JUDGMENT : MARLI VANKUNG, J. 1. Heard Mr. Lalremtluanga, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Mary. L. Khiangte, learned Govt. Advocate for the State respondent Nos. 5, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 23. 2. None appeared for the other private respondents. Though, notice was deemed to be served upon the private respondents through the newspaper publication vide this Court’s Order dated 05.02.2018. 3. The instant appeal is filed u/s 17 (2) (b) of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act , r/w Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC for setting aside the impugned Order dated 25.10.2016 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl District, Aizawl in connection with Civil Suit No. 81/2011. 4. Brief facts of the case is that the appellant had filed Civil Suit No. 81/2011 on 19.08.2011 against the present private respondents and for cancellation of the order dated 15.11.1999, passed by respondent No.3, for the re-issue of (i) LSC No 2343/1985 in favour of respondent No-4,(ii) LSC No 709/1991 in favour of respondent No-6, (iii) LSC No 710/1991 in favour of respondent No-7, (iv) LSC No 712/1991 in favour of respondent No-8, (v) LSC No 713/1991 in favour of respondent No-9, (vi) LSC No 714/1991 in favour of respondent No-10, (vii) LSC No 715/1991 in favour of respondent No-4, (viii) LSC No 708/1991 in favour of respondent No-11 (ix) LSC No 718/1991 in favour of respondent No- 12, (x) LSC No 720/1991 in favour of respondent No-13 without the knowledge and consent of the appellant/plaintiff as some of the areas under the said house sites were covered by PP No 758/1976 issued in favour of the appellant/plaintiff .The suit was also filed against issuance of (i) LSC No 2581/1987 in favour of respondent No-19, (ii) LSC No 2582/1987 in favour of respondent No-20, (iii) LSC No 2583 in favour of respondent No- 21, (iv) LSC No 2584/1991 in favour of respondent No-22, (v) LSC No 2577/1987 in favour of respondent No-15, (vi) LSC No 2576/1987 in favour of respondent No-14, (vii) LSC No 2578/1987 in favour of respondent No 16, (viii) LSC No 2579/1987 in favour of respondent No-24 and (ix) LSC No 2580/1987 in favour of respondent No-18 by the respondent No-3 within the land covered by PP No 758/1976 belonging to the appellant/plaintiff. 5. 5. The suit was contested by respondents raising their objections on the grounds amongst others like the suit being barred by res judicata and being barred by law of limitation. Accordingly on 05.07.2013, the following issues were framed: i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style. ii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation, resjudicata/estoppel and acquiescence. iii) Whether the plaintiff has cause of action against the defendants. iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claim. If so to what extend? 6. The learned Senior Civil Judge after hearing both the parties passed the impugned Order dated 25.10.2016, and dismissed the Civil Suit No. 81/2011, by observing that the plaintiff had previously filed another suit i.e Eviction Suit No.6/2010 before the Court of the Senior Civil Judge- II, Aizawl District on the same cause on action but the parties are different to some extent. The said Eviction Suit was rejected on 04.05.2011, at the initial stage, by finding that the suit is barred by limitation. Accordingly the learned Senior Civil Judge also dismissed the instant Civil Suit 81/2011, on the grounds of the suit being barred by limitation by finding that the civil suit was filed against the defendants who hold LSC’s issued in the year 1987 and 1985. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had filed the instant appeal. 7. Mr. Lalremtluanga, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the fresh suit filed as a Civil Suit, cannot be barred by limitation unless the parties were given a chance to adduce evidence and that Civil Suit No. 81 of 2011 was dismissed without the evidence of the parties. He submitted that limitation is a mixed question of law and rejecting the suit without taking evidence is barred in law and dismissing the same on the ground of limitation frustrated the very purpose of the suit. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned Trial Court had erred in dismissing the suit on the grounds of res judicata, since the relief claimed in the eviction suit and the subsequent suit are different, and that the defendants are different in the instant civil suit except for respondent Nos. 4 & 5. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned Trial Court had erred in dismissing the suit on the grounds of res judicata, since the relief claimed in the eviction suit and the subsequent suit are different, and that the defendants are different in the instant civil suit except for respondent Nos. 4 & 5. He submitted that the other 9 (nine) defendants in the eviction suit are: (i) Shri. Rosiama, Bawngkawn Brigade, (ii) Shri. Lalnunnema, Bawngkawn Brigade, (iii) Shri. Vanlalsanga, Bawngkawn Brigade, (iv) Shri. Lalrinchhana, Bawngkawn Brigade, (v) Shri. Biakmawia, Bawngkawn Brigade, (vi) Shri. Thanseia, Chaltlang Lily Veng, (vii) Shri. Hualkunga, Chaltlang Lily Veng, (viii) Shri. Biakliana, Chaltlang Lily Veng, (ix) Shri. Mangkunga, Chaltlang Lily Veng, (x) Shri. Chaldailova, Ramhlun Veng, who are not parties in the subsequent civil suit. He further submitted that the mentioned civil suit was also not disposed of on merit but dismissed on the ground of limitation and therefore, it is not barred against the subsequent suit. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Civil Suit No. 81 of 2011 was to be considered under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, where the appellant was required to prove for title of immoveable property wherein she was not given the opportunity to prove that she was in possession of her land and that the Civil Suit was filed within 12 years which is the limitation period under section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act . The learned counsel also submitted that some of the LSC issued within the periodic patta of the appellant were issued in 1991 and the appellant is also challenging the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 15.11.1999 which are all within 12 years since the Civil Suit was filed in 2011 however the trial court had add in dismissing the civil suit without affording the appellant the opportunity to prove her case. The learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex court in (i) Balasaria Construction (P) Vs. Hanuman Seva Trust & Ors . 2006 (5) SCC 658 (Para 8), (ii) P. Kumarakurubaran Vs. P. Narayanan (Para 13 and 14) and the judgment of a coordinate bench in (iii) Nandita Acharjee Vs. State of Assam & Ors. 2016 (3) GLT 176 (Para 13 and 15) 10. Mrs. Mary. L. Khiangte, learned Govt. Hanuman Seva Trust & Ors . 2006 (5) SCC 658 (Para 8), (ii) P. Kumarakurubaran Vs. P. Narayanan (Para 13 and 14) and the judgment of a coordinate bench in (iii) Nandita Acharjee Vs. State of Assam & Ors. 2016 (3) GLT 176 (Para 13 and 15) 10. Mrs. Mary. L. Khiangte, learned Govt. Advocate for the State respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the appellant has no locus standi to file the instant appeal. The learned Government Advocate submitted that the place of dispute is at Brigade road, Bawngkawn and the present appellant is a resident of Chaltlang which is close to Brigade road, Bawngkawn and therefore, the appellant should have been aware of the encroachment of her landed property as claimed by her, at an earlier date. The LSCs which are challenged by the appellant on being issued to the private respondents are during the years 1985 to 1987, whereas the appellant is coming to the court with the knowledge that her periodic patta was encroached upon at a later date in the year 2011 which is barred by Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act , 1963, wherein the period of limitation is 12 years. The learned Government Advocate thus submits that the learned Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 81/2011 vide its order dated 25.10.2016 had rightly dismissed the civil suit on the ground of limitation, since the records clearly showed that the suit was barred by Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act . 11. The learned Government Advocate relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers & Ors. (2004) 11 SCC 1 . “21. In the instant case, the appellant contends that during the pendency of the first suit, certain subsequent events have taken place which has made the first suit infructuous and in law the said suit cannot be kept pending and continued solely for the purpose of continuing an interim order made in the said suit. 24. “21. In the instant case, the appellant contends that during the pendency of the first suit, certain subsequent events have taken place which has made the first suit infructuous and in law the said suit cannot be kept pending and continued solely for the purpose of continuing an interim order made in the said suit. 24. Almost similar is the view taken by this Court in the case of J.M. Biswas v. N.K. Bhattacharjee, (2002) 4 SCC 68 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 475 wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 71, para 10) “The dispute raised in the case has lost its relevance due to passage of time and subsequent events which have taken place during the pendency of the litigation. … In the circumstances, continuing this litigation will be like flogging a dead horse. Such litigation, irrespective of the result, will neither benefit the parties in the litigation nor will serve the interest of the Union.” 12. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for both the parties and I have also perused the documents on record. 13. From the submissions made by the learned counsels, the main point for consideration in the present appeal is, whether the learned Trial Court had erred in dismissing the Civil Suit by finding that the suit was barred by the law of limitation against some of the defendants, without affording the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence. 14. On a quick recap of the facts of the case, it is seen that the appellant had claimed that she was initially having the landed property at Bawngkawn Brigade road measuring 8 bighas/1.07 hectares under Periodic Patta No. 758/1976. Thereafter, she learnt that her landed property was encroached upon by the issuance of various LSCs and accordingly, she had submitted a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner on 29.05.1997. The ASO-II had then passed an order on 29.05.1998, wherein it was found that her landed property was encroached upon by respondent No. 4. However, without setting aside the said finding of the ASO-II, the Deputy Commissioner again passed an order dated 15.11.1999 for the re-issuance of LSCs to the private respondents who are 19 in nos. The ASO-II had then passed an order on 29.05.1998, wherein it was found that her landed property was encroached upon by respondent No. 4. However, without setting aside the said finding of the ASO-II, the Deputy Commissioner again passed an order dated 15.11.1999 for the re-issuance of LSCs to the private respondents who are 19 in nos. It is seen that the appellant had first file an Eviction Suit No. 06/2010 against some of the respondents which was dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act . Thereafter, the appellant had filed the Civil Suit No. 81/2011 against 19 nos. of the private respondents which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 25.10.2016 for being barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act ,1963. 15. On a perusal of the documents on record, it is seen that the civil suit was filed on 29.05.2011 and the case of the appellant is that in the instant case, the period of limitation has to be considered under Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act , wherein the period of limitation is 12 years. On a perusal of the documents on record, it is seen that the LSCs issued to the respondents varied from the years 1985, 1987 & 1991. It is also seen that the order of the Deputy Commissioner for the re-issuance of the LSCs to the private respondents was issued on 15.11.1999. Thus, this court finds that whether the civil suit is barred by limitation in respect of all the LSCs of all the respondents, is a question of fact which needs to be looked into by giving the opportunity to the parties to adduce their evidence, since it appears that some of the LSCs appear to be issued within the period of 12 years from the date of filing the Civil Suit. 16. This court finds it appropriate to refer to the case in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Seva Trust & Ors. (Supra) is applicable in the instant case, wherein the Apex Court had observed that the question of limitation is a mix question of law and fact and that the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of issue of limitation and taking of evidence. It is seen that the Apex Court in P. Kumarakurubaran Vs. (Supra) is applicable in the instant case, wherein the Apex Court had observed that the question of limitation is a mix question of law and fact and that the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of issue of limitation and taking of evidence. It is seen that the Apex Court in P. Kumarakurubaran Vs. P. Narayanan & Ors. (Supra) had observed that rejecting a plaint where substantial factual dispute exists concerning limitation is illegally unsustainable. 17. In view of the above as discussed and the decision of the Apex Court, this court finds it fit to remand the matter back to the Trial Court by affording the parties to adduce evidence to decide the issue raised on whether or not the Civil Suit is barred by limitation under the Indian Limitation Act , 1963. 18. Accordingly, RFA No. 14/2017 stands allowed and disposed of.