ORDER : 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner challenges the order of preventive detention dated 20.05.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent, which in turn was confirmed by the State, as per the G.O.Rt.No.1230 GAD (SC-I) Department, dated 25.06.2025. 2. Heard Mr. Ch.Raghavulu, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader attached to the office of the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the official respondent Nos. 1 to 5. 3. About five crimes were registered against a person by name Nadigatla Nookaraju (hereinafter referred to as ‘detenu’) in various police stations. All the said crimes are registered for the offences punishable under Section 7(B) r/w 8(A) etc., of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020, against the detenu. As the detenu has been repeatedly indulging in commission of the said offences of manufacturing illicit liquor and being in possession of the same and selling the same, the 2nd respondent, who is the detaining authority was of the opinion that the acts of the detenu in repeatedly indulging himself in committing the said offences are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as it has got the effect of causing harm to the health and life of the public. Therefore, he was of the view that an order of preventive detention is required to be passed against him to prevent him from committing the said offences in future. The liquor that was seized from him was also sent to the chemical analyst for examination. The chemical analyst, after examining the same, opined as per the report furnished by him that it is illicit distilled liquor and it is unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. Therefore, considering the said facts, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order of preventive detention dated 20.05.2025. After complying with the procedural prescriptions of law, the said order of preventive detention was in turn confirmed by the State by G.O.Rt.No.1230 GAD (SC-I) Department, dated 25.06.2025. So, the detenu has been in detention pursuant to the said orders of preventive detention passed by the 2nd respondent, confirmed by the State. 4. The petitioner is the wife of the detenu. She has challenged the said order of preventive detention on two grounds. So, the detenu has been in detention pursuant to the said orders of preventive detention passed by the 2nd respondent, confirmed by the State. 4. The petitioner is the wife of the detenu. She has challenged the said order of preventive detention on two grounds. It is her case that the detenu has submitted a representation to the 2nd respondent-detaining authority, as per the right conferred on him under the Act and without considering the said representation that he has passed the impugned order of preventive detention and even the Government also confirmed the said order without considering his representation and failure to consider his representation makes the impugned order of preventive detention invalid. The other ground urged by her is that the detenu was already in judicial custody in connection with another crime and while he was in judicial custody in the 5th crime that was registered against him that the impugned order of preventive detention was passed and it is not permissible under law and the order of preventive detention is vitiated on that ground also. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner is two-fold as narrated supra and on the basis of the above said two grounds, she sought to set-aside the impugned orders and set the detenu at liberty. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No.2, who is the detaining authority. Reiterating the contentions raised in the counter affidavit, learned Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents would contend that the detenu did not submit any representation either to the 2nd respondent-detaining authority or the State before passing the order of preventive detention and before the same was confirmed by the State. He submits that the order of detention was confirmed by the State on 25.06.2025 and thereafter, the detenu has submitted his representation on 28.07.2025 and as it was submitted subsequent to passing the orders of preventive detention and confirmation of the same, the question of considering the same does not arise and he contends that the petitioner cannot seek to impeach the impugned order of preventive detention on the said ground. As regards the second ground is concerned, it is contended by learned Government Pleader that even though the detenu has been in judicial custody in one crime, nothing prevents the detaining authority to pass an order of preventive detention while he was in judicial custody and the said ground also cannot be made as basis for challenging the order of preventive detention. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others, (1992) 1 SCC 1 . 6. We have meticulously considered the aforesaid relied contentions raised by both the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader. 7. First, we would like to deal with the second ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. As noticed supra, according to him, the detenu was in judicial custody in the Fifth crime i.e., in Crime No.185 of 2025 of Prathipadu Police Station, registered on 13.05.2025 for the offences punishable under Section 7(B) read with 8(A) of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and he was arrested in connection with the said crime on 15.05.2025 and he was remanded to judicial custody and while he was in judicial custody that the impugned order of preventive detention was passed on 20.05.2025. So, according to him, when the detenu was already in judicial custody in connection with a crime that was registered against him, the order of preventive detention cannot be passed. The legal position in this regard has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the above cited judgment of Abdul Sathar’s case. In the said judgment, the Apex Court has considered the earlier cases decided on the point and ultimately summarized the law. In para No.12, while laying down the law and reaching to the conclusion, it is held as follows: “A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody.” 8. In para No.12, while laying down the law and reaching to the conclusion, it is held as follows: “A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody.” 8. Therefore, from the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, the legal position is now very clear that the mere fact that a person was already in custody at the time of passing the order of preventive detention will not make the order of preventive detention invalid. It is clear from the said law that a detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person, who is already in custody. 9. Therefore, the order of preventive detention in the present case cannot be set-aside on the said ground urged by the petitioner. Apropos the first ground that is urged by the petitioner that the representation made by the detenu was not considered by the detaining authority or the State is concerned, admittedly, the order of preventive detention was passed on 20.05.2025 and the said order was confirmed by the State, after complying with the procedural prescriptions of law on 25.06.2025. The detenu did not submit any representation to the detaining authority before passing the said order of detention or to the State before confirming the said order of detention. Admittedly, he has submitted his representation after confirmation of the order of detention i.e., on 28.07.2025. Therefore, when he has not submitted his representation well within the time, there was no occasion for both the detaining authority and also the State to consider his representation. But, the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others, (1991) 1 SCC 476 at para No.20 of the judgment, held as follows: “It may be borne in mind that the confirmation of detention does not preclude the Government from revoking the order of detention upon considering the representation. Secondly, there may be cases where the Government has to consider the representation only after confirmation of detention. Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the representation could be received even after confirmation of the order of detention. Secondly, there may be cases where the Government has to consider the representation only after confirmation of detention. Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the representation could be received even after confirmation of the order of detention. The words ‘shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order’ in Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the obligation of the government is to offer the detenu an opportunity of making a representation against the order, before it is confirmed according to the procedure laid down under Section 8 of the Act. But if the detenu does not exercise his right to make representation at that stage, but presents it to the government after the government has confirmed the order of detention, the government still has to consider such representation and release the detenu if the detention is not within the power conferred under the statute. The confirmation of the order of detention is not conclusive as against the detenu. It can be revoked suo motu under Section 11 or upon a representation of the detenu.” 10. Therefore, from the law enunciated by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, the legal position is now very clear that the detenu got right to submit representation even after confirmation of the order of detention by the State. It is for the State to consider the same and to pass appropriate orders according to law, on it. 11. Even though, it is stated that the representation was submitted to the 2nd respondent-District Collector and not to the State, after confirming the order, the Collector has to forward the said representation to the State, which has confirmed it, to consider the same and to pass appropriate orders on it according to law. Therefore, in view of the legal position discussed above, the order of preventive detention cannot be held to be invalid at present. It cannot be set-aside on the two grounds urged by the petitioner. But a direction is required to be given to the 1st respondent-State to consider the representation that was submitted by the petitioner belatedly after the confirmation order was made by the State and pass appropriate orders on it, according to law. The 2nd respondent-District Collector has to forward the representation to the State. But a direction is required to be given to the 1st respondent-State to consider the representation that was submitted by the petitioner belatedly after the confirmation order was made by the State and pass appropriate orders on it, according to law. The 2nd respondent-District Collector has to forward the representation to the State. The petitioner is also at liberty to submit a fresh representation, if he intends, to the State to consider the same. 12. Therefore, the Writ Petition is disposed of, accordingly, with the above direction. 13. As already representation was submitted by the petitioner on 28.07.2025, the 2nd respondent-District Collector shall forward the same to the State within one (1) week from date of this order and on receipt of the same, the State has to pass appropriate orders on it, according to law within one (1) week from date of receipt of the said representation from the 2nd respondent-District Collector. If the petitioner submits any fresh representation, then also, the State has to consider it and pass appropriate orders on it, according to law within one (1) month from date of receipt of the said representation. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.