JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, the learned Dy. SGI appearing on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. A. Dasgupta, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. B. Das, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondents. 2. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked challenging the award dated 20.03.2018 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Guwahati (hereinafter referred to as, “the learned Industrial Tribunal) in Reference Case No. 02/2015 whereby the learned Industrial Tribunal directed to reinstate the respondents herein in the capacity of casual workers on the same wages as was applicable to them at the time of their disengagement and further directed the petitioner No. 2 herein to pay a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- each to all the workmen involved in the reference within 90 days from the date of receipt of the award in-lieu of back wages. 3. It is relevant to take note of that this Award dated 20.03.2018 was notified and thereupon the instant writ petition was filed on01.10.2018. The record further reveals that vide the order dated 16.11.2018, notice was issued and the impugned award was suspended till the next date. Subsequent thereto, there is no order by which the interim order was extended. However, during the pendency of the instant proceedings, the respondents herein filed an Interlocutory Application being I.A.(Civil) No. 431/2019 claiming their dues in terms with Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act of 1947”). 4. This Court allowed the said application and directed the management to pay the full wages, last drawn by the respondents herein inclusive of any maintenance allowance as provided under the Rules, if any. The petitioner No. 2 was also granted the liberty to deploy the respondents in any other project under the petitioner No. 2, if so desired, though there was no direction to do so. This aspect is important as would be seen in the later segments of the present judgment. 5. It further appears that this Court vide an order dated 04.08.2021 directed the petitioner No. 2 to continue to pay the wages to the respondents in terms with the order dated 14.09.2019 w.e.f.16.11.2020 till 04.08.2021. 6. This aspect is important as would be seen in the later segments of the present judgment. 5. It further appears that this Court vide an order dated 04.08.2021 directed the petitioner No. 2 to continue to pay the wages to the respondents in terms with the order dated 14.09.2019 w.e.f.16.11.2020 till 04.08.2021. 6. Another important aspect which requires to be taken note of, that in pursuance to the order passed in I.A.(Civil) No. 431/2019, the respondents herein except the respondent No. 1, have been reinstated and they have been paid the minimum wages. As regards the respondent No. 1, the question of reinstatement did not arise, taking into account that the husband of the respondent No. 1 expired. 7. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court now take into consideration whether this is a fit case for exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. The materials on records show that the respondents herein were employed as muster roll/casual workers under the establishment of the petitioner No. 2 sometime in the year 2001 and 2002 and they continued to render service till July, 2005. It further appears that these respondents, thereupon, were engaged by a contractor in the Pagladiya Dam Project, which the petitioners herein were taking steps for setting up. 9. It may not be out of place, out here, to mention that the Government of Assam was supposed to hand over land for the purpose of the development of the Pagladiya Dam Project, but only an area of 956 hectares of land were handed over and the respondents herein were engaged to watch and ward the 956 hectares of land which was handed over by the State of Assam. It happened so, as the Bodoland Territorial Council who actually had to hand over the said land failed to hand over the balance land of 6529 hectares, this resulted in abandoning the Pagaladiya Dam Project. 10. It happened so, as the Bodoland Territorial Council who actually had to hand over the said land failed to hand over the balance land of 6529 hectares, this resulted in abandoning the Pagaladiya Dam Project. 10. It is very pertinent to take note of that on 15.05.2013, the Chief Engineer-I of the petitioner No. 2 Board had written a letter to the Secretary, Government of Assam, Water Resource Department wherein it was mentioned that there was an unanimous decision th taken in the 56 meeting of the petitioner No. 2 on 22.03.2013 whereby on account of the inability of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) to provide the balance land of 6529 hectares, the project would be abandoned and all the members were in agreement to issue a notice for disengagement of the personnel engaged for watch and ward of 956 hectares of land provided by the State Government to the Brahmaputra Board. The contents of the said communication dated15.05.2013 being relevant are reproduced herein under: “ No. BB/PC/2002/11/Pt-II/615 Government of India Ministry of Water Resources Office of the Chief Engineer-I Brahmaputra Board Basistha, Guwahati-29 Dated May 15, 2013 To The Secretary Government of Assam Water Resources Department Dispur, Guwahati-781006 Sub: Pagladiya Dam Project-Disengagement of personnel engaged for ward and watch duty for protection of land by Brahmaputra Board regarding Sir, In spite of consistent effort, both by Water Resources Department, Government of Assam and Brahmaputra Board, the remaining land of 6529 ha needed for development of Pagladiya Dam Project could not be handed over by Government of Assam to Brahmaputra Board. Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), through letter No. BTC/FC-14/2004/184 dated 22 nd November, 2012, based upon the decision taken in the meeting of Bodoland Territorial Council held on 19.10.2012, indicated inability of BTC in providing balance land of 6529 ha for resumption of field activities under construction of Pagladiya Dam Project. The issue was brought before the 56 th meeting of Brahmaputra Board held on22 nd March 2013 at Imphal, Manipur. All the members present in the meeting were unanimous on proposal of Brahmaputra Board for transfer of 956 ha of land provided in the beginning by Water Resources Department, Government of Assam for development of Pagladiya Dam Project, back to Government of Assam. All the members present in the meeting were unanimous on proposal of Brahmaputra Board for transfer of 956 ha of land provided in the beginning by Water Resources Department, Government of Assam for development of Pagladiya Dam Project, back to Government of Assam. Further, all the members were in agreement to issue a notice for disengagement of personnel engaged for watch and ward of 956 ha of land provided by State Government by Brahmaputra board. Accordingly, in implementation of above decision of Brahmaputra Board, the Brahmaputra Board issued necessary order to discontinue engagement of personnel engaged for watch and ward duty with effect from 1 st June, 2013 through this office communication No. BB/PC/2004/BTC/69/37 dated April, 29, 2013, with a copy endorsed to you also. It is requested that necessary arrangement for protection of land of 956 ha handed over to the Brahmaputra Board for development of Pagaldia Dam Project, from unauthorized occupation, may kindly be put in place with effect from 1 st June, 2013. Yours faithfully (Joy Barman) Chief Engineer-I” 11. It is further relevant to take note of that on the basis of the said decision, the Secretary of the Petitioner No. 2 on 29.04.2013 directed the Superintending Engineer, Nalbari Circle, Brahmaputra Board to disengage the 26 personnels engaged for watch and ward of the 956 hectares of land handed over by the Government of Assam to the Brahmaputra Board for development of Pagladiya Dam Project w.e.f. 01.06.2013. The contents of the said communication is reproduced herein under: “ No. BB(PC)/2004/BTC/69/37 Government of India Ministry of Water Resources Office of the Chief Engineer-I Brahmaputra Board Basistha, Guwahati-29 Dated April 29, 2013 To, The Superintending Engineer, Nalbari Circle, Brahmaputra Board, Nalbari Sub: Disengagement of personnel from watch and ward of 956 ha of land transferred by Government of Assam for development of Pagaladiya Dam Project to Brahmaputra Board. 26 personnel, engaged for watch and ward of 956 ha of land handed over by Government of Assam to Brahmaputra Board for development of Pagladiya Dam Project, may be disengaged with effect from 1 st June, 2013. Action taken in this regard may be intimated to this office. This may be treated as ‘important’. (Joy Barman) Secretary” 12. 26 personnel, engaged for watch and ward of 956 ha of land handed over by Government of Assam to Brahmaputra Board for development of Pagladiya Dam Project, may be disengaged with effect from 1 st June, 2013. Action taken in this regard may be intimated to this office. This may be treated as ‘important’. (Joy Barman) Secretary” 12. Pursuant thereto, the respondents herein were disengaged, which resulted in the respondents approaching the learned Central Administrative Tribunal claiming appropriate directions for consideration of the case of the respondents in terms with the Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularization) Scheme of the Government of India, 1993. This application so filed before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal and registered as O.A. No. 143/2013, was rejected, which resulted in filing of two writ petitions before this Court which were registered and numbered as WP(C) No. 1958/2014 and WP(C) No. 1490/2014. The learned Division Bench of this Court vide an order dated 05.05.2014 issued certain directions to the appropriate Government to make a reference and in consequence thereof, the appropriate Government i.e. the Central Government had made a reference on 10.06.2015. The terms of reference so made are as herein under: “ (1) Whether petitioners are in the employment of the Respondent- Board and, if so, from which date and with what status (temporary or any other one)? (2) In case, if it is held that the petitioners were/are in the employment of Respondent-Board, may be in any capacity, then what relief(s) petitioners are entitled to claim from the Respondent?” 13. It is noticed that the learned Industrial Tribunal, after recording evidence, arrived at an opinion that the engagement of the respondents through the contractor was merely a paper transaction and for all purposes, the respondents continued to remain the employees of the petitioner No. 2 and accordingly, passed the award directing the petitioner No. 2 to reinstate the workmen in the capacity of casual employees on the same wages as applicable to them at the time of their disengagement and further awarding an amount of Rs.50,000/- to each workman in-lieu of back wages. 14. Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, the learned Dy. 14. Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, the learned Dy. SGI appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the learned Industrial Tribunal had erred in law as well as on facts and had committed an error in exercise of jurisdiction in coming to a conclusion that it was a paper transaction insofar as the disengagement of the respondents from the petitioner No. 2 board and the engagement of the respondents by the contractor. He further submitted that as the respondents were only engaged for watch and ward of the Pagladiya Dam Project and as the said Dam Project had been abandoned, the learned Industrial Tribunal ought not to have issued the award. 15. Mr. A. Dasgupta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the order of disengagement clearly mentions that directions were issued by the petitioner No. 2 for disengagement of the respondents herein, meaning thereby, that for all intents and purpose, the petitioner No. 2 was the principal employer and the respondents were the workmen and the contract entered into with the contractor was merely a camouflage. In that regard, the learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India LTD. & Others Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers & Others, (2001) 7 SCC 1 and, more particularly, to Paragraph No. 71 of the said judgment. 16. In the backdrop of the above submissions, this Court had also perused the records which were called for from the learned Industrial Tribunal. 17. Amongst the various documents which were exhibited, it appears that Exhibit No. 6 was the report dated 04.08.2010 of the Committee for grant of temporary status to casual workers under the Brahmaputra Board i.e. the petitioner No. 2 herein. The list of casual workers working under the petitioner No. 2 were duly mentioned. It is seen that from the said report and more particularly, the list that the names of the respondents appears in the list of casual workers working under the petitioner No. 2 who were recommended for conferring temporary status. Further to that, it is also seen that the names of the respondents were shown in the said list as engaged as casual workers, in the Pagladiya Dam Division-II. 18. Further to that, it is also seen that the names of the respondents were shown in the said list as engaged as casual workers, in the Pagladiya Dam Division-II. 18. At this stage, this Court finds it very pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India LTD. (supra) wherein the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed, that depending upon an adjudication, as to whether, the employment of a workman was a camouflage or was under the direct employment of the contractor, it can be ascertained, as to whether, there was a master-servant relationship between the principal employer and the workman. This Court finds it pertinent to take note of Paragraph No. 71 of the said judgment which is reproduced herein under: “ 71. By definition the term “contract labour” is a species of workman. A workman shall be so deemed when he is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer. A workman may be hired: (1) in an establishment by the principal employer or by his agent with or without the knowledge of the principal employer; or (2) in connection with the work of an establishment by the principal employer through a contractor or by a contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer. Where a workman is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by the principal employer through a contractor, he merely acts as an agent so there will be master-and-servant relationship between the principal employer and the workman. But where a workman is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by a contractor, either because he has undertaken to produce a given result for the establishment or because he supplies workmen for any work of the establishment, a question might arise whether the contractor is a mere camouflage as in Hussainbhai case and in Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. case etc.; if the answer is in the affirmative, the workman will be in fact an employee of the principal employer; but if the answer is in the negative, the workman will be a contract labour.” 19. case etc.; if the answer is in the affirmative, the workman will be in fact an employee of the principal employer; but if the answer is in the negative, the workman will be a contract labour.” 19. The learned Industrial Tribunal, on the basis of the evidence, had come to an opinion that it was merely a paper arrangement, by which, the respondents herein, who were all along under the employment of the petitioner No. 2, were being engaged through a contractor and this finding of fact is arrived at on the basis of evidence which included the order dated 29.04.2013 whereby, the petitioner No. 2 Board had disengaged the respondents. 20. It is very pertinent at this stage, to observe that this Court is not sitting as an Appellate Court over the Award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal and the exercise of the jurisdiction is limited to see, as regards the decision making process suffers from gross illegalities i.e. being without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous. This Court finds it relevant, at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Another Vs. Bikartan Das & Others, ( 2023) 16 SCC 462 and more particularly, Paragraph Nos. 49 and 50 which deals with, as to how, the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court is required to be exercised. The said paragraphs being pertinent are reproduced herein under: “ 49. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of the Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 50. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 50. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 21. In the backdrop of the above, if this Court duly takes note of the materials on record, the findings arrived at by the learned Industrial Tribunal and the disengagement of the respondents as would be seen from the communication dated 15.05.2013 and 29.04.2013 which have been already quoted herein above, it is the opinion of this Court that this is not a fit case for exercising the certiorari jurisdiction inasmuch as there appears to be no error in exercise of jurisdiction or is palpably erroneous. 22. Besides the above adjudication, this Court further finds it relevant to take in consideration a very vital aspect of the matter i.e. whether the industrial dispute still continues as on today inasmuch as the petitioners and, more particularly, the petitioner No. 2 on its own volition without any directions passed by this Court had engaged all the respondents except the respondent No. 1. It is pertinent to observe that this Court only directed payment of the last drawn wages and if the petitioners wished they would be at liberty to engage the respondents (except respondent No. 1) in any different location of the petitioner No. 2. The said order under no circumstances can be said to be orders directing reinstatement by this Court, but rather the petitioners have complied with the impugned award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal. Under such circumstances, the question of interference with the Award dated 20.03.2018 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal do not arise. Additionally, the directions passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal to pay a lump-sum of Rs. 50,000/- for each workmen in-lieu of back wages was a very conservative amount so directed to be paid, for which, the question of interference does not arise. 23. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned award dated 20.03.2018 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, for which, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. 24. The records which have been called for be returned back to the learned Tribunal below.