JUDGMENT : N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR, J. 1. Heard Mr. M.J. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Dilip Mazumdar, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, assisted by Mr. R. Dhar, learned Addl. Senior Government Advocate; and Ms. M. Kalita, learned standing counsel, PHED; appearing on behalf of their respective respondents. 2. The petitioner, herein, by way of instituting the present proceeding, has prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities for effecting appointment in respect of the petitioner on compassionate ground in terms of the recommendations made by the jurisdictional District Level Committee. The petitioner has further prayed for a review of the decision of the State Level Committee so arrived at in respect of the application so submitted by her in its meeting held on 21.11.2015. 3. As projected in the writ petition, the husband of the petitioner Late Sanjib Narayan Das while working as a Junior Engineer in the establishment of the Executive Engineer, PHED, Dhubri Division, Dhubri, had died-in-harness on 08.10.2010. The petitioner in pursuance of the death of her husband in harness, submitted an application on 06.01.2011, before the competent authority praying for consideration of her case for appointment on compassionate ground. The application as submitted by the petitioner in the matter, came to be placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 25.01.2011. The jurisdictional District Level Committee on consideration of the application of the petitioner, proceeded to recommend her case for appointment on compassionate ground along with that of one Shri Dulal Roy who had also made a similar application. The recommendations as made by the jurisdictional District Level Committee came to be placed before the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 17.03.2015. However, no recommendation was made by the State Level Committee in the said meeting. Thereafter, it is projected that the case of the petitioner was again placed before the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 21.11.2015. The State Level Committee, thereafter, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Achyut Ranjan Das & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors ., 2006 (4) GLT 674 ; proceeded to reject the application of the petitioner by holding that the same being not considered for want of vacancies for a period of 2 years, the said application must be understood to have spent its force. v. State of Assam & Ors ., 2006 (4) GLT 674 ; proceeded to reject the application of the petitioner by holding that the same being not considered for want of vacancies for a period of 2 years, the said application must be understood to have spent its force. The decision as arrived at by the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, was communicated by the respondent authorities vide communication, dated 28.01.2016, to the petitioner, herein. 4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present proceeding before this Court. 5. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner, has reiterated the facts as noticed hereinabove and has submitted that the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 25.01.2011, had recommended the case of the petitioner along with one Shri Dulal Roy for appointment on compassionate ground against an identified vacant post of Grade-IV. However, the State Level Committee without appreciating the rival merit of the candidate placed before it; in terms of the recommendations made by the jurisdictional District Level Committee, proceeded to reject the case of the petitioner. It is submitted that subsequently said Shri Roy was recommended for appointment on compassionate ground. 6. In the above premises, Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner, herein, has been discriminated against in the matter and accordingly, the decision as arrived at by the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, pertaining to the petitioner, herein, would call for an interference from this Court. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, appearing for the State Respondents, has submitted that the case of the petitioner was rejected by the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, on the ground that the application as submitted by the petitioner, having remained pending for a period of 2 years on account of non-availability of a vacant post for consideration of her case for appointment on compassionate ground, had lost its force. 8. Mr. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, has further submitted that the husband of the petitioner had died-in-harness on 08.10.2010. The learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, has also submitted that the immediacy for effecting appointment on compassionate ground insofar as the petitioner is concerned, has lost its force. The learned Addl. 8. Mr. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, has further submitted that the husband of the petitioner had died-in-harness on 08.10.2010. The learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, has also submitted that the immediacy for effecting appointment on compassionate ground insofar as the petitioner is concerned, has lost its force. The learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of W.B. v. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors., (2023) SCC Online SC 219 and has further contended that in terms thereof; the delay so occasioning, has rendered the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, to be a stale one and no further direction for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground, would be called for in the matter. 9. Mr. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Advocate General, Assam, in the above premises, has submitted that the present writ petition is bereft of any merit and the same is required to be dismissed. 10. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 11. It is a settled position of law that public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of an application and on merits. The appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of recruitment. It is merely an exception to the requirement of law keeping in view the fact of the death of the employee while in service, leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases, the object is to enable the family to get over the sudden financial crises. Such appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to be made in accordance with the Rules, Regulations, or, administrative instructions taking into consideration, the financial condition of the family of the deceased. The favourable treatment to the dependent of the deceased employee must have a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased employee, there are millions and millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased employee, there are millions and millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the Rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the service rendered by him and the legitimate expectation, and the change in the status and affairs of the family endangered by the erstwhile employment, which are suddenly upturned. The claims for of appointment on compassionate ground would mandate that there be no delay in effecting such appointment, the object being to mitigate the hardships faced by the family due to the death of the bread earner. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (supra), on the issue involved in the present proceeding, has drawn the following conclusions: “32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source. 33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter. 35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 . In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: "9.... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, In its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Itwas pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 ; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 . 40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 , wherein the following observations were made: "19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time." 13. Applying the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the husband of the petitioner had expired on 08.10.2010. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time." 13. Applying the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the husband of the petitioner had expired on 08.10.2010. The consideration that is now sought to be made in respect of the petitioner herein, for appointment on compassionate ground is a consideration so required to be made after a lapse of around 14 years. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment in respect of the petitioner has been lost. Such delay is attributable to both the authorities of the State as well as the petitioner; however, entertaining the claim at this point of time would be of no avail, because, admittedly, the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though she was not favoured with an appointment on compassionate grounds. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground be considered or entertained by the respondent authorities. 14. The contention of the petitioner that she was discriminated against in- as-much as the case of said Shri Dulal Roy who was also recommended along with the petitioner, herein, by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 25.01.2011, for appointment on compassionate ground, was considered for appointment while the case of the petitioner was so rejected by the State Level Committee in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, is being so considered only to be rejected in-as-much as the petitioner, herein, has not challenged the appointment of said Shri Dulal Roy. 15. At this stage, it is required to be noticed that this Court in the case of Achyut Ranjan Das (supra), while laying down the principles required to be followed for consideration of claims relating to compassionate appointment had laid down that if the application of eligible candidates remained pending and cannot be considered due to want of vacancies for a period of 2(two) years from the date of making of such application, all such applications would require no further consideration. The State Level Committee rejected the case of the petitioner when the same was placed before it, in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, on the ground of non- availability of vacancies. The State Level Committee rejected the case of the petitioner when the same was placed before it, in its meeting held on 21.11.2015, on the ground of non- availability of vacancies. Further, the application of the petitioner must also be held to have lost its force after 2(two) years from the date of it was so preferred. The said prescription as made in the case of Achyut Ranjan Das (supra), was reiterated by this Court in the case of Fozirul Nessa & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors ., 2010 (4) GLT 340. 16. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached herein above by this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in the present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for this Court to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance to death of her husband, in harness, occasioning in the year 2010. 17. In view of the above conclusions, this writ petition is held to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.