Y. P. Reddy S/o Late Shri Y. Ramana Reddy v. Central Industrial Security Force, Rep. by its Director General
2025-11-20
A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA, BATTU DEVANAND
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J. Introductory :- 1. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of Writ Petition in W.P.No.28673 of 2013 under orders dated 19.09.2024 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the writ petitioner filed the present appeal. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties will be hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and the respondents as and how they are referred in the writ petition. 3. The Writ Petition was filed seeking the relief of any writ, order or direction, particularly one in the nature of Mandamus, against the proceedings of Respondent No.4 in imposing compulsory retirement on the petitioner as a measure of punishment, which was confirmed in appeal proceedings by Respondent No.3 and also the proceedings of Respondent No.2, declaring them as illegal, arbitrary, bad in law, disproportionate and violative of principles of natural justice under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and to set aside the same, directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. Case of the Writ Petitioner: 4........ [i] The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the respondent force on 15.07.1986. A charge sheet was issued against him dated 26.09.2011 with the allegations that he was found sleeping while on duty at23:59 hours on 02.09.2011. [ii] Further, he was charged that earlier there was thirteen punishments and two severe warnings against him. He was found sleeping while on duty on six occasions. The explanation of the petitioner that he was sick and had submitted medical certificates in that regard but the same was not considered. The petitioner was supplied with a copy of the enquiry report dated 08.02.2013, seeking his explanation and he submitted his explanation on 27.02.2013. Whereas, the orders are passed on the same day imposing compulsory retirement. When the appeal was pending, proceedings dated 09.04.2013, directing petitioner to vacate the quarters etc. were issued. [iii] The appeal before the appellant authority and the review before the revisional authority were in vain. [iv] The punishment of compulsory retirement is a major punishment and the same is disproportionate for the charge of sleeping. Hence the same deserves to be set aside. Case of the respondents: 5. The petitioner was discharging his duties as a sentry in a very hyper-sensitive unit like SDSC SHAR.
[iv] The punishment of compulsory retirement is a major punishment and the same is disproportionate for the charge of sleeping. Hence the same deserves to be set aside. Case of the respondents: 5. The petitioner was discharging his duties as a sentry in a very hyper-sensitive unit like SDSC SHAR. The establishment is having national importance under the continuous radar of the armed forces and the Ministry of Space Centre. The dereliction of duties by a sentry in such a sensitive posting is not a routine matter. The misconduct is grave. Hence, appropriate orders are passed. Ample opportunity was given to the petitioner, principles of natural justice were followed and a detailed enquiry was conducted. His previous misconduct was also considered as the same is permissible in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Bishamber Das Dogra , (2009) 13 SCC 102 . 6. The learned Single Judge, after considering the contentions of both sides and also the previous misconduct of the writ petitioner / appellant, sensitive nature of the duties in which the appellant is placed and after satisfied with the fairness in the procedure adopted in the enquiry, dismissed the Writ Petition observing that there are no grounds to interfere with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority / respondents. 7. The present appeal is filed questioning the orders of the learned Single Judge. 8. Heard both sides extensively. Perused the material available on record. Arguments in the appeal: 8. (A) For the appellant/writ petitioner: [i] The learned Single Judge erred in taking note of the previous punishment which cannot be the basis. [ii] The learned Single Judge failed to note that the petitioner suffered ill health and undergone treatment due to health issues. The constant medication and drowsiness put him to suffer punishment and the same cannot be basis for imposing major punishment of compulsory retirement. [iii] The punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the charge even if the same is true. 8. (B) For the respondents: [i] The appellant is endowed with sensitive duties and the misconduct is grave when seen in the light of the duties he has to perform. The appellant failed to mend his conduct and attitude.
[iii] The punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the charge even if the same is true. 8. (B) For the respondents: [i] The appellant is endowed with sensitive duties and the misconduct is grave when seen in the light of the duties he has to perform. The appellant failed to mend his conduct and attitude. [ii] The orders passed by the disciplinary authority are in accordance with the procedure and law and the appreciation of the same by the learned Single Judge, particularly with regard to the absence of any grounds for interference, is well-reasoned and does not warrant any interference. 9. Now the points that arise for determination in this appeal are: 1) Whether the orders of the learned Single Judge dated 19.09.2024 in W.P.No.28673 of 2013 declining to interfere with the orders of disciplinary authority in respect of the charge of misconduct of the appellant that he was sleeping while on duty and the imposition of punishment of compulsory retirement for the same are proper or require any interference, if so, on what grounds? 2) What is the result of this appeal? Point No.1: Precedential Guidance as to the scope of judicial review against the findings of the disciplinary authority: 10........ [i] In a case between B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others , (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the scope of judicial review against the findings of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority. Relevant observations are made at paras 12 and 13, which read as follows:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” [ii] Further, in the said judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court observed the scope and powers of the Court as to interference with punishment vide para 18, which are as follows:- “18.
A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact- finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” [iii] Further, in a case between Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 677 at page 381 the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment that can be imposed, vide paras 15 and 19, which read as follows: “ 15. As is clear from the above that the judicial review of the quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a decision afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. ……. 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” [iv] In a case between Union of India and Others vs. Bishamber Das Dogra (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that 22. This Court in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612 considered the issue as to whether while imposing the punishment it is permissible to take into consideration the past conduct of an employee if it is not so mentioned in the second show-cause notice. 31. It is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline [vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 529 (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar, (2008) 1 SCC 224 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 164 (SCC p.226, para 6) 33. Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the LINE and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the show-cause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the LINE for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned. [v] Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Government of A.P. and Others vs. Mohd. Taher Ali , (2007) 8 SCC 656 , where the Police Constable was appointed on election duty but absented from the same found that it is in fact an important business for the whole nation and the lapse on the part of the employee was found to be serious. [a] It is also observed that Police force is a disciplinary force and when the employee was deputed for such important duty of election, absenting from duty is a serious lapse and the same cannot be treated lightly. Compulsory retirement imposed in that connection was confirmed. [b] Further, the orders of the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration were found not proper by the Hon’ble Apex Court. [c] Further, with regard to taking note of similar misconduct on previous occasions, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that there can be no hard and fast rule that it cannot be taken into consideration. [d] The observations in para Nos.4 and 5 of the said judgment (4 supra) are found relevant for appreciating the context in the present case. They are as follows: 4. It is an admitted position that the respondent was appointed on election duty but he absented himself from election duty. It seems that the respondent did not consider the election duty to be an important business which is very important for the whole nation.
They are as follows: 4. It is an admitted position that the respondent was appointed on election duty but he absented himself from election duty. It seems that the respondent did not consider the election duty to be an important business which is very important for the whole nation. The respondent was appointed on election duty and was deputed to take security arrangement but absented himself from duty. This is a very serious lapse on the part of the respondent. The police force is a disciplined force and the respondent was detailed for such an important duty of election. He absented himself from election duty. Such kind of serious lapse cannot be treated lightly. It is a very important function and if the incumbent avoided the duty of election, he cannot escape from the liability of the penalty of compulsory retirement. We fail to understand the reason for the Administrative Tribunal or for the High Court to have remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the respondent. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that in fact, the disciplinary authority while passing the order has taken into consideration the earlier absence of the respondent from the duty. He submitted that this could not have been taken into consideration as the respondent was not aware about these incidents and those were not the part of the charges levelled against him. In support of his submission learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the judgment of this Court titled State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506 : (1964) 4 SCR 540 but in the present case we are satisfied that in fact the respondent deliberately absented himself from duty and did not offer any explanation for his absence from election duty. It is not the respondent's first absence. He also absented himself from duty on earlier occasions also. In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority.
He also absented himself from duty on earlier occasions also. In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority. The police force is a disciplined force and if the respondent is a habitual absentee then there is no reason to ignore this fact at the time of imposing penalty. Moreover, even ignoring the earlier absence, in our opinion, the absence of 21 days by a member of a disciplined force is sufficient to justify his compulsory retirement. Analysis, reasoning and decision: 11. There is no dispute about the procedure followed, particularly service of articles of charge, method of conducting departmental enquiry and examining the witnesses. The charges are as follows: ARTICLE - I No. 864502579 Constable Y.P. Reddy of "D" COY, CISF Unit SDSC SHAR was detailed for "C" shift duty from 2100 hrs on 02-09- 2011 to 0500 hrs on 03-09-2011 at Building No.145 of D Coy Area. During the course of his duty, at about 2359 hrs on 02-09-2011, he was found sleeping by sitting on a chair inside the sentry post having removed his cap when checked by Insp/Exe Md. Iqbal A.A., Bn. Duty Officer. This act of No.864502579 Constable Y.P. Reddy amounts to gross indiscipline, negligence and dereliction of duty on his part. Hence, the charge. ARTICLE - II That the said No.864502579 Constable Y.P. Reddy has a history of bad records of service. He has earned 13 punishments and two severe warnings during his past service in the CISF. Despite having proceeded against and penalized on different occasions, six of which had been on grounds of sleeping, No.864502579 Constable Y.P. Reddy has not mended his ways and continues to be indiscipline and displays dereliction of duty. Hence the charge. 12. With regard to the mental condition of the writ petitioner at the relevant time, the proceedings of disciplinary authority would show that the writ petitioner claimed that he come to duty daily from his residence which is at a distance of 20 K.M., which proves that the mental condition is not so serious and when he was asked to produce a medical unfit certificate, no such certificate was produced. 13.
13. As per the evidence of P.W.4, the writ petitioner has earned thirteen punishments and two severe warnings during his past service. It cannot be the case of the writ petitioner that previous punishments are not covered by the charge, for the reason that charge No.2 is clear as to previous misconduct. The misconduct of the writ petitioner that he was sleeping when posted on sensitive duty and that there was similar conduct on previous occasions is fortified with the evidence. 14. P.W.2, examined to show that the writ petitioner / charged officer was found sleeping, he was not even cross-examined by the writ petitioner. The same is the situation with regard to the other witnesses P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.4. 15. The reasons assigned for not cross-examining is that he was not in mentally good condition. It was not the case that any medical certificates were produced or adjournment sought on the ground of sickness. The observations are very clear that there were no abnormalities informed by the controlling officer as to the health / medical condition of the charged officer. 16. Upon incidental observations of the factual scenario and upon considering the orders passed by the learned Single Judge, this Court finds that the conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge and the reasons assigned thereof are proper and that there are no grounds to interfere. Point No.1 is accordingly answered against the appellant / writ petitioner. Point No.2: 17. For the reasons and conclusions drawn under Point No.1, the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed. 18. In the result, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. The orders of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.28673 of 2013 shall stand confirmed. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.