ORDER : This writ petition challenges the order dated 21 st March, 2025 in O.A. No.64/2023 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Jaipur. 2. Ms. Manjeet Kaur, the learned counsel for the respondents, appearing on advance copy has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this writ petition. 3. At the outset, we may indicate that the petitioner approached the Tribunal in O.A. No.27/2012 seeking reinstatement in service. However, the prayer for reinstatement was not granted by the Tribunal and the Original Application was dismissed vide order dated 16 th August, 2022. 4. In the second round, the petitioner has come with a prayer for grant of pension and back wages in view of his acquittal in the criminal case on 18 th November, 2011. 5. The petitioner was enrolled in Army on 28 th April, 1994 and he was arrested by the Civil Police on 14 th August, 1995 while he was undergoing military training. In the crime registered vide F.I.R. No.61/91 at Police Station Neem Ka Thana, district Sikar, allegation of committing offences under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code was levelled. Consequent upon his arrest by the Civil Police, the petitioner was discharged from service on the ground of "Unlikely to become an Efficient Soldier" under Rule 13(3) IV of Army Rules, 1954 which reads as under: ".......13. Authorities empowered to authorize discharge. (1) Each of the authorities specified in column 3 of the Table below shall be the competent authority to discharge service person subject to the Act specified in column 1 thereof on the grounds specified in column 2. (2) Any power conferred by this rule on any of the aforesaid authorities shall also be exercisable by any other authority superior to it. (2A) Where the central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff decides that any persons subject to the Act should be discharged from service, either unconditionally or on the fulfillment of certain specified conditions, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Commanding Officer shall also be the competent authority to discharge from service such person or any person belonging to such class in accordance with the said decision. (3) In the table “commanding officer” means the officer commanding the corps or department to which the person to be discharged belongings except that to the case of junior commissioned officer and warrant officer of the Special Medical Section of the Army Medical Corps, the “commanding officer” means the Director of the Medical Services, Army, and in the case of junior commissioned officer and warrant officers of Remounts, Veterinary and Farms Corps, the “Commanding officer” means the Director Remounts, Veterinary and Farms.....…" 6. The Tribunal has held as under: “10. Moreover, it needs no emphasis that the discipline is the backbone of the Armed Forces, which has to be maintained at all costs to maintain its operational efficiency by having men of absolute character to defend the country as mandated by the Constitution of India. The Indian Army cannot afford to have such personnel on its roll who have been found to be criminals and accused of serious criminal offences under the IPC. Though the Applicant was acquitted later by the Juvenile Justice Board, Sikar (Rajasthan) after 20 years of the commission of the offence in 1991, such persons may jeopardise the strength of an organization especially the Indian Army, which takes pride in being a disciplined force. 11. In the present case, the Applicant did not disclose the vital fact that he has been arraigned in a case under Sections 147, 148, 302 and 149 of IPC before being enrolled in the Army on 28.04.1994. The same came to the knowledge of Army authorities when an Inspector of Police came to Training Centre and arrested the Applicant on 14.08.1995. Therefore, he was liable to be dealt with under Rule 44 of Army Rules, 1954. Since the Applicant did not disclose his involvement in criminal case to the Army authorities and was arrested by Police under the above Sections, the Competent Authority rightly dismissed the Applicant from Service under Rule 13(3) IV of Army Rules, 1954. The question of issue of Show Cause Notice and holding of preliminary inquiry has already been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UOI & Ors Vs Manoj Deswal & Ors (Supra). 12. The question of issue of Show Cause Notice and holding of preliminary inquiry has already been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UOI & Ors Vs Manoj Deswal & Ors (Supra). 12. The judgment of AFT (RB), Lucknow cited by the Applicant in the case of Lakhan Singh (Supra) is distinguishable as in the case of Lakhan Singh (Supra), the Applicant was acquitted in criminal case and his appeal to reinstate him in service was allowed by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court whereas in the present case, though the Applicant was acquitted of the offences by the Juvenile Justice Board, Sikar (Rajasthan) but no order for his reinstatement in service was passed. Further, it will be a travesty of justice if the plea of the Applicant for grant of Service Pension to him by considering him in service till his pensionable service on notional basis is acceded to, as he had not even completed his training and was yet to be arrested as a Sepoy in the Indian Army when he was discharged. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts, we find that the petition lacks merit on all counts and, hence, is dismissed. Miscellaneous Applicant(s) pending, if any, also stand disposed off.” 7. Upon perusal of the materials on record, we find the order of discharge became final and the petitioner came to the Tribunal about sixteen years after his discharge from Army on the ground that he was acquitted by the criminal Court. 8. This is by now well settled that acquittal in a criminal case is not a ground to interfere with the order passed under the extant Service Rules. While there would be a different yardstick and considerations for acquittal in a criminal case, it is the preponderance of probability that would be the guiding principle in civil matters. The petitioner who was acquitted nineteen years after his discharge from Army cannot lay a challenge to the order of discharge dated 14 th August, 1995 on the ground that he has now been acquitted by the criminal Court. This is well known that delay and latches are the reasons for which the writ Court may decline to interfere in the matter. This is well known that delay and latches are the reasons for which the writ Court may decline to interfere in the matter. Besides that there is no plausible explanation forthcoming from the petitioner as to delay of about twenty seven years in filing O.A. No.64/2023, the prayers made in both the Original Applications are like two sides of the same coin and could not have been granted after dismissal of O.A. No.27/2012. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere in this matter. 9. At this stage, a prayer for leave to appeal is made by Ms. Anjali Minocha, the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. Article 132 of the Constitution of India provides that a High Court may certify under Article 134A that the case involves a "substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution”. We may also refer to Article 133 of the Constitution of India which provides that the High Court may certify under Article 134A while passing any judgment and decree or final order in a civil proceeding that the case involves a "substantial question of law of general importance”. The present case does not involve any substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution. We also do not find that the present matter involves any substantial question of law of general importance or that any issue is required to be decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. While so, the prayer for leave to appeal is decline. 12. In view of the above discussions, writ petition is dismissed.