JUDGMENT : 1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellants / Appellants / Defendants against the Decree and Judgment dated 09.06.2003, in A.S.No.75 of 1998 on the file of learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Srikakulam (for short, ‘the First Appellate Court’) confirming the decree and Judgment dated 20.04.1998, in O.S.No.108 of 1993 on the file of learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam (for short, ‘the Trial Court’). 2. The Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.108 of 1993 seeking recovery of Rs.39,670.72 ps., being the principal and interest from the Defendants based on the promissory note, dated 20.06.1991. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: On 20.06.1991, Defendants 1 and 2 borrowed Rs.30,200/-, agreeing to pay with 14 % annual interest, and executed a promissory note infavour of the Plaintiff. On 19.07.1993, the Plaintiff sent a registered notice to the Defendants demanding payment. The Defendants acknowledged receipt of the notice, but the 1 st Defendant responded on 03.08.1993 with false claims. Despite this, the Defendants have failed to repay the amount due on the promissory note. 5. The 1 st Defendant filed a written statement adopted by the 2 nd Defendant, wherein, contended that the 2 nd Defendant did not sign the alleged promissory note, claiming her signature is forged. The promissory note is, therefore, invalid. The 1 st Defendant acknowledges borrowing Rs.6000/- from Plaintiff in 1979, with interest paid until 1983. However, the 1 st Defendant could not pay interest from 1984 to 1986 due to financial difficulties. The 1 st Defendant alleges that under threat and coercion, he was forced to sign the suit promissory note while confined in the Plaintiff’s father-in-law’s house. The amount of Rs.30,200/- stated in the promissory note was not supported by any legitimate monetary consideration. Furthermore, the 1 st Defendant claims that a written endorsement, issued by the Plaintiff in the presence of elders on 22.06.1991, acknowledged that the actual accrued amount due was Rs.20,000/-, not Rs.30,200/-. The 1 st Defendant also asserts that he made Rs.2,400/- payments on 10.08.1991, Rs.8,000/- on 05.01.1992 and Rs.6,000/- on 10.03.1992, for which the Plaintiff provided unstamped receipts. Furthermore, the 1 st Defendant claims that a written endorsement, issued by the Plaintiff in the presence of elders on 22.06.1991, acknowledged that the actual accrued amount due was Rs.20,000/-, not Rs.30,200/-. The 1 st Defendant also asserts that he made Rs.2,400/- payments on 10.08.1991, Rs.8,000/- on 05.01.1992 and Rs.6,000/- on 10.03.1992, for which the Plaintiff provided unstamped receipts. These payments, totalling Rs.16,400/-, have not been deducted from the alleged amount of Rs.30,200/-, and the Plaintiff has suppressed these facts in the suit. Consequently, the 1 st Defendant contends that he owes only Rs.3,600/-and requests the dismissal of the suit with costs. 6. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court has framed the following issues: 1) Whether the suit pronote is true, valid and supported by consideration? 2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to suit claim? 3) To what relief? 7. During the trial, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.6. 8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the Trial Court decreed the suit with costs in O.S.No.108 of 1993 for Rs.39,670.72 ps., and subsequent interest at 14 2/5 % per annum from the date of the suit till the date of decree and at 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date of realization on the principal amount of Rs.30,200/-. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants filed an Appeal in A.S.No.75 of 1998 on file of the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the 2 nd Appellant / 2 nd Defendant also signed Ex.A.1? 2) Whether the suit pronote was obtained under coercion and is devoid of consideration to a tune of Rs.10,200/-? 3) Whether the part payments of Rs.2,400/-, dt.10.08.1991, Rs.8,000/-, dt.05.01.1992, and Rs.6,000/-, dt.10.03.192 are true and valid? 4) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Court is not sustainable in Law? 5) To what relief? 10. The First Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal with costs in A.S.No.75 of 1998 by its Judgment and Decree dated 09.06.2003. Assailing the same, the Defendants preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. 5) To what relief? 10. The First Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal with costs in A.S.No.75 of 1998 by its Judgment and Decree dated 09.06.2003. Assailing the same, the Defendants preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. I heard Sri Bommana Ramakrishna, learned Counsel representing the Appellants/Defendants and Sri Y. Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff. 12. The Appellant’s Counsel asserts that the Plaintiff approached the Court with unclean hands. Plaintiff accepted the amounts paid under Ex.s.B.1 to B.5, and thus, there is no justification for not deducting these amounts from the decretal sum. Both Courts failed to consider that the promissory note was obtained under threat and coercion, lacking valid consideration, and as such, it does not meet the necessary ingredients under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘N.I Act’). The learned Counsel further contends that the oral evidence presented by the Plaintiff was insufficient to prove that the Defendants executed the promissory note. Additionally, the promissory note lacks the signature of the 2 nd Defendant, and the findings of both Courts on this matter are claimed to be perverse and illegal. 13. Based on the Appellant’s contentions, the following substantial questions of Law is involved in this Second Appeal: Whether the Courts below are justified in considering Ex.A.1 as a promissory note despite the fact the ingredients required for a promissory note under the N.I. Act have not been satisfied. 14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of CPC. 15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others , 2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questionsof Law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 ) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…… 16. Considerations in Section 100 of CPC arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. Considerations in Section 100 of CPC arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of Law. 17. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC, this Court must confine itself to the substantial questions of Law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, the substantial questions of Law are the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 18. The 2 nd Defendant is the spouse of the 1 st Defendant, and their relationship is undisputed. In support of the Ex.A.1 promissory note transaction, the Plaintiff himself testified as PW.1 and further examined PW.2, Simma Kameswararao, the attesting witness to Ex.A.1. Both PW.1 and PW.2 unequivocally testified that the Defendants borrowed Rs.30,200/- from the Plaintiff, executing Ex.A.1 on 20.06.1991, with an agreement to repay the amount along with interest at a rate of Rs.1.20 per hundred per month, having duly received the consideration. It is evident that Plaintiff sent a registered notice to the Defendants, as seen in Ex.A.2, duly accepted by the Defendants as indicated by Exs.A.3 and A.4 (Postal acknowledgements). In response, the1 st Defendant replied, as reflected in Ex.A.5. 19. On behalf of the Defendants, the 1 st Defendant was examined as DW.1. He admitted to executing the Ex.A.1 promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff. DW.1’s testimony, in conjunction with Ex.A.1, confirms that he was the scribe of the document. According to his version, however, the 2 nd Defendant did not sign Ex.A.1, alleging that Plaintiff forged her signature. The contents of Ex.A.1 clearly state that the 1 st Defendant and his wife, the 2 nd Defendant, borrowed Rs.30,200/- from the Plaintiff. DW.1’s testimony, in conjunction with Ex.A.1, confirms that he was the scribe of the document. According to his version, however, the 2 nd Defendant did not sign Ex.A.1, alleging that Plaintiff forged her signature. The contents of Ex.A.1 clearly state that the 1 st Defendant and his wife, the 2 nd Defendant, borrowed Rs.30,200/- from the Plaintiff. The 2 nd Defendant, who testified as DW.2, denied her signature on Ex.A.1, the promissory note. It is not her case that she had disputes with her husband, and he inserted her name in the promissory note, falsely indicating that she had borrowed the money alongside him. Furthermore, the 1 st Defendant failed to explain why he referred to the 2 nd Defendant as one of the executants of the promissory note alongside him. Without any explanation from the 1 st Defendant, it can be inferred that he acknowledged the 2 nd Defendant's involvement by naming her as an executant. 20. However, the 2 nd Defendant did not take steps to prove that Ex.A.1 does not bear her signature or that it is a forgery. Once the testimony of PWs.1 and 2 established the validity of the promissory note, the burden shifted to the 2 nd Defendant to demonstrate that her signature was not present on Ex.A.1. 21. According to the testimony of DWs.1 and 2, elders resolved the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendants on 22.06.1991, during which the Plaintiff issued Ex.B.1, an undertaking acknowledging that the Defendants owed a sum of Rs.20,000/-. Even if Ex.B.1 is considered authentic, it indicates that the 2 nd Defendant and the 1 st Defendant became liable to repay the Plaintiff. The Defendants also claim that after Ex.B.1, they paid Rs.2,400/- to the Plaintiff's brother-in-law and received a receipt in return, vide Ex.B.2. However, the Defendants failed to take steps to examine the Plaintiff's brother-in-law to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, it is not the Defendants' case that the Plaintiff instructed them to make the payment to his brother-in- law. Additionally, the Defendants assert that the 1 st Defendant paid Rs.8,000/- on 05.01.1992 and Rs.6,000/- on 10.03.1992, for which they obtained receipts, Exs.B.3 and B.4, from the Plaintiff. 22. The Defendants also claim that mediation took place with DW.3 on 24.09.1994, during which the Defendants provided an undertaking vide Ex.B.5 to settle the dispute before the eldeRs.However, the Plaintiff allegedly failed to attend. 22. The Defendants also claim that mediation took place with DW.3 on 24.09.1994, during which the Defendants provided an undertaking vide Ex.B.5 to settle the dispute before the eldeRs.However, the Plaintiff allegedly failed to attend. DW.3 testified that he sent Ex.B.6 notice to the Plaintiff, urging him to settle the dispute with the Defendants. After evaluating the evidence, the Trial Court found that the testimonies of DWs.1 to 3 did not sufficiently establish that a settlement occurred on 22.06.1991 and 24.09.1994. The Trial Court justified this conclusion by noting that the recitals in Ex.B.1 were vague. As pointed out by the Trial Court, if the Plaintiff had obtained Ex.A.1 under duress, such circumstances would likely have been reflected in the elders' meeting. Additionally, Ex.B.1 does not include the names of the elders involved, further weakening the Defendants’ claim. 23. As correctly noted by the Trial Court, the Defendants failed to examine the so-called elders to authenticate Ex.B.1. Consequently, the Trial Court's finding that Ex.B.1 was not proven holds good. Additionally, the Defendants did not call any witnesses to prove Exs.B.3 and B.4 receipts, and they provided no satisfactory explanation for the absence of such testimony. The Plaintiff, however, maintains that no mediation took place. Had mediation occurred, as the Defendants claim, they would have obtained a written receipt from the Plaintiff. As per the Defendants' version, Ex.A.1 was obtained under duress, with the Plaintiff allegedly threatening and coercing them at knife- point. It is also evident that both Defendants 1 and 2 are teachers, while the Plaintiff is an illiterate individual. Moreover, if Ex.A.1 had been obtained under duress, the Defendants, being teachers, would not have remained silent; they would have pursued legal remedies. The First Appellate Court pointed out that if Ex.A.1 had been obtained under coercion, DW.1 would have reported the matter to the police or sent a notice to PW.1 immediately. Similarly, had the Defendants made payments under Ex.A.1, they would have endorsed on the back side of the promissory note. The Defendants have failed to offer any convincing explanation for obtaining receipts on unstamped papers instead of making endorsements on the promissory notes. The Trial Court rejected the Defendants' claims regarding Exs.B.2 to B.4 documents by providing detailed reasons. 24. Similarly, had the Defendants made payments under Ex.A.1, they would have endorsed on the back side of the promissory note. The Defendants have failed to offer any convincing explanation for obtaining receipts on unstamped papers instead of making endorsements on the promissory notes. The Trial Court rejected the Defendants' claims regarding Exs.B.2 to B.4 documents by providing detailed reasons. 24. The Trial Court appropriately refrained from comparing the signatures of the 2 nd Defendant as shown in Ex.A.6 and A.7 (the acquaintance register), as the 2 nd Defendant put initials, whereas Ex.A.1 contains her full signature. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court accepted PW.2’s testimony, as no contradictions were drawn out during his cross-examination, and no evidence was presented suggesting any ill will towards the Defendants. The First Appellate Court also noted that DW.1 did not dispute PW.2's presence during the transaction. It rightly observed that there was no specific reason for PW.2 to depose on behalf of the Plaintiff falsely. Furthermore, the First Appellate Court correctly pointed out that as the Plaintiff did not refer Ex.A.1 to an expert for examination, it could not be viewed as a negative aspect of the Plaintiff’s case. Ultimately, the First Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court's reasoning and upheld the finding that DW.2 signed the promissory note with her husband. 25. The First Appellate Court noted that Ex.A.5, the reply notice sent by the Defendants, does not indicate that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.A.1 promissory note under coercion. It further observed that the contents of Ex.A.5 were inconsistent with the defences raised by the Defendants in their pleadings. After thoroughly examining the evidence, the First Appellate Court found the Defendants' claim regarding the holding of panchayats to be implausible, based on the cross-examination of witnesses. Additionally, the Defendants failed to provide a valid explanation as to why PW.1 was not confronted with Ex.B.1 during his initial cross-examination. The First Appellate Court also recorded reasons for not considering the evidence of PW.1 admitting that Ex.B.3 bore his signature. 26. The First Appellate Court, after evaluating the evidence, concluded that even if DW.3’s testimony was accepted as true, there was no valid discharge of the debt following the terms of the promissory note or Section 82 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 26. The First Appellate Court, after evaluating the evidence, concluded that even if DW.3’s testimony was accepted as true, there was no valid discharge of the debt following the terms of the promissory note or Section 82 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court rejected the Defendants' defence, noting that DW.1 had failed to examine the attestors of Exs.B.2 to B.4 despite having stated in cross-examination that he would do so. After reviewing all the evidence, both Courts found that the Defendants executed the promissory note upon receiving the consideration amount. Both the Courts provided detailed reasoning for rejecting the Defendants' discharge claim. 27. It is well-established in Law that a mere denial of the receipt of consideration does not constitute a valid defence. Defendants have failed to present any substantial reason or evidence to challenge the credibility of the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2 regarding executing the promissory note. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 was consistent regarding executing the promissory note by the Defendants. Despite extensive cross-examination, nothing emerged to undermine the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 about executing the promissory note and passing consideration. Furthermore, Defendants failed to establish the circumstances under which they executed Ex.A.1 without receipt of consideration amount. Moreover, any rebuttal could have been based either through direct evidence or by proving the preponderance of probabilities. In this instance, the Defendants did not rebut the presumption even by the preponderance of probabilities. 28. In light of the defence presented and the evidence submitted, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court observed that the Defendants failed to discharge the initial burden of proof to demonstrate the non-existence of consideration. Moreover, no other evidence refutes the presumption provided under Section 118 of the N.I. Act. This Court has no hesitation in affirming that the Plaintiff has successfully established the validity of Ex.A.1. 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in several cases, has held that the exercise of powers under Section 100 of CPC can interfere with the findings of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence. Some of these judgments are Hajazat Hussain V. Abdul Majeed & others. , [2011 (7) SCC 189], Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin , [ 2012 (8) SCC 148 ] , and Vishwanath Agrawal V. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 (7) SCC 288 . 30. Some of these judgments are Hajazat Hussain V. Abdul Majeed & others. , [2011 (7) SCC 189], Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin , [ 2012 (8) SCC 148 ] , and Vishwanath Agrawal V. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 (7) SCC 288 . 30. The findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which affirm that Plaintiff has established the execution of the suit promissory note by Defendants after receiving the consideration amount, is neither perverse nor a result of misinterpretation of documents or misreading of evidence. After careful reading of the material on record, this Court finds that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently decreed the Plaintiff's suit by recording all the findings of facts against the Defendants enumerated above, and the findings were neither against the pleadings nor evidence nor against any provisions of Law. 31. This Court discerns no perversity in the Judgments rendered by the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by both the Courts are consistent with established legal principles. Both the Courts meticulously reviewed all the evidence available on record. 32. This Court considers that the Trial and First Appellate Courts' conclusions are not subject to interference under Section 100 of CPC. In these circumstances, upon consideration of the decrees and judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, this Court is satisfied that thearguments presented pertain solely to the factual matrix and do not involve any substantial questions of Law. The Appellants have not raised any legal issues in this Second Appeal that warrant consideration. There are no sufficient grounds to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. There is no question of Law, let alone the substantial question of Law, involved in this Second Appeal, and therefore, the Appeal is liable to be dismissed. 33. As a consequence, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The judgment dated 09.06.2003 of learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Srikakulam, in A.S.No.75 of 1998, stands confirmed. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.