JUDGMENT : The instant Criminal Revision Application has been filed on behalf of the petitioners challenging the impugned order dated 21.08.2024 passed in MCA No. 2085 of 2024 by Sri Niraj Kumar Vishawakarma, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Dhanbad by which learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Dhanbad has rejected the discharge petition filed by the petitioners under Section 227 of the Cr. P. C. in connection with Dhanbad Mahila P. S. Case No. 30 of 2023 corresponding to G. R. No. 682 of 2023 [S. T. No. 279 of 2024] for the offences under Sections 498(A), 323, 313 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. It has been alleged by the informant- Arpita Kumari in the FIR that she was married with one Vishwamitra Singh on 08.12.2022 as per the Hindu Customs and on the date of engagement on 11.04.2022, Rs. 1,00,000/- was given and Rs. 5,00,000/- were also given on the date of Tilak on 04.12.2022 and Rs. 9,51,000/- was given on 16.12.2022 by the Bank Transfer. Further articles of Rs. 5,00,000/- was given. Thereafter at the time of Bidai, i.e. on the next day of marriage, her father had given Rs. 9,00,000/- cash. Further on demand of her in-laws members, Rs. 14,000/- was given by Bank Transfer on 16.01.2023 and Rs. 50,000/- cash was given. After marriage, she went to the house of her husband, but after some days her husband and her mother in-law Mira Singh and her father in-law, Krishna Singh had started torturing her physically continuously and they used to say that her parents had not given proper dowry and started demanding Rs. 10,00,000/- cash and one Honda City Car and for which they used to torture her by constantly assaulting her by legs and shoes etc. and threatened her of dire consequences. She also alleged that on 23.12.2022 her husband and his parents (i.e. the petitioners) tried to throttle her neck to kill her, but she managed anyhow and saved herself. Thereafter, she informed the matter to her parents, but even thereafter her in-laws members continued to assault her brutally. and threatened her of dire consequences. She also alleged that on 23.12.2022 her husband and his parents (i.e. the petitioners) tried to throttle her neck to kill her, but she managed anyhow and saved herself. Thereafter, she informed the matter to her parents, but even thereafter her in-laws members continued to assault her brutally. Her husband had severely assaulted her by fists near her eyes, that one serious injury on her eyes was caused and her body was bruised due to their beating and even she wanted to get her treated not allowed, but even her husband, mother in-law and father in-law used to assault and used to abuse her and her husband also used filthy languages to her parents. She has stated that apart from demand of dowry, her husband takes wine and narcotics and her husband has established illicit relationship with one lady openly and used to establish illicit relationship with her in her matrimonial home in presence of her father in-law and mother in-law. When she protested the above, then her husband threatened her to marry with the said lady and she also got photograph of illicit relationship of her husband and for taking him wine and finally she was assaulted and ousted from her matrimonial home. She further alleged that again her husband came on 05.02.2023 at her resident at Sindri and started assaulting and abusing her and started demanding Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rs. 10.00/- Lakh) cash and a Car and threatened her to marry another girl, if demand is not fulfilled. The above occurrence took place for about one week in presence of her neighbours. She also alleged that due to assault made by her husband, her pregnancy of 2 and ½ months was terminated on 17.03.2023. 3. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the State and learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party no. 2. 4. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that impugned order dated 21.08.2024 passed by the learned Court below is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eyes of law. It is submitted that petitioners are innocent and have not committed any offence. It is submitted that the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh is father in-law of the opposite party no. 2 and the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh is mother-in-law of the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that petitioners are innocent and have not committed any offence. It is submitted that the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh is father in-law of the opposite party no. 2 and the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh is mother-in-law of the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that they had neither any demanded dowry nor tortured the informant. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has specifically submitted that no case under Sections 307 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners and particularly against the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh, who is mother in-law of the opposite party no. 2. It is submitted that no overt act is attributed against the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh, who is mother in-law of the opposite party no. 2 for assaulting the informant and for demanding dowry. It is submitted that the informant has falsely alleged that her husband had tried to throttle her neck and for which she saved herself anyhow from the clutches of her husband. It is submitted that there is no injury report of sustaining grievous injury or any injury dangerous to life. Thus, I. O. has committed error by submitting the charge sheet under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh. 5. It is submitted that the police has merely charge sheeted under Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh, but the learned Court below has taken cognizance under Sections 498(A), 323, 313 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh and his son Vishwamitra Singh. 6. It is submitted that the police had submitted final form in favour of the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh. However, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad has also taken cognizance against the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh by differing from the police report without giving any reasons. 7. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh and his son Vishwamitra Singh. 6. It is submitted that the police had submitted final form in favour of the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh @ Meera Singh. However, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad has also taken cognizance against the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh by differing from the police report without giving any reasons. 7. It is submitted that there is no injury report or report of termination of pregnancy and alleged abortion has allegedly taken place in the house of the in-laws members and for which the petitioners had no role to play and hence no case under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against them. In view of the above, it is submitted that the learned Trial Court has wrongly come to the conclusion that charge under Sections 307 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Versus Girish Radhakrishnan Varde reported in 2014 (3) SCC 659 and hence, the impugned order may be set aside and this Criminal Revision Application may be allowed. 8. On the other hand, learned APP has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the impugned order dated 21.08.2024 passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that both the petitioners and her son namely Vishwamitra Singh had assaulted and tortured the informant for demand of dowry. It is submitted that probative value of the witnesses cannot be looked into at this stage and hence, this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party no. 2- informant, after adopting the submission of the learned counsel for the State, has further submitted that this Criminal Revision Application is devoid of merit. It is submitted that there is direct allegation against the petitioners and the husband of the informant namely Vishwamitra Singh for demanding dowry and for torture and for assaulting the informant due to non-fulfilment of Dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/- and one Honda City Car. It is submitted that at the instance of both the petitioners, her son namely Vishwamitra Singh (husband of the informant i.e. opposite party no. 10,00,000/- and one Honda City Car. It is submitted that at the instance of both the petitioners, her son namely Vishwamitra Singh (husband of the informant i.e. opposite party no. 2) had tried to throttle the neck of the informant with an intention to kill her. However, the informant survived somehow and managed to free herself form the clutches of her husband. It is submitted that the husband of the informant is drunkard and is drugs addicted and has illicit relationship with one another girl. 10. It is further submitted that earlier also the petitioners had challenged the order taking cognizance by filing W. P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn by the petitioners on 18.02.2025 before the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary) of this Court. 11. It is submitted that so far as the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the injury report may not be required to be produced in each and every case and it has to be seen and inferred from the circumstances of the case. It is submitted that the Informant has filed medical papers to show abortion i.e. termination of her pregnancy. It is submitted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court cannot make roving inquiry and the probative value of the statement of the witnesses cannot be seen at this stage. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal Versus Anil Kumar Bhunja reported in (1979) 4 SCC 274 and in the case of State of M. P. Versus S. B. Johari and Others reported in (2000) 2 SCC 57 . 12. It is submitted that in view of the above this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 13. Perused the records of this case and case diary and considered the submissions of both the sides. 14. In the rejoinder filed by the informant to the discharge petition filed by the petitioners before the learned Court below, the informant has enclosed the medical report of the victim lady i.e the opposite party no. 2 regarding termination of her pregnancy, which is enclosed as Annexure-4 in the rejoinder dated 19.08.2024 filed by the informant. 15. 14. In the rejoinder filed by the informant to the discharge petition filed by the petitioners before the learned Court below, the informant has enclosed the medical report of the victim lady i.e the opposite party no. 2 regarding termination of her pregnancy, which is enclosed as Annexure-4 in the rejoinder dated 19.08.2024 filed by the informant. 15. It appears that earlier also the petitioners had challenged the order taking cognizance by filing W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn by the petitioners on 18.02.2025 before the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary) of this Court. 16. The order dated 18.02.2025 passed in W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 by the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary) of this Court is as follows:- “Heard the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks permission of this Court to withdraw this writ petition with liberty to file a criminal miscellaneous petition. This writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty. The interim order passed earlier vide order dated06.12.2024 is vacated. Registry is directed to intimate the court concerned forthwith.” 17. It appears that the informant-opposite party no. 2 had lodged the FIR against the petitioners and who will father in-law and mother in-law and also had lodged the FIR against her husband for brutal assaulting her for several times not only on her matrimonial home in presence of her father-in-law and mother-in-law, but also before her neighbours for non fulfillment of demand of Rs. 10,00,000/- and one Honda City Car and for termination of her pregnancy of 2 and ½ months on 17.03.2023. 18. It appears that the petitioners and their son are residents of Kolkata whereas the wife-informant is resident of Dhanbad. 19. It appears that the police had submitted final form against the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh, but has submitted charge sheet against Vishwamitra Singh i.e. the son of the petitioners for the offences under Sections 498-A/323/313/307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act whereas the police has submitted charge sheet against the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh only for the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh only for the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. However on 06.03.2024, the learned Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance by differing with the police report in respect of the petitioners and had taken cognizance against Vishwamitra Singh and also against these petitioners for the offences under Sections 498-A/323/313/307 of the Indian Penal Code. 20. It transpires that thereafter the petitioner had preferred W. P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 before the High Court of Jharkhand by challenging the order taking cognizance. However, on 18.02.2025, the said Writ Petition was withdrawn before the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary) of this Court with liberty to file criminal miscellaneous petition. 21. Thus, the petitioners have themselves withdrawn the said W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024. 22. However, in the meantime, the petitioners had also filed discharge petition on 12.08.2024 i.e. Annexure-3 under Section 227/228 of the Cr. P.C and the informant-opposite party no. 2 has also filed her rejoinder on 19.08.2024 i.e. Annexure-4 of this Criminal Revision Application before the learned Court below, although they were well aware of the fact that their W. P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 is pending before this Court. 23. Thereafter vide impugned order dated 21.08.2024, discharge petition filed by the petitioners was rejected and hence, the present Criminal Revision Application has been filed. 24. However, at the time of filing of this Criminal Revision Application No. 959 of 2024 before this Court, the petitioners have suppressed the fact of filing of W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 before this Court in para-2 of this Criminal Revision Application and this amounts to suppression of fact on behalf of the petitioners. 25. The petitioners have merely stated in para-2 of this Criminal Revision Application that they have not moved earlier before this Court against the impugned order dated 21.08.2024 passed by the learned Court below and the petitioners have not moved any regular bail application or anticipatory bail application or Criminal Revision or Criminal Miscellaneous Petition or Criminal Writ in the present case. However, the petitioners had filed W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 before this Court. 26. However, the petitioners had filed W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 before this Court. 26. This clearly shows that the petitioners are guilty of suppressing the fact of filing of W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 before this Court and the petitioners have not come before this Court with clean hands and even the learned counsel who had filed W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 is the one and the same counsel who had filed this Criminal Revision Application. 27. Although, learned Senior Counsel has strenuously argued that there is no specific overt act of assault or termination of pregnancy of the informant against the petitioners and all the allegations have been made against their son Vishwamitra Singh and hence no case under Section 307 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code are made out against the petitioners. 28. However, this Court is not convinced with the above submissions as it has come in the subsequent statement of the informant –opposite party no. 2 at para-2 and para-88 of the case diary that the informant–opposite party no. 2 was mercilessly assaulted by her husband Vishwamitra Singh in presence of the petitioners several times and due to which, she had become unconscious also and yet the petitioners remained mute spectators. 29. It has also come on record that only in the FIR, but also in the subsequent statement of the informant recorded at para-2 and para-88 of the case diary that the parents and brother of the informant-opposite party no. 2 were forced to pay Rs. 9,51,000/- by cash to her husband Vishwamitra Singh and by taking the said amount as ‘Gift’ through an affidavit before the Notary Public and apart from this, they have also received Rs. 4,50,000/- in the Bank Account of the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh. 30. It appears that the informant has given dates i.e. 13.10.2022 and 05.02.2023 for assaulting her mercilessly due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 31. It further reveals from the statements of one Kameshwar Singh, Kundan Kumar Srivastava and Ashraf Sheikh recorded at para-104, 105 and 106 of the case diary respectively that Vishwamitra Singh i.e. the husband of the informant-opposite party no. 2 had assaulted and tried to throttle the neck of the informant-opposite party no. 31. It further reveals from the statements of one Kameshwar Singh, Kundan Kumar Srivastava and Ashraf Sheikh recorded at para-104, 105 and 106 of the case diary respectively that Vishwamitra Singh i.e. the husband of the informant-opposite party no. 2 had assaulted and tried to throttle the neck of the informant-opposite party no. 2 on the rear seat of the Car, however on raising alarm, the witnesses, Kameshwar Singh, Kundan Kumar Srivastava and the driver Ashraf Sheikh had saved her anyhow on 11.02.2023. 32. It also reveals on 05.02.2023, the informant was assaulted brutally in her own parental house by the husband of the informant in presence of the independent witnesses Hasina Khatoon, Jarin Khatoon and Indra Mohan Singh, whose statements have been recorded at para-107, 108 and 109 of the case diary respectively. 33. From conjoint reading of para- 20,21, 22 and 89 of the case diary, it appears that the informant-opposite party no. 2 produced Pen Drive of 32 GB before the Police Station in which she had given three (3) Audio Chat and One (1) Video, in which it has come on record that when the informant had disclosed about assault upon her by her husband Vishwamitra Singh, then the mother of the informant had supported regarding the assault by her son, then the petitioner no. 2, Mira Singh i.e. mother of the Vishwamitra Singh commented upon her and she saved her son and paid no heed whereas the petitioner no. 1, Krishna Kumar Singh is said to have instigated the informant to the institute the case against their son. They had also admitted that their son is drug addict and has illicit relationship with one another lady. 34. Thus, the petitioners were having full knowledge of the atrocities of their son made by him upon the informant-opposite party no. 2, yet they remained silent spectators. 35. The son of the petitioners has not challenged the order taking cognizance in this case against him for the offences under Sections 307 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code, rather the petitioners i.e. the mother in-law and father in-law have challenged the order taking cognizance and had filed discharge petition. 36. However, it is well settled law that the case cannot proceed at two places and the case of the petitioners cannot be tried separately from the case of their son. 37. 36. However, it is well settled law that the case cannot proceed at two places and the case of the petitioners cannot be tried separately from the case of their son. 37. Although, there is no specific injury report regarding the grievous injury on the person of the informant-opposite party no. 2, but the series of assault and the conduct of Vishwamitra Singh, who is the son of the petitioners, led to termination of her pregnancy on 17.03.2023. This shows that he had assaulted her several times, which could have led to her death due to throttling of her neck.The petitioners cannot remain silent as they were matured and they could have asked their son to behave properly, which they failed to do so. 38. At the stage of framing of charges, this Court may not gone to pros and cons of trial and should not meticulously examine the statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P. C. and this Court has to see as to whether Vishwamitra Singh, who is the son of the petitioners has intention to kill the informant-opposite party no. 2 for non-fulfillment of dowry in presence of his parents. 39. From perusal of the case diary, it would appear that on numerous occasions as mentioned above, the son of the petitioners had assaulted the informant-opposite party no. 2 to such an extent that could have caused her death. Thus, intention on the part of the husband of the informant is seen at the stage of framing of charges under Sections 307 and 313 of the Indian Penal Code as due to assault made by the husband of the informant, pregnancy of two an half months (i.e. 2½ months), was terminated, which was Dr. Sangeeta Karan, which is also supported from the statement of Dr. Sangeeta Karan recorded at para-98 of the case diary. 40. Sangeeta Karan, which is also supported from the statement of Dr. Sangeeta Karan recorded at para-98 of the case diary. 40. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Versus Girish Radhakrishnan Varde reported in (2014) 3 SCC 659 at para 13 and 14 as follows:- “Para- 13:- But the instant matter arises out of a case which is based on a police report as a first information report had been lodged before the police at Deesa Police Station under Section 154 CrPC and, therefore, the investigation was conducted by the police authorities in terms of procedure prescribed under Chapter XII CrPC and thereafter charge-sheet was submitted. At this stage, the Chief Judicial Magistrate after submission of the charge-sheet appears to have entertained an application of the complainant for addition of three other sections into the charge-sheet, completely missing that if it were a complaint case lodged by the complainant before the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, obviously the Magistrate had full authority and jurisdiction to conduct enquiry into the matter and if at any stage of the enquiry, the Magistrate thought it appropriate that other additional sections also were fit to be included, the Magistrate obviously would not be precluded from adding them after which the process of cognizance would be taken by the Magistrate and then the matter would be committed for trial before the appropriate court. Para-14:- But if a case is registered by the police based on the FIR registered at the police station under Section 154 CrPC and not by way of a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC before the Magistrate, obviously the magisterial enquiry cannot be held in regard to the FIR which had been registered as it is the investigating agency of the police which alone is legally entitled to conduct the investigation and, thereafter, submit the charge-sheet unless of course a complaint before the Magistrate is also lodged where the procedure prescribed for complaint cases would be applicable. In a police case, however after submission of the charge-sheet, the matter goes to the Magistrate for forming an opinion as to whether it is a fit case for taking cognizance and committing the matter for trial in a case which is lodged before the police by way of FIR and the Magistrate cannot exclude or include any section into the charge-sheet after investigation has been completed and charge-sheet has been submitted by the police. Hence, the above judgment is not applicable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 41. The case of the petitioners is covered under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as follows:- “Para-34:- Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 42. The act of the petitioners come under the category of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, which prescribes that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 43. Even the Hon’ble supreme Court in the judgment reported in the case of Krishnan Versus State reported in AIR 2003 SC 2978 = (2003) 7 SCC 56 and also in the case of Gopi Nath Versus State of U.P. reported in AIR 2001 SC 2493 = (2001) 6 SCC 620 has held that in order to attract Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary that each one of the accused must assault the deceased and it is enough if it is shown that they shared a common intention to commit the offence. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Seva Ram Versus State of U.P. reported in AIR 2008 SC 682 that Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of the criminal act. 44. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Seva Ram Versus State of U.P. reported in AIR 2008 SC 682 that Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of the criminal act. 44. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja reported in (1979) 4 SCC 274 at para-18 as follows:- “Para- 18:- It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 1977 SC 2018 ] the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 45. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Ors. reported in (2022) 12 SCC 657 at paragraph nos.23, 34 and 35 as follows:- “ Para - 23:- In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and 228CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under : (SCC pp. 376-77) “21. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under : (SCC pp. 376-77) “21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” Para-34:- We may now proceed to consider the issue on hand from a different angle. It is a settled position of law that in a criminal trial, the prosecution can lead evidence only in accordance with the charge framed by the trial court. Where a higher charge is not framed for which there is evidence, the accused is entitled to assume that he is called upon to defend himself only with regard to the lesser offence for which he has been charged. It is not necessary then for him to meet evidence relating to the offences with which he has not been charged. He is merely to answer the charge as framed. The Code does not require him to meet all evidence led by the prosecution. He has only to rebut evidence bearing on the charge. The prosecution case is necessarily limited by the charge. It forms the foundation of the trial which starts with it and the accused can justifiably concentrate on meeting the subject-matter of the charge against him. He need not cross-examine witnesses with regard to offences he is not charged with nor need he give any evidence in defence in respect of such charges. Para - 35: - Once the trial court decides to discharge an accused person from the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and proceeds to frame the lesser charge for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC, the prosecution thereafter would not be in a position to lead any evidence beyond the charge as framed. To put it otherwise, the prosecution will be thereafter compelled to proceed as if it has now to establish only the case of culpable homicide and not murder. To put it otherwise, the prosecution will be thereafter compelled to proceed as if it has now to establish only the case of culpable homicide and not murder. On the other hand, even if the trial court proceeds to frame charge under Section 302 IPC in accordance with the case put up by the prosecution still it would be open for the accused to persuade the Court at the end of the trial that the case falls only within the ambit of culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 IPC. In such circumstances, in the facts of the present case, it would be more prudent to permit the prosecution to lead appropriate evidence whatever it is worth in accordance with its original case as put up in the charge-sheet. Such approach of the trial court at times may prove to be more rationale and prudent.” 46. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Khaja vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 715 at paragraph nos.8 and 9 as follows: “ Para-8:- As rightly submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – State, merely because the injuries sustained by the complainant – Mohammad Khan Pathan (PW-2) were very simple in nature, that would not absolve the appellant/accused from being convicted for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. What is important is an intention coupled with the overt act committed by the appellant/accused. In the instant case, it was proved by cogent evidence that the appellant/accused had tried to assault the complainant – Mohammad Khan Pathan (PW-2) with Gupti and that too on his head. Though the complainant received injury on his right shoulder while avoiding blow on his head, from the blunt part of the Gupti, such an overt act on the part of the appellant/accused would be covered by the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. There being no infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant in the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. There being no infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant in the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. Para-9 :- Having regard to the cases filed against the appellant/accused – S K Khaja pending the present appeal, we are also not inclined to take any lenient view and to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.” 47. It has been held by High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in the case of Karan Tandon and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in Criminal Revision No.2937 of 2002 at paragraph nos.4, 6, 7 and 23 as follows:- “ Para-4 :- Learned senior counsel for the applicants has submitted that the authorities of Jabalpur Hospital had submitted a query report showing the nature of injuries and also the possible weapons which could have caused the injuries sustained by the complainant. He has submitted that it is clear from the said report that the injuries were simple in nature and not grievous and were caused with the help of baseball bat, iron rod but not by any deadly weapon. He has further submitted that the reports of doctors and their opinion clearly indicate that the applicants caused simple injuries which could likely be caused by iron rod, baseball bat and wooden sticks, therefore, according to him, required ingredients to constitute the offence of Section 307 of I.P.C. were not there. He has also submitted that the trial Court at the time of framing the charge, failed to consider the material aspect that if required ingredients to constitute an offence of Section 307 of I.P.C. are not available, then the Court should not have framed the charge of Section307 of I.P.C. Para - 6 :- Per contra, learned senior counsel for the complainant has submitted that the Court, at the time of framing the charge and travelling within the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C., has to consider as to whether on the basis of material available, the accused can be discharged or not. He has also submitted that the applicants are not claiming that on the basis of material available, no offence is made-out and therefore, they shall be discharged, but the order of framing the charge is being assailed on the ground that offence of Section 307 of I.P.C. is not made-out and therefore, the charge framed under the said section is not proper whereas it should be framed under Sections 323 and 325 of I.P.C. He has further submitted that if it is not a case of discharge, then exercising the power provided under Section 228 of Cr.P.C., the Court has to see as to whether the trial is to be conducted or not and the material on the basis of which the offence has been registered, is triable by the Court of Session or Judicial Magistrate and as such, he frames the charges. According to learned senior counsel for the complainant, the trial Court at the time of framing the charge, has to see the material available and decide as to whether the said trial is to be conducted by the Court of Session or Judicial Magistrate. If the material does not satisfy the Court to the extent that whether the offence is made-out or not, then the accused could be discharged and nothing more is required to be done at the time of framing the charge. He has further submitted that it is for the trial Court to examine whether the offence under Section 307 of I.P.C. is made-out or not and that will be done only after recording the evidence and appreciating the same. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to produce the required material so as to constitute the offence of Section 307 of I.P.C., then the trial Court at the time of passing the final order, shall be free to observe that the case of Section 307 of Cr.P.C. is not made-out and can convert the punishment in other sections minor than that of 307 of I.P.C. He has also submitted that merely because the injuries sustained by the complainant were simple in nature, it does not mean that the accused cannot be convicted under the said offence because the most important aspect is the intention coupled with the overt act committed by the accused. He has submitted that the Court has to see the intention and the weapon used and part of the body assaulted and then the Court can gather as to whether it is an offence of Section 307 of I.P.C. and conviction can be given or not. He has submitted that at this stage, only on the basis of opinion of the doctors, the charge of Section 307 of I.P.C. cannot be altered. Para - 7 :- To substantiate his contentions, learned senior counsel for the complainant has relied upon the judgments reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 715 parties being S.K. Khaja Vs. The State of Maharashtra, the order passed in Cr.R. No.654 of 2017 parties being Rajesh Tiwari Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Another. He has also placed reliance upon the judgments reported in (2019) 13 SCC 62 parties being State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Deepak, (2012) 9 SCC 460 parties being Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander & Another, (2022) 15 SCC 817 parties being State of Rajasthan Vs. Gurbachan Singh & Others, (2015) 11 SCC 366 parties being Jage Ram & Others Vs. State of Haryana, (2017) 3 SCC 198 parties being State of Rajasthan Vs. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2022) 12 SCC 657 parties being Ghulam Hassan Beigh Vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey & Others. Para-23:- In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Supreme Court as well as the High Court has observed that for constituting an offence under Section 307 of I.P.C., the nature of injury is not very material but it is the intention which is the material ingredient. It has already been observed by this Court taking aid of the view taken by the Supreme Court and also of the High Court that the intention cannot be gathered only on the basis of weapon used, but it can be gathered after recording the statements of the parties and appreciating the evidence produced by the parties before the trial Court. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, this Court is also of the opinion that in the present case though the charge has been framed under Section 307 of I.P.C. by the trial Court on the basis of material available on record and placed before the Court by the prosecution, but only on the basis of opinion of doctors in respect of nature of injuries, it is not appropriate to alter the charge of Section 307 of I.P.C. especially under the circumstances when the intention of the accused persons in causing injuries to the complainant can be determined only after appreciating the evidence which will be produced by the parties during the course of trial.” 48. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shoyeb Raja vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2624 at para no.11.2 and para-11.3 as follows: “ Para-11.2:- This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, as far back as 1961, observed the constituents of the Section, having referred to various judgments of the Privy Council, as under: “a person commits an offence under Section 307 when he has an intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It is to be clearly understood, however, that the intention to commit the offence of murder means that the person concerned has the intention to do certain act with the necessary intention or knowledge mentioned in Section 300. The intention to commit an offence is different from the intention or knowledge requisite for constituting the act as that offence. The expression “whoever attempts to commit an offence” in Section 511, can only mean “whoever : intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge necessary for the commission of that offence”. The same is meant by the expression “whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he, by that act, caused death, he would be guilty of murder” in Section 307. This simply means that the act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence of murder. The expression “by that act” does not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death. This simply means that the act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence of murder. The expression “by that act” does not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death. Such a result must be the result of that act whether immediately or after a lapse of time.” (Emphasis supplied) “ Para-11.3:- Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand 5 holds that the nature or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under this section, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. It has been held: “10. …To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. …What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.” 11 . It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or intention to cause death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually causing death are really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability under Section 307 IPC. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” (Emphasis supplied) 49. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shamsher Singh reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 807 at para no.12 as follows: “ Para-12:- It may be emphasized that to attract Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree. If hurt of any nature is caused and it is proved that there was intention or knowledge to cause death, Section 307 IPC would stand attracted.” 50. It is well settled from a catena of decisions that meticulous examination of statement of witnesses has not to be done at the stage of framing of charges. 51. It is also well settled that the defence of the accused person cannot be looked into at the stage of framing of charges. 52. It has been held in the case of Anup Kumar Lakhotia Vs. The Union of India through Central Bureau of Investigation reported in 2022 (1) JLJR page 127 and Para-25 of the said judgment is as follows: “Para-25:- The learned court below, while considering the petition for discharge considered the scope of Section 227 of Cr. P. C. and recorded that hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression ‘hearing the submissions of the accused’ cannot mean opportunity to file material is to be granted to the accused. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” 53. The expression ‘hearing the submissions of the accused’ cannot mean opportunity to file material is to be granted to the accused. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” 53. It has been held that in the case of State By The Inspector Of Police, Chennai vs. S. Selvi and Another reported in 2018 (13) SCC455 at paragraph No.10 as follows:- “Para-10:- If on the basis of the material on record, the Court would form prima facie opinion that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame charge, though for conviction it is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of charges, the probative value of the material on record has to be gone into and the Court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant conviction. The Court is required to evaluate the material on record at the stage of Sections 227 or 239 of the Code, as the case may be, only with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at the face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with the presumption that materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate such material with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose existence of the ingredients of the offence.” 54. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. E. Shivalingamurthy Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 at para17.3, 17.6 and 18 as follows:- “Para-17.3:-The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court. Para-17.6:- The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court. Para-17.6:- The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. Para-18:- The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression. "the record of the case", used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any. produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge. the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).” 55. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Ors and in the case of Kanta Devi Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 290 at para-39 as follows:- “Para-39:- The court while considering the question of framing charges under Section 227 CrPC has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. If the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused, which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing charges and proceeding with the trial. The probative value of the evidence brought on record cannot be gone into at the stage of framing charges. The court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value disclose the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The probative value of the evidence brought on record cannot be gone into at the stage of framing charges. The court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value disclose the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter, the evidence is not to be weighed as if a trial is being conducted. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh where it has been held that at the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 or 228 Cr.P.C., if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence, then the court should proceed with the trial. 56. In view of the discussion made above, this Court finds that this is not one of those cases in which separate trial can be conducted for two sets of people for the same offences. 57. The husband of the informant-opposite party no. 2 has not filed any discharge petition in anticipation that if the petitioners succeed in the present Criminal Revision Application, then the said case will automatically get transferred before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1 st Class instead of the case being tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Therefore, the petitioners cannot take advantage for the wrongs committed by their son in a technical manner. 58. It is also evident from the FIR that not only cash transactions, but also huge transaction of the amount of Rs. 9,51,000/- and Rs. 4,50,000/- and Rs. 14,000/- had taken place on three different places by way of Bank Transfer and thus, this is not one of those cases in which evidence of taking dowry in the Bank Account from the family members of the victim girl is not ruled out. 59. 9,51,000/- and Rs. 4,50,000/- and Rs. 14,000/- had taken place on three different places by way of Bank Transfer and thus, this is not one of those cases in which evidence of taking dowry in the Bank Account from the family members of the victim girl is not ruled out. 59. This Court is not emphasized much as this may prejudice to the case of the petitioner during trial and it is left to the discretion of the learned Court below to decide the case on its own merit, but still this Court finds that the petitioners by keeping their eye off against the acts of their son would save them from the acts of their son. 60. Apart from this, the petitioners are also held guilty for supressing the fact before this Court for not mentioning the filing of W.P. (Cr.) No. 979 of 2024 in the present Criminal Revision No. 979 of 2024 in para-2 and thus, they are also guilty for suppressing the material fact before this Court and it is evident that the petitioners have not come before this Court with clean hands. 61. In view of the discussion made above and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, though, there is specific allegation of assault to the informant by their son, this Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below while rejecting the discharge petition and accordingly, the impugned order dated 21.08.2024 passed in MCA No. 2085 of 2024 by Sri Niraj Kumar Vishawakarma, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Dhanbad rejecting the discharge petition filed by the petitioners under Section 227 of the Cr. P. C. in connection with Dhanbad Mahila P. S. Case No. 30 of 2023 corresponding to G. R. No. 682 of 2023 [S.T. No. 279 of 2024] for the offences under Sections 498(A), 323, 313 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is affirmed. 62. Thus, Criminal Revision No. 959 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.