E. K. Kesavan S/o. Kunhiraman v. Thomas S/o. Joseph
2025-01-28
SOPHY THOMAS
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (Sophy Thomas, J.) This appeal is at the instance of the complainant in CC No.595 of 2001 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Sulthan Bathery, challenging acquittal of the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred as ?the NI Act?), vide judgment dated 03.05.2002. 2. The case of the complainant is that the accused purchased ginger from him for a sum of Rs.94,500/- during 1996. He failed to pay that amount, in spite of repeated demands. Finally, he issued Ext.P1 cheque for that amount, assuring that it would be honoured on presentation before the bank. But the cheque was returned dishonoured for the reason ?funds insufficient?. Complainant sent registered lawyer notice to the accused intimating dishonour of the cheque, and demanding the cheque amount. In spite of receipt of notice, the amount has not been repaid, and hence the complaint. 3. On taking cognizance, and on appearance of the accused before the trial court, particulars of offence was read over and explained, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. PW1 was examined and Exts.P1 to P6 were marked from the side of complainant to prove his case. 4. On closure of complainant?s evidence, accused was questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought on record. But no defence evidence was adduced. 5. On analysing the facts and evidence, and on hearing the rival contentions from either side, the trial court acquitted the accused finding that Ext.P1 cheque was issued by the accused towards discharge of a time barred debt. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the accused, complainant preferred this appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and learned counsel for the 1st respondent/accused. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that though the transaction between the complainant and the accused was in February 1996, he failed to pay the amount in spite of repeated demands. Later, he issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 30.05.1999, assuring that there would be sufficient funds in his account to honour that cheque. But the cheque was returned dishonoured for the reason ?funds insufficient?. In spite of lawyer notice, he did not pay that amount. 8.
Later, he issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 30.05.1999, assuring that there would be sufficient funds in his account to honour that cheque. But the cheque was returned dishonoured for the reason ?funds insufficient?. In spite of lawyer notice, he did not pay that amount. 8. Relying on the Division Bench decision of this Court, in Dr.K.K.Ramakrishnan v. Dr.K.K.Parthasaradhy and Another [ 2003 (2) KLJ 513 ], learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the trial court ought not have acquitted the accused, since he issued Ext.P1 cheque promising to pay the due amount, as envisaged under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The delivery of the cheque to the drawee creates a right to recover the money. On the cheque being dishonoured, the person concerned becomes liable for prosecution. The execution of the cheque is an acknowledgement of a legally enforceable liability and when it is dishonoured, the consequences of prosecution and punishment will follow. 9. The only question to be answered in this appeal is, whether prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act would lie, if Ext.P1 cheque was issued for a time barred debt? 10. True that the transaction between the complainant and the accused was in February 1996 and Ext.P1 cheque was issued on 30.05.1999. So, obviously, the cheque was issued after three years of the transaction. Explanation to Section 138 of the NI Act says that for the purposes of this section, ?debt or other liability? means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. As per Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement made without consideration is void unless, ?it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits.? Even in a case, where a claim for recovery through a civil suit has become barred by limitation, a promise made in writing and signed by the executant to pay, becomes an agreement supported by consideration. Such an agreement is enforceable under law. By virtue of the provisions of Section 46 of the NI Act, the delivery of a cheque completes the transaction. By the factum of delivery, the written promise matures into an enforceable contract.
Such an agreement is enforceable under law. By virtue of the provisions of Section 46 of the NI Act, the delivery of a cheque completes the transaction. By the factum of delivery, the written promise matures into an enforceable contract. This is so despite the fact that the limitation for recovery of the amount may have expired before the making of the written promise. 11. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Dr.K.K.Ramakrishnan?s case cited supra are worth quoting, which read thus: ?12. ??????.. Section 138 provides for a penalty in a case where a cheque is dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds. The cheque has to be by way of payment of a ?legally enforceable debt or a liability?. The liability may arise out of a contract or otherwise. Thus, to determine as to whether or not a liability is legally enforceable, the provisions of the Contract Act cannot be said to be irrelevant. These can provide a cause for a legal liability. Resultantly, when a person writes a cheque and delivers it to a person, the drawee not only gets the civil right to present the cheque and recover the amount, but in the event of the cheque being dishonoured the person who has issued the cheque becomes liable for prosecution under Sec.138. In other words, the issuance of a cheque becomes a promise to pay under section 25(3) of the Contract Act. The delivery of the cheque to the drawee creates a right to recover the money. On the cheque being dishonoured the person concerned becomes liable for prosecution. The execution of the cheque is an acknowledgement of a legally enforceable liability and when it is dishonoured the consequences of prosecution and punishment follow. 13. ??????????. If the claim is barred by limitation even before the cheque is actually drawn, it cannot amount to an acknowledgement of a debt or liability. This contention cannot be accepted. It is, undoubtedly, true that ?to draw? means to write and sign. However, even if the claim is barred by limitation on the date of the drawing of the cheque, on delivery to the other person, it becomes a valid consideration for another agreement. The drawal of the cheque evidences such an agreement. This acknowledgement is enforceable. The drawing and delivery of a cheque create a legally enforceable liability.
However, even if the claim is barred by limitation on the date of the drawing of the cheque, on delivery to the other person, it becomes a valid consideration for another agreement. The drawal of the cheque evidences such an agreement. This acknowledgement is enforceable. The drawing and delivery of a cheque create a legally enforceable liability. Thus, we are of the opinion that when a person writes, signs and delivers a cheque to another it is an acknowledgment of a legally enforceable liability. Thereafter, if the cheque is dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds such a person shall not be entitled to plead that, at the time of his writing the cheque the claim had become barred by limitation and, thus, he is not liable to be punished under section138. ? 12. The concluding remarks in that decision says that when a person issues a cheque, he acknowledges his liability to pay. In the event of the cheque being dishonoured, on account of insufficiency of funds, he will not be entitled to claim that the debt had become barred by limitation and that the liability was not thus legally enforceable. He would be liable for penalty in case the charge is proved against him. 13. In Ramakrishnan v. Gangadharan Nair and Another [ 2006 (3) KLJ 161 ], this Court, relying on the Division Bench decision cited supra , held that, a promise in writing to pay an amount, the consideration of which is a time barred liability, is valid and is not bad for want of consideration under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. A promise to pay a time barred debt cannot be assailed as an unenforceable promise, on the ground that there is no consideration and the cheque issued for the discharge of such a liability would fall within the sweep of Section 138 of the NI Act. 14. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Dr.K.K.Ramakrishnan?s case cited supra , gives a clear answer to the question posed in the present appeal. When the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque, it was a promise made in writing and signed by him and it becomes an agreement supported by consideration and that agreement is enforceable under law. Delivery of the cheque completes that transaction.
When the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque, it was a promise made in writing and signed by him and it becomes an agreement supported by consideration and that agreement is enforceable under law. Delivery of the cheque completes that transaction. By the factum of delivery, that written promise matures into an enforceable contract, creating a right on the drawee to recover the money. When that cheque was dishonoured, the drawer becomes liable for prosecution. So the trial court went wrong in acquitting the accused finding that Ext.P1 cheque was issued for a time barred debt, which was not legally enforceable. 15. The available facts and circumstances are sufficient to show that the accused owed Rs.94,500/- to the complainant towards the price of ginger purchased by him, and he issued Ext.P1 cheque towards discharge of that debt. He had complied with all the statutory mandates in order to attract an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. So he is liable to be convicted and sentenced for that offence. In the result, the accused is found guilty and he is convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act. 16. Regarding the sentence to be imposed, learned counsel for the 1st respondent would plead for a lenient view, as the transaction was of the year 1996 and the appeal was pending before this Court for the last 18 years. 17. In Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [ 2010 (2) KHC 428 ] Hon?ble Apex court observed that it is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect . In Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore Khore [2011 KHC 281], Hon?ble Apex court held that the gravity of a complaint under the NI Act cannot be equated with an offence under the provisions of the IPC or other criminal offences. An offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, is almost in the nature of a civil wrong which has been given criminal overtones. Imbibing the spirit of these decisions, and taking the moral responsibility of the long delay of about 18 years in disposing this appeal, this Court is not inclined to send the 1st respondent/accused behind the bars for a transaction which occurred about 28 years back, for an amount of Rs.94,500/-.
Imbibing the spirit of these decisions, and taking the moral responsibility of the long delay of about 18 years in disposing this appeal, this Court is not inclined to send the 1st respondent/accused behind the bars for a transaction which occurred about 28 years back, for an amount of Rs.94,500/-. So the 1st respondent/accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one day till rising of court and to pay compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for four months. 18. The 1st respondent/accused has to appear before the trial court on or before 08.04.2025 to receive the sentence and to pay compensation amount to the appellant/complainant. As far as possible the 1st respondent shall give notice to the appellant/complainant or his counsel regarding his date of appearance before the trial court. If the appellant/complainant is absent on that day to receive the compensation amount, the 1st respondent/accused can deposit that amount before the trial court. In case of failure of the 1st respondent/accused to appear before the trial court as directed above, to receive the sentence and to pay the compensation amount, the trial court has to execute the sentence against him, without further delay. 19. Registry to forward a copy of this judgment along with the trial court records, to the trial court, for complying with the directions aforesaid. Accordingly the appeal stands allowed.