ORDER : ARUN MONGA, J. 1. The appellant-plaintiff is before this Court against the order dated 17.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.2, Sriganganagar in Civil Misc. Case No.25/2024(CIS No.68/2024), vide which his application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC was dismissed. 1.1. The appellant filed a suit seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions against the defendant bank, along with interim relief, primarily to restrain the bank from terminating his services or making adverse remarks in his employment record, and to direct payment of salary for three months post-resignation. He also sought issuance of requisite employment documents including the relieving letter, NOC, and experience certificate. 2. Facts first. The appellant was appointed as Assistant Vice President–Branch Head at the defendant’s Sri Ganganagar branch pursuant to an offer letter dated 11.10.2021, which he accepted. He joined duties on 12.01.2022 and was consistently rated as a satisfactory performer, having received a performance rating of 4.5 out of 5 in March 2023, a salary increment of Rs.10,500, and a reward tour to Thailand. The branch under his leadership was awarded Rs.4,66,000 as an incentive. 2.1. On 01.04.2024, the appellant’s minor son fell critically ill and required continued medical treatment in Sri Ganganagar. Despite repeated representations requesting retention at the current posting due to his son’s medical needs, the appellant was transferred to Lalheri/Khanna Mandi, Punjab on 04.04.2024. Unable to relocate, the appellant tendered his resignation on 03.05.2024 with a request for immediate acceptance and payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice, in accordance with the terms of the offer letter. 2.2. The bank did not formally accept or reject the resignation. Instead, it issued communications dated 26.06.2024 and 14.07.2024 instructing the appellant to report to the new place of posting, failing which disciplinary proceedings would be initiated. The appellant was also denied release documents and employment credentials. A legal notice dated 14.07.2024 sent by the appellant remained unanswered. 2.3. The appellant alleged that the bank's refusal to relieve him from duties or to accept his resignation was arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice. It was further contended that Clause 12 of the offer letter was unilateral, permitting termination by the bank upon three months’ notice or salary in lieu, but not affording the same right to the employee, rendering the clause inequitable and illegal. 3. It was further contended that Clause 12 of the offer letter was unilateral, permitting termination by the bank upon three months’ notice or salary in lieu, but not affording the same right to the employee, rendering the clause inequitable and illegal. 3. The bank, in reply, denied the allegations, asserting that the appellant had accepted all employment terms, including Clause 12. It claimed the performance rewards were due to collective branch efforts and referred to a prior complaint of misconduct filed with the RBI in August 2023. The bank further submitted that the appellant had not officially informed it of his son’s condition nor furnished supporting documentation. After being granted 20 days of leave, the appellant allegedly remained absent without intimation, warranting disciplinary action. The resignation was also stated to be in contravention of Clause 12 as it lacked the required notice period. 4. Upon hearing both parties, the Trial Court found no sufficient ground to grant interim relief and dismissed the injunction application. Aggrieved by said rejection, the present appeal has been preferred. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the case file. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, inter alia, argues that the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the appellant's application for a temporary injunction by accepting the respondent's version of facts without fair consideration. The learned trial Court overlooked the arbitrary nature of the appellant’s employment contract, particularly Clause 12, which allows for unilateral termination. The appellant's personal circumstances, including his son’s medical condition and the unjust resignation process, were ignored. The appellant also demonstrated a strong prima facie case, and the balance of convenience favors granting relief and yet his application was dismissed. Thus, the impugned order should be set aside. 7. I have perused the impugned order. Learned trail court, while dismissing the application, inter alia, held that the applicant (appellant herein) had accepted the offer of appointment and its terms, making his claim of arbitrariness unfounded. The applicant’s resignation was dated 03.05.2024, but his transfer was ordered a month earlier, on 04.04.2024. During this intervening period, he submitted brief leave applications but failed to provide a consistent or adequate reason for his prolonged absence. The trial court noted that his actions did not reflect bona fide intent. 7.1. The applicant’s resignation was dated 03.05.2024, but his transfer was ordered a month earlier, on 04.04.2024. During this intervening period, he submitted brief leave applications but failed to provide a consistent or adequate reason for his prolonged absence. The trial court noted that his actions did not reflect bona fide intent. 7.1. The court further observed that the bank had issued several notices in May, June, and July 2024, asking the applicant to return to duty and explain his absence, but he only responded months later. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the application lacked credibility. Moreover, the interim relief sought was similar to the final relief being pursued in the main claim, and such relief cannot be granted in the absence of a prima facie case. Finally, applying the threefold basic principles i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, the court held that the applicant failed to establish any of the three. It also held that in the absence of a prima facie case, the other two criteria are irrelevant. Therefore, the trial court found no basis for granting interim relief and rejected the application, stating that the precedents cited by the applicant were distinguishable and not applicable to the present facts. 8. In my opinion, the learned trial Court has thoroughly analyzed the record, there seems no error in considering the facts on record, perversity or illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court. I am inclined to agree with its well reasoned order. No interference is thus called for. 9. In light of voluntarily acceptance of Contractual Terms by the appellant as per the offer letter dated 11.10.2021, including Clause 12, which outlined the terms of termination and resignation, requiring three months’ notice or salary in lieu, the Trial Court correctly noted that the appellant’s claim of arbitrariness in the contract lacks merit, as he was bound by the terms he agreed to upon joining. 10. The appellant also did not disclose an FIR lodged against him during his tenure as Branch Manager, which was brought to the bank’s attention by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This non- disclosure and the resulting transfer were significant factors in undermining his claim of arbitrary treatment. 11. The appellant’s resignation on 03.05.2024 cited his son’s illness, but he had already been transferred on 04.04.2024. This non- disclosure and the resulting transfer were significant factors in undermining his claim of arbitrary treatment. 11. The appellant’s resignation on 03.05.2024 cited his son’s illness, but he had already been transferred on 04.04.2024. His absence from duty, despite limited approved leave (06.04.2024– 10.04.2024 and 15.04.2024–20.04.2024), was not adequately justified beyond the resignation. The Trial Court rightly held that prolonged absence without sufficient cause or prior intimation lacked bona fide intent. The bank issued multiple notices (28.05.2024, 26.06.2024, and 07.07.2024) directing the appellant to rejoin duty and explain his absence, but he failed to respond until August 2024. Since the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case, the court correctly concluded that these additional requirements for granting a temporary injunction were not met. 12. Moreover, the appellant’s request for an injunction to restrain the bank from terminating his service or making adverse remarks was essentially identical to the relief sought in the main suit. The Trial Court appropriately noted that granting such interim relief would be tantamount to deciding the main claim prematurely, which is impermissible. 13. Dismissed. 14. However, non-interference by this Court in the instant appeal shall not preclude the respondent-bank to take a decision either way on the pending resignation letter of the appellant and/or the same shall be dealt with by passing an appropriate speaking order in accordance with law. 15. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.