ORDER : V. SRISHANANDA, J. 1. Heard Sri. Akram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Sappannar Basavaraj Shivappa, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Defendant in O.S. No.756/2021 is the revision petitioner challenging the Order dated 05.09.2022 rejecting the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a), (b) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure in this revision petition. 3. Facts in the nutshell which are utmost necessary for disposal of the present petition are as under: 3.1 A suit for specific enforcement of alleged agreement of sale dated 01.07.2019 came to be filed by the respondent/plaintiff against the revision petitioner/ defendant. 3.2 The said suit is being contested by the defendant by filing written statement inter alia filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a), (b) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure. 3.3 Application was opposed by the learned Trial Judge by impugned Order dated 05.09.2022 inter alia holding in Paragraphs No.10 to 14 as under: 10. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have admittedly mentioned about the said writ appeal pending before Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka. Admittedly the writ appeal is pending before Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka at W.A.No.3915/2019. The right, title and interest of defendant is hanging on the outcome of said writ appeal. The question before court is as to whether the said appeal would come in the way of plaintiffs in agitating right over the said Agreement of Sale dated 01-07-2019. Admittedly the time for completion of contract was fixed by the parties in the said Agreement by agreeing to complete the contract within 06 months from the date of making good and marketable title by the prospective vendor. Therefore the said time starts from the date of making good The and marketable title by the prospective vendor. defendant cannot straight away invoke Section 17 of Specific Relief Act and deny the right of plaintiffs. The title of defendant has not been completely decided in the said appeal and he has not been decided as title less person. Therefore he cannot press into service the said Section. It is premature to invoke said Section 17 and held that the plaintiffs have entered Agreement with the title less person. As regards second component of said Section 17 is concerned it is premature to accept that the title of defendant is doubtful. Therefore he cannot press into service the said Section. It is premature to invoke said Section 17 and held that the plaintiffs have entered Agreement with the title less person. As regards second component of said Section 17 is concerned it is premature to accept that the title of defendant is doubtful. The said Section makes it very clear that the court can refused to enforce the said Agreement in its entirety against defendant when the case reached to the stage of directing the prospective vendor to execute Sale Deed. In the instant case the defendant has also contended that the said Agreement of Sale has been got executed by playing fraud and misrepresentation. Therefore the issue over execution of Agreement of Sale has to be tried and when it reached to the stage of directing the prospective vendor to execute Sale Deed within time fixed by the court, it can take note of Section 17(b) of Specific Relief Act. Therefore the factum of enforcibility of Agreement is concerned, the defendant can take aid of Section 17(b) of said Act at the time of final disposal of suit and if it reached to the stage of fixing date for completion of contract. He can take the shelter of said Section and make submission over the entitlement of relief of plaintiffs. 11. Interestingly the Record of Right is standing in the name of 3rd party by name Mr. V. Rajanna S/o Venkatappa. The nature of entry is shown as sale on 04- 07-2005. Therefore issue of title of defendant is not only couched with said writ proceedings it also indicate the interest of other 3rd party which requires to be examined. Therefore the defendant cannot invoke said Section 17 and seek rejection of plaint at this stage. The said application of Section 17(b) of Specific Relief Act will be considered at the appropriate stage if the right of defendant is still hanging on the outcome of dispute. 12. Secondly the defendant has contended that he has repaid the said advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest. He claimed that he has paid in all a sum of Rs.6,12,500/-. He has claimed that he has canceled the said G.P.A. and Agreement of Sale. The plaintiffs have denied the said assertion. The plaintiffs have contended that they have paid in all a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- to the defendant. He claimed that he has paid in all a sum of Rs.6,12,500/-. He has claimed that he has canceled the said G.P.A. and Agreement of Sale. The plaintiffs have denied the said assertion. The plaintiffs have contended that they have paid in all a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- to the defendant. The defendant has contended that he has returned advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/-. Therefore the said assertion of parties indicates that they are in variance in regard to payment of advance Sale Consideration. Therefore the said dispute of parties over exchange and return of advance amount requires to be adjudicated. It is well settled law that the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiffs cannot be doubted on the basis of contentions taken in the application. The averments of application and Written Statement are irrelevant in deciding the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C. Therefore the contention of defendant that he has returned the amount to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs have no cause to maintain The said fact suit cannot be accepted at this stage. requires trail. The counsel for defendant relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2015) 8 S.C.C. 331 to contend that if the plaint averments indicates non existence of cause of action the court can reject the pliant on the basis of said pleading. In the instant case the plaint averments indicates existence of dispute over Cancellation of Agreement and its enforcebility which would be considered by holding full pledge trail. Therefore the said citation will not assist the defendant in seeking rejection of plaint. 13. The defendant has also contended that the time for enforcement of contract has already been elapsed on 09- 01-2020. Therefore the plaintiffs have no cause to maintain the suit. Thought the said Agreement indicate time as the essence of contract which could be considered while examining the claim of plaintiffs in showing his readiness and willingness in enforcing the said contract. The said clause in the Agreement also indicate that it runs from the date of making marketable title. Therefore the said clause cannot be invoked at this stage to thrown out the plaint. The time limit to file suit for Specific Performance has been governed by Article 54 of Limitation Act which prescribes three year time to file such suit from the date of denial. Therefore the said clause cannot be invoked at this stage to thrown out the plaint. The time limit to file suit for Specific Performance has been governed by Article 54 of Limitation Act which prescribes three year time to file such suit from the date of denial. The present suit is filed within three years from the date of Agreement itself. Therefore the contention of defendant that the plaintiffs cannot maintain suit over the said Agreement of Sale cannot be accepted at this stage. 14. He has not The defendant has also contended that the plaintiffs have paid improper court fee. explained as to how the court fee paid by the plaintiffs is insufficient. Never the less the issue of court fee can also be adjudicated along with other issues by framing appropriate issues. Therefore the grounds urged by the defendant fails to aid him in seeking rejection of plaint. On over all reading of plaint with the documents produced by the parties the plaint averments indicate existence of cause of action. The plaintiffs claimed that the Agreement of Sale dated 01-07-2019 & General Power of Attorney dated 04-06-2019 & Memorandum of Understanding dated 20-06-2019 are still in existence and it could be enforced. The defendant denied the factum of existence of said Agreement. He has contended that he has revoked the said Agreement and Power of Attorney. The said issue requires to be tried. The question of entitlement of relief claimed by the plaintiffs has to be considered after full pledge trail by taking note of the dispute pending at writ appeal and by taking note of Section 17(b) of Specific Relief Act. Therefore the issue of entitlement of relief cannot be considered at this stage. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for defendant reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C.C. 2421 could be distinguished on fact. The title of defendant has not been finally decided in the said appeal. However that would not curtail the plaintiffs in seeking adjudication of his right over the said alleged Agreement. Therefore the claim of plaintiffs cannot be termed as false and vexatious at this stage. Hence I hold above point in the Negative. 4. The title of defendant has not been finally decided in the said appeal. However that would not curtail the plaintiffs in seeking adjudication of his right over the said alleged Agreement. Therefore the claim of plaintiffs cannot be termed as false and vexatious at this stage. Hence I hold above point in the Negative. 4. Being aggrieved by the same, defendant is before this Court in this revision petition on the following grounds: The impugned order passed by the Hon'ble Trial Court is erroneous on the face of the record since the Hon'ble Trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that, as per clause 4 Page No.11 of the Agreement for Sale dated 01.09.2019, it specifies that, the Sale Deed to be executed in favour of Respondents only when the title is clear from all embargoes. When such being the fact, the tile of the Petitioner is seriously disputed in batch of Writ Appeals in W.A No.3915-3916-3412/2019 wherein The performance of the Agreement of Sale is contingent in nature, as per the terms of the Agreement for Sale, the Sale Deed ought to have been executed in favour of the Respondents only when the title of the property is cleared from all the disputes. Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act envisages that: 32. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening. Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void. The suit filed by the Respondents to seek the relief of specific performance is premature and it does not give raise to cause of action to sue. The legislative intend under Section 32 of the Act clearly specifies that, if any event or happening does not happen, such contract cannot be enforced by law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has rightly held that: It is the duty of the court to interpret the document of contract as was understood between the parties, strictly, without altering the nature of the contract. A different interpretation cannot be given dehors the context, Polymat India (P) Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2005) 9 SCC 174 . In view of the above, the Hon'ble Trial Court has not perused the Agreement for Sale recitals/terms. A different interpretation cannot be given dehors the context, Polymat India (P) Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2005) 9 SCC 174 . In view of the above, the Hon'ble Trial Court has not perused the Agreement for Sale recitals/terms. This crucial aspect has been disregarded, as such, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. It is also pivotal to submit that, the case of the respondents in the suit for specific performance is also hit by the provisions of the Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as follows: 17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable: (1) A contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or lessor: The property, cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire of moveable property. In the instant case, the Petitioner has no tile as on date, so as to enable himself to execute the Sale Deed executed in favour of the Respondents. Thereby, even on this ground alone, the impugned Order deserves to be set aside. The impugned order suffers from grave legal infirmities, since the Hon'ble Trial have failed to look into the averments of the Plaint in OS No.756/2021, the plaint averments are glaring that, there is a title dispute pending in Writ Appeals and an order of status quo is subsisting against the Petitioner/Defendant with respect to Agreement for Sale property. When such being the fact, the same has been disregarded by the Hon'ble Trial Court before passing the impugned order. In this regard, The Hon'ble Apex Court in P.V Gururaj Reddy Vs. P.Neeradha Reddy (2015) 8 SCC 331 has rightly held that: Para No.5: it is the averments in the plaint that have to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law.... It is only if the averments in the plaint ex-facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under law the plaint can be rejected. It is only if the averments in the plaint ex-facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under law the plaint can be rejected. In all other situations, the claims will have to be adjudicated in the course of the trial. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in T.Arivandandam Vs. T.V Satyapal AIR 1997 SC 2421 has rightly held that: 'Para No.5: The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful reading- not formal- reading of plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and merit less, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power Order VII Rule 11 of CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. Even otherwise the impugned order is highly capricious, as the Hon'ble Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the Petitioner has already terminated/revoked the Agreement for Sale, GPA dated 04.06.2019 and MOU 20.06.2019 duly executed in favour of the Respondents. This apart, the Petitioner has also returned back the entire Sale consideration received mentioned in the Sale Agreement, which is received and was not returned back to the Petitioner. It is implied that, the sale consideration has been received back by the respondents though RTGS transfer and the same was not opposed nor returned to the Petitioner, and thus now the respondents are estopped from seeking the relief of specific performance. The case of the respondents is also barred by the Doctrine of Estoppel. Significantly, when the Agreement itself is expired and has lost its sanctity, it cannot be enforced by law. All the remedies left to the Respondents is to seek for damages. But rather the suit for specific performance is filed with a vexatious motive. The impugned order is otherwise arbitrary, capricious suffers from legal infirmity and as such the impugned order is required to be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court. Viewed from any angle the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is capricious, coercive, and opposed to the principles of natural justice. The Petitioner craves leave of this Hon'ble Court to urge additional grounds, if any, at the time of presenting the arguments on merits. The Petitioner has paid the requisite Court Fee of Rs.20 Rs Schedule II, Article II (q) (iii) of the KCF and SV Act, 1958. 5. Sri. The Petitioner craves leave of this Hon'ble Court to urge additional grounds, if any, at the time of presenting the arguments on merits. The Petitioner has paid the requisite Court Fee of Rs.20 Rs Schedule II, Article II (q) (iii) of the KCF and SV Act, 1958. 5. Sri. Akram, learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterating the grounds urged in the revision petition vehemently contented that defendant is not the owner of the suit property and the alleged agreement of sale is also seriously disputed by the parties and under such circumstances, in view of Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act, suit is not maintainable before the Trial Court which fact has not been properly taken note of by the learned Trial Judge while dismissing the application and sought for allowing the revision petition. 6. During the pendency of this revision petition, co-ordinate bench of this Court on 07.04.2025 passed an Order which reads as under: "The question to be answered in this Civil Revision Petition is what is to be done under circumstances where the defendant, who is the owner of the property put forth before the Court a contention that in terms of the order passed by this Court the parties have been directed to maintain status-quo, which would mean that the defendant who is the owner of the property cannot alienate the property in question in favour of the plaintiffs. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel Sri D.L.Jagadeesh, Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act, clearly provides that in matters of a contract or sale of any immoveable property, specific enforce cannot be sought in faovur of the vendor under circumstances where the vendor has either lost title to the property or a cloud is cast on the title by virtue of any order passed by a competent court. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent are required to assist this Court as to what is to be done under these circumstances. Re-list this matter on 22.04.2025. All further proceedings in O.S.No.756/2021 shall stand stayed till the next date of hearing." 7. Sri. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent are required to assist this Court as to what is to be done under these circumstances. Re-list this matter on 22.04.2025. All further proceedings in O.S.No.756/2021 shall stand stayed till the next date of hearing." 7. Sri. Akram would contend that since the revision petitioner is not the absolute owner of the suit property, there cannot be any specific enforcement of the alleged agreement of sale in view of Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act and does sought for allowing the revision petition. 8. He would further invite the attention of this Court that he had already repaid sum of Rs.6,12,500/- on 23.02.2021 which is disputed by the respondent. 9. A memo is also filed by the revision petitioner to the effect that they are prepared to repay the entire advance sale consideration to the respondent as the alleged contract is incapable of performance. 10. Said memo reads as under: " I, the undersigned counsel for the Petitioner, hereby place on record the copy of the Demand Draft bearing No.517715, dated 22.09.2025, for the sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only), towards the advance amount received by the Petitioner for registering the sale agreement signed between the parties as directed by this Hon'ble Court. Hence the same must be taken on record in the interest of the justice." 11. Per contra, Sri. Basavaraj Sappanavar, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the ownership of the defendant is already crystallized in the Writ Petition No.11969/2008 connected with WP No.11970/2008 against which no doubt against which a writ appeal is pending in WA No.3915/2019. 12. As on today since the defendant is owner of the property. As such, the embargo under Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be pressed into service by the revision petitioner and sought for dismissal of the revision petition. 13. Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. 14. On such perusal of the material on record, it is crystal clear that in respect of agreement to sell dated 01.07.2019, suit came to be filed. No doubt defendant has disputed the agreement seriously. 15. 13. Having heard the arguments of both sides, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. 14. On such perusal of the material on record, it is crystal clear that in respect of agreement to sell dated 01.07.2019, suit came to be filed. No doubt defendant has disputed the agreement seriously. 15. Validity of the agreement of sale cannot be decided at the threshold by holding a mini trial while considering the application filed by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. In order to appreciate the argument put-forth as to the title of the defendant in conveying the subject matter of the suit property, it is just and necessary for this Court to cull out Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under : 17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable (1) A contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favor of a vendor or lessor- (a) who, knowing not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell or let the property; (b) who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property, cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire of movable property." 17. Sri. Basavaraj Sappannavar however contented that title to the defendant has been already held to be proved by Order dated 09.07.2019 in WP No.11969/2008 and connected writ petition No.11970/2008. 18. Parties also agree that there is a writ appeal pending on the file of this Court in WA No.3915/2019. 19. However, if the petitioner succeeds in the writ appeal and ultimately if the petitioner is held to be not the owner of the suit property, then the embargo under Section 17 would come into operation on careful reading of the above provision of law. 20. Till such time, there cannot be an argument which can be countenanced in law, that Section 17 would come in the way of continuation of the suit before the Trial Court. 21. 20. Till such time, there cannot be an argument which can be countenanced in law, that Section 17 would come in the way of continuation of the suit before the Trial Court. 21. All other disputed questions cannot be the subject matter of an enquiry under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. Suffice to say that the learned Trial Judge in the aforesaid paragraphs has taken into consideration every one of the contentions of the defendant and has rightly rejected the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. Taking note of the above factual aspects, this Court is of the considered opinion that the grounds urged in the revision question would not require further consideration by admitting the same. 24. Hence, following order: ORDER (i) Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. (ii) All contentions are kept open to be urged on the trial, uninfluenced by the observations of this Court in this Order.