JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna, J. 1. This writ appeal is filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, by the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 24532 of 2024. The writ petition was filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 transfer order dated 01.02.2024 issued by the 3 rd respondent transferring the appellant from Thiruvananthapuram to Ramakkalmedu in Idukki district and Ext.P9 order dated 02.07.2024 by which the 1 st respondent rejected Ext.P7 representation dated 15.05.2024 submitted by the appellant against Ext.P1. The appellant also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to permit him to continue as Senior Technical Assistant in the office of the 2 nd respondent at Thiruvananthapuram. As per the impugned judgment dated 04.04.2025, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.Being aggrieved, the appellant filed this writ appeal. 2. The case of the appellant, in brief, is that he joined service as a Technician under the 2 nd respondent on 12.07.1995. In the year 2021, he was promoted as Sub-Engineer (now redesignated as Senior Technical Assistant). As per Ext.P1 transfer order dated 01.02.2024, he was transferred from Thiruvananthapuram to Ramakkalmedu in Idukki district. According to the appellant, the 3 rd respondent has no authority or power to shift a post from the Headquarters to another district. The post of Senior Technical Assistant was created based on Ext.P2 order dated 25.02.2021 issued by the 1 st respondent on the basis of Ext.P3 report related to restructuring of the 2 nd respondent issued in the year 2019. It is further contended by the appellant that he cannot be transferred out of Thiruvananthapuram without shifting the post of Senior Technical Assistant. He submitted Ext.P7 representation dated 15.05.2024 before respondents 1 and 3 and then approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No.19544 of 2024 challenging Ext.P1. By Ext.P8 judgment dated 06.06.2024, this Court disposed of the writ petition directing the 1 st respondent to consider and pass orders in Ext.P7 within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and till such time the appellant was permitted to continue at Thiruvananthapuram. But by Ext.P9 order dated 02.07.2024, the 1 st respondent rejected Ext.P7 representation. But by Ext.P9 order dated 02.07.2024, the 1 st respondent rejected Ext.P7 representation. Ext.P9 order was issued relying on Ext.P10 letter dated 31.05.2024 issued by the 3 rd respondent to the 1 st respondent, and according to the appellant, in Ext.P10, the 3 rd respondent requested the Government to shift the post occupied by the appellant to Idukki. Without passing an order to shift the post, it is not possible to transfer the appellant from Thiruvananthapuram to Idukki. Moreover, the appellant had undergone an open-heart surgery in March 2024, and this fact was also overlooked by the 3 rd respondent while transferring him. 3. Respondents 2 and 3 filed a counter affidavit dated 18.07.2024 in the writ petition opposing the reliefs and producing Ext.R3(a) document. 4. The 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit dated 30.09.2024 opposing the reliefs sought in the writ petition and producing Ext.R1(a) document. 5. After considering the rival contentions raised by the parties, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition as said above and also directed the 2 nd respondent to take an appropriate decision, if the appellant does not join his transferred place of posting within one week from the date of that judgment. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, the learned Senior Government Pleader, and the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3. 7. It is trite that whether an employee is to be transferred to a different division, etc, are matter for the employer to consider, depending upon the administrative necessities. The power to transfer an employee in a transferable service is within the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his or her duties for the establishment. The inconveniences caused to the employee and his family, consequent to the transfer are not sufficient to interfere with the orders of transfer. Generally, the Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere in the orders of transfer of an employee issued by the employer, for administrative reasons, as it will adversely affect the smooth functioning of that institution. The circumstance under which the Court can interfere with the orders of transfer is laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments. 8. The circumstance under which the Court can interfere with the orders of transfer is laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in several judgments. 8. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 the Apex Court held thus: “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, (2001) 8 SCC 574 the Apex Court held thus: “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 279 the Apex Court held thus: “15. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. This Court in Mayadevi M.P. and another v. Canara Bank and others, 2015 (4) KHC 874 held that an order of transfer cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order of transfer. It is far too late in the day to assert that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with an order of transfer of an employee as if it is sitting in appeal over such an order issued by the employer. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, this Court cannot interfere with an order of transfer of an employee. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, this Court cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer issued by the employer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives, unless it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer. 12. Again, in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 2023 (3) KLT 893 , this Court held that law is too well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and the employee has no legal right in this behalf. It is also well settled that, unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loathed in interfering with the same. 13. Admittedly, the appellant joined service as a Technician under the 2 nd respondent on 12.07.1995. In the year 2021, he was promoted as Sub-Engineer and the post is redesignated as Senior Technical Assistant. 13. Admittedly, the appellant joined service as a Technician under the 2 nd respondent on 12.07.1995. In the year 2021, he was promoted as Sub-Engineer and the post is redesignated as Senior Technical Assistant. According to the 1 st respondent, the 2 nd respondent is the special purpose agency of the Government to implement non-conventional energy projects in the State. It has several projects completed and ongoing, all over Kerala. At Ramakkalmedu in Idukki district, it holds 200 Acres of land suitable for non-conventional energy production. The 2 nd respondent was able to utilise only a small portion of this land, and a large portion of it remains idle. Though the appellant contends that in order to transfer him to Idukki, shifting of the post from Thiruvananthapuram to Idukki is necessary, he has no case that the duties that will be assigned to him at Idukki will be different from those assigned to him at Thiruvananthapuram. Moreover, in the counter affidavit, the 1 st respondent says that when Government passed Ext.P9 order on Ext.P7 representation submitted by the appellant, the original transfer order issued by the 3 rd respondent is merged with Ext.P9 order and all presumed defects in Ext.P1 transfer order were removed with its ratification by the Government. We find force in the said contention of the 1 st respondent when considering the fact that the appellant submitted Ext.P7 representation to the 1 st respondent, conceding the authority of the Government to take a decision in the transfer order issued by the 3 rd respondent. Therefore, by Ext.P9 order, in effect, the post presently held by the appellant itself is shifted to the transferred station of the appellant. 14. While going through the entire facts and circumstances, we find no mala fides or statutory violation in Ext.P1 transfer order issued by the 3 rd respondent, which is in effect ratified by Ext.P9 order of the 1 st respondent. 15. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. 16. In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.