JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This writ petition arises out of a suit for declaration under Section 229 -B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short, 'the Act of 1950') with an alternate prayer for possession, if upon trial possession of the plaintiff and defendant No.2 be not established. By the judgments and decree impugned, passed concurrently by the three Courts below, the suit has been dismissed as not maintainable, the suit property being held not to be ‘land’ within the meaning of Section 3 (14) of the Act of 1950. 2. Before proceeding with this judgment, we must take note of the course of proceedings here, which show that by a judgment and order dated 14.12.2005, the writ petition was allowed with a remand to the Assistant Collector, respondent No.3, to decide Issue No.4 himself in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 31-A of the Act of 1950. 3. A recall application on behalf of the heirs and LRs of respondent No.9 was filed along with a delay condonation application, bearing C.M. Recall No.34408 of 2006 and C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.34411 of 2006 with a case that when judgment was passed on 14.12.2005, the petitioner was long dead and his heirs and LRs had not been brought on record, rendering the judgment void. Respondent Nos.7 and 9 also died pending the writ petition and their heirs and LRs too had not been substituted. The recall application along with the delay condonation application sought recall of the judgment and order dated 14.12.2005 and abatement of the writ petition. Pending the recall application, an application for substitution of the heirs and LRs of the deceased petitioner, Ram Raj, being petitioner Nos.1/1, 1/2 and 1/3, was allowed vide order dated 04.12.2006. It also needs notice that respondent No.7 is also dead and so also respondent Nos.8 and 9. Their heirs and LRs have been substituted much earlier. 4. Heard Mr. H.M.B. Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R.C. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Manik Chand Yadav, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 9/2 and 9/3 and Mr. Manoj Kumar, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 8/1, 8/2, 8/3 and 8/4. Respondent Nos. 7/1, 7/2 and 7/3 have been sufficiently served. No one appears on their behalf. The records have been perused. Manik Chand Yadav, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 9/2 and 9/3 and Mr. Manoj Kumar, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 8/1, 8/2, 8/3 and 8/4. Respondent Nos. 7/1, 7/2 and 7/3 have been sufficiently served. No one appears on their behalf. The records have been perused. 5. The petitioner instituted Suit No.398 of 1967 before the Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar, Azamgarh with a case that his father, Jagannath, whose other son was Ramjit, defendant No.2 to the suit, was the sirdar of land, comprising Plot No.169 of Khata No.36 and Plot No.170 of Khata No.51, situate in Village Churipur, Tappa Phareha, Pargana Nizamabad, Tehsil Sadar, District Azamgarh (for short, 'the suit property'). Jagannath was recorded as the tenure-holder of the suit property since 1350 fasli, and, after the abolition of zamindari, he became a sirdar of the same and recorded as such in the revenue records. Jagannath died in the year 1960, leaving behind him, his two sons, the petitioner Ram Raj and the other son Ramjit, as his heirs and LRs, entitled to inherit. The petitioner's name along with that of his brother Ramjit, defendant No.2 to the suit and respondent No.8 to the writ petition, was mutated in place of the deceased, Jagannath. The petitioner and his brother, Ramjit, accordingly, came to be recorded as sirdar of the suit property. Until the year 1369 fasli, according to the petitioner, Plot No.169 was recorded as one plot with an area of 0.369 acres. 6. The case is that in 1370 fasli, respondent No.7 to the writ petition, now represented by his heirs and LRs, who is defendant No.1 to the suit, in collusion with the Patwari, got Plot No.169 trifurcated and recorded as Plot Nos.169/1 (0.62), 169/2 (0.203) and Plot No.169/3 (0.095). A khatauni for the fasli year 1369 and khasra for the fasli year 1370 has been placed on record by the petitioner to show this change, which he calls to be without authority of the law. In substance, it is said that this entry in favour of Harish Chandra in column No.6 of the khasra is fictitious, collusive and contrary to the Land Records Manual. It is not backed by any order made by a competent Authority. It is in derogation of the petitioner's title and that of his brother, Ramjit. 7. In substance, it is said that this entry in favour of Harish Chandra in column No.6 of the khasra is fictitious, collusive and contrary to the Land Records Manual. It is not backed by any order made by a competent Authority. It is in derogation of the petitioner's title and that of his brother, Ramjit. 7. The short case then is that on the basis of this fictitious entry, Harish Chandra, paying ten times the annual land revenue, got his estate enlarged into bhumidhari with transferable rights. It is noteworthy that the suit here was instituted on 27.05.1966. It was contested by Harish Chandra, respondent No.7, who denied the plaint allegations, saying that he was the bhumidhar of the suit property recorded in his favour. One of the pleas raised in the written statement filed by Harish Chandra was that the suit property was not land within the meaning of Section 3 (14) of the Act of 1950, and, therefore, the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. This plea was founded on facts that the suit property was not being used for the purpose of agriculture or for purposes connected with horticulture, animal husbandry, pisciculture etc., and, had, therefore, ceased to be land within the meaning of Section 3 (14). 8. The suit came up for framing of issues before the Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh. He was apparently not the Assistant Collector, In-charge of the Sub-Division. He framed as many as nine issues. Of these, Issue No.4 read, 'Whether the plots in suit are land within the meaning of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act?'. The Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh referred the aforesaid issue to the Assistant Collector, In-charge of the Sub- Division or the S.D.O. on 06.02.1967 in accordance with the provisions of Section 331 -A of the Act of 1950. 9. The Sub-Divisional Officer carried out a spot inspection on 07.01.1968, drawing up an inspection memo, which is on record. He returned his findings on the issue on 04.07.1969, holding that the suit property is not 'land' but 'abadi'. The Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh vide his judgment and decree dated 22.04.1970 accepted the findings returned by the Sub-Divisional Officer under sub-Section (3) of Section 3 31-A of the Act of 1950, finding himself bound and dismissed the suit. 10. He returned his findings on the issue on 04.07.1969, holding that the suit property is not 'land' but 'abadi'. The Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh vide his judgment and decree dated 22.04.1970 accepted the findings returned by the Sub-Divisional Officer under sub-Section (3) of Section 3 31-A of the Act of 1950, finding himself bound and dismissed the suit. 10. The said decree was appealed by the petitioner, who is the plaintiff, to the Commissioner of the Gorakhpur Division. The appeal came on for hearing before the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur on 22.07.1971. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Trial Court's decree. 11. A second appeal was then carried to the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, being Second Appeal No.285(z) of 1970-71. This appeal too failed with the Board dismissing it vide judgment and decree dated 24.05.1978, affirming the Courts below. 12. Aggrieved by the judgments of the three Courts below and the decree made by the Board, the petitioner, Ram Raj instituted this writ petition on 13.07.1978. It was admitted to hearing on 02.08.1978 and the petitioner's dispossession from the suit property restrained. Apparently, this interim order has continued in operation. 13. There has been one added feature to the lis, not much substantive in nature, and, that is that Harish Chandra transferred the suit property to respondent No.9, Ram Subhag. He is now represented on record by his heirs and LRs. 14. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Courts below have faltered in their understanding of the jurisdictional fact, entitling the Trial Court to make a reference under Section 3 31-A of the Act of 1950, in that, that it is in dispute if the suit property was land under Section 3 (14) of the Act of 1950 or abadi. Instead, according to the petitioner, the jurisdictional fact is that the suit property is a sirdari whereas according to defendant No.1/respondent No.7, he is a bhumidhar of some part of it. Instead, according to the petitioner, the jurisdictional fact is that the suit property is a sirdari whereas according to defendant No.1/respondent No.7, he is a bhumidhar of some part of it. Therefore, there was no occasion to make a reference to the SDO under Section 3 31-A. The other question, that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the Assistant Collector of the Sub-Division in this case was competent to decide the issue, if the suit property was abadi under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 3 31-A of the Act of 1950, read with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, and there was no occasion for him to refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer. 15. We are of opinion that so far as the second question is concerned, the Courts below are absolutely right in invoking sub- Section (1) of Section 331 -A of the Act of 1950 and not falling back on the proviso, inasmuch as the Assistant Collector, who tried the suit, was apparently not In-charge of the Sub-Division. He, therefore, sent it to the Sub-Divisional Officer, which means the Assistant Collector, In-charge of the Sub-Division. 16. So far as the first question is concerned, at this distance of time, and, given the statutory changes, where all sirdar have become bhumidhar, first with non-transferable rights and then with transferable rights, the relief claimed by the petitioner and his rights would have to be understood in accord with the law. At the hearing of this petition, the learned Counsel for parties have been at much issue, if indeed the question whether the suit property was agricultural or abadi, has all been correctly decided by the Trial Court. What they now submit is that the Courts below have erred in deciding the question if the suit property was land within the definition of Section 3 (14) of the Act of 1950 or abadi. We are of opinion, upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, that substantially the dispute in this petition is if indeed the suit property is land, regarding which the suit is cognizable by the Revenue Court or abadi, where the suit would be cognizable by the Civil Court. We are of opinion, upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, that substantially the dispute in this petition is if indeed the suit property is land, regarding which the suit is cognizable by the Revenue Court or abadi, where the suit would be cognizable by the Civil Court. The other question, that really matters, is, and, which we think, is the all important one now, is that if the suit property is indeed abadi, as held by the Courts below, should they have dismissed the suit or made an order, directing a return of the plaint for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction. 17. Upon a perusal of the Trial Court's order, we find that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Azamgarh, before deciding the issue of nature of the suit property, carried out a personal inspection thereof on 07.01.1968 and found it to be parti surrounded by a boundary wall, where no crop had been raised in the past 14-15 months. In deciding the question about the nature of land i.e. if it is abadi, the Sub-Divisional Officer opined the land to be crop-less for the last 2 or 3 years. He looked into the extracts of the khasra, where he found it to be recorded as abadi. He recorded a categorical finding that the suit property was not being used for purposes of agriculture or pisciculture etc. and that it was not land. This finding has been affirmed by the Additional Commissioner in appeal and also by the Board in second appeal. Nothing perverse has been demonstrated about this finding by learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Learned Counsel for respondent Nos.9/1 and 9/2, Mr. Manik Chand Yadav, has supported the finding and urged that the writ petition be dismissed. 18. We find that since the Courts below, in exercise of their power under Section 331 -A of the Act of 1950, have concurrently opined that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, they ought not have dismissed it. Instead, the plaint should have been returned for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction, which in this case would obviously be the Civil Court. The plaint with necessary amendments could then be presented to that Court. The disturbing part is that this process has consumed almost the lifetime of two generations. Instead, the plaint should have been returned for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction, which in this case would obviously be the Civil Court. The plaint with necessary amendments could then be presented to that Court. The disturbing part is that this process has consumed almost the lifetime of two generations. The action involved in this writ petition commenced in the year 1966 and this writ petition has taken 47 years to decide without event in the cause. We find ourselves helpless to enter judgment on merits of the parties' case, because neither the Revenue Court nor the Civil Court have tried the suit. This indeed is a very disturbing state of affairs and we think that for the future, wherever jurisdictional issues are involved, irrespective of the nature of proceedings before this Court or the Courts below, all causes must be placed on a priority schedule and decided within matters of weeks, if not days. 19. The issue as to what course of action is to be adopted in the event a suit is held not cognizable by the Civil or the Revenue Court, as the case may be, we may refer to Bansraj and others v. Moti and others , 2019 (11) ADJ 185 , where after a copious review of authority in point, I held: “ 45. A reading of the phraseology of Rule 10 which speaks about the exercise of power to return a plaint at any stage of the suit, and then the explanation clarifying that it can be exercised also by a Court of appeal or revision, in the opinion of this Court postulates that there is absolutely no class of cases or stage of proceeding where the power to return a plaint ought not to be exercised, once the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction. The fact that the power can be exercised by the Court of appeal or revision, that has been clarified through an explanation, logically takes within its fold those cases where trial has gone through the whole way. The principle that where a plaintiff moves a wrong Court that does not have jurisdiction to try the action that he has brought, must be penalized with a dismissal of his suit does not seem to fit into the scheme of things. The principle that where a plaintiff moves a wrong Court that does not have jurisdiction to try the action that he has brought, must be penalized with a dismissal of his suit does not seem to fit into the scheme of things. The question of jurisdiction at times may be quite debatable, or jurisdictional facts may depend upon determination of the Court to be made during trial subject to evidence, or at times upon an application of the law which the parties did not understand to be that what the Court has concluded. If any of these contingencies where the Court finds itself to be without jurisdiction, there is simply no reason to penalize a litigant with the dismissal of his suit. Looked at from another angle, a Court that opines not to have any jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit does not have jurisdiction to decide anything about it; a fortiori it has no jurisdiction to dismiss the suit.” 20. In this view of the matter, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed in part . The impugned judgment and decree dated 24.05.1978 passed by the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, the judgment dated 22.07.1971 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur and the judgment dated 22.04.1970 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh, are hereby quashed . A direction is issued to the Assistant Collector, First Class, Azamgarh, or whichever Court is its present successor, to return the plaint in Suit No.398 of 1967 to the plaintiff-petitioner, for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law, within six weeks of receipt of a copy of this order. It is further ordered that for a period of six months, or until appropriate orders are passed on the temporary injunction application, if made in the suit, now presented to the Court of competent jurisdiction by the plaintiff-petitioner, whichever is earlier, the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the suit property. 21. There shall be no order as to costs.