JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant review petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking review of the order dated 25.04.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No.2265 of 2023. 2. It needs to refer herein that the judgment passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No.2265 of 2023 has been carried to the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal being S.L.P. (C) Diary No.42077 of 2024. The same, however, was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court seeking review. Accordingly, the said Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file review, for ready reference, the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court needs to be referred, as under:- “1) Learned senior counsel for the petitioner prays for withdrawal of this special leave petition with liberty to approach the High Court seeking review. 2) As prayed, the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty.” 3. The present review therefore has been filed in pursuant to the aforesaid liberty. Facts 4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition which also carried in the instant review petition, needs to be referred which reads as under:- 5. It is the case of the review petitioner/writ petition that the petitioner joined the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) on 24/02/1992 as stenographer and was promoted as Personal Assistant (PA) on 02/05/2008 retrospectively w.e.f. 14/07/1997. The review petitioner was disciplined and dedicated employee of the Organization, working with sincerity and devotion to duty. The petitioner, while in service, was never communicated about any adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR). 6. Thereafter, one Smt. Dashma Bobonga filed an FIR No.0073 on 23/06/2017 with Sadar Police Station, Chaibasa alleging false allegation that the petitioner, her sister’s son ’Sanjat Alda’ and one Ram Chandra Mukhi have fraudulently withdrawn Rs.1,91,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Ninety One Thousand Only) from her and her son and daughter’s savings bank account. In consonance to the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was arrested on 23/06/2017 and Rs.22,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Only) was seized from him. The petitioner was released on bail on 04/09/2017. The petitioner was placed under deemed suspension w.e.f. 23/06/2017 vide order no. JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/08 dated 27/06/2017. 7. In consonance to the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was arrested on 23/06/2017 and Rs.22,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Only) was seized from him. The petitioner was released on bail on 04/09/2017. The petitioner was placed under deemed suspension w.e.f. 23/06/2017 vide order no. JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/08 dated 27/06/2017. 7. The Head Quarter of the petitioner during suspension was changed to District Office, Giridih as per order no. 12 dated 08/08/2017. However, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked vide order no.JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/61 dated 29/11/2017. 8. The Ld. Magistrate West Singhbhum at Chaibasa acquitted the petitioner vide order dated 18.09.2017. 9. Upon acquittal by the Ld. Trial Court on 18/09/2017, the petitioner received the Charge Memorandum dated 20/12/2018 under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CC & A) Rules, 1971 for the same allegations of which the Judicial Magistrate acquitted the petitioner, issued by the Addl. Central Provident Fund Commissioner (ACC), Bihar and Jharkhand for which departmental proceeding against the petitioner is still continuing. 10. The review petitioner under the Conduct Rules applied for permission to purchase a flat in the name of his wife on 11/12/2018. The petitioner, while submitting the aforesaid request, submitted that he shall finance the consideration money from (i) Personal savings Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs (ii) Withdrawal); from SPF Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs Only) and (iii) Personal loan Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs Only). Upon which, the Competent Authority granted permission vide letter no.JH/RO/RNCAdm-I/ immovable property/2018/9731 dated 01/01/2019. In consonance to aforesaid approval; the petitioner paid an amount of Rs. 27,00,000/- (Twenty Seven Lakhs Only) to the seller of the flat by withdrawing Rs.23,92,611/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lakhs Ninety Two Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Only) from his PF Account and the balance from his Personal Savings. Subsequent to the transaction, the respondent no. 4 started putting queries through various letters regarding personal savings of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) proposed to be saved in the next two years. 11. The DOPT issued Office Memorandum dated 11/03/2016 bearing no.25013/1/2016-Estt.-A-IV that "where autonomous institutions have adopted the provisions of FR 56(J), Administrative Ministry may ensure that they are strictly followed in letter and spirit. 12. Thereafter, the Respondent no. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) proposed to be saved in the next two years. 11. The DOPT issued Office Memorandum dated 11/03/2016 bearing no.25013/1/2016-Estt.-A-IV that "where autonomous institutions have adopted the provisions of FR 56(J), Administrative Ministry may ensure that they are strictly followed in letter and spirit. 12. Thereafter, the Respondent no. 3 in pursuance of DOPT OM dated 11/09/2015 issued circular no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56J/2015/589 dated 14/06/2017 relating to periodical review under Rule 56(J) of Fundamental Rules and Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and in pursuance thereto, respondent no.3 with the approval of respondent no.2 constituted the Screening Committee and Review Committee to consider the case of the officials of the Organization under Fundamental Rule 56 (J) of and Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 13. The respondents issued another circular no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56-J/2015/3959 dated 05/08/2019 wherein the participation of the vigilance representative in the Screening Committee was dispensed. 14. The Regional PF Commissioner, Ranchi forwarded assessment sheet of the petitioner for consideration of the Screening Committee as per letter no.JH/RO/RNC/Adm-I/FR 56J/2018/795/16748 dated 22/01/2020. The Assessment Report do not depict the correct information. The RPFC has expressed the opinion on presumption that due to their inquiry about savings of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) in next two years, the petitioner cancelled the transaction. In fact, totally ignored the factual aspect that seller/builder defrauded and cheated the petitioner. 15. The Screening Committee comprising (i) Additional Central PF Commissioner who is the Appointing Authority, (ii) RPFC-I of the Region who sent assessment report for placing before the Screening Committee and (iii) Assistant Director Vigilance who was not to be member of the Committee was constituted of the Screening Committee is per se illegal for two reasons viz; (i) senior most member being the appointing authority and the (ii) RPFC who sent adverse assessing report being member of the committee and associating Assistant Director Vigilance as a member in contravention of the circular dated 05/08/2019. 16. The Screening Committee considered the case of the review petitioner in their meeting held on 23/12/2020. The function assigned to the Screening Committee was to collate the service records of the petitioner and place the same before the Review Committee to consider the case of the petitioner under Rule 56 (J) of the Fundamental Rules. 16. The Screening Committee considered the case of the review petitioner in their meeting held on 23/12/2020. The function assigned to the Screening Committee was to collate the service records of the petitioner and place the same before the Review Committee to consider the case of the petitioner under Rule 56 (J) of the Fundamental Rules. But the Screening Committee dehors the jurisdiction and the function assigned to it as assumed the role of the Review Committee by recommending in conclusion "Based on above facts, the members of the Screening Committee are of unanimous opinion that Md. Mobin Alam, PA, is a fit case for compulsory retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 (J). The official has outlived his utility to the organization and has actually never been useful to the organization even in the past." The findings of the committee are totally contrary to the factual position on record. The minutes of the Screening Committee is only copying the Assessment Report sent by the RPFC. 17. The Review Committee in their meeting held on 09/03/2021 considered the recommendation of the Screening Committee. The Review Committee considered the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR) of the applicant. 18. The Review Committee is also influenced by the Charge memorandum no.118/ZO (BR&JH)/ Vig./ Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20/12/2018 which is issued for the same charges of which the Trial Court acquitted the appellant. Moreover, they failed to consider that the inquiry proceedings in respect of the charge memorandum was continuing to ascertain the truth of imputations and they cannot resort to action under Rule 56 (J) as a short cut to the inquiry and proving of the charges alleged against the applicant. 19. The Review Committee while recommending the petitioner for pre-mature retirement is influenced by the recommendation of Screening Committee and the remarks of the Screening Committee that the general reputation and trustworthiness of the petitioner has been so dismissal that despite holding the post of PA his services have rarely been used by any officer. The finding of the Review Committee is contrary to the factual position as the petitioner has been attached with different officers. The Review Committee recommended the applicant for pre-mature retirement under FR 56 (J) on the ground that the petitioner has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful which is contrary to the factual position as explained. 20. The finding of the Review Committee is contrary to the factual position as the petitioner has been attached with different officers. The Review Committee recommended the applicant for pre-mature retirement under FR 56 (J) on the ground that the petitioner has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful which is contrary to the factual position as explained. 20. Being aggrieved by the acts, actions and inactions of respondents against illegal and arbitrary orders, the petitioner approached Ld. Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench by filing Original Appeal No.050/00270/2021. The Ld. Tribunal, while disposing off the aforesaid Original Appeal vide order dated 07/05/2021 directed the respondents to consider and pass order on the representation of the applicant ( review petitioner herein) within time as per spirit of the DOPT OM on the subject dated 28/08/2020. 21. It is the further case of the review petitioner that in pursuance to the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted representations dated 24/05/2021 & 24/06/2021 before the respondent to decide the same in time and as per direction of the Ld. Tribunal, but instead of deciding the representation within the time as directed by the Ld. Tribunal, sought extension of time by filing application before Ld. Tribunal. Extension of time was granted by Ld. Tribunal subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand Only). Upon extension of time, the respondents rejected the representation of the petitioner on the recommendation of the Representation Committee vide order dated 23.12.2021. 22. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove based upon the pleading that the review petitioner was appointed as Stenographer in the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) on 24.02.1992 and promoted to the post of Personal Assistant on 14.07.1997. 23. The Screening Committee of the EPFO was constituted as per the circular dated 14.06.2017 for the purpose of scrutinizing the service records of the applicant. The meeting of the said Committee was conveyed on 23.12.2020 and found his case fit for retirement under Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rule. The decision so taken for compulsory retirement was passed on 28.04.2021. 24. The review petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 28.04.2021, had approached the tribunal by filing original application which was disposed of on 07.05.2021 with a direction upon the respondents to consider and pass order on the representation of the applicant within the stipulated period. 25. The decision so taken for compulsory retirement was passed on 28.04.2021. 24. The review petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 28.04.2021, had approached the tribunal by filing original application which was disposed of on 07.05.2021 with a direction upon the respondents to consider and pass order on the representation of the applicant within the stipulated period. 25. The respondents had considered and rejected the said representation vide order dated 23.12.2021, aggrieved thereof, the original application being Original Appeal No.051/00124/2022 has been filed. 26. The learned Tribunal, after calling upon the respondents, who had filed the written statement and on consideration of the rival submissions made on behalf of both the parties, the original application was dismissed declining to interfere with the impugned order taking into consideration the discussion made in the recommendation of the review committee, which according to the tribunal, cannot be called arbitrary or without any material, rather, the committee has considered the said report which shows the consideration of the service records of the applicant including the APARs, memorandums and warnings issued in past for dereliction of punctuality, diligence and absenteeism, applicant’s general conduct reflected through registration of FIR, his arrest and subsequent acquittal by the trial court on the basis of compromise and his evasive conduct about his savings. 27. The appointing authority, by applying the weeding out principle has constituted Screening Committee, in exercise of power conferred under the provision of Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rules. The authority, after taking into consideration the entire service book, has taken decision for compulsory retirement of the petitioner and accordingly, he has compulsory been retired. 28. The petitioner, being an employee of the Central Government, had approached to the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 051/00124/2022. The learned Tribunal has refused to interfere with the decision taken by the authority, against which, the writ petition has been filed. Argument advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioner 29. This Court has declined to interfere with the view taken by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal by dismissing the writ petition. The writ petitioner, against the dismissal of the writ petition, has approached to the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing S.L.P. being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.42077 of 2024. Argument advanced on behalf of the Review Petitioner 29. This Court has declined to interfere with the view taken by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal by dismissing the writ petition. The writ petitioner, against the dismissal of the writ petition, has approached to the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing S.L.P. being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.42077 of 2024. However, the said S.L.P. was withdrawn with a liberty to prefer review and accordingly, the present review petition has been filed by taking the following grounds:- (i) There is no consideration that APARs for the year 2016 has not been communicated to the petitioner but the same has also been taken as a ground for compulsory retirement. (ii) The petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case and once, he has been acquitted, filing of FIR cannot be construed to be a ground for compulsory retirement. (iii) The disclosure not made which was to be made in view of the provision of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 cannot come for consideration of weeding out principle, since, the property which was to be purchased finally, had not been purchased. (iv) The details of the communicated entries in service which is 19 in number but out of the same, 18 has been closed to be a stigma but even then, the same has been taken into consideration for weeding out principle. 30. Learned counsel for the review petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the same having not been considered in right perspective and as such, it is a fit case for exercising the power of review. Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent 31. Per Contra, Mr. Parth S. A. Swaroop Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2 to 4 has submitted that all the grounds which are being raised, have already been taken into consideration by this Court and the petitioner by re-agitating the same, is trying to make the said ground to be a ground for review, which is not permissible. 32. Moreso, the petitioner has travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court by challenging the order passed by this Court but the same has been withdrawn, however, the liberty was taken by him to file review. 33. 32. Moreso, the petitioner has travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court by challenging the order passed by this Court but the same has been withdrawn, however, the liberty was taken by him to file review. 33. It has been contended that merely because the liberty has been granted by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it does not mean that any ground is allowed to be agitated by the review petitioner making the same to be a ground for review, rather, the ground is only to be entertained if acceptable within the scope to exercise the power of review. All the four grounds have already been taken into consideration by this Court and as such, the said ground cannot be said to be a new one for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that error apparent on the face of record or the fact could not be produced in spite of all due diligence. 34. However, the submission has been made that all these aspects of the matter, have already been considered and taken note by this Court, which would be evident from the fact that the consideration of non-communication of APARs is itself evident from the details of communicated entries in service as referred at para-4.3 of the vigilance profile, which has been considered by this Court, available at page-23 of the judgment sought to be reviewed. 35. The 2nd ground that in the judicial proceeding, the petitioner has been acquitted, can also not be a ground, since, the said judgment in the criminal proceeding was passed on the basis of settlement, i.e., the entire amount, which the petitioner has not paid in favour of the claimant, had been agreed to be paid and accordingly paid by him in favour of the beneficiary and on that count, the beneficiary does not intend to contest the case and in that view of the matter, the criminal case was resulted in acquittal, hence, the said judgment cannot be said to be clean acquittal. 36. 36. It is further evident that the moment, the petitioner has made payment, it means that he has admitted the fact about non-disbursement of claimed amount in favour of the beneficiary which goes to the moral turpitude, integrity and honesty of the petitioner which has been taken into consideration while applying the weeding out principle on the basis of settled position of law that the entire service record is to be seen. 37. So far as the argument of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 is concerned, what has been argued on behalf of the petitioner is not acceptable, reason being that, whatever material or articles have been purchased, it is the statutory requirement in view of the provision of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 to communicate it to the appointing authority, so that the appointing authority may be conscious with respect to such purchase in order to come to the conclusion that whatever articles have been purchased either movable or immovable property, the same must be within the known source of income. 38. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that all these grounds however cannot be taken as a ground to review merely because the counsel who had represented the writ petition now has been replaced by another. Analysis 39. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, pleadings and the order sought to be reviewed. 40. This Court, before coming to the power/scope to exercise the scope of review seeking review of the said order, needs to refer the underlined principle on which the power of review, is to be exercised. 41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ] , particularly, at paragraph-32 has observed as under: “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” 42. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India , (1980) Supp. SCC 562 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under: “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: ‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 43. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 43. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:— (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 44. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence having been taken in the matter of making available the factual aspect of the relevant documents. 45. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of the due diligence, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra). 46. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the power of review can be exercised only the two folds ground, i.e., (i) if there is any error apparent on the face of the order; or (ii) the fact which could not have been brought to the notice of the court in spite of the due diligence having been taken by the concerned party. 47. Further, law is well settled that a review petition, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 , for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” 48. Similarly, in S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai Kannan and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to? In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order. It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which the controversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under: “(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1. (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.” 49. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review. 50. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 51. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 52. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr . , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7, which reads as under:- “16.1. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr . , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7, which reads as under:- “16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. 16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. 16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review. 16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". 16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. 16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.—" 53. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussion it is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognized and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made. 54. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 54. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of review. Further an error which is not self- evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. 55. It is evident from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the parameters have been fixed in the recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , and in sum and substance, the power of review can only be exercised if there is error apparent on the face of order or the fact could not have been produced in spite of due diligence. 56. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case by taking into consideration the ground, as has been agitated on behalf of the petitioner, we are now proceeding to examine as to whether, the same can be said to be a ground to exercise the power of review. 57. The 1st ground has been taken regarding acquittal in the criminal case. 58. Although, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case but as would be evident from the judgment of acquittal which has been passed on the basis of settlement in a case where the petitioner while working in Employees Provident Fund Organization, has not disbursed the money in favour of legitimate beneficiary and in consequence thereof, based upon the FIR, the judicial proceeding had commenced. 59. The charge-sheet was submitted and the trial was proceeded by framing charge under Sections 467, 468, 471 & 120B of the IPC. The beneficiary, in course of trial, has agreed for settlement, as offered by the petitioner by expressing wishes of making payment of the legitimate amount in favour of the petitioner and accordingly, the amount has been paid. 60. The charge-sheet was submitted and the trial was proceeded by framing charge under Sections 467, 468, 471 & 120B of the IPC. The beneficiary, in course of trial, has agreed for settlement, as offered by the petitioner by expressing wishes of making payment of the legitimate amount in favour of the petitioner and accordingly, the amount has been paid. 60. The competent court of criminal jurisdiction, based upon the aforesaid settlement, has decided the judicial proceeding by acquitting the petitioner. 61. It is, thus, evident that the criminal case has not been decided on merit, rather, on the basis of settlement that too, on the admission made on behalf of the petitioner in the judicial proceeding by accepting to make payment in favour of the beneficiary. 62. The aforesaid fact has been taken into consideration by this Court, as would be evident from paragraph-57 of the impugned order (writ petition), wherein, the issue of integrity and moral turpitude has been taken note on account of the fact that the amount which was to be given in favour of the beneficiary under the EPF has not been given and subsequently, on the basis of the compromise when the criminal case was instituted, the said criminal case was ended in settlement, for ready reference, paragraph-57 of the order impugned (writ petition) is being quoted as under:- “ 57. It has also been considered about the issue of integrity and moral turpitude and not only that, the amount which was to be given in favour of the beneficiary under the EPF has not been given and subsequently, on the basis of the compromise when the criminal case was instituted, the said criminal case was ended.” 63. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the ground which is being taken regarding the issue of acquittal in the criminal case, has already been taken into consideration by this Court while deciding the writ petition and hence, it is not available for the review petitioner to re-agitate the aforesaid issue by making the same as a ground. 64. This Court, therefore, applying the principle upon which the power of review is to be exercised, is of the view that the ground of acquittal cannot be a ground for review, since, it has already been taken into consideration by this Court. 65. 64. This Court, therefore, applying the principle upon which the power of review is to be exercised, is of the view that the ground of acquittal cannot be a ground for review, since, it has already been taken into consideration by this Court. 65. The 2 nd ground has been taken that the entry made of the year, 2016 has not been communicated. The same has also been taken into consideration by this Court, as would be evident from paragraph-50, wherein, details of the communicated entries in the service book have been referred by taking note of paragraph-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the service record, which has been taken into consideration by the Screening Committee, for ready reference, paragraph-50 of the order impugned (writ petition) is being quoted as under:- “ 50. The details of the communicated entries in the service book has been taken into consideration along with the failure on the part of the writ petitioner for giving intimation of property transaction made by the officials, for ready reference, the details as referred in paragraph-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the consideration made by the Screening Committee are being referred as under:- “ 4.2 Vigilance Profile 4.2.1 A case No. G.R. Case No. 318/2017/TR No. 461/17 was filed against Sh. Mobin Alam, PA in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa for offences punishable under Section 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Sh. Mobin Alam PA was acquitted by the District and Session Judge-I Chaibasa vide order dated 18.07.2017 but the acquittal was on the basis of compromise between the accused and the complainant. The facts of the case are as follow:- i. Shri Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridhi while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur cheated and withdrew Rs. 1,91,000/- from pension accounts of Smt. Dashma Bobonga W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa, East Singhbum and her two children in collusion with two other accomplices. A FIR was filed against them in Sadar Thana, Chaibasa and the Police authority taking immediate action arrested him along with cash amount Rs. 22,000/- ii. 1,91,000/- from pension accounts of Smt. Dashma Bobonga W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa, East Singhbum and her two children in collusion with two other accomplices. A FIR was filed against them in Sadar Thana, Chaibasa and the Police authority taking immediate action arrested him along with cash amount Rs. 22,000/- ii. The trial court in its order dated 18.09.2017 pronounced the order as –“After going through the evidence of the prosecution witness, it is clear that during illegal transaction all accused persons have not prepared any forged document to withdraw the amount from the A/c of informant, her son and daughter. Hence, no case is made out for the offences u/s 467, 468, 471, 120(B) IPC rest section 420 IPC is compoundable in nature with permission of the court. The informant and her son and daughter have deposed that they have received all amount from the accused person and they do not want to proceed in this case. They agreed to settled their dispute happily. Informant, PW2 and PW3 have stated that on the po8int of compromise that accused was returned all amount and both parties have settled their dispute and not they do not want to proceed further in this case. On joint compromise petition dated 01.07.2017 both parties have signed which are duly identified by their respective lawyer. There is no public policy involved. The compromise petition is in order. Under such circumstances, compromise petition is hereby accepted. Hence, the accused persons namely 1. Mobin Alam 2. Ram Chandra Mukhi and 3. Sanjay Alda are hereby acquitted from all the charges of this case on compromise basis. They are also discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bond. 4.2.2 One Charge Memorandum No. 118/Zo(BR&JH)/Vig./Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20.12.2018 has been issued under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CCA) Rules, 1971 which is pending at the inquiry stage. The charges against the official in the said charge memorandum are- (a) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur willfully committed grave misconduct by cheating and resoring to withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 1,91,000/- from the saving Bank Account of Smt. Dashma Bobonga, W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa. The charges against the official in the said charge memorandum are- (a) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur willfully committed grave misconduct by cheating and resoring to withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 1,91,000/- from the saving Bank Account of Smt. Dashma Bobonga, W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa. East Singbum and also from the Savings bank Accounts of her two children in collusion with other accomplices namesly Shri Ram Chandra Mukhi s/o Shri Bogeswar Mukhi Medical Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda, S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, vill- Harilatola, Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, Vill Harilatola, Thana Mufsil Chaibasa in a fraudulent manner. (b) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur was reportedly found at Punjab National Bank, Chaibasa on 23.06.2017 without getting headquarters leaving permission. He had taken Restricted Holiday Leave for 23.06.2017 but did noit apply for headquarters leaving permission. Without headquarters leave permission, he left the headquarter. The matter of not taking headquarters leave permission has been confirmed by Regional Office, Jamshedpur vide letter No. JH/RO/JSR/Adm/Pers/528/03/409 dated 02.11.2018. It is violation of Provision FR- 11 which provides that permission for leaving headquarter is essential for government servant before leaving the headquarter. 4.3 Details of communicated entries in Service Book- i Memorandum dated 22.01.2003 for deserting his seat and leaving office during the office hour on regular basis without any permission. ii Memorandum dated 18.02.2003 for deserting his seat and leaving the office without prior permission of or intimation to the competent authority. iii Memorandum dated 01.02.2005 for failure to dispose the work assigned to him. iv Memorandum dated 06.07.2005 from absence fro office without permission and to submit daily work report. v Memorandum dated 05.08.2005 to be punctual and disposal of work assigned to him. vi Memorandum dated 25.11.2005 for not coming to office in time. vii Office noted dated 20.04.2006 not allowing Shri Mobin Alam to mark his attendance on 20.04.2006 as he did not attend office in time and treating his absence as leave without pay till it is regularized by the competent authority. vi Memorandum dated 25.11.2005 for not coming to office in time. vii Office noted dated 20.04.2006 not allowing Shri Mobin Alam to mark his attendance on 20.04.2006 as he did not attend office in time and treating his absence as leave without pay till it is regularized by the competent authority. viii Memorandum dated 18.05.2012 for absence from office on 18.05.2012 2.00 PM ix Memorandum dated 28.08.2012 for absence from office on 28.08.2012 at 3.00 PM x Office Noted dated 25.09.2012 for absence from office on 28.08.2012. Note given by APFC (Cash) on 27.09.2012 with reference to office note dated 25.09.2012 stating that the submission of Shri Mobin Alam is absolutely false and baseless. xi Warning dated 20.11.2012 for absence from office without intimation. xii Memorandum dated 06.02.2014 for not disposing a grievance case within due date. xiii Memorandum dated 27.03.2014 for absence without any permission on 27.03.2014 at 12.45 P.M. xiv Memorandum dated 05.12.2014 from absconding from duty without any information/prior permission. xv Memorandum dated 18.02.2015 for late coming to office as well as non-appearance in the office as and when he calls upon. xvi Memorandum dated 13.05.2016 absence from duty on 12.05.2016 without any information. xvii Recordable Warning dated 14.06.2016 for unauthorized absence. xviii Memorandum dated 30.03.2017 for absence from office on 30.03.2017 xix Warning dated 13.04.2017 for unauthorized absence from office.” 4.4 Regarding intimation of property transactions made by the official- On 11.12.2018, he had given an application in APPENDIX-V seeking prior intimation or previous sanction under rule 18(2) of CCS conduct rule, 1964 regarding purchase of flat worth Rs, 50,00,000 (Fifty lakhs) wherein source of funding was reported as Rs, 10,00,000/- from personal saving, Rs. 15,00,000/- from personal Loan and Rs. 25,00,00/- from SPF. In reply to further query, he replied that he intends to save the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- within a period of 2 years at the time of taking delivery of flat. When further query was raised about near impossibility of such high saving within two years, he changed his stance and stated that "I have made conversation with the members of family and friend circle who have promised to provide loan but they refused to give prior approval. When further query was raised about near impossibility of such high saving within two years, he changed his stance and stated that "I have made conversation with the members of family and friend circle who have promised to provide loan but they refused to give prior approval. He further made an excuse that "the sentence used by me for taking financial supports from my family and friends was under personal savings and not under personal loan." Subsequently, when he was asked to submit all the saving details, he informed the office that he has cancelled the transaction ostensibly citing that the builder has sold out the flat to other person after taking amount from him and thereafter he has moved the Civil Court, Jamshedpur against the builder.” 66. It is further evident from paragraph-51, wherein, it has been observed by this Court that the Screening Committee, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has come to the conclusion that the services of the writ petitioner have rarely been utilized by any Officers. 67. It has further been observed at paragraph-52 that it can be summarized that the expression “dead wood” as referred by the Hon’ble Supreme Court aptly describes this official as he has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful and hence, the Review Committee after going through the relevant documents and applying its mind and other facts as available in the records, has opined that it is a case for invocation of the provisions under Fundamental Rule 56(J), for ready reference, paragraph-52 is being referred as under:- “ 52. Thus, from the conspectus of above, it can be summarized that the expression “dead wood” as referred by the Hon’ble Supreme Court aptly describes this official as he has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful and hence, the Review Committee after going through the relevant documents and applying its mind and other facts as available in the records, has opined that it is a case for invocation of the provisions under Fundamental Rule 56(J).” 68. The argument which has been advanced by making the ground for review that the entry made of the year, 2016 has not been communicated, which cannot be said to be a ground for acquittal in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vrs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada & Anr. Vrs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada & Anr. , reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 , upon which, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon, wherein, it is evident that the consideration can be given if the order of compulsory retirement has been passed solely on the basis of one action, as has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex at paragraph-32 of the said judgment that “it is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law.” 69. But herein, it is not the fact like that, rather, the reason for compulsory retirement is manifolds and not based upon one ground. Therefore, the conclusion which has been arrived by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-34 of the said judgment, having been relied upon by this Court, wherein, it has been held that the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. However, due care is to be given that they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed mala fide or it is based on no evidence or it is arbitrary. 70. The further consideration as has been referred at paragraph-34(iv) is that the government shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. For ready reference, paragraph-32 to 34 of the said judgment are being referred as under:- “ 32. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the rules/orders in that behalf. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the rules/orders in that behalf. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation or representations, as the case may be. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of the recent years are not communicated or if communicated, the representation received in that behalf are pending consideration. On this account alone, the action under F.R. 56(j) need not be held back. There is no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the government, if it chooses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks, would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that they are not communicated to the government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if any representation made by the government servant is there, it shall also be taken into consideration. We may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law. We may mention in this connection that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution is no less an important safeguard. Even with its well known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action. 33. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks — not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. Even with its well known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action. 33. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks — not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well stated in J.N. Sinha [ (1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791 ] and other decisions referred supra. 34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary — in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter — of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” 71. The another ground has been taken regarding the applicability of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The same cannot also be said to be a new ground, rather, the same has been taken into consideration by this Court, as would be evident from paragraph-58 of the order impugned (writ petition). 72. Further, the ground has been taken that the disclosure had not been made, since, no property was purchased due to certain dispute. But, this Court has considered the provision of Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and found therefrom that the communication is to be given to the Employer prior to purchase of the said property. 73. This Court, on consideration of the ground for review, as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the review petitioner, is of the view that all the grounds have been considered by this Court exhaustively and no new thing has been brought said to attract the principle of error apparent on the face of record or anything could have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. 74. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the fact of the present case so far as exercising the power of review is concerned, is not coming under the law laid down by way of formulating the parameters as in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , hence, it is not a case where the power of review is to be exercised. 75. In the result, the instant review petition fails and is, dismissed. 76. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr. (supra ) , hence, it is not a case where the power of review is to be exercised. 75. In the result, the instant review petition fails and is, dismissed. 76. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Arun Kumar Rai-I agree