ORDER : 1. This Criminal Petition has been filed seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.648 of 2020 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate at Jangaon, Warangal District (presently Jangaon District), wherein the petitioner was arrayed as accused No.2, for the offences punishable under Sections 324 , 290 and 506 r/w 34 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 01.03.2019, the complainant lodged a complaint stating that he owns a printing press under the name and style of Madhavi Printing Press, located on Nehru Road at Gandhi Chowk, Jangaon. As part of road widening activity, the complainant was dismantled a portion of the press building up to 3.6 feet. Around 12:00 PM on the same day, while discussing site boundary issues with his neighbour, Koyyada Srinivas, an unrelated person named Thati Kumar and his daughter, i.e., the petitioner herein unnecessarily interfered, picked a quarrel, and abused the complainant and his family in filthy language. During the quarrel, the petitioner physically assaulted the complainant, his daughter-in-law Madhavi, and his younger son Karthik by beating them with footwear. It is alleged that Thati Kumar, who belongs to the Harijan community, threatened to falsely implicate them in SC/ST atrocity case, if they responded. The complainant further stated that Thati Kumar had been roaming around the premises for the past three days, creating a sense of fear. It is also alleged that Koyyada Srinivas provoked Thati Kumar by offering false promises of financial gain, thereby instigating the quarrel. By misusing the protection granted under caste law, the accused persons allegedly intimidated, abused, and assaulted the complainant and his family members. Basing on the same, present crime was registered. 3. Heard Mr.Karam Chendu Komireddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Mr.V.Uma Kanth Reddy, learned counsel representing Mr.C.Ruthwik Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has not committed the alleged offences and has been falsely implicated in the present case. He further submitted that the only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she beat respondent No.2 and his family members with footwear. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner has not voluntarily caused hurt using a dangerous weapon. He further submitted that the only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she beat respondent No.2 and his family members with footwear. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner has not voluntarily caused hurt using a dangerous weapon. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 324 of the IPC are not attracted against the petitioner. He further submitted that the other offences levelled against the petitioner, namely, Sections 290 and 506 of the IPC, are non-cognizable offences. The Investigating Officer, without obtaining prior permission from the competent Magistrate as required under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) conducted investigation and filed a final report and the same is gross violation of provisions of Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. Hence, the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.2 is clear abuse of the process of law and is liable to be quashed. 5. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the order passed by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.P.No.2894 of 2015. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that accused No.1, who is the father of the petitioner/accused No.2, had lodged a complaint against respondent No.2 on 01.03.2019, based on which, Crime No.96 of 2019 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 323 r/w 34 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (for short ‘SC/ST (POA) Act, 2015’). He further submitted that even according to the allegations made in both complaints, there is no dispute regarding the occurrence of the alleged incident on 01.03.2019. Even according to the allegations made in the present complaint, the offence under Section 323 of the IPC is attracted, and not the offence under Section 324 of the IPC. Mere mentioning of an offence under Section 324 of the IPC does not entitle the petitioner to seek quashing of the proceedings. Whether the petitioner has committed the offences or not has to be revealed after full fledged trial. Basing on the grounds which are pleaded in the present criminal petition, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor also reiterated very same submissions made by the learned counsel for respondent No.2. 8. Basing on the grounds which are pleaded in the present criminal petition, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor also reiterated very same submissions made by the learned counsel for respondent No.2. 8. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that based on the complaint lodged by respondent No.2, Crime No.95 of 2019 was registered against the petitioner and others. Upon perusal of the allegations made in the complaint and the charge sheet, it reveals that the only allegation levelled against the petitioner is that she beat respondent No.2/de-facto complainant, with footwear. The Investigating Officer filed the final report for offences punishable under Sections 324 , 290 and 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. 9. It is very much relevant to extract Section 324 of the IPC, which reads as follows: “ Section 324 - Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means: Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 10. The above provision clearly reveals that an offence under Section 324 of the IPC is attracted only if the accused voluntarily causes hurt by using a dangerous weapon. In the case on hand, the petitioner/accused No.2 has not used any dangerous weapon. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet, the petitioner caused hurt to respondent No.2 by using footwear. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the ingredients of Section 324 of the IPC do not attract against the petitioner. 11. In the case on hand, the petitioner/accused No.2 has not used any dangerous weapon. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet, the petitioner caused hurt to respondent No.2 by using footwear. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the ingredients of Section 324 of the IPC do not attract against the petitioner. 11. Even according to the learned counsel for respondent No.2, based on the allegations made in the complaint, the offence under Section 323 of the IPC is applicable. However, the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet for the offence under Section 324 of the IPC and in respect of the very same incident, based on the complaint filed by the petitioner's father, Crime No.96 of 2019 was registered against respondent No.2 for the offences punishable under Section 323 of the IPC and other offences and the very same offence under Section 323 of the IPC is applicable against the petitioner/accused No.2 in the present case and the said offence is a non-cognizable offence. In the case of non-cognizable offences, the Investigating Officer is required to obtain prior permission from the competent Magistrate before conducting an investigation, as required under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. The offences alleged against the petitioner, namely under Sections 290 and 560 of the IPC are also non-cognizable offences. Therefore, under the provisions of Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer ought to have obtained prior permission from the competent Magistrate to conduct the investigation. However, in the present case, the Investigating Officer conducted the investigation and filed the final report without obtaining such prior permission as required under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. 12. In Crl.P.No.2894 of 2015 the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad relied upon the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Keshav Lal Takur v. State of Bihar , (1996) 11 SCC 557 , wherein it is specifically held that when the alleged offence is non-cognizable in nature, the police cannot register an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. or proceed with investigation on its own. Investigation into a non-cognizable offence can be undertaken only pursuant to an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. In the absence of such permission, the entire investigation and the report submitted by the police are without jurisdiction. Investigation into a non-cognizable offence can be undertaken only pursuant to an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. In the absence of such permission, the entire investigation and the report submitted by the police are without jurisdiction. Consequently, any cognizance taken by the Magistrate on such a report is invalid in law, and the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 13. In Nanda Gopalan v. State of Kerala , (2015) 11 SCC 137 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the applicability of Section 324 IPC depends upon the nature of the weapon used and that an act constitutes an offence under Section 324 only when hurt is caused by a dangerous weapon or means likely to cause death or grievous hurt. Objects not inherently dangerous, such as sticks, stones, or other blunt household articles, would ordinarily not fall within the ambit of “dangerous weapons.” Applying the said principle, a slipper cannot by any stretch of interpretation be treated as a dangerous weapon, and the essential ingredients of Section 324 IPC are not satisfied. The act, at best, constitutes simple hurt under Section 323 IPC; and given the trivial nature of the incident, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, the FIR was rightly quashed. 14. For the foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Keshav Lal Takur’s case (supra) Nanda Gopalan’s case (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.2 in C.C.No.648 of 2020 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate at Jangaon, Warangal District (presently Jangaon District), is clearly an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the said proceedings are liable to be quashed, and accordingly quashed. 15. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.