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2025 DIGILAW 1209 (JHR)

Shiv Shankar v. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary

2025-04-29

RAJESH KUMAR, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent, is directed against the order dated 14.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1021 of 2024, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 09.10.2023 passed by the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division has been assailed, by which, the order passed by the revisional authority has been held to be proper and the writ petition has been dismissed. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under: 2(i). It is the case of the writ petitioner that respondent No.5 is the owner of one shop in ground floor and mezzanine floor under Shop No.13 situated at Ranchi Club Complex, Main Road, Ranchi. The writ petitioner approached the respondent No.5 for renting the shop for a showroom in name and style of ‘Satya Paul’ in the year 2010 and accordingly, the writ petitioner and respondent No.5 entered into a lease agreement dated 06.10.2010. In terms of said lease agreement, the respondent No.5 agreed to let out the shop with all fixtures on a rent of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) per month for the period of 11 months. After expiry of the said lease agreement dated 06.10.2010, petitioner and respondent No.5 entered into a lease agreement dated 06.10.2011 for the period of 11 months, reiterating the terms and conditions of the earlier agreement and further agreement was entered on 01.09.2012. 2(ii) It is the further case of the writ petitioner that he was in possession of the shop and was complying with all the terms and conditions of the agreement and there was a good relation between the writ petitioner and respondent No.5. Again, after the expiry of the lease agreement dated 01.09.2012, the writ petitioner kept requesting the respondent no.5 to renew the lease in favour of the writ petitioner, but the respondent No.5 kept assuring the writ petitioner of renewing it when he visits Ranchi, as he was posted outside Ranchi. The respondent No.5 failed to renew the lease agreement, the writ petitioner was constrained to send a letter dated 13.05.2016 to the respondent No.5 requesting him to renew the lease agreement. The respondent No.5 failed to renew the lease agreement, the writ petitioner was constrained to send a letter dated 13.05.2016 to the respondent No.5 requesting him to renew the lease agreement. Instead of renewing the lease agreement, the respondent No.5 served a legal notice dated 20.05.2016 on the writ petitioner for eviction of the petitioner from the shop in question. 2(iii). Subsequently, respondent No.5 filed a petition bearing J.B.C. (Eviction) Case No.51/2016 before the Rent Controller- cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar Ranchi under Section 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) of Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Vide order dated 22.01.2019, the Rent Comptroller- cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi has been pleased to direct the writ petitioner to pay the remaining arrear of rent and directed to vacate the premises in question. 2(iv). Thereafter, writ the petitioner moved to the Appellate Authority i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 09.07.2022 passed in J.B.C. Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19 under Section 36 of the Act has been pleased to set aside the order of the Rent Comptroller dated 22.01.2019 and allowed the writ petitioner to pay the arrears and to continue in the premises in question. 2(v). Against that order, the respondent No.5 moved before the Commissioner in Revision which was numbered as J.B.C. Revision Case No.30/2022 under Section 37 of the Act. The Commissioner has allowed the revision vide order dated 09.10.2023 whereby the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 09.07.2022 in J.B.C. Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19 has been set aside. Being aggrieved with the same, writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1021 of 2024 has been filed. 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant has entered into tenancy agreement by virtue of deed of agreement of lease dated 1 st September, 2012. The appellant has entered into possession of the said land in the capacity of tenant. The private respondent no.5, landlord has made an application before the Rent Controller-cum Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Ranchi by filing an application for eviction of the present appellant on the ground of Section 19(1)(a)(d)(e) of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2011’), i.e., on the ground of breach of condition of tenancy in default of making payment of rent and expiry of the period of lease. 4. 4. The Rent Controller, after hearing the parties, has passed the order on 22.01.2019, whereby and whereunder, the ground so far as it relates to Section 19(1)(a) has been found to be not established by the respondent no.5. However, the ground so far as it relates to default of making payment of rent has been found to be established and as such, the direction has been passed to pay Rs.6 lakhs in favour of respondent no.5 with an order of eviction of the premises in question. 5. The appellant has preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi being JBC Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19. The said appeal, on hearing the learned counsel for the parties, has been disposed of. The appellate court has found the element of default in making payment of rent. The appellant, however, has made Rs.6 lakhs on different dates in favour of respondent no.5 in compliance of the order passed by the Rent Controller-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Ranchi and as such, by accepting the assurance of the appellant of making payment of rent regularly, the appeal has been allowed by permitting the appellant to stay as tenant in the suit premises on the condition of making payment of regular rent. The order passed by the appellant authority has been challenged by filing revision before the Commissioner being JBC Revision Case No.30 of 2022. The revisional authority has hearrd the parties. The revisional authority has come to the conclusion that the appellant has violated the terms and condition of the agreement, since, he has handed over the possession of the shop on sub-lease and as such, the same has been held to be in violation of the provision of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, 2011. 6. The revisional authority, on the basis of the aforesaid ground, has passed an order of eviction and to handover the possession of the premises in question in favour of respondent no.5 herein. 7. The order passed by the revisional authority has been assailed by the appellant (tenant) by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. 8. The grounds have been raised that the revisional authority has erred in deciding the revision holding that in the light of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, 2011, the petitioner/appellant has violated the terms and conditions of the tenancy. 9. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. 8. The grounds have been raised that the revisional authority has erred in deciding the revision holding that in the light of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, 2011, the petitioner/appellant has violated the terms and conditions of the tenancy. 9. Such ground has been taken in the backdrop of the fact that the appellate court has allowed the appeal on the condition to pay regularly the rent, in the light of the provision of Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011. Therefore, the order passed by the revisional authority by coming to the finding of breach of condition of agreement ought not to have been taken into consideration. 10. The learned Single Judge, without appreciating the aforesaid fact, has passed the order by travelling to another issue without taking into consideration the fact of allowing the appeal to continue in the possession after making payment of arrears of rent. Argument advanced on behalf of Pvt. Respondent 11. Per contra, Ms. Bharti Kumari, learned counsel for the respondent no.5 has defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. It has been contended that the Rent Controller has passed order on the issue of breach of terms and conditions of the agreement, however, according to the Rent Controller, the same has not been established. However, the revisional authority has taken note of the said fact and on the basis of the admitted fact as available on record that the revisional authority has come to conclusion of breach of terms and conditions of agreement, since, the shop was sub-letted in favour of third party which is in violation of terms and conditions of the agreement. 13. Learned counsel has further submitted that the factum of default has already been established which is sufficient for the issue of eviction. 14. The learned Single Judge has gone into the issue of purport of the Act, 2011 and on consideration of availability of one of the grounds as available in the order passed by the appellate authority of making default of payment of rent and in that view of the matter, if the writ petition has been dismissed without showing interference with the order passed by the revisional authority, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. Analysis 15. Analysis 15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the authorities right from the Rent Controller to the appellate and the revisional authority as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 16. The issue which requires consideration in this case is:- (i) Whether the factum of default in making payment of rent as required for eviction as provided under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011 if has been found to be established, is it available for the higher forum to condone the said default on meeting out the same by defaulting party. (ii) Whether the order passed by the revisional authority by considering the finding so recorded of violation of the terms and conditions as one of the grounds for eviction as provided under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, 2011, if has been considered which will be said to be excess to the jurisdiction of the revisional authority in the light of the power exercised under Section 37 of the Act, 2011. 17. This Court, before considering the aforesaid two issues which are to be considered independent to each other, needs to refer herein the factual aspects. 17(i) It is the case that respondent No.5 is the owner of one shop in ground floor and mezzanine floor under Shop No.13 situated at Ranchi Club Complex, Main Road, Ranchi. The writ petitioner approached the respondent No.5 for renting the shop for a showroom in name and style of ‘Satya Paul’ in the year 2010 and accordingly, the writ petitioner and respondent No.5 entered into a lease agreement dated 06.10.2010. In terms of said lease agreement, the respondent No.5 agreed to let out the shop with all fixtures on a rent of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) per month for the period of 11 months. After expiry of the said lease agreement dated 06.10.2010, petitioner and respondent No.5 entered into a lease agreement dated 06.10.2011 for the period of 11 months, reiterating the terms and conditions of the earlier agreement and further agreement was entered on 01.09.2012. 17(ii) It is the further case that he was in possession of the shop and was complying with all the terms and conditions of the agreement and there was a good relation between the writ petitioner and respondent No.5. 17(ii) It is the further case that he was in possession of the shop and was complying with all the terms and conditions of the agreement and there was a good relation between the writ petitioner and respondent No.5. Again, after the expiry of the lease agreement dated 01.09.2012, the writ petitioner kept requesting the respondent no.5 to renew the lease in favour of the writ petitioner, but the respondent No.5 kept assuring the writ petitioner of renewing it when he visits Ranchi, as he was posted outside Ranchi. The respondent No.5 failed to renew the lease agreement, the writ petitioner was constrained to send a letter dated 13.05.2016 to the respondent no.5 requesting him to renew the lease agreement. Instead of renewing the lease agreement, the respondent No.5 served a legal notice dated 20.05.2016 on the writ petitioner for eviction of the petitioner from the shop in question. 17(iii). Subsequently, respondent No.5 filed a petition bearing J.B.C. (Eviction) Case No.51/2016 before the Rent Controller- cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar Ranchi under Section 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) of Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Vide order dated 22.01.2019, the Rent Comptroller-cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi has been pleased to direct the writ petitioner to pay the remaining arrear of rent and directed to vacate the premises in question. 17(iv). Thereafter, writ the petitioner moved to the Appellate Authority i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 09.07.2022 passed in J.B.C. Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19 under Section 36 of the Act has been pleased to set aside the order of the Rent Comptroller dated 22.01.2019 and allowed the writ petitioner to pay the arrears and to continue in the premises in question. 17(v). Against that order, the respondent No.5 moved before the Commissioner in Revision which was numbered as J.B.C. Revision Case No.30/2022 under Section 37 of the Act. The Commissioner has allowed the revision vide order dated 09.10.2023 whereby the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 09.07.2022 in J.B.C. Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19 has been set aside 18. The application for eviction has been filed admittedly under Section 19(1)(a)(d) & (e) of the Act, 2011, for ready reference, Section 19(1) is being referred as under:- “19. The Commissioner has allowed the revision vide order dated 09.10.2023 whereby the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 09.07.2022 in J.B.C. Appeal No.82R15 of 2018-19 has been set aside 18. The application for eviction has been filed admittedly under Section 19(1)(a)(d) & (e) of the Act, 2011, for ready reference, Section 19(1) is being referred as under:- “19. Eviction of tenant .-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of an order passed by the Controller on one or more of the following grounds;- (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person, for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Controller thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing that tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Controller shall pass an order accordingly; and fix proportionately the standard rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the standard rent fixed under Section 12. Explanation I. In this clause, the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (h) of Section 2. Explanation II. Explanation I. In this clause, the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (h) of Section 2. Explanation II. Where there are two or more buildings let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. (d) where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 27; (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on (f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building expiry of the period of tenancy; and (f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Municipality or the Municipal Corporation or the Regional Development Authority or any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully carried out without the premises being vacated.” 19. The response has been filed by the appellant before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller has given finding with respect to issue of breach of terms and conditions of the agreement. 20. It is evident from the material available on record particularly the application filed for eviction wherein the premises in question has been sub-letted in favour of third party. The terms and conditions of the agreement contains a condition that the third-party entry is prohibited, as would be evident from condition no.5, which is being referred as under:- “5. That it has been agreed between the parties that (he Lessee will have no right to sub-let die premises to any one.” 21. The Rent Controller has come to the finding that violation of breach of condition of agreement, has not been established by the respondent no.5. 22. That it has been agreed between the parties that (he Lessee will have no right to sub-let die premises to any one.” 21. The Rent Controller has come to the finding that violation of breach of condition of agreement, has not been established by the respondent no.5. 22. However, so far as the ground of default in making payment of arrears of rent is concerned, the same has been found to be established and assessment of amount of Rs.6 lakhs has been referred by the Rent Controller in the order dated 22.01.2019, which has been directed to be paid in favour of respondent no.5 with a direction for eviction of premises. 23. It is, thus, evident from the order passed by the Rent Controller that the factum of one of the reasons for eviction, i.e., default in making payment of arrears of rent has been found to be established. 24. 23. It is, thus, evident from the order passed by the Rent Controller that the factum of one of the reasons for eviction, i.e., default in making payment of arrears of rent has been found to be established. 24. It needs to refer herein that the provision of Section 19 contains a provision that where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of an order passed by the Controller on one or more of the following grounds;- (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person, for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Controller thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing that tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Controller shall pass an order accordingly; and fix proportionately the standard rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the standard rent fixed under Section 12. (d) where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 27; (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on (f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building expiry of the period of tenancy; and (f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Municipality or the Municipal Corporation or the Regional Development Authority or any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully carried out without the premises being vacated, meaning thereby, Section 19 contains altogether six conditions and as such, as per the statutory mandate even on establishment of one of the grounds as contained under Section19, the Rent Controller is to pass an order of eviction. 25. The order passed by the Rent Controller has been carried to the appellate authority. The appellate authority has exercised the power under Section 36 of the Act, 2011 which confers power to the appellate authority that after perusing the memorandum of appeal and hearing the appellant, if necessary summarily dismiss the appeal, or call for records of the case from the Controller and after examining such records and, if necessary, making such further enquiry as he thinks fit decide the appeal. 26. It is, thus, evident from the provision of Section 36 of the Act, 2011 that the appellate authority is to decide the matter after calling for the records of the case for the purpose of examining the material available on record. 27. It is evident from the order passed by the appellate authority wherein after perusal of record, the party having been heard by the appellate authority, has accepted the offer made by the appellant of making payment of Rs.6 lakhs which has been assessed by the original authority, Rent Controller on the head of default in making payment of arrears of rent. 28. 28. The appellant has undertaken to make payment of defaulted amount and on the basis of further undertaking of making payment of rent on month-to-month basis, he has continued to be in possession of the land, for ready reference, the relevant part of the order is being quoted as under:- “7. Heard both the parties to this appeal. On perusal of materials available on record I find that during the pendency of this appeal the appellant has paid Rs.4,00,000/- on 08.01.2021, Rs.1,00,000/- on 12.02.2021 and Rs.6,00,000/- on 15.12.2021 to the respondent no.2 in compliance of the order of this court. Also find that before approaching this court appellant had paid to the respondent no.2 Rs.4,30,000/- through NEFT on 21.12.2016 and Rs.4,30,000/- on 20.01.2017 through Demand Draft. Appellant also have given the assurance to pay the rent regularly to the respondent no.2. Therefore it shows that the appellant is ready and willing to pay the rent amount to the respondent no.2.” 29. The question which is now to be considered by this Court that when the Rent Controller, the Original authority has even come to the conclusive finding of establishing one ground for eviction and if on that basis, the order of eviction has been passed, is it available for the appellate authority to go contrary to the direction passed by the Rent Controller by meeting out the ground of eviction having been established by the Rent Controller, the original authority. 30. This Court, is of the view that it is not available for the appellate authority to travel beyond the prayer made in the original application that too if the application has been made under Section 19 of the Act, 2011 for eviction, wherein, one of the grounds has been established by the Rent Controller on contest. 31. Here, the appellate authority, the moment has accepted the undertaking given by the appellate of deposit of the amount of Rs.6 lakhs on different dates which itself clarifies that the appellate authority has also accepted the conclusive finding having been arrived at by the Rent Controller holding the appellant as defaulting party by not making payment of arrears of rent assessed to be Rs.6 lakhs. 32. 32. The purport of Section 19 is that the moment, the tenant is being held to be defaulting party, the same will be conclusive one and the nature of such finding holding the tenant to be defaulting party, cannot be allowed to be relaxed by giving liberty to such defaulting party of making payment of arrears of rent, as assessed by the Rent Controller. 33. The appellate authority has committed gross error and by doing that, he has exceeded his jurisdiction as conferred under Section 36 of the Act, 2011. 34. The respondent no.5, the landlord has preferred revision before the revisional authority invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 37 of the Act, 2011. 35. The revisional authority has called for the record, as per the power conferred and has also considered the issue in addition to the issue of default in making payment of rent of breach of terms and conditions as referred under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act 2011. 36. The revisional authority has found that the breach of terms and conditions has been established. The revisional authority therefore has come to the conclusion that the appellant has not been able to defend the same, since, the premises in question has been sub-letted in favour of one Nikita Narayan. 37. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised the ground that the consideration of an issue of Section 19(1)(a), which has been found to be not established by the Rent Controller, was not available for the revisional authority to adjudicate upon the same in absence of any challenge to that part of the order passed by the Rent Controller, i.e., the primary argument agitated. 38. So far as the argument of default in making payment of rent, which has been paid by the appellant during the pendency of appeal is concerned, the said fact is admitted one, the moment the said amount has been paid. 39. Making payment of the said amount assessed by the Rent controller as a ground for eviction is admitted one, as such, on that ground alone, the premises is required to be evicted in view of the purport of Section 19 of the Act, 2011. 40. 39. Making payment of the said amount assessed by the Rent controller as a ground for eviction is admitted one, as such, on that ground alone, the premises is required to be evicted in view of the purport of Section 19 of the Act, 2011. 40. The revisional authority ought to have taken into consideration the aforesaid issue while passing the order even without going through the issue of Section 19(1)(a), reason being that, if one ground is being established then the same is sufficient for order of eviction. 41. But since the revisional authority has gone into the issue of Section 19(1)(a) also and the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusive finding that while doing so, the revisional authority has not committed any illegality, hence, this Court is to decide the said issue. 42. This Court before considering the aforesaid issue needs to refer herein, the provision of Section 37 of the Act, 2011, which is being referred as under:- “ 37. Revision -(1) The Commissioner may, either of his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal under this Act. (2) The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing. (3) Such revision application shall be disposed of within six months from the date of filing of such application.” 43. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the revisional authority, Commissioner has been conferred with the power to exercise the revisional power of his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal under this Act. The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing. 44. The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing. 44. It is evident that the revisional authority has been conferred with the power to exercise the same on his own motion or even on application made in this behalf and while doing so, the revisional authority can revise any order passed by the Rent Controller or by the appellate authority on appeal under this Act, meaning thereby, the revisional authority can also suo motu consider the order passed by the Controller independent to that of the order passed by the appellate authority that is very specific in the aforesaid provision that the moment the stipulation has been made under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 that the revisional authority may revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal. 45. The power conferred to the revisional authority by conferring suo motu power itself clarifies the power of the revisional authority, i.e., only in order to rectify if the error committed either by the Rent Controller or by the appellate authority. 46. The moment, the power has been conferred to the revisional authority to exercise the power of revision of an order passed by the Controller and as such, it is not incumbent upon the revisional authority to throw out the revision if it has been filed directly against the order passed by the Controller. 47. Adverting to the issue of Section 19(1)(a) in the context of the aforesaid interpretation of Section 37, it would be evident that the Controller although has found the ground of Section 19(1)(a) having not been established by the respondent no.5. 48. The revisional authority, in exercise of power conferred under Section 37 of the revisional jurisdiction, has called for the original records and after perusing the entire things including sub-letting of the premises in favour of one Nikita Narayan and in that view of the matter, if the revisional authority has come to the conclusion by holding that the reason assigned before reaching to the conclusion of not establishing the element of Section 19(1)(a) regarding the breach of agreement which has been found to be not established, has been held to be improper finding. 49. 49. The revisional authority, further by exercising the power, has directed for eviction of the premises considering the reason of eviction as provided under Section 19(1)(a). 50. This Court, has already referred hereinabove that the premises is to be evicted only on the availability of one of the grounds if found to be established by the competent forum. 51. The default in making payment of rent as per the requirement as stipulated in condition no.19(1)(d) has been established and not only that the appellant has also admitted the said fact of default in making payment of arrears of rent accepting his status to be defaulting party, hence, on that count only, the order of eviction is to be passed. 52. Since the issue of Section 19(1)(a) has been agitated on behalf of the appellant, therefore, the said issue is being discussed herein keeping the fact into consideration that even on the ground of default in making payment of arrears of rent, it is a case of eviction. 53. The revisional authority, has gone beyond it, which has been said to be exceeding jurisdiction by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, but we are not impressed with such argument, reason being that the revisional authority has been conferred with the power under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 to revise any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority. The word is not that the revision is to be exercised against the order passed by the appellate authority, rather, the revisional power is to be exercised independently either the order having passed by the Controller or by the appellate authority. 54. Therefore, this Court is of the view that while considering the issue of Section 19(1)(a) by the revisional authority as was considered by the Rent Controller, the revisional authority has not committed any error. 55. This Court, on discussion of the aforesaid fact as above and adverting to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that if the learned Single Judge has come to the view that while considering the issue of Section 19(1)(a), the revisional authority has not committed an error, which according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 56. 56. Further, the learned Single Judge in order to reach to such conclusion has also relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of E. Palanisamy Vrs. Palanisamy (dead.) by Lrs. & Ors., reported in ( 2003) 1 SCC 123 and Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begaum (smt.) & Ors. , reported in (1994) 2 SCC 671 57. This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussion and in entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 58. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed. 59. Pending Interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Rajesh Kumar, J.-I agree