JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J. 1. RULE. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Siddarth Rami, learned AGP waives service of rule for the respondents. 2. The present Special Civil Application is filed praying for the following reliefs:- “9(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit this Special Civil Application ; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may further be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari and be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 09.09.2016 passed by the respondent no.1 in Revision Application No.MVV/BAKHAP/SUOMOTU/SURAT/2/2012; (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay the further execution, operation and implementation of the order dated 09.09.2016 passed by the respondent no.1 in Revision Application No. MVV/BAKHAP/SUOMOTU/SURAT/2/2012; 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the names of the petitioners’ ancestor Shri Ramanlal Motiram came to be entered as Tenant in the second right of the land bearing Survey Nos.66/1, 67 and 68/A-1 admeasuring Hectors 2-88-34 at Nana Varachha, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. The ancestor of the petitioners thereafter purchased the subject land from the original owner Shri Bhagabhai Nathabhai in the year 1949. Accordingly, mutation entry No.415 dated 01.12.1959 came to be effected in the revenue records in favour of Shri Ramanlal Motiram. That the subject land was shown as “Restricted Tenure” in the revenue records. Accordingly, an application was made to the Mamlatdar, Choryasi to correct such a mistake and that by mutation entry No.1014 dated 16.06.1988, the Mamlatdar, Choryasi removed the words “Restricted Tenure”. The said mutation entry No.1014 came to be set aside by the Dy. Collector and the same came to be confirmed by the Collector, Surat. Thereafter, Shri Ramanlal Motiram preferred revision application before the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. By order dated 18.05.1995, the said revision application came to be partly allowed and the orders passed by the Dy. Collector as well as Collector, Surat came to be quashed and set aside and the case was remanded back for fresh consideration. Pursuant to such remand, the Dy. Collector vide order dated 25.02.1996 rejected the entry No.1014. By order dated 18.05.1995, the said revision application came to be partly allowed and the orders passed by the Dy. Collector as well as Collector, Surat came to be quashed and set aside and the case was remanded back for fresh consideration. Pursuant to such remand, the Dy. Collector vide order dated 25.02.1996 rejected the entry No.1014. That thereafter the petitioners’ ancestor Shri Ramanlal Motiram made an application under Section 84 (C) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 [“Act” for short] before the Mamlatdar & ALT (Tenancy), Choryasi for regularizing the sale in his favour and to remove the restrictions under Section 43 of the Act. By detailed order dated 30.09.1996, the Mamlatdar & ALT (Tenancy), Choryasi passed an order directing that if the applicant Shri Ramanlal Motiram pays a penalty of Re.1/- within 3 months, then the transaction would be regularized and the restrictions under Section 43 of the Act will be removed. Pursuant to the said order dated 30.09.1996, the petitioners’ ancestor Shri Ramanlal Motiram paid penalty of Re.1/- on 22.10.1996. The said order came to be implemented and the words “Restricted Tenure” came to be deleted. The said order dated 30.09.1996 was taken in review by the Dy. Collector which came to be upheld by the order dated 21.12.1996 passed by the Dy. Collector. Since the said orders dated 30.09.1996 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT (Tenancy), Choryasi and confirmed and upheld by the Dy. Collector vide order dated 21.12.1996 were not challenged further, the same attained finality. 4. Mr. Bhaumik Dholariya, learned advocate for the petitioners submits that the petitioners’ ancestor Shri Ramanlal Motiram Patel passed away on 07.08.1999 and by way of mutation entry No.1083 dated 11.08.1995, the names of the petitioners came to be entered in the revenue records in respect of the subject land. Thereafter, by mutation entry No.1180 dated 05.08.1999 names of the petitioner Nos.5 and 6 also came to be entered in the revenue records in respect of the subject land. That thereafter, the petitioners applied for conversion of the subject land into Non-Agricultural use purpose. Accordingly, an application under Section 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 [“Code” for short] came to be made for educational and residential purposes. By orders dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009, the petitioners were granted permission for Non-Agricultural use in respect of the subject land. Accordingly, an application under Section 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 [“Code” for short] came to be made for educational and residential purposes. By orders dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009, the petitioners were granted permission for Non-Agricultural use in respect of the subject land. That thereafter, the petitioners have obtained various development permissions and about 400 housing units and apartments have been constructed. A school has also been constructed. He submits that the third party rights have also been created in the residential units by executing registered sale deeds to various persons who are residing there since long and the school is also operating since the year 2009 with around 3,000 students studying therein. That by communication dated 21.07.2012, the respondent No.2 Collector, Surat requested the respondent No.1 Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department to initiate suo motu proceedings against the orders dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009 granting permission for Non-Agricultural use. That accordingly, show cause notices came to be issued to the petitioners. The said show cause notices were served upon the petitioners in July, 2016. That thereafter, by impugned order dated 09.09.2016, the respondent No.1 Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department has allowed the suo motu proceedings and quashed and set aside the orders dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009 granting Non-Agricultural use permission to the petitioners in respect of the subject land. Aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the present writ petition. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been granted Non-Agricultural use permission of the subject land after following due procedure and upon payment of necessary premium. He submits that the restricted tenure of the subject land also came to be removed by order dated 30.09.1996 by the Mamlatdar and came to be confirmed by the Dy. Collector in review proceedings on 21.12.1996. He further submits that more than 9 years after obtaining of the first permission for Non-Agricultural use in the year 2003 and thereafter subsequent Non-Agricultural use permissions obtained in the year 2005 and 2009, the respondent No.2 Collector by communication dated 21.07.2012 requested the respondent No.1 Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department to initiate suo motu proceedings against the said orders granting Non-Agricultural use permission. He submits that such proceedings are barred by limitation in view of various judgments passed by this Court as well as Hon’ble Apex Court whereby it has been held that the revenue authorities have to initiate proceedings within a reasonable time. He submits that in the present case, pursuant to the Non-Agricultural use permission received by the petitioners, the development permissions have been obtained and around 400 residential units have been constructed, sold and transferred to the third parties by various registered sale deeds also. He further submits that a school is also constructed and about 3,000 students are studying in the said school since the year 2009 and all the constructions are authorized constructions after seeking valid permissions from various competent authorities, including the Surat Municipal Corporation. He submits that since the impugned order dated 09.09.2016 is passed beyond the reasonable period of time, the same is in teeth of the law as laid down by this Court as well as Hon’ble Apex Court and therefore, ought to be quashed and set aside. 6. Per contra, Mr. Siddarth Rami, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent authorities submits that the order dated 30.09.1996 passed by the Mamlatdar removing the restricted tenure of the subject land in question was itself bad in law and was granted without having any authority. He submits that the said illegality came to the knowledge of the revenue authorities only in the year 2012. He submits that thereafter, the respondent No.2 Collector has recommended initiation of appropriate proceedings by the respondent No.1 Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. He submits that since the order dated 30.09.1996 changing the tenure of the subject land, was itself bad in law, the subsequent permissions under Section 65 of the Code and the development permissions for developing the lands in question would be illegal. He submits that because of the order dated 30.09.1996, the State Government has lost valuable revenue. He submits that the restrictions under Section 43 of the Act came to be removed by the Mamlatdar without due procedure of law. The restricted tenure of the land could not be altered without prior permission of the Collector. In the present case, no prior permission of the Collector was obtained. Further, only penalty of Re.1/- was imposed for removal of the restrictions from the subject land in question and thereby causing financial loss to the State Government. The restricted tenure of the land could not be altered without prior permission of the Collector. In the present case, no prior permission of the Collector was obtained. Further, only penalty of Re.1/- was imposed for removal of the restrictions from the subject land in question and thereby causing financial loss to the State Government. He submits that the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department by the impugned order has taken all these aspects into consideration and has rightly set aside the Non-Agricultural use permissions dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009 granted by the Collector in favour of the petitioners. He, therefore, submits that no interference is called for in the impugned order. 7. Heard learned advocates for the parties, perused the documents on record and considered the submissions. 8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the order dated 30.09.1996 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT (Tenancy), Choryasi and confirmed and upheld by the Dy. Collector vide order dated 21.12.1996 has not been carried in appeal or revision before the higher forum and the same have attained finality. Further, in respect of initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the respondent No.2 Collector, upon a specific query from this Court, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that no appropriate proceedings for setting aside the order dated 30.09.1996 passed by the Mamlatdar and the order dated 21.12.1996 passed by Dy. Collector have been initiated by the revenue authorities till date. 9. It is the case of the respondents that the said order dated 30.09.1996 is without jurisdiction and is bad in law as it was the sole jurisdiction of the Collector to pass such an order for converting the restricted tenure of the land. However, in the present case, the revenue authorities though have termed the said order dated 30.09.1996 as illegal and without jurisdiction, surprisingly, have not initiated any proceedings for setting aside the said order dated 30.09.1996 on the basis of which further orders granting permissions for Non-Agricultural use under Section 65 of the Code have been passed on 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009 which have now been set aside by the impugned order by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. 10. 10. By catena of decisions of this Court as well as Hon’ble Apex Court, it is now well settled that any suo motu proceedings initiated at the behest of higher authorities have to be initiated within a reasonable period of time. Exercising such powers beyond reasonable time will not justify the delay and render the exercise arbitrary. 11. In support of his contention, learned advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya v. State of Gujarat , 2012 (0) AIJEL-HC 228585 and in case of State of Gujarat v. Jitendrasinh Jagmalsinh Sodha , 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC 245041. 11.1 In case of Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya v. State of Gujarat , 2012 (0) AIJEL-HC 228585, this Court has held thus:- “13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed for a considerable period and by a passage creating valuable rights in favour of a considerable section of people, like the appellants in the present case, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the competent authority under the Act would be entitled to exercise powers under Sec. 84C of the Act at any point of time. 14. xxx xxx 15. xxx xxx 16. In the case of E.S.I.C. Vs. C.C. Santhakumar, , the Supreme Court has elaborately explained this principle of action to be taken within a reasonable period of time. It would be appropriate for us to quote Paragraph Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. 35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The Court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 36. In The State of Gujarat Vs. 35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The Court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 36. In The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, , it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word ""reasonable"". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child''s toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what is reasonable"" in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness ""belongs to the knowledge of the law, and therefore, to be decided by the Courts"". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Another, and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. and Another. As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson, (41 LJ.Ch. 472), it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Another, and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. and Another. As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson, (41 LJ.Ch. 472), it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others Vs. P. Mangamma and Others. 38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal, it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case; a "reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ''directly''; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea". 39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows: “That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer. Reasonable time" is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. If it is proper to attempt any definition of the words "reasonable time" as applied to completion of a contract, the distinction given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested, namely, that a "reasonable time" means as soon as circumstances will permit. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case. The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in question. A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea. Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the case. (Kinney) It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments for use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has been completed and the owner has demanded their return. The expression "reasonable time" means so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. 40. In all these cases, at hand the factual aspects have not been examined, because the grievance appears to have been focused on the applicability of Sec. 77(1A)(b). 17. While dealing with suo motu revisional power under Sec. 84C of the Act, 1976 the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, , held that generally where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of powers under statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is what the Supreme Court said: “Section 84C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is what the Supreme Court said: “Section 84C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September, 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah, Sp. W.A. No. 2770 of 1979 disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Sec. 84C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid Sec. should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, and in the case of Ram Chand and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Sec. 84C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. 18. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk P. Union Ltd., while dealing with the power of revision under Sec. 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held: “17. A bare reading of Sec. 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. A bare reading of Sec. 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 11 of the Act is five years.” 19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not prescribe time- limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time even if there is a breach of Sec. 43 of the Act, which is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction. 20. Thus, so far as the first aspect of the matter is concerned, we hold that the learned Single Judge was not justified in taking the view that as the breach complained of is as regards Sec. 43 of the Act and as the land is a new tenure land, the powers to initiate action could be exercised at any point of time. 21. 21. Having taken the view that in the present case, the authorities could not have initiated proceedings under Sec. 84C of the Act, after a period of almost 28 years, the only benefit that could accrue in favour of the appellants is that the land in question would not vest with the Government. However, the nature and character of the land being a new tenure land will remain as it is, and therefore, the appellants will not be in a position to make use of the land for any other purpose.” 11.2 In case of State of Gujarat v. Jitendrasinh Jagmalsinh Sodha , 2023 (0) AIJEL-HC 245041, while considering the similar issue, this Court has held thus:- “13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187 has held that Commissioner exercising the power under Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, had not exercised the revisional powers within few months from the date of the order of the Collector and as such it was bad in law. It has been further held : “11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order and it seems to us that this order was passed too late.” 14. The statutory authorities exercising suo motu powers would be required to exercise the same within a reasonable time and exercise of such powers beyond reasonable time would not justify their act and render the exercise arbitrary. Where a statutory provision for exercise of suo motu power of revision does not prescribe any limitation, it is trite law that such power should be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in case of transaction which can be termed as void transaction. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another vs. D. Narsing Rao and others (supra) had held that exercise of the revisional powers after delay would tantamount to fraud upon statute. It has been further held : “31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. 32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant- State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed.” 16. Keeping these authoritative principles in mind when the facts on hand are looked into at the cost of repetition it is to be held that the suo motu power is sought to be exercised by the Collector for setting aside the mutation entries made in the year 1990 by issuing the show cause notice in the year 2012 i.e. on 14.08.2012 i.e. after a period of 22 years. The reason for exercising such suo motu power is on the ground of revenue entries having been made by overwriting. The reason for exercising such suo motu power is on the ground of revenue entries having been made by overwriting. As to when said overwriting was detected or how the subsequent entries were allowed to be made and certified and yet no action was taken is not forthcoming from the said show cause notice. Though it has been stated in the show cause notice that entries were illegally made, as to what is the illegality that had taken place while carrying out such entries is not forthcoming from the show cause notice as well as from the order passed by the Collector on 20.02.2013. On the other hand, disputed entries would reflect that land came to be allotted at an undisputed point of time by recognizing the allottee as a tenant. If the records are not forthcoming to prove the grant of tenancy, that by itself would not be a ground on which the entries made in the revenue record would lose its presumptive value nor any inference can be drawn doubting the tenancy. The person who alleges the entries to be bad on account of any illegality having been committed has to necessarily prove the same and in the absence of any proof being led in this regard, the order of the Collector as confirmed by the Special Secretary, Revenue Department, could not have been sustained. Hence, learned Single Judge was correct and justified in setting aside the impugned orders and allowing the Special Civil Applications which cannot be found fault with. We do not find any infirmity either on facts or in law to interfere with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge.” 12. In the present case, the suo motu proceedings have been initiated after a period of more than 9 years which cannot be said to be within a reasonable period of time in respect of the orders dated 12.03.2003, 12.08.2005 and 05.05.2009. Further, the subject lands in question have been developed after obtaining necessary permissions. 400 residential units have been constructed and transferred to third parties purchasers by way of registered sale deeds. A school is also constructed with about 3,000 students studying therein. Further, the subject lands in question have been developed after obtaining necessary permissions. 400 residential units have been constructed and transferred to third parties purchasers by way of registered sale deeds. A school is also constructed with about 3,000 students studying therein. Further, no appropriate proceedings have been initiated by the revenue authorities till date for setting aside the order dated 30.09.1996 which is termed by the Collector as being illegal order and without jurisdiction and the said order is still in force as on date. The suo motu proceedings thus, initiated by the revenue authorities are bad in law and contrary to the settled legal position that such suo motu revisionary powers have to be exercised within a reasonable period of time. The impugned order is accordingly quashed and set aside. 13. In view of the aforesaid reasons and observations, the present Special Civil Application is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute to aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.