This portion of the statement was marked as Ext.D2. Similarly, when questioned about whether he had informed the police that PW1 confronted the accused about his friends’ inappropriate behaviour, and that the accused asked Vinu to leave the house, he denied having made such a statement, and that portion was marked as Ext.D3. 15. PW3 stated that PW2 (Rajan) had travelled in his auto rickshaw and they had gone to a place called Annamanada. He stated that the persons who had travelled with him in the auto-rickshaw were not there in the Court. When asked whether he knows the accused, he answered in the negative. 16. PW4 is Divya C.S., the wife of Vinu. She stated that on 14.04.2008, while she and the deceased were on the way to her sister’s house, they had seen the accused. Vinu stopped the bike and told the accused that he would come back immediately. Later, she came to know that her husband was no more. 16. PW4 is Divya C.S., the wife of Vinu. She stated that on 14.04.2008, while she and the deceased were on the way to her sister’s house, they had seen the accused. Vinu stopped the bike and told the accused that he would come back immediately. Later, she came to know that her husband was no more. She identified MO2 mundu, and MO3 shirt worn by the deceased on that day. 17. PW5 is Bindu, the wife of the accused. She stated that on 14.04.2008, at about 5:30 p.m., an incident had occurred in her house. She stated that one Vinu suffered certain injuries on that day and was shifted to the hospital. She stated that Vinu had come to her house in the evening, and three persons were with him. She also mentioned that Vinu had behaved inappropriately towards her. It was after this, that the incident leading to Vinu’s injuries occurred. She did not state anything about the involvement of the accused. 18. The above is in short the evidence let in by the prosecution. 19. The defence is not disputing that the death of Vinu was not homicidal. A reading of the evidence of PW11 would reveal that the Doctor had noted about 15 injuries which include abrasions and contusions. He stated that the injuries Nos. 3, 4, 14, and 15 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The prosecution has thus established that the death of Vinu was a case of homicide. 20. The next question is whether the prosecution has established the fact that the injuries were inflicted by the accused as alleged in the charge. 21. A reading of the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 5 would leave no manner of doubt that the incident had occurred in the courtyard of the house of PW1. The only question that needs to be examined is whether there was such a grave and sudden provocation that would bring the case of the appellant within the ambit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC. As stated above, the deceased and the accused are close friends. The accused had in fact invited the deceased and PW2 to his house on ‘Vishu’ day to celebrate. Even the wife of the deceased has no case that there was any prior animosity between the parties. As stated above, the deceased and the accused are close friends. The accused had in fact invited the deceased and PW2 to his house on ‘Vishu’ day to celebrate. Even the wife of the deceased has no case that there was any prior animosity between the parties. The deceased and PW2 had been drinking since the morning. From the sequence of events established in the case, it appears that the chosen mode of celebration for ‘Vishu’ by the parties involved—including the accused, the deceased, and the prime witness, Rajan (PW2)—was binge drinking alcohol. It has also come out in evidence that the deceased behaved inappropriately towards the wife of the accused, under the influence of alcohol, and this irked the in-laws of the accused. The deceased was initially pushed outside and this fact is spoken to by PW2. The confronted portion of the evidence of PW2 gives a clear picture of what had transpired in the house. It was when Vinu insisted on getting back in the house to taunt the wife of the accused that the accused, in a fit of anger, took a firewood lying in the courtyard and hit the deceased with the same. From the entire prosecution evidence, it is difficult to gather that the accused had the intention to murder his close friend and that the act was premeditated. The injuries noted by the Doctor were a result of the impact of the heavy firewood log rather than the force applied. 22. Now the question is whether offence attracted is murder as defined under Section 300 of the IPC. Section 299 of the IPC defines culpable homicide. Section 299 covers classes of cases where an act is done with the intention of causing death and/or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause the death of the other person. In all these situations, it will amount to a culpable homicide. A culpable homicide would be murder unless it falls in any of the general Exceptions (1) to (5) to Section 300 of the IPC which would bring the offence outside the purview of Section 300 and make it culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In all these situations, it will amount to a culpable homicide. A culpable homicide would be murder unless it falls in any of the general Exceptions (1) to (5) to Section 300 of the IPC which would bring the offence outside the purview of Section 300 and make it culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Once it falls in that class of cases, then it is permissible for the court to impose milder punishment in terms of Section 304 Part I or Part II, as the case may be. The punishment under Section 302 of the IPC on the one hand, and Section 304 of the IPC on the other is divided by a fine line of distinction as to when a culpable homicide would or would not be murder. The provisions of Section 304 itself form a kind of exception to the applicability of Section 302 of the IPC, in other words, provisions of Section 304 Part II of the IPC would apply only if it is not a murder. 23. At this stage itself, it would be relevant to notice Section 300 IPC and Exception (1) to the said provision: “300. Murder.— Except in the cases hereinafter excepted culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— 3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— 4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.” Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos— First.— That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.” (emphasis supplied) 24. The aforesaid Section provides five exceptions wherein culpable homicide does not amount to murder. In this case, we are concerned only with Exception (1). Under Exception (1), an injury resulting in the death of a person would not be considered murder when the offender has lost self-control due to grave and sudden provocation. It is crucial to note that the provision itself clarifies through the Explanation that determining what constitutes a grave and sudden provocation, sufficient to take out the offence from the ambit of murder, is inherently a question of fact. Provocation, in this context, is understood as an external stimulus that can result in a loss of self-control. Such provocation, and the reaction it triggers, must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances. The provocation must be such that it would unsettle not merely a hasty, hot-tempered, or hypersensitive person but also a person of calm temperament and ordinary sensibilities. By crafting this Exception, the law aims to consider situations in which a person of normal behaviour reacts to a given incident of provocation. Thus, the protection extended by Exception (1) applies to a normal person acting reasonably and naturally under the circumstances of the given provocation. The law ensures that such situations are evaluated with due consideration for the natural human reaction to grave and sudden provocation, thereby distinguishing culpable homicide from murder. (See: Arun Raj v Union of India and Others, 2010 6 SCC 457 ). 25. In Budhi Singh (supra), the Apex Court, while explaining the doctrine of sudden provocation coming under Exception (1) of Section 300 of the IPC observed as under: “18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal application. 25. In Budhi Singh (supra), the Apex Court, while explaining the doctrine of sudden provocation coming under Exception (1) of Section 300 of the IPC observed as under: “18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal application. This will always have to depend on the facts of a given case. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of the court is to examine from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence if there was such grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably conclude that it was possible to commit the offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a person placed in such circumstances could lose self-control but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury. 19. Another test that is applied more often than not is that the behaviour of the assailant was that of a reasonable person. A fine distinction has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss of self-control and the one which inspires an actual intention to kill. Such act should have been done during the continuation of the state of mind and the time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the dominion over the mind. Once there is premeditated act with the intention to kill, it will obviously fall beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.…….” 26. As held by the Apex Court, the doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction or the formulation of a principle of universal application. Its applicability must always depend on the specific facts and circumstances of a given case. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of the Court is to examine, from the perspective of a person of reasonable prudence, whether the provocation was so grave and sudden that it could reasonably lead to the commission of the offence of culpable homicide, and whether, based on the facts, it does not amount to murder. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of the Court is to examine, from the perspective of a person of reasonable prudence, whether the provocation was so grave and sudden that it could reasonably lead to the commission of the offence of culpable homicide, and whether, based on the facts, it does not amount to murder. Another commonly applied test is whether the behaviour of the assailant is what would have been expected from a reasonable person placed in an identical situation. A clear distinction must be drawn between a sudden and grave provocation leading to a temporary loss of self-control and an act inspired by an actual intention to kill. The act in question must have been committed during the continuation of the provoked state of mind, without sufficient time for the accused to regain control over his mind and actions. Once it is established that the act was premeditated with the intent to kill, it would clearly fall beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. An offence resulting from the grave and sudden provocation would typically imply that a person placed in such circumstances could temporarily lose self-control and that such loss of control must have occurred in close proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation may consist of a single act or a series of acts committed by the deceased against the accused, ultimately leading to the infliction of injury. 27. K. M. Nanavati v. State Of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1962 SC 605 ) is a much-cited judgment of the Apex Court, which dealt with and explained the concept and doctrine of grave and sudden provocation within its legal dimensions. 85. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. 28. In the case on hand, the facts establish that the accused and the deceased were close friends. They had met in the morning and had consumed alcohol at Varapuzha. The accused had invited the deceased to his house to celebrate Vishu with the family of the accused. Even on the way to the house of the accused, the deceased and PW2 had consumed alcohol. The deceased was so tipsy that he started misbehaving with PW5, in the presence of her family members. This irked Biju, the brother of PW5, and PW1. Both of them questioned the accused and reprimanded him for bringing the drunk deceased to their house. The accused pushed the deceased out of the house and this resulted in a physical altercation. It was when the deceased tried to re-enter the house, that the accused took a log of firewood lying in the courtyard and hit him 2-3 times. The infliction of the injury with the firewood, which was lying in the courtyard, was not premeditated and was a direct result of grave and sudden provocation when the accused saw the deceased, under the influence of alcohol, continuing to misbehave with his wife, despite having been pushed out of the house. It has to be said that a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would certainly be provoked to lose his self-control and if that be the case it would bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the IPC. It has to be said that a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would certainly be provoked to lose his self-control and if that be the case it would bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the IPC. As held by the Apex Court, the mental background created by the previous act of the victim also has to be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for attacking the deceased. The fatal blow can easily be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and there is no material to suggest that there was any time for premeditation and calculation. It needs to be borne in mind at this juncture that premeditation and intention to kill are two vital factors among others that the Court must consider before holding the accused guilty of an offence under Section 302 or Section 304 of the IPC. 29. As stated above, Section 300 of the IPC provides for Exceptions that will constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304 of the IPC. When and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. It is trite law that Section 304 Part II of the IPC comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (See: Jagriti Devi v. State of H.P , (2009) 14 SCC 771 ). 30. In Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1 , the Apex Court after analyzing Section 299 of the IPC which deals with punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder observed as under: 14. This section is in two parts. 30. In Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1 , the Apex Court after analyzing Section 299 of the IPC which deals with punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder observed as under: 14. This section is in two parts. If analysed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused. In that situation the case will fall in Part II of Section 304 IPC as in the present case. 31. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, [ (1983) 2 SCC 342 ] , the accused on the spur of the moment inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The Doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court held as under in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment: “8. ……..The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.” The Apex Court altered the appellant's conviction from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced the accused to five years of rigorous imprisonment. 32. In Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Admn.), [1990 SCC (Cri) 713] , the accused inflicted a single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. 32. In Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Admn.), [1990 SCC (Cri) 713] , the accused inflicted a single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had taken place on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the Doctor, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Apex Court observed as under: 14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.” The Apex Court while setting aside the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC, convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. 33. In light of the above, we are of the view that the appellant cannot be attributed with the intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, but only be attributed with the knowledge that his actions were likely to cause an injury that could result in death. We are of the view that the act was committed without premeditation, at the spur of the moment, due to sudden provocation, and without any undue cruelty. Under such circumstances, we are inclined to hold that the case at hand does not fall within Clause third of Section 300 of the IPC and that the accused could only be found guilty under Part II of Section 304 of the IPC. 34. Under such circumstances, we are inclined to hold that the case at hand does not fall within Clause third of Section 300 of the IPC and that the accused could only be found guilty under Part II of Section 304 of the IPC. 34. In the result, we allow this appeal but only to the extent that instead of Section 302 of the IPC, the appellant shall stand convicted for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of seven (7) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only) and in default of payment of fine, to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for six months. The conviction and sentence passed for the offences under Sections 326 and 324 of the IPC are upheld. The sentences shall run concurrently. The fine imposed upon the appellant and the default sentence awarded to him for the offence under Section 326 of the IPC shall remain unaltered. If the fine is realized, Rs.1,50,000/- shall be given to PW4. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms in modification of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge.