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2025 DIGILAW 1228 (TS)

VST Industries Ltd. v. State of Telangana

2025-10-15

APARESH KUMAR SINGH, G.M.MOHIUDDIN

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Sunil B. Ganu, representing learned counsel Ms. K. Maanasa, appears for the appellant. Ms. M. Shalini, learned Government Pleader for Services-II, appears for respondents No.1 and 2. Learned counsel Sri B. Balaji, representing learned counsel Sri C. Nageshwar Rao, appears for the unofficial respondents. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. 58 workmen of the appellant raised an industrial dispute under Section 10 (1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for implementation of an oral settlement entered into by the union and the management under the guidance of the President of the Union. I.D.No.02 of 2015 was instituted upon reference by the Labour Department. The workmen were seeking the benefit of compassionate appointment. The workmen had retired between the years 2008 to 2012. The learned Industrial Tribunal-II at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) by an order dated 15.02.2021 declined the relief by holding as under: “17. In view of the above decision, in this case all the petitioners are retired from the services from 2006 to 2012 and now they want to implement the settlement arrived by Management and Union in the year 2013 under Ex.M1. As per Ex.M1. As per Ex.M1, the previous settlement dt:16.6.2010 was terminated due to new settlement entered by Union and the Management on 8.11.2013 before the conciliation officer u/s 12(3) r/w section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As per the admission of WW1 and WW2, the terms and conditions entered by the Union with the Management is binding on all the employees. Whereas the petitioners retired from the services on different dates from 2006 onwards to 2012. On the other hand, the respondent clearly established that there was a settlement between union and Management before the conciliation officer under Ex.MI in the place of old settlement and new settlement was came into effect on 8.11.2013. If that is so, the terms and conditions mentioned in settlement in the year 2013 is not binding on the petitioners and this court have no jurisdiction directing the management to apply the same with retrospective affect. On the other hand, as per section 2(p) any other settlement must be in writing and it should be duly signed by both parties. On the other hand, as per section 2(p) any other settlement must be in writing and it should be duly signed by both parties. Therefore, the oral settlement raised before the late Sri P. Janardhan Reddy ex-union President of the Respondent Company/Minister have no force in the eye of law. Therefore, there is no any justification to the petitioners to demand the respondent company to apply the terms and conditions mentioned in 2013 settlement retrospectively to the employees who are retired in the year 2006 to 2012. 18. On the other hand, this court found latches on part of the petitioners that alleged to be legal Representatives of deceased employee's straight way added as parties to the reference without adding the names of deceased employee and his occupational status. Apart from above, the petitioners are all retired from the services long back and accepted the retirement benefits without any protest till raising the dispute before the Labour Commissioner vide their representation dated 31.12.2014. Admittedly, the demands of group of retired employees were not supported by Union before the Joint Commissioner. 19. Apart from above, except WW1 and WW2, other petitioners were not given any authorization on their behalf to adjudicate the issue before this Court. On the other hand, once the employee retired from the services after attaining superannuation it automatically ends the relationship of employee and employer other than in a case of removal, retrenchment, lay off closure etc. then only the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is applicable. Here the petitioners retired long back and received the payments without any protest. Therefore, the management thinks that there is no any dispute in between them. Subsequently, entered with the new settlement before the Labour Commissioner with the Union. Therefore, the dispute raised by the present petitioners can't be treated as Industrial Dispute and it is only an individual dispute. 20. In view of the discussions of this court, this court have no power to go beyond the reference and no power to direct the respondent to enter into a settlement with the retired employees. On the other hand, this court have no power to implement the 2013 settlement retrospectively to the petitioners who are alleged to be retired long back. Therefore, the petitioners not entitled any benefits as claimed by them. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the respondent against the petitioners. 21. On the other hand, this court have no power to implement the 2013 settlement retrospectively to the petitioners who are alleged to be retired long back. Therefore, the petitioners not entitled any benefits as claimed by them. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the respondent against the petitioners. 21. Issue No.2: In view of the discussions in issue No.1, the petitioners not entitled any relief as prayed by them. Hence, the claim petition of petitioners is hereby dismissed due to lack of merits. 22. In the result , petition is dismissed without cost. Accordingly, this reference is answered.” 4. During the pendency of the industrial dispute reference, eight of the workmen had passed away without being substituted by the legal heirs. The surviving workmen, aggrieved by the award dated 15.02.2021 in I.D.No.02 of 2015, preferred a writ petition, being W.P.No.34921 of 2021, which is pending. The dependants of the remaining deceased workmen in the said industrial dispute (hereinafter referred to as, “the writ petitioners”), chose to prefer an independent writ petition i.e., W.P.No.19415 of 2022, which is the impugned proceedings, for a direction to respondent No.2 therein, who is the appellant herein, to consider their request for compassionate appointment. The learned writ court, after considering the stand of the parties, directed the appellant to consider the grievance of the petitioners therein as per their representation dated 15.10.2012 seeking compassionate appointment without any delay. The appellant, being aggrieved, has preferred this appeal. 5. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that in the first place, the appellant is neither a State nor an instrumentality where the scheme of compassionate appointment applies. Even otherwise, the settlement which was in vogue till 2010 had been replaced by another settlement of 2013, which was sought to be applied retrospectively at the instance of the workmen in the industrial dispute reference. The learned Tribunal declined the relief. None of writ petitioners were impleaded as the legal heirs of the workmen who died during the pendency of the reference. Learned Senior Counsel submits that none of these workmen had died in harness. All of them had retired by 2012 and died during the pendency of the reference. The learned writ court failed to appreciate that the appellant is not a State or an instrumentality where the scheme of compassionate appointment exists. Learned Senior Counsel submits that none of these workmen had died in harness. All of them had retired by 2012 and died during the pendency of the reference. The learned writ court failed to appreciate that the appellant is not a State or an instrumentality where the scheme of compassionate appointment exists. There was no settlement at the relevant point of time which could enable the workmen to stake a claim for appointment of their dependents on their death or retirement. The writ petitioners approached the learned writ court straightaway after ten years of the alleged representation. Such a claim was also belated and stale. There was no legal entitlement on the part of the writ petitioners to seek a direction or mandamus upon the appellant. Despite all these shortcomings, the learned writ court issued a direction, though innocuous in nature, but having implications which could not be implemented by the appellant. He relies upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining , (2008) 10 SCC 115 (paragraphs 8 to 14), Government of India v. P. Venkatesh , (2019) 15 SCC 613 (paragraph 8) and also a recent decision in Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika v. Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika Kamgar Union , (2022) 10 SCC 172 (paragraph 8). Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that therefore the impugned order may be set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has opposed the prayer and submits that the impugned directions are only for consideration of the grievances of the writ petitioners for compassionate appointment. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order of the learned writ court. He also submits that since the representation of the writ petitioners had remained pending for ten years, they straightaway approached the learned writ court. He does not dispute that the writ petitioners were never impleaded as legal heirs before the learned Tribunal in the industrial dispute reference. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has also not been able to show any right arising out of a settlement or legal right or contractual right to seek compassionate appointment based on which a direction could be issued by the learned writ court. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has also not been able to satisfy as to whether the appellant falls in the category of a State or its instrumentality against whom the writ petition was maintainable. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners has also not been able to satisfy as to whether the appellant falls in the category of a State or its instrumentality against whom the writ petition was maintainable. 7. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taken note of the relevant material and facts pleaded. The attendant facts referred to in the foregoing paragraphs make it abundantly clear that the writ petition was not maintainable against the appellant, as it is neither the State or its instrumentality nor performing any functions of public nature as such. That is why all the workmen approached the learned Tribunal on reference of an industrial dispute which was declined by the learned Tribunal. The writ petitioners have failed to establish any legal or contractual right or any right arising out of a settlement between the employer and the workmen which could clothe them with a legitimate claim for being considered for compassionate appointment. The alleged representation was made in the year 2012 before the management of the appellant. The writ petition was filed in the year 2022 after ten years of delay. In this regard, the pronouncements of the Apex Court which had been relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant squarely apply to the facts of the case. It would be appropriate to extract the opinion of the Apex Court in the case of C. Jacob (supra) in paragraphs 11 and 13 hereunder: “ 11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” It would also be appropriate to extract the opinion of the Apex Court in the case of P. Venkatesh (supra) in paragraph 8 hereunder: “8. This “dispose of the representation” mantra is increasingly permeating the judicial process in the High Courts and the Tribunals. Such orders may make for a quick or easy disposal of cases in overburdened adjudicatory institutions. But, they do no service to the cause of justice. The litigant is back again before the court, as this case shows, having incurred attendant costs and suffered delays of the legal process. This would have been obviated by calling for a counter in the first instance, thereby resulting in finality to the dispute. By the time, the High Court issued its direction on 9-8-2016 [ P. Venkatesh v. Central Administrative Tribunal , 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 20868] nearly twenty-one years had elapsed since the date of the death of the employee.” 8. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of the learned writ court in W.P. No. 19415 of 2022, dated 23.07.2025, cannot be sustained. It is therefore set aside. 9. The writ appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.