Order : (Arvind Kumar Verma, J.) By way of this petition, the petitioner has approached this Court assailing the notice dated 2.12.2024 issued under Section 8(4) of the PMLA and Rule 4(5) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Taking Possession of Attached or frozen properties confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority) Rules 2013 by the Directorate of Enforcement to the respondent No.2/ICICI Bank directing to transfer the outstanding balance in five fixed deposits (FDRs) maintained by the petitioner to another bank by the ED. 2. Facts of the case in brief is that a legal notice was sent by the ED on the basis of the order dated 7.10.2024 passed by the learned Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) of the PMLA in OC No. 2318/2024 confirming the Provisional Attachment Order No. 2/2024 dated 02.05.2024 passed in the Enforcement case Information Report dated 11.04.2024 registered by the ED under the PMLA. 3. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was neither informed in person or through its counsel regarding the pronouncement of the Confirming Order and the following aspects are as under: (I) Pronouncement of orders before the Adjudicating Authority is notified by way of a cause list that is publicly accessible. In other cases, the intimation of pronouncement of an order is given through e-mail. (ii) the order of the learned adjudicating authority is not uploaded or on accessible through it website. (iii) counsel for the petitioner has filed Vakalatnama on the behalf of the petitioner on 26.09.2024 when the complaint was finally heard and filed the written submissions on 29.09.2024 whereby the Adjudicating Authority was intimated that the petitioner (Director-Trilok Singh Dhillon) was in judicial custody. (iv) the Director of the Company (Trilok Singh Dhillon) is in judicial custody at Central Jail Raipur and which is established from the following facts: (i) the service of Show Cause Notice of OC No. 2318/2024 upon Trilok Singh Dhillon was effectuated in Central Jail (ii) the Vakalatnama filed before the learned Adjudicating Authority contains an endorsement of the Jail Superintendent & (iii) the pleadings in the written submission filed before the Adjudicating Authority and those made in the petition makes it amply clear that the Director of the Petitioner Company is in jail and therefore the service of the order dated 7.10.2024 ought to have been effectuated in jail. (iv) The submission that the director of the petitioner/Company (Trilok Singh Dhillon) is in custody and neither the counsel for the petitioner was intimated or the copy of the confirming order was delivered or communicated to the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the counsel did not enter his appearance on the date of pronouncement of the Confirming Order and the ED has not supplied any proof of any email or intimation being sent to the petitioner or his counsel with regard to the pronouncement of the order. It has been contended by the counsel for the petitioner the date of the pronouncement of the Confirming Order cannot be deemed to have been communicated to the petitioner as per Regulation 27 of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 (“Regulations”) Regulation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not only entitled to be informed about the operative part or the final directions in the Confirming Order but also the reasons and grounds upon which the PAO was being confirmed. (Regulation 26, Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013). He submits that the failure to intimate the petitioner of the pronouncement of the Confirming Order and the subsequent failure to supply copy of the Confirming Order by the the learned Adjudicating Authority is failure to comply the principles of natural justice. The PAO (Provisional Attachment Order) passed by the Ed in the prsent case is a complete abuse of process and does ot meet the requirement of Section 5 & 8 of the PMLA. 6. He submits that Regulations 27 and 28 of the Regulations use the phrases “delivered to the parties” and “communication of the order to the parties”. Both these regulations must be interpreted wholistically. The word delivered in Regulation 27 must be understood in the context of the word “communication” used in Regulation 28. The requirement under the Regulations to communicate the Confirming Order must be interpreted purposively rather than an empty formality. This is especially so since the requirement of communicating a judicial order is necessary concomitant which the learned Adjudicating Authority is bound to comply with under Section 6(15) of the PMLA. The need to communicate the Confirming Order cannot be said to have been met without bringing to the knowledge of the petitioner the grounds on which the PAO was confirmed. The need to communicate the Confirming Order cannot be said to have been met without bringing to the knowledge of the petitioner the grounds on which the PAO was confirmed. He has relied upon the judgment of State of Punjab Vs. Qaisar Jehan Begum (1964) 1 SCR 971 , which reads as under: “4. As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in Raja Harish Chandra's Case (1). It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate an and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression...... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandra's case (1), is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under s. 12 (2) of the Act, the party -must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under s. 12 (2) of the Act, the party -must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had knowledge of the award. One of the respondents gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said "The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given by me but the amount of compensation was not known to me, nor did I know about acquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my karinda had told me on the day I filed the said application that the land had been acquired by the Government." 6. In another matter of L allubhai Jogibhai Patel Vs. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 427 “20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that Shri C. L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu. But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be "communicated" to the detenu. "Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the 'ground' to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. "Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the 'ground' to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the 'grounds' are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikishan v. State of Maharashtra: and Haribandhu Dass. v. District Magistrate (ibid).” 7. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Confirming Order was addressed to Trilok Singh Dhillon at his residence which cannot be countenanced for the following reasons: (i) At any time, there exists no reason for the Confirming Order to be delivered to the petitioner through Trilok Singh Dhillon after counsel for the petitioner had unequivocally communicated on multiple occasions that he was in judicial custody for several months ii) the tracking reports filed by the ED do not have the complete details of the address to which the copies of the Confirming Order was purportedly sent. In so far as the Delivery Report of the Ed is concerned, the service appears to have been attempted to serve somewhere in Mumbai. However the same has been returned to the office of the Adjudicating Authority. 8. Further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on being intimated about the notice impugned, the petitioner immediately addressed a representation each to the ED and the ICICI on 5.12.2024 raising the abovementioned objections. However no reply was received against these representations and the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by way of the this petition on 16.12.2024 and on the same date as per direction of the ED, impugned notice was enforced and the amounts lying in the fixed deposits was transferred to the ED and the intimation of the same was provided by ICICI to the petitioner on 18.12.2024. The first aspect of serving copy the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority ought to be made readily made available to the parties concerned. The first aspect of serving copy the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority ought to be made readily made available to the parties concerned. It has been submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that whenever an Adjudicating Authority or any other officer of the Enforcement Directorate passes any order, the same ought to be made available to the litigants within a reasonable period of time in order to enable them to avail their remedies in accordance with law. In fact the petitioner was intimated about the order dated 7.10.2024 after passing of the said order when the notice was issued that too on enquiry being made by the respondent No.2 and prior to the notice, the petitioner was not having any knowledge of the confirmation of attachment order by the Adjudicating Authority. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the ED has exercised the power under Section 8(4) of the PMLA and under the Rules contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court and Delhi High Court in their judgments. Thus, the petitioner has sought for the following relief: Firstly, that the ED cannot resort to taking coercive measures under the Rules against the petitioner without supplying copy of the Confirming Order on which the coercive measures are based. He has referred to the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the matter of Bliss Abode Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Zonal Office, Directorate of Enforcement and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5644 . He submits that due to non supply of the copy of the Confirming Order prior to the outstanding sums, the petitioner could not approach the Appellate Tribunal under the PMLA by way of an appeal under Section 26 of the PMLA to obtain a stay or any interim relief. The petitioner had also been deprived of understanding the grounds for confirming the PAO which form the basis of the coercive action under Section 8(4) of the PMLA. Secondly, there was no need to resort to the power under Section 8(4) of the PMLA since the fixed deposits were under lien from 2023. It has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of Vijay Madalal Chowdhury Vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1 , it has been observed as under: “179. Viewed thus, supply of ECIR in every case to person concerned is not mandatory. It has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of Vijay Madalal Chowdhury Vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1 , it has been observed as under: “179. Viewed thus, supply of ECIR in every case to person concerned is not mandatory. From the submissions made across the Bar, it is noticed that in some cases ED has furnished copy of ECIR to the person before filing of the complaint. That does not mean that in every case same procedure must be followed. It is enough, if ED at the time of arrest, contemporaneously discloses the grounds of such arrest to such person. Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973 Code. Revealing a copy of an ECIR, if made mandatory, may defeat the purpose sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act including frustrating the attachment of property (proceeds of crime). Non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an internal document of ED, cannot be cited as violation of constitutional right. Concededly, the person arrested, in terms of Section 19 of the 2002 Act, is contemporaneously made aware about the grounds of his arrest. This is compliant with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is not unknown that at times FIR does not reveal all aspects of the offence in question. In several cases, even the names of persons actually involved in the commission of offence are not mentioned in the FIR and described as unknown accused. Even, the particulars as unfolded are not fully recorded in the FIR. Despite that, the accused named in any ordinary offence is able to apply for anticipatory bail or regular bail, in which proceeding, the police papers are normally perused by the concerned Court. On the same analogy, the argument of prejudice pressed into service by the petitioners for non-supply of ECIR deserves to be answered against the petitioners. For, the arrested person for offence of money-laundering is contemporaneously informed about the grounds of his arrest; and when produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to call upon the representative of ED to produce relevant record concerning the case of the accused before him and look into the same for answering the need for his continued detention. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the argument under consideration does not take the matter any further. ED MANUAL 180. It had been urged that the 2002 Act creates an overbroad frame with no fetters on investigation. Besides questioning the refusal to furnish copy of ECIR, grievance is also made about the opacity surrounding the usage of ED Manual. Relying on Section 4(b)(v) of the RTI Act, it was urged that it was obligatory on the part of the Public Authority to publish the stated Manual within 120 days of the enactment of RTI Act. All other authorities including the Central Vigilance Commission, Income-tax Authorities, Authorities under 1962 Act, Police Authorities, Jail Authorities have adhered to this statutory compliance, except the ED. In response, it is submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General that ED Manual is an internal departmental document only for the use of officers of the ED. It is to give them guidance on proper enforcement of 2002 Act and outlines the procedure for implementation of the provisions of this Act. In addition, reliance is placed on the exposition of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari704. In paragraph 89 of this decision, the Court observed thus: “89. Besides, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the special procedures prescribed under the CBI Manual to be read into Section 154. It is true that the concept of “preliminary inquiry” is contained in Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of CBI. However, this Crime Manual is not a statute and has not been enacted by the legislature. It is a set of administrative orders issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers. It cannot supersede the Code. Moreover, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Code itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon to import the concept of holding of preliminary inquiry in the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to submit that CBI is constituted under a special Act, namely, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and it derives its power to investigate from this Act.” 704 Supra at Footnote No.206 (also at Footnote No.13) 181. It is true that the ED Manual may be an internal document for departmental use and in the nature of set of administrative orders. It is true that the ED Manual may be an internal document for departmental use and in the nature of set of administrative orders. It is equally true that the accused or for that matter common public may not be entitled to have access to such administrative instructions being highly confidential and dealing with complex issues concerning mode and manner of investigation, for internal guidance of officers of ED. It is also correct to say that there is no such requirement under the 2002 Act or for that matter, that there is nothing like investigation of a crime of money-laundering as per the scheme of 2002 Act. The investigation, however, is to track the property being proceeds of crime and to attach the same for being dealt with under the 2002 Act. Stricto sensu, it is in the nature of an inquiry in respect of civil action of attachment. Nevertheless, since the inquiry in due course ends in identifying the offender who is involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and then to prosecute him, it is possible for the department to outline the situations in which that course could be adopted in reference to specific provisions of 2002 Act or the Rules framed thereunder; and in which event, what are the options available to such person before the Authority or the Special Court, as the case may be. Such document may come handy and disseminate information to all concerned. At least the feasibility of placing such document on the official website of ED may be explored. APPELLATE TRIBUNAL 182. Serious grievance has been made about the vacancies in the Appellate Tribunal despite the serious prejudice being caused on account of provisional attachment order and, in some cases, taking over possession of the property so attached. This grievance, even though genuine, cannot be the basis to test the validity of the provisions of the 2002 Act or to question the efficacy of those provisions on that account. The Parliament by this special legislation having created an expert body being Appellate Tribunal to deal with matters concerning attachment, possession and confiscation and vesting of property in the Central Government, it is, but necessary, that the forum should be functional and accessible to the aggrieved persons uninterruptedly. We need to impress upon the Executive to take necessary corrective measures in this regard. We need to impress upon the Executive to take necessary corrective measures in this regard. Absent such forum, the aggrieved persons have to rush to the High Court on every occasion which indeed is avoidable. PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE 2002 ACT 183. It is urged that there is no gradation of punishment depending on the nature of offence which may be committed by the principal offender and other offenders. Section 4704A of the 2002 Act makes no distinction between person directly involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and the other not so directly involved. Further, the scheduled offence may have been committed by someone else and the offence of money-laundering by third person owing to being involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. The petitioners have relied on Section 201 and 212 of IPC. It is their case that this distinction is absent in Section 4 of the 2002 Act which provides that the term of rigorous imprisonment shall not be less than three years and extend upto seven years or ten years, as the case may be, with fine. This argument to say the least is flimsy and tenuous. For, the punishment under Section 4 is not in relation to the predicate offence, but offence of money-laundering under Section 3 of the 2002 704A 4. Punishment for money- laundering.—Whoever commits the offence of money- laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine [***]**: Provided that where the proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering relates to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule, the provisions of this section shall have effect as if for the words “which may extend to seven years”, the words “which may extend to ten years” had been substituted. **The words “which may extend to five lakh rupees” omitted by Act 2 of 2013, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 15-2- 2013, vide S.O. 343(E), dated 8-2-2013). Act. The person may be involved in any one or more than one process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. All of them are treated as one class of offender involved in money-laundering. **The words “which may extend to five lakh rupees” omitted by Act 2 of 2013, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 15-2- 2013, vide S.O. 343(E), dated 8-2-2013). Act. The person may be involved in any one or more than one process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. All of them are treated as one class of offender involved in money-laundering. The proceeds of crime may be derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity with which the offender involved in money- laundering offence may not be directly concerned at all. Even so, he becomes liable to be proceeded under Section 3 and punished under Section 4 of the 2002 Act. The principle of an accessory after the fact will have no application to the offence of money-laundering. Suffice it to observe that the argument under consideration is devoid of merit.” 10. In the above matter it has been held that the power under Section 8(4) must be resorted to in extreme situations and not in a routine and mechanical manner. The reply filed by the ED in the present case, does not point any circumstances which justify or warrant the exercise of the extreme power. The ED has also provided a vague justification which cannot be countenanced in law. The subjective satisfaction purportedly recorded by the ED cannot be immune from judicial review and procedural requirement and safeguards cannot be treated as having been complied with merely on the ipse dixit of the ED. It is also contended by the petitioner that even the notice addressed to the respondent No.2/Bank does not enclose the copy of the Confirming Order. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the impugned notice dated 2.12.2024 passed by the respondent No.1 to respondent No.2 under Section 8(4) PMLA and Rule 4(5) PMLA ,2013 in O.C. No.2318/2024 may be quashed/set aside and direction may be issued for quashing/setting aside the order dated 7.10.2024 under Section 8(3) of the PMLA in OC No. 2318/2024 and supply certified copy of the record of proceedings forthwith. 11. Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/ED submits that the petitioner was in the possession of proceeds of crime. It is submitted that the PAO dated 02.05.2024 was issued only after having recorded the reasons to believe and the learned Adjudicating Authority has confirmed the OC bearing No. 2318/2024 after recording of reasons. 11. Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/ED submits that the petitioner was in the possession of proceeds of crime. It is submitted that the PAO dated 02.05.2024 was issued only after having recorded the reasons to believe and the learned Adjudicating Authority has confirmed the OC bearing No. 2318/2024 after recording of reasons. He submit that the existence of an efficacious remedy is not a bar to a writ petition involving a violation/breach of the principles of natural justice. However, it is humbly submitted that maintainability and entertainability are two different aspects and has to be taken care of before deciding to entertain any writ petition. He submits that petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable on an particular ground but the question of whether to entertain the petition or not, entirely depends on the discretion of the High Court. And in the case in hand, since the petitioner had an alternative remedy to approach the Appellate Tribunal but the petitioner had straightaway approached the High Court for the relief without even exhausting the then available remedy. The legislature itself has provided the relief under the proviso to Section 26 (2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which the petitioner has not exhausted. 12. It is further contended that the principle of natural justice has not been violated. The respondent has followed the due process of law and the present petitioner was not able to secure his presence not because of the omission on the part of the concerned institution but because of the voluntary conduct of the petitioner by not marking the presence on the relevant date. 13. Reply to the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner was not intimated of the pronouncement of the Confirming Order, he submits that the counsel for the petitioner was present in the final arguments of OC No. 2318/2024 through VC before the Adjudicating authority and after conclusion of arguments, the Adjudicating authority informed the counsels that the order has been reserved for pronouncement on 7.10.2024. 14. 14. To the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that he did not receive the certified copy of the confirmation order dated 7.10.2024, he submits that to get the certified copy of the confirmation order, it can be obtained within seven days after submission of the requisite fee, after pronouncement of the said order. He submits that the order is directly forwarded by the Adjudicating Authority to the e-mail/postal address of the defendants available. It is submitted that the said order was delivered at the two addresses which include the residence of Trilok Singh Dhillon and his Company. However, the order was not delivered to the official address located in Mumbai. 15. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that possession of the movable properties was taken strictly in accordance with the provisions laid down in PMLA 2002. It is reiterated that this transfer of amount into the bank account of the respondent is final. It is submitted that if the PMLA Court finds that properties are not involved in money laundering then the properties shall be restored to the petitioner. Section 8(5) and 8(6) of the PMLA reads as under: 5. Where on conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has been committed, it shall order that such property involved in the money-laundering or which has been used for commission of the offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government. 6. Where on conclusion of a trial under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money laundering has not taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it shall order release of such property to the person entitled to receive it.” 16. Next contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the copy of the Confirming order has been communicated to the petitioner merely because it has been purportedly sent to the residence and M/s. Petrosun Bio Refineries Pvt. Limited are separate persons in the eye of law and service of the certified copy on even one if completed,cannot be deemed service on the other as per Regulation 27 of the Adjudicating Authority Procedure Regulations, 2013. 17. 17. Counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner was having sufficient knowledge about the pronouncement of the order by the learned Adjudicating Authority and the Apex Court and High Courts, have time and again re-affirmed the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the procedure is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. It has been further reiterated that possession of the movable properties was taken strictly in accordance with the provisions laid down in PMLA, 2002 and per the said provision, there is no need to issue notice to the defendant before taking possession of movable property. The respondent can directly issue notice to the bank for transfer of funds into the bank account of the respondent. As per Rule 4(5) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Taking Possession of Attached or Frozen Properties Confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2013 there is no need to issue notice to the party in case of movable property, the wordings of the Rule are as under: “where the property confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority is in the form of money lying in a bank or a financial institution, the Authorized officer shall issue a direction to the bank or financial institution, as the case may be to transfer and credit the money to the account of the Directorate of Enforcement.” 18. He contended that the petitioner herein had not appeared before the Adjudicating Authority voluntarily in spite of having knowledge about the date of pronouncement of the final order. However, the said provisions of 27 of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 (“Regulations”) Regulation would apply only if the parties secure their presence before the authority but in the present case,the petitioner voluntarily missed the hearing with some ulterior motive. 19. Contention of learned counsel for respondent No.2/Bank is that the Bank has acted strictly in compliance with the directions issued by the Adjudicating Authority, PMLA in Original Complaint Case No. 2318/2024 dated 7.10.2024. he submits that the assertion of the petition that the notice is ‘ex facie illegal” is unfounded. The order dated 7.10.2024 which directed the attachment of the petitioner’s fixed deposits, was passed after due consideration of all facts and submissions made by the parties and there is not only valid but enforceable and the respondent No.2 is duty bound to give effect to it. The order dated 7.10.2024 which directed the attachment of the petitioner’s fixed deposits, was passed after due consideration of all facts and submissions made by the parties and there is not only valid but enforceable and the respondent No.2 is duty bound to give effect to it. To the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the confirming order was not communicated to the petitioner, he stated that in the order itself it has been mentioned that “the soft copy of the order will be uploaded on the email of the Defendant (whenever available) within 48 hours from the pronouncement of the order, one hard copy of the order is also despatched simultaneously on the address available with the Adjudicating Authority. Further the certified copy of the order will be made available within seven working days after the deposit of required fee with the Registrar of the Adjudicating Authority, PMLA.” 20. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available in the form of an appeal under the PMLA instead of filing this writ petition. He further submits that the respondent No.1 is not responsible for communicating the order to the Petitioner and it is his onus to be aware of the order which has been explicitly stated by its communication. It is further contended that the respondent No.2 has executed the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority, PMLA and is in no way contrary to law or principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the Bank has been unnecessarily dragged into this case despite its bonafide compliance with the legal order and has acted in full compliance of the directions issued by the Adjudicating Authority, PMLA. 21. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority. 22. After appreciating the relevant facts and material on record and the impugned order, the replies and rejoinder filed, the arguments referred above, it appears that the only issue involved in this petition is that whether Regulation 27 of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 has been complied with by the Adjudicating Authority ? Section 27 of the above Regulations, 2013 which reads as under: “27. Section 27 of the above Regulations, 2013 which reads as under: “27. Copy of order be delivered on date of its pronouncement.- If the parties or representatives of the parties remain present on the date of pronouncement of the order, a copy of the order, if ready, shall forthwith be delivered to the parties or the representatives of the parties present under their signatures and in that case, it shall not be necessary to send again the copy of the order to the parties present.” 23. Therefore the Adjudicating Authority is bound to deliver the copy of the order to the parties or their representatives. It is undisputed fact that counsel for the petitioner has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the petitioner on 29.09.2024 whereby the Adjudicating Authority was intimated that the petitioner (Director-Trilok Singh Dhillon) was in judicial custody. The service of Show Cause Notice of OC No. 2318/2024 upon Trilok Singh Dhillon was effectuated in Central Jail, Raipur. The Vakalatnama filed before the learned Adjudicating Authority contains an endorsement of the Jail Superintendent . 24. It is also pertinent to mention here that the written submission was filed before the Adjudicating Authority by the petitioner through his counsel and in the petition, it is shown that the Director of the Company ie. the present petitioner is in jail. It is also clear from the record that the Adjudicating Authority has not communicated the order to the petitioner in jail. The Adjudicating Authority has communicated it to the residential address of the petitioner when in fact, he was in jail at the relevant time. 25. It is also pertinent to mention here that on the date of pronouncement of the order dated 7.10.2024 passed by the learned Adjudicating Authority, learned counsel for the petitioner did not appear before the Adjudicating Authority for the reasons best known to him. The Adjudicating Authority has not supplied any proof of mail or intimation to the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the pronouncement of the order by the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority has not supplied any proof of mail or intimation to the counsel for the petitioner with regard to the pronouncement of the order by the Adjudicating Authority. As per the order of the Adjudicating Authority, the order was passed in open court therefore the same ought to have been served upon the petitioner forthwith in terms of Regulation 27 of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 which evidently did not happen therefore this Court is of the considered view that the procedure of Regulation 27 of the Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 has not been complied with. It is also important fact that a physical copy of the order was not delivered to the petitioner till date nor mail has been sent through the Jail Superintendent, Raipur. Under Section 26(3) of the PMLA, 2002 the petitioner has a right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is directed that the Adjudicating Authority shall provide the copy of the order to the petitioner or his counsel either physically or through email within a period of 7 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order and thereafter 20 days time is granted to the petitioner to avail of its appellate remedy. The question of law raised is left open. 26. Needless to say, the observation of this Court shall not bind the Appellate Tribunal which shall decide the appeal on its own merits. With these observations, the present writ petition along with all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.