JUDGMENT : T Mallikarjuna Rao, J. 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.'), is filed by the Appellant/Plaintiff challenging the decree and Judgment dated 28.03.2017 in O.S.No.50 of 2015 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Parvatipuram, (for short, ‘trial Court’). 2. The Appellant is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.50 of 2015 against the Defendant directing her to pay Rs.13,95,000/- along with subsequent interest at 18% per annum on Rs.10,00,000/- due under the registered mortgage deed, dated 28.07.2012, from the date of filing the suit till the date of realization. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is reasonable to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: Defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- from Plaintiff, agreeing to repay the amount with interest at the rate of 18% per annum, and executed a registered simple mortgage deed dated 28.07.2012, under document No. 2833/2012, agreeing to redeem the mortgage within one year by creating a charge over the plaint schedule property. Despite repeated demands and requests by the Plaintiff, the Defendant failed to repay the loan. Defendant continued to delay the matter, and on 06.10.2014, Plaintiff learned that Defendant was trying to alienate the plaint schedule property to third parties. When Plaintiff confronted Defendant, she was challenged to take any action she wished. Consequently, the Plaintiff filed the present suit to recover the loan amount based on the mortgage deed. 5. In the written statement, Defendant refuted the plaint averments and asserted that Plaintiff, being a poor woman, could not have lent Rs.10,00,000/-. The Defendant further contended that she did not need to borrow such a large sum as a housewife and small farmer with Ac.3.00 cents of land. She never executed a registered mortgage deed in favour of the Plaintiff, describing the alleged deed dated 28.07.2012 as a forgery. She explained that her husband had a rice mill in Kotipam, mortgaged to the State Bank of Hyderabad, but due to loss, the bank sought to sell the mill, prompting their move to Rajahmundry in 2009. During this time, she claimed that her husband’s enemies fabricated documents, including the alleged mortgage deed, and filed suits against him. She explained that her husband had a rice mill in Kotipam, mortgaged to the State Bank of Hyderabad, but due to loss, the bank sought to sell the mill, prompting their move to Rajahmundry in 2009. During this time, she claimed that her husband’s enemies fabricated documents, including the alleged mortgage deed, and filed suits against him. Defendant also contended that Plaintiff never demanded repayment of the loan and sought protection under A.P.Act 7/77, requesting the suit be dismissed with costs for lack of cause of action. 6. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the mortgage deed dated 28.07.2012 is true, valid and binding on the Defendant? (2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for suit amount? (3) To what relief? 7. The suit was initially filed before the Principal District Court, Vizianagaram, as O.S.No.107 of 2014. It was later transferred to the trial court and renumbered as O.S.No.50 of 2015. 8. During the trial, on behalf of Plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Ex.A.1. On behalf of Defendant, no witnesses were examined, and no documents were marked. 9. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit without costs. 10. Sri Kuriti Bhaskara Rao, learned counsel for the Appellant / Plaintiff, asserts that the trial Court failed to consider the clear terms of the registered mortgage deed (Ex.A.1), executed on 28.07.2012, which acknowledged the Defendant's receipt of Rs.10,00,000/- in total, with Rs.6,00,000/- previously borrowed and Rs.4,00,000/- paid at the time of execution. The Sub-Registrar verified the document and took the Defendant's thumb impression, with two witnesses present. Despite this, the trial Court did not address the execution of the mortgage deed. He further asserts that the trial Court overlooked written arguments and evidence, particularly, the testimonies of PWs.2 and 3, who confirmed the payment mode. Instead of appreciating this material evidence, the trial Court dismissed it without valid reasoning. 11. Additionally, PW.3's cross-examination further corroborated the transaction and execution of the Ex.A.1 in favour of the Plaintiff. The Appellant claims that the trial Court dismissed the suit, ignoring issue No.1, which questioned the validity of the Ex.A.1. Despite the Defendant's claim of forgery, Ex.A.1 was duly executed in the presence of Sub-Registrar and witnesses. 11. Additionally, PW.3's cross-examination further corroborated the transaction and execution of the Ex.A.1 in favour of the Plaintiff. The Appellant claims that the trial Court dismissed the suit, ignoring issue No.1, which questioned the validity of the Ex.A.1. Despite the Defendant's claim of forgery, Ex.A.1 was duly executed in the presence of Sub-Registrar and witnesses. Furthermore, the mortgage property, valued at over Rs.33,00,000/-, had an outstanding loan of only Rs.3,00,000/- to the State Bank of Hyderabad, not Rs.10,00,000/- as claimed by the Defendant. The trial Court failed to apply sound legal principles and wrongly dismissed the suit. Therefore, the Appellant seeks the Judgment and decree to be set aside and the Appeal to be allowed in the interest of justice. 12. Per contra, Sri Dandamudi Vasavi Ratna Kumari, learned counsel for the Respondent / Defendant, contends that the trial Court correctly appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference. 13. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1) Is the trial Court justified in holding that the Plaintiff failed to prove the execution of Ex.A.1, registered simple mortgage deed, dated 28.07.2012? 2) Does the Judgment passed by the trial Court need any interference? 3) Whether the Appellant / Plaintiff is entitled to a decree? If so, to what amount? POINT NOs.1 to 3: 14. The First Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial court's findings. Considering the nature and scope of the First Appellate Court in Vinod Kumar V. Gangadhar, MANU/SC/0946/2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. Again, in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, MANU/SC/0768/2010, this Court, taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court, reiterated the principle as mentioned above with these words: 3. How the regular first Appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from original decrees. How the regular first Appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the Judgment of the appellate Court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision, and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first Appeal is a valuable right of the parties, and unless restricted by law, the whole case is open to rehearing both questions of fact and law. The Judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of first Appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right, and the parties have a right to be heard on questions of law and facts. The Judgment in the first Appeal must address all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By L.Rs. MANU/SC/0091/2001 and Madhukar and ORs.v. Sangram and ORs. MANU/SC/0302/2001 The Court of First Appeal has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. When the Court of First Appeal takes a different view, the Judgment of the first appellate Court must show the conscious application of mind and record its findings based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The Judgment must record the reasons as to why the first appellate Court differs from the Judgment of the Trial Court. Given the settled legal position outlined above, I now re-appreciate the evidence on record, taking into account the evidence adduced by both parties, to assess the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court. 15. The Judgment must record the reasons as to why the first appellate Court differs from the Judgment of the Trial Court. Given the settled legal position outlined above, I now re-appreciate the evidence on record, taking into account the evidence adduced by both parties, to assess the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court. 15. The learned counsel for the Appellant asserts that the trial Court erred in failing to draw an adverse inference from the Defendant's non-examination despite being a party to the mortgage. The learned counsel contends that the Plaintiff’s claim is purportedly backed by the oral evidence of PWs.1 to 3. In response, the learned counsel for the Respondent asserts that, as correctly held by the trial Court, the Plaintiff failed to establish the passing of consideration. This was due to Plaintiff's failure to produce the promissory notes allegedly executed by Defendant and evidence of any subsisting liability at the time the mortgage was executed. After properly assessing the evidence, the trial Court reached a sound and unassailable conclusion, which merits this Court's full endorsement. 16. The Plaintiff has been examined as PW.1. Her husband, K. Rama Krishna Rao, is examined as PW.2. Their version of events is that the Defendant borrowed Rs.10,00,000/- from the Plaintiff and executed a registered simple mortgage deed on 28.07.2012 (Ex.A.1), agreeing to repay the loan with interest at the rate of 18% per annum, while mortgaging the schedule property. Defendant, however, denies the transaction, contending that the simple mortgage deed is a blatant forgery and asserts that she never borrowed any sum, let alone Rs.10,00,000/- from Plaintiff at any point in time. To substantiate the mortgage transaction, the Plaintiff examined one of the attestors to the deed, K. Srinivasa Rao, as PW.3. The evidence of PWs.1 to 3, in conjunction with Ex.A.1, reveals that the document was attested by K.Chakradhar Rao and PW.3 and scribed by Belagam Sivananda Rao. PW.3 testified that Defendant borrowed Rs.3,00,000/- on the second Saturday of May 2012, Rs.3,00,000/- on the third Sunday of June 2012, and Rs.4,00,000/- on 28.07.2012, the very day the mortgage deed (Ex.A.1) was executed. 17. The trial Court observed that during the cross-examination of PW.1, she failed to provide the complete details of the transaction. However, she claimed that her husband was privy to such information. 17. The trial Court observed that during the cross-examination of PW.1, she failed to provide the complete details of the transaction. However, she claimed that her husband was privy to such information. In line with this, PW.2, the Plaintiff's husband, testified to the payments of Rs.3,00,000/- on the second Saturday of May 2012, Rs.3,00,000/- on the third Sunday of June 2012, and Rs.4,00,000/- on 28.07.2012. Despite this testimony, the trial Court noted significant inconsistencies in the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 concerning the alleged payments made to the Defendant. Given these discrepancies, the trial Court found their testimonies unreliable and discarded their evidence accordingly. 18. The trial Court also highlighted a crucial inconsistency in the testimony of PW.3, who stated that the Defendant had executed two promissory notes, which were later torn, and a fresh document was subsequently executed at the Sub-Registrar's office in Parvathipuram. The trial Court further observed that the three different dates mentioned by PWs.2 and 3 were neither reflected in the plaint nor the chief affidavit of PW.1, suggesting that these details were developed during the trial without proper pleadings. Ex.A.1, the mortgage deed clearly states that Plaintiff had previously lent Rs.6,00,000/- and, on the day of execution of the mortgage, Defendant received an additional Rs.4,00,000/-, in the presence of witnesses. From the outset, the Plaintiff's case was that a total of Rs.10,00,000/- was involved, with Rs.6,00,000/- paid earlier and Rs.4,00,000/- on the date of the mortgage transaction. The mere fact that the Plaintiff and her witnesses later testified to the particulars of the payment of Rs.6,00,000/- does not warrant the complete rejection of their evidence. In fact, the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff is not in stark contrast to her initial pleadings and, therefore, cannot be dismissed in its entirety as inconsistent. The trial Court overlooked a crucial aspect of the mortgage deed, Ex.A.1, which explicitly indicates that a payment of Rs.6,00,000/- was made before the execution of the mortgage deed. While it is true that the specifics of this earlier payment were not provided in the evidence, the contents of the mortgage deed itself establish the Plaintiff's claim of a prior payment of Rs.6,00,000/-. Section 25 of the Contract Act unequivocally establishes that past consideration is valid consideration for the formation of a binding contract. 19. While it is true that the specifics of this earlier payment were not provided in the evidence, the contents of the mortgage deed itself establish the Plaintiff's claim of a prior payment of Rs.6,00,000/-. Section 25 of the Contract Act unequivocally establishes that past consideration is valid consideration for the formation of a binding contract. 19. In Atluri Usha Swamy V. Vijay Prestessed Products (P) Limited and others, 2002 (5) ALT 68 , the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: "It is well settled that the consideration for any contract need not be contemporaneous to the document itself. Consideration can be past, present and future. The same is valid in law as long as law does not prohibit it. The presumption under Section 118 of the Act may not necessarily be as to the amounts specified in the promissory note itself. The presumption can be as to the existence of consideration as such, but not the quantum of it and that is what is needed in law for giving effect to the transaction". 20. In Joseph Mariano Santos Pinto V. Aires Concocao Rodrigues,MANU/GO/0027/1975 , the Goa, Daman And Diu Judicial Commissioner's Court are pleased to consider whether a sum of money due sometime prior to the execution of the promissory note can be a good consideration for the issuance of the promissory note, and further held as follows: In the said case, Defendant owed Plaintiff a sum of Rs.485/- for the buffalo that he purchased in May 1966, and on February 16th 1967, he executed the promotion wherein he stated that he had received the money mentioned in the promissory note. Considering the various rulings of the Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court, it is held that the learned Trial Judge was correct in holding that there was consideration and that it decreed the suit of the Plaintiff. 21. The testimony of PWs.1 to 3 is crystal clear, confirming that Ex.A.1 mortgage deed was taken as past consideration, and the payment of Rs.4,00,000/- was made at the time of the mortgage transaction. The failure to provide detailed particulars of the Rs.6,00,000/- payment does not invalidate the core statement made in the mortgage deed. Therefore, the trial Court’s disregard for the clear reference to this payment within Ex.A.1 was a significant oversight. 22. The failure to provide detailed particulars of the Rs.6,00,000/- payment does not invalidate the core statement made in the mortgage deed. Therefore, the trial Court’s disregard for the clear reference to this payment within Ex.A.1 was a significant oversight. 22. The learned counsel for the Respondent contends that when the Plaintiff pleads the existence of payments prior to the Ex.A.1 mortgage transaction, he has to prove the said fact to the satisfaction of the Court, and as the Plaintiff has not let in evidence, he would fail in the suit. He relied on the Judgment of Gomi Bai and Ors to support his contention. V. Uma Rastogi and Ors.MANU/AP/1138/2004, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: ……… Secondly, Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao, MANU/SC/0172/1999 is of no assistance to the Appellant. When the burden of proof lies on Plaintiff, and such burden is not discharged initially for the non-appearance of Defendant or non-production of rebuttal evidence by Defendant, adverse inference as contemplated under Section 102 of the Evidence Act cannot be drawn by the Court. The same would amount to allowing the suit to claim wholly and solely on the weakness of the Defendant's case rather than the strength of the Plaintiff's case. In this regard, a reference may be made to the following observations made by this Court in V. Srisailam v. V. Krishna Murthy., MANU/AP/1128/2002. Evidence means and includes all statements which the Court permits to be made by witnesses in relation to matters of fact and enquiry. It may be oral evidence or documentary evidence produced for inspection by the Court. Any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature, or extent of any right, liability, or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows is expressed by the phrase 'facts in issue'. (See Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). As per Section 101 of the Evidence Act, a person who desires the Court to give Judgment as to any legal right or liability depending on the existence of facts must prove that those facts exist and the burden of proof lies on such person. He would fail if no evidence at all was given on either side. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court is entitled to presume the existence of any fact. He would fail if no evidence at all was given on either side. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court is entitled to presume the existence of any fact. As per illustration (h) a person who refuses to answer a question, an inference can be drawn that if he had given an answer, it would be unfavourable to him. When the Court raises adverse inference, these provisions of the evidence law have to be kept in mind. 23. Before examining whether Plaintiff discharged that onus and thus shifted it on Defendant, it is to take note of the procedure prescribed for proof of execution of the document. In this regard, Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 is reproduced hereunder: 68.- Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested. - If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied. 24. The learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in Thakkar Vrajlal Bhimjee V. Thakkar Jamnadas Valjee And another, 1994 SCC (4 ) 723, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 3. In Kunwar Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Behari Singh,MANU/PR/0010/1939, it has been held that one of the essentials of a mortgage deed is that each of the attesting witnesses must have signed the document in the presence of the executant. The Court held that if the provisions of Sections 58 and 59 of the Registration Act and Sections 3 and 59 of the Transfer of Property Act are read together, there was no escape from the conclusion that a mortgage deed was required to be proved by producing; it least one of the attesting witnesses. In view of this decision, the Judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld. 25. In view of this decision, the Judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld. 25. This Court finds that the Judgment cited by the Respondent's counsel does not aid the Defendant's case. In the present matter, Plaintiff examined the attesting witness, PW.3, whose testimony fully supports the Plaintiff's position. Given the evidence provided by PW.3, it is difficult to conclude that the statutory requirements are not met. 26. However, mere proof of the contents of the document does not prove the due execution of the mortgage deed. The Plaintiff has not only to prove the contents of the document, but she has to prove that the document was duly executed as required by Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the same was registered. 27. The execution of the mortgage deed can, however, be proved only if the Plaintiff can show that the mortgagor signed the document with intent to execute the same and the deed was attested in the manner required by law. To prove the signature of the mortgagor on the deed, Plaintiff relied upon Sub- section (2) of Section 60, Registration Act. That sub-section, in so far as it is material, provides that where a certificate of registration under Sub-section (1) of Section 60 has been signed, sealed and dated by the registering officer, it shall be admissible to prove that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. Section 59 requires the registering officer to affix the date and his signature to all endorsements made under Sections 52 and 58. 28. Section 58(1)(a) requires the registering officer to endorse the signature and addition of every person admitting execution of every document, and, if such execution has been admitted by the representative, assign or agent of any person, the signature and addition of such representative, assign or agent. In this case, from the endorsement made on the deed of mortgage by the Sub-Registrar, it is clear that the mortgage deed was admitted to have been executed by the mortgagor and duly presented by him/her for registration. 29. Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in M.L.Abdul Jabbar Sahib V. H. Venkata Sastri and Sons,1969 LawSuit (SC) 41, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 10. The Indian Registration Act. 1908 lays down a detailed procedure for registration of documents. 29. Learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in M.L.Abdul Jabbar Sahib V. H. Venkata Sastri and Sons,1969 LawSuit (SC) 41, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 10. The Indian Registration Act. 1908 lays down a detailed procedure for registration of documents. The registering officer is under a duty to enquire whether the document is executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed and to satisfy himself as to the identity of the executant, Section 34(3). He can register the document if he is satisfied with the identity of the person executing the document and if that person admits execution [Section 25(1)]. The signatures of the executant and of every person examined with reference to the document are endorsed on the document (Section 58). The registering officer is required to affix the date and his signature to the endorsements (Section 59). Prima facie, theregistering officer puts his signature on the document in the discharge of his statutory duty Under Section 59 of the Registration Act and not for the purpose of attesting it or certifying that he has received from the executants a personal acknowledgement of his signature. 30. The record clearly demonstrates that Ex.A.1, the mortgage deed, includes the Defendant's photograph and is duly registered following the provisions of the Registration Act. Despite being served with the suit summons, Defendant has failed to initiate any action against Plaintiff alleging the fabrication of the document. It is not the Defendant's contention that the registering authorities failed to appraise her of the contents of the Ex.A.1 document. Notably, the Defendant has not taken the witness stand to substantiate her claim of fabrication. Furthermore, she has refrained from appearing in Court to deny her signature on Ex.A.1. Once it is established that the Defendant executed Ex.A.1, the onus shifts to her to explain the contents of the mortgage deed, specifically concerning the alleged passing of the consideration amount. 31. The record reveals that the Ex.A.1 document is registered, and the registration of the document reinforces the valid execution of the document. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh and ORs.V. Birbal and Ors.,MANU/SC/8139/2006, it was held as follows: 27. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh and ORs.V. Birbal and Ors.,MANU/SC/8139/2006, it was held as follows: 27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption. The above Judgment in Prem Singh’s case has been referred to in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale V. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and others,MANU/SC/0442/2009 . 32. The Defendant, who is a party to Ex.A1, to prove that the mortgage came into existence under the circumstances stated in the written statement, that too, without any consideration, though there are some recitals in the deed, regarding the passing of consideration. This Court is conscious of the fact that Ex.A1 is not a negotiable instrument, armed with presumption, under the Negotiable Instruments Act. In this view, the initial burden is upon the Plaintiff to prove the passing of consideration. In this case, given the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 supported by recitals in the registered document viz., Ex.A1, to which the Defendant is a party, are sufficient to discharge the initial burden, thereby shifting the burden to disprove the passing of consideration, or to disprove the recitals contained in Ex.A1, thereby to establish the fact, if it is a fact, that Ex.A1 is not supported by consideration. In a mortgage deed, if there are recitals that the mortgage money was given as a loan to the mortgagor, either on that date or previous to that date, affirming that the mortgagor received the amount, then the burden is on the mortgagor to prove, that no consideration was in fact paid. This proposition is laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in R.S. Kothari V. Smt. Anar Dei,1968 (1) SCWR 235. 33. The Defendant's stance is that her husband suffered significant financial losses in the rice mill business, leading to the property being notified for sale. She claims that Ex.A1, the mortgage deed, was fabricated by the Plaintiff in collusion with the attestors and scribe. 33. The Defendant's stance is that her husband suffered significant financial losses in the rice mill business, leading to the property being notified for sale. She claims that Ex.A1, the mortgage deed, was fabricated by the Plaintiff in collusion with the attestors and scribe. The Defendant has failed to come into the witness box to support her case. Despite her allegations regarding the fabrication of Ex.A1 by the Plaintiff in collusion with the attestors and scribe, she has not provided direct testimony to substantiate these claims. The absence of her testimony significantly weakened her defence, as she needed to take the opportunity to present her version and face cross-examination personally. However, Defendant failed to present any concrete evidence or material on record to substantiate her allegations that Plaintiff, attestors, and scribe conspired to fabricate the document. Furthermore, it was notspecifically suggested during the cross-examination of PWs.1 to 3 that Ex.A.1 lacked the Defendant’s signature or that it was a forged document. The absence of such a direct challenge weakens the credibility of the Defendant’s claims. 34. In dismissing the suit, the trial Court failed to conduct a thorough and objective examination of the pleadings, instead relying on mere surmises and conjectures. This oversight is particularly glaring because Defendant did not come forward to testify in her defence. This omission should have been given considerable weight in assessing the credibility of her claims. By choosing not to present herself in the witness box, the Defendant deprived the Court of the opportunity to scrutinize her testimony under cross-examination, which is a fundamental aspect of the adversarial process. Instead of focusing on this crucial gap in the Defendant's defence, the trial Court gave undue significance to minor inconsistencies in the evidence provided by the Plaintiff's witnesses. These trivial discrepancies were overemphasized and used as the primary basis for rejecting the Plaintiff's case, even though they did not materially affect the core of the Plaintiff's claim. Such an approach fails to recognize that inconsistencies in testimony are not uncommon in cases involving multiple witnesses and do not render the entire case unworthy of consideration. 35. The submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant, that for the non-examination of the Defendant, an adverse inference and presumption against the Defendant has to be taken, is of much force. 35. The submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant, that for the non-examination of the Defendant, an adverse inference and presumption against the Defendant has to be taken, is of much force. The proper person who could speak about the execution of the mortgage deed and passing of consideration thereunder should be only the Defendant, the party to Ex.A1. 36. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the Court to draw certain presumptions based on certain facts. Section 114(g) says the Court may presume that the evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Under this provision, an adverse inference could be drawn against the defendants for failing, on their part, to call the material witness, viz., the second Defendant. Further, when a party fails to call as his witness, the principal person involved in the transaction, who is competent to give a first hand account of the matters of controversy and throw light on them and who could rebut the allegations of the other side, it is legitimate on the part of the Court to draw an adverse inference against the party, who failed to produce such principal witness or who failed himself/herself to be examined as a witness, when he is a party, as ruled by the Apex Court in V.K.Saklecha V. Jagjiwan, MANU/SC/0370/1972 , Engu Lakshmamma V. Vennapuse Chinaa Malla Reddy,MANU/SC/0271/1985 and in Vidhyadar V. Mankikrao,MANU/SC/0172/1999. In the above third cited decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held as follows: "Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross- examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the trial Court and avoided the witness box so that he may not be cross- examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the sale transaction between defendant No. 2 and the Plaintiff was bogus". 37. Admittedly, Defendant abstained from entering into the box, which should give rise to an adverse inference against her, to contend against the recitals in Ex.A1, given the admitted position that Defendant is the signatory, i.e., an executant to Ex.A1 38. 37. Admittedly, Defendant abstained from entering into the box, which should give rise to an adverse inference against her, to contend against the recitals in Ex.A1, given the admitted position that Defendant is the signatory, i.e., an executant to Ex.A1 38. Furthermore, the trial Court disregarded the fact that the Plaintiff's claim was supported by a registered mortgage deed, Ex.A.1, which clearly outlined the terms of the loan and the agreement between the parties. This document, executed and registered under the law, should have carried significant weight in the Court's analysis, as it serves as a formal and legally binding record of the transaction. Ignoring the importance of Ex.A.1, the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit without properly considering the pivotal evidence that substantiated the Plaintiff's case. 39. In the absence of any tangible evidence from the Defendant to substantiate the claim of fabrication, the matter does not progress further. The testimony of the attesting witness unequivocally supports the Plaintiff's case, effectively dispelling any doubts and tilting the balance decisively in favour of the Plaintiff. 40. Assuming that Plaintiff failed to pay the amount covered under Ex.A.1, in the ordinary course, Defendant ought to have issued a notice, calling upon Plaintiff, setting forth under what circumstances Ex.A1 came into existence, then demanding the amount also or questioning the genuineness of the document itself 41. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff is able to establish the execution of the Ex.A.1 mortgage deed in her favour by Defendant. Given the same, the findings and conclusions recorded by the trial Court are based on something other than a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. Based on the evidence available on record and the settled position of law, as pointed out, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Plaintiff has proved the case regarding the passing of consideration under Ex.A1, which should follow the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for. The trial Court, unfortunately, without considering the case from its proper perspective on the legal position correctly, committed an error in concluding that the execution of Ex.A1 is not proved and is not supported by consideration. In light of the foregoing discussion, the trial Court's Judgment to dismiss the suit is based on an incomplete and flawed evaluation of both the pleadings and the evidence. In light of the foregoing discussion, the trial Court's Judgment to dismiss the suit is based on an incomplete and flawed evaluation of both the pleadings and the evidence. In this view, the findings of the trial Court regarding Ex.A1 should be reversed, and the suit should be decreed as requested. The Trial Court Judgment is erroneous, cannot be sustained, and is liable to be set aside, and the Appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the Points are answered. 42. As a result, (a) The Appeal Suit is allowed without costs. (b) The Judgment and Decree, dated 28.03.2017, passed in O.S.No.50 of 2015 by the learned II Additional District Judge, Parvatipuram, is set aside. (c) The suit in O.S.No.50 of 2015 is preliminarily decreed with costs for a sum of Rs.13,95,000/- together with interest @ 12% p.a., on Rs.10,00,000/- from the date of the suit till the date of trial Court's Judgment and thereafter, interest @ 6% p.a., till the date of redemption. The time for redemption is three months from this date. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.