Arunkumar P. S/o Parameswaran Nair v. Cochin Devaswom Board
2025-05-19
ANIL K.NARENDRAN, MURALEE KRISHNA S.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. 1. This writ appeal is filed under section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 27677 of 2024, challenging the judgment dated 03.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. 2. The appellant is presently working as “Sambandhy” at Chittoor Sree Krishnaswamy Temple under the management of the 1 st respondent Cochin Devaswom Board. By Ext.P1 order dated 29.07.2024, issued by the 2 nd respondent Devaswom Commissioner, the appellant was transferred to Arikanniyoor Temple, which according to the appellant is more than 85 kms away from his present working place. According to the appellant, he filed Ext.P2 complaint against the Secretary of the Temple Advisory Committee of Chittoor Sree Krishnaswamy Temple, alleging an offence under Section 84 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The accused in that complaint is an influential person and he caused the issuance of Ext.P1 transfer order. The appellant claims that he is a native of Alappuzha and has been suffering from perforation of the left ear and allergic rhinitis. He underwent surgery in the month of August 2022. He submitted Ext.P3 request dated 26.07.2023, seeking transfer to some other temples having less blowing of Conch, considering his illness. The transfer of the appellant is against Ext.P4 Government Order dated 25.02.2017 bearing G.O.(P)No.3/2017/P&ARD. The appellant is getting a salary of Rs.22,000/- only and he has to look after his aged parents. If the transfer is effected, it will adversely affect the appellant. Raising these contentions, the appellant filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 transfer order dated 29.07.2024 issued by the 2 nd respondent. 3. By the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2025, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, noting that the appellant was transferred at his request. However, the learned Single Judge permitted the appellant to again approach the competent authority to transfer him to a nearby place, if he is so advised. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the Cochin Devaswom Board. 5. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different division, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the Cochin Devaswom Board. 5. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different division, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. The power to transfer an employee in a transferable service is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his or her duties for the establishment. The inconveniences caused to the employee and his family consequent to the transfer are not sufficient to interfere with the orders of transfer. Generally, the Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere in the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer, for administrative reasons, as it will adversely affect the smooth functioning of that institution. The circumstance under which the Court can interfere with the orders of transfer is laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments. 6. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas , (1993) 4 SCC 357 the Apex Court held thus: “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly, if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied) 7. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan , (2001) 8 SCC 574 the Apex Court held thus: “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration.
Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 279 the Apex Court held thus: “15. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied) 9. This Court in Mayadevi M.P and another v. Canara Bank and others, 2015 (4) KHC 874 held that an order of transfer cannot be interfered with in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order of transfer. It is far too late in the day to assert that, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with an order of transfer of an employee as if it is sitting in appeal over such an order issued by the employer. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, this Court cannot interfere with an order of transfer of an employee. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are ’vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides’, cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives.
Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are ’vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides’, cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, this Court cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer issued by the employer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives, unless it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer. 10. Again, in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 2023 (3) KLT 893 , this Court held that law is too well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and the employee has no legal right in this behalf. Unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loathed to interfere with the same. 11. During the course of argument, the learned Standing Counsel for Cochin Devaswom Board invited our attention to Ext.P4 Government Order dated 25.02.2017 and submitted that the said order pertains to Government employees and the same is not applicable to the temple employees under the Cochin Devaswom Board. 12. The appellant made Ext.P3 request dated 26.07.2023 for transfer from his present place of employment, highlighting health issues. In pursuance to the said request, he was transferred by Ext.P1 transfer order issued by the 2 nd respondent. The grievance of the appellant at present is that the transfer was not granted to the place where he was requested. 13. It is well settled that as far as transfer of an employee is concerned the Court, exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would interfere only if there is statutory violation or the order of transfer is vitiated by malafides. No such vitiating circumstance or violation of statute could be seen in the instant case. In such circumstances, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. 14. In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.