ORDER : M. NAGAPRASANNA, J. The petitioner/accused is at the doors of this Court calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.943 of 2024 pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge at Bengaluru, arising out of crime in Crime No.126 of 2024, registered for offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) and Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC . 2. Facts, adumbrated are as follows: - The 2 nd respondent is the complainant. It is the case of the prosecution that the 2 nd respondent and the petitioner along with two others were partners in the business of real estate established in the name and style of ‘Green Land Infra’ in Bangalore City. The firm is registered on 28-01-2011. On 08.08.2011, the petitioner along with his wife and one witness CW-6/Mohan Kagadala joined the firm as business partners. The agreement between the partners was said to be that the complainant will be appointed as the Managing Director and the petitioner would be nominated as a Joint Signatory Authority. All the partners come together with a vision to develop the lands belonging to the local farmers. Time passed by, after about a decade of the said partnership, dispute arose between the partners particularly, between the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent, on the score that the petitioner did not sign several documents pertaining to the firm, due to which, the development at various places was stalled. An incident is narrated that comes about on 23-12-2020, when the petitioner called the 2 nd respondent/complainant over phone and asked him to come near MES ground at Jayanagar. The two met on the location. 3. It is further alleged that the petitioner had threatened the2 nd respondent with dire consequence, if the petitioner did not receive his invested money back from the firm. The further narration is that, the petitioner has hurled abuses referring to the caste of the complainant. On the said incident, a complaint was initially registered before the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as ‘DCRE’) on 20-04-2021 by the 2 nd respondent. The delay of four months in taking the complaint to DCRE was also explained. The further narration is that, the petitioner has hurled abuses referring to the caste of the complainant. On the said incident, a complaint was initially registered before the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as ‘DCRE’) on 20-04-2021 by the 2 nd respondent. The delay of four months in taking the complaint to DCRE was also explained. The DCRE keeps the complaint for over three years and on 01-04-2024, directs registration of a crime. It is thus, the crime is registered before the jurisdictional Police on 06-04-2024, for the afore-quoted offences. The incident in the crime is said to have taken place on 23-12-2020. After registration of crime, the Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner for the offences quoted supra. Filing of the charge sheet and issuance of summons has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. This Court interdicts further proceedings against the petitioner by grant of an interim order on 10-07-2024. This comes to be challenged by the complainant before the Apex Court. The Apex Court rejects the Special Leave Petition, reserving liberty to the complainant to seek vacation of the interim order. An application is filed by the complainant seeking vacation of the interim order. The matter is heard at that stage with the consent of parties. 5. Heard Sri Shrinath Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Sri Mohammed Sultan Beary, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. RIVAL SUBMISSIONS UNFURLED: ACCUSED: 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that an incident that took place on 23-12-2020 is complained of even before the DCRE on 20-04-2021, which is four months after the incident. The crime then comes to be registered on 06-04-2024, which is close to four years after the incident. Notwithstanding the said delay, the Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence on 07-06-2024 and registered a case in Special Case No.943 of 2024. Projecting the aforesaid date, the learned counsel would seek to contend that there has been gross delay at every stage. He would contend that it was always open to the complainant to register the complaint before the jurisdictional police or before the concerned Court invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.But, the complainant chose to go before the DCRE. Projecting the aforesaid date, the learned counsel would seek to contend that there has been gross delay at every stage. He would contend that it was always open to the complainant to register the complaint before the jurisdictional police or before the concerned Court invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.But, the complainant chose to go before the DCRE. 7. The allegation in the complaint is that, the petitioner has abused the complainant taking the name of his caste. On a perusal of the complaint, the learned counsel would submit that what the petitioner has uttered is ‘do not show your caste mindset'. This has become the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act. The learned counsel would submit that permitting further trial in the case at hand would become an abuse of the process of law for the reason that the petitioner and the complainant were partners in the same firm. The partnership turns into a dispute. To settle scores with the petitioner, the complainant has now registered the complaint bringing in a multipronged attack against the petitioner. He would further contend that so called eyewitnesses in the case, are known to the complainant for four decades and a decade respectively, and they are residents at different locations. They cannot be eyewitnesses at all in the case at hand. He would seek quashment of the proceedings.Respondent COMPLAINANT’S: 8. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the 2 nd respondent/complainant would take this Court through the backdrop of the allegations. The petitioner joins ‘Green Land Infra’along with his wife; reducing the share of the two to 12.5%, they have joined as managing partners. Dispute arose between the petitioner and the complainant on account of the petitioner abruptly generating non-cooperation with the complainant in the year 2013. It appears, that the dispute ended up by closure of the business on 15-01-2016. Between 2016 and 2020, the projects that were half done were sought to be completed. The entire incident that is alleged has happened on 23.12.2020, when the petitioner calls the complainant to a ground and abuses him. This is witnessed by two eyewitnesses one C.Mahesh and Kanakachala. Four months thereafter, the complainant approaches DCRE. The DCRE holds the complaint for four years. Then, on 12-02-2024 records the statement of the petitioner and the complainant; on 11-03-2024 and 13.03.2024, the eyewitnesses respectively rendered their statements before the DCRE. This is witnessed by two eyewitnesses one C.Mahesh and Kanakachala. Four months thereafter, the complainant approaches DCRE. The DCRE holds the complaint for four years. Then, on 12-02-2024 records the statement of the petitioner and the complainant; on 11-03-2024 and 13.03.2024, the eyewitnesses respectively rendered their statements before the DCRE. The report of the DCRE was prepared and recommendation was made to the Jayanagar Police Station to register a FIR on the 2 nd respondent’s complaint, of the year 2021. It is then the proceedings have taken place. He would submit that the petitioner knew that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste as he was his partner and knowing fully well, he has hurled abuses in the playground, which is witnessed by two eyewitnesses. He would submit that the Police after thorough investigation have filed a charge sheet and, therefore, the proceedings must be permitted to be continued, failing which, would be putting a premium on the hurling of abuses by the petitioner upon the complainant. He would seek dismissal of the petition. STATE: 9. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the State would also toe the lines of the learned counsel representing the complainant in contending that delay in transmitting the complaint by the DCRE should not go against the complainant as the complainant has diligently registered the complaint before the DCRE. Since charge sheet is filed, the Additional State Public Prosecutor seeks dismissal of the petition. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. CONSIDERATION: The chronicle of facts: 11. The afore-narrated facts though not in dispute would require reiteration for a link in the chain of events. The petitioner and the complainant and two others form partnership firm, M/s Green Land Infra. The complainant is said to be an expert in land development. The firm comes into existence on 08-08-2011 with certain shares between the petitioner, the complainant and others. The operations in the firm were smooth till the year 2013. Disputes arose between the partners of the firm with regard to finances. Owing to the said dispute, the projects that were undertaken by the partnership firm came to a grinding halt. The firm, on the dispute, between its partners, ends on 15-01-2016. The operations in the firm were smooth till the year 2013. Disputes arose between the partners of the firm with regard to finances. Owing to the said dispute, the projects that were undertaken by the partnership firm came to a grinding halt. The firm, on the dispute, between its partners, ends on 15-01-2016. Therefore, what began as a cordial partnership soon devolved into a theatre of discord culminating in its dissolution in the year 2016. Between 15-01-2016 to 2020, it is the averment in the complaint that the partners kept on dragging execution of the project. 12. Comes the year 2020. The petitioner is said to have summoned the complainant to MES grounds, Jayanagar at 11-00 a.m. and has hurled casteist abuses against the complainant. Though this incident was on 23-12-2020, the complainant does not choose to register a complaint immediately before the jurisdictional Police or before the jurisdictional Magistrate invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Instead, after about 118 days, on 20 th April, 2021 the complainant registers a complaint before the DCRE. The complaint so registered reads as follows: For about three paragraphs, the narration is that, there is dispute between the partners in the partnership. The incident, that is the fulcrum of the lis, happens on 23-12-2020, which is narrated in the last two paragraphs. All that the narration in the complaint is that, the petitioner has hurled one particular abuse / the sole utterance is, ‘do not reveal your casteist mindset’ . Except this, there is no casteist slur alleged by the complainant himself before the DCRE. Other abuses are hurled but not casteist. This complaint which narrates an incident of 23-12-2020 is registered after a hiatus of 118 days. A perusal at the complaint nowhere indicates a plausible explanation for the delay of 118 days in approaching the DCRE. 13. The DCRE does not immediately act. For the first time, after close to 3 years, the DCRE responds to the query of the complainant and begins to record the statement of witnesses. The statement of the petitioner is recorded on 12-02-2024. The statements of eyewitnesses is recorded on 11-03-2024 and 13.03.2024, respectively. It is germane to notice the statements of both the eyewitnesses. For the first time, after close to 3 years, the DCRE responds to the query of the complainant and begins to record the statement of witnesses. The statement of the petitioner is recorded on 12-02-2024. The statements of eyewitnesses is recorded on 11-03-2024 and 13.03.2024, respectively. It is germane to notice the statements of both the eyewitnesses. One C. Mahesh renders his statement on11.03.2024, which reads as follows: The statement is that, he incidentally was in the ground on 23.12.2020 and he knows the complainant for five years and has heard hurling of abuses by the petitioner. The next witness is one Kanakachala, who is said to be knowing the complainant for 40 years. His entry into the ground is the same as the other eyewitness. His statement is recorded on 13.03.2024, which reads as follows: On the statements of these two eyewitnesses, before the DCRE, an endorsement is issued on 06-04-2024 , directing registration of crime before the jurisdictional Police. It is then on 06-04-2024, the crime comes to be registered. The Police after investigation file a charge sheet against the petitioner. The summary of the charge sheet, as obtaining in column No.17, reads as follows: The charge sheet however presents a miraculously enriched narrative – a classic instance of retrospective embellishment. The transformation between the complaint, statements and summary of the charge sheet is too conspicuous to ignore, as the name of the caste comes here for the first time. If the complainant was abused with the name of the caste, nothing prevented him to narrate the same in the complaint before the DCRE. Before the DCRE all that the complainant alleges is hurling of an abuse, do not display your casteist mindset. But, in the charge sheet the improvement is seen. 14. The concerned Court in terms of its order dated 07-06-2024 takes cognizance for the following offence: “7.06.2024: ACP, Jayanagara Sub-Division, Bengaluru City has filed charge sheet in Cr.No.126 of 2024 of Jayanagar PS on 5-06- 2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 506 , 504 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Accused is on interim bail For kind orders. Accused is on interim bail For kind orders. 07-06-2024: This charge sheet is submitted by the ACP, Yeshwanthapura Sub-Division, Bengaluru City, against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 506 , 504 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. I have perused the contents of charge sheet along with enclosures. Prima facie case is made out for alleged offences against the accused. Hence, cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 506 , 504 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)Act, 1989 is taken. Register the case as Special case against the accused.Issue summons to accused r/by 11-07-2024 Sd/- (RAJESH KARNAM.K) Lxx Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge & Special Judge, Bengaluru.” Taking of cognizance and issuance of summons leads the petitioner at the doors of this Court. 15. The issue now is, whether further trial should be permitted to be continued against the petitioner. It thus, becomes necessary to notice the statement of the petitioner recorded before the DCRE, it reads as follows: In contrast, the statement of the complainant is also to be noticed.It reads as follows: If a perusal of the complaint and the justification by the complainant is seen, it is purely a financial transaction between the two that had gone wrong. All that the statement of the complainant before the DCRE also is, ‘do not show your casteiest mindset’ . These statements are amplified and glorified by the Police while filing the charge sheet. 16. The offences against the petitioner are the ones punishable under Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v-a) of the Act.They read as follows: “ 3. All that the statement of the complainant before the DCRE also is, ‘do not show your casteiest mindset’ . These statements are amplified and glorified by the Police while filing the charge sheet. 16. The offences against the petitioner are the ones punishable under Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v-a) of the Act.They read as follows: “ 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities .—(1)Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— … … … ( r ) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; ( s ) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view; (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— … … … (v-a) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 3 deals with punishment for offences of atrocities. Section 3(1)(r) punishes a person who intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe in a place within a public view. Sub-clause (s) punishes a person who abuses a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view. Section 3(2)(v-a) which punishes a person who commits any offence against a person or property knowing that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The other offences alleged are the ones punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC . 17. The aforesaid provisions have fallen for interpretation before the Apex Court in plethora of judgments. I deem it appropriate to notice the judgment rendered in the case of HITESH VERMA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND , (2020) 10 SCC 710 wherein the Apex Court holds as follows: “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. I deem it appropriate to notice the judgment rendered in the case of HITESH VERMA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND , (2020) 10 SCC 710 wherein the Apex Court holds as follows: “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [ Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435 , at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaonsabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original) 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104], this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)( v ) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out. 19. This Court in a judgment reported as SUBHASH KASHINATH MAHAJAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [ SUBHASH KASHINATH MAHAJAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA , (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] issued certain directions in respect of investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v. State of Maharashtra [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] reviewed the directions issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as under: (Union of India case [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri)686], SCC p. 797, para 52) “52. There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC.” 20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the amending Act (Central Act 27 of 2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India [Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 657] held that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under: (SCC p. 751, para 12) “12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and no argument to the contrary has been raised.” 21. In Gorige Pentaiah [Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446] , one of the arguments raised was non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale [Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 789 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 20] as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment. 22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law. 23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 13 SCC 612 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 818] held that there is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 618, para 9) “9. Having regard to the settled legal position on external interference in investigation and the specific facts of this case, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person may be accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person may be accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a particular charge or charges, on any ground available to him in law. Under Section 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the Criminal Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount to abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse. There is no requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The supplementary report filed by the police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.” 24. In view of the above facts, we find that the charges against the appellant under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out. Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.”” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that the complainant and the accused therein were at loggerheads with regard to certain civil disputes. Due to the dispute, the provisions of the Act are misused to harass the accused. The Apex Court further observes that unless the victim is abused, intimidated, harassed intentionally by the accused, it would not constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. 18. The issue in the case at hand is whether the petitioner has intentionally abused taking the name of the caste of the complainant. The complaint before the DCRE is quoted supra. The statement of the complainant before the DCRE is also quoted supra. If both are read in tandem, the only allegation by the complainant is that the petitioner has uttered the words ‘not to show casteiest mindset’. Barring this, there is no other allegation by the complainant himself against the petitioner. This is more a rebuke than reproach . Furthermore, the element of public view is suspect. 19. If both are read in tandem, the only allegation by the complainant is that the petitioner has uttered the words ‘not to show casteiest mindset’. Barring this, there is no other allegation by the complainant himself against the petitioner. This is more a rebuke than reproach . Furthermore, the element of public view is suspect. 19. The complainant nowhere narrates in the complaint that there were eyewitnesses or there were people around him who have watched the squabble between the two. The eyewitnesses as observed hereinabove are close friends of the complainant. It is both their statements that they accidentally came to the spot for their own work and they had witnessed hurling of abuses. The statements are verbatim similar. What would unmistakably emerge on a perusal of the statements is that, abuse taking the name of the caste of the complainant with an intention to humiliate and intimidate the complainant was never made by the petitioner. The so-called eyewitnesses again are to be held to have been procured later, as there is no narration in the complaint that the incident was witnessed by two eyewitnesses nor the eyewitnesses would say that they accompanied the complainant to the ground. Therefore, the statements of witnesses, who are friends of the complainant, cannot be given any credence. DELAY AT EVERY STAGE: 20. Insofar as registration of the complaint, it is the incident which happens on 23.12.2020. If the complainant was so aggrieved by the hurling of abuses, nothing stopped the complainant from registering the complaint the very next day or few days later, before the jurisdictional Police Station. But, the complainant keeps quiet; 118 days pass by . He does not go before the Police, but goes before the DCRE. The DCRE keeps the complaint for three years , gives life to it only in 2024 . Though the complainant cannot be held at fault for the act of DCRE in keeping the complaint pending, the initial delay of 118 days would be fatal, apart from the fatalities narrated hereinabove, as it casts a long shadow on the veracity of the allegations. Above all, there is no casteiest remark intentionally made by the petitioner as is obtaining under Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act. A pure and simple financial dispute between the partners of a firm is projected to become a crime under the Act. 21. Above all, there is no casteiest remark intentionally made by the petitioner as is obtaining under Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act. A pure and simple financial dispute between the partners of a firm is projected to become a crime under the Act. 21. The other offence is under Section 3(2)(v-a) of the Act.This Section does not get attracted at all. There is no property belonging to the complainant being taken away by the petitioner, though it cannot be said that the petitioner was not aware of the caste of the complainant. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the provisions of the Act would not get attracted even to their remotest sense in the case at hand, in the light of the elucidation by the Apex Court in the case of HITESH VERMA (supra). Therefore, permitting further trial qua the offences under the Act would become an abuse of the process of law. OFFENCES UNDER IPC – SECTIONS 504 AND 506: 22. What remains is the offence under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC . Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC read as follows: “ 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace .—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation .— Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc .—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC have their ingredients in Section 503 of the IPC . The purport of Section 503 of the IPC need not detain this Court for long or delve deep to the matter. The Apex Court in the case of MOHAMMAD WAJID v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , (2023) SCC OnLine SC 951 has held as follows: “27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:— 1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 , IPC , the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 , IPC , the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504 , IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504 , IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. ChunnibhaiDayabhai , (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:— “To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 31. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC . The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence would not amount to intentional insult under Section 504 of the IPC . The same goes with Section 506 of the IPC . If the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment is noticed, what would unmistakably emerge is that, the entire episode of crime is a story twined on a financial dispute. The Apex Court in the very judgment further observed that in such cases the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should read between the lines and obliterate the crime. The Apex Court also considers the fatality of a criminal case on delay in lodging the FIR. It reads as follows: “ DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR 36. The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in the year 2021. The Apex Court also considers the fatality of a criminal case on delay in lodging the FIR. It reads as follows: “ DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR 36. The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in the year 2021. There is no reference to any date or time of the incident in the FIR. The allegations are too vague and general. Had it been the case of prompt registration of the FIR, probably the police might have been able to recover Rs. 2 Lakh from the possession of the accused persons alleged to have been forcibly taken away from the pocket of the first informant. The FIR also talks about a document on which the first informant and his brother were forced to put their signatures. We wonder, whether the investigating agency was in a position to collect or recover any such document from the accused persons containing their signatures in the course of the investigation, more particularly when the State says that the investigation is over and the charge sheet is also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is the State going to prove its case against the accused persons. The FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The object of insisting upon lodging of the FIR to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. 37. In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay in the registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing of the FIR. However, delay with other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case rendering the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings. However, delay with other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case rendering the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in the case on hand, is lodged after a period of more than one year without disclosing the date and time of the alleged incident and further without any plausible and convincing explanation for such delay, then how is the accused expected to defend himself in the trial. It is altogether different to say that in a given case, in the course of investigation the investigating agency may be able to ascertain the date and time of the incident, etc. The recovery of few incriminating articles may also at times lend credence to the allegations levelled in the FIR. However, in the absence of all such materials merely on the basis of vague and general allegations levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be put to trial. 38. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State vehemently submitted that considering the gross criminal antecedents of the appellants before us, the criminal proceedings may not be quashed. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State in her written submissions has furnished details in regard to the antecedents of the appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an impression that the appellants are history sheeters and hardened criminals. However, when it comes to quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings, the criminal antecedents of the accused cannot be the sole consideration to decline to quash the criminal proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents may be, still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of any offence or his case falls within one of the parameters as laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court should not decline to quash the criminal case only on the ground that the accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution has adverse and harsh consequences for the persons named as accused. In Directorate of Revenuev. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370 , this Court explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without sufficient grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution. Initiation of prosecution has adverse and harsh consequences for the persons named as accused. In Directorate of Revenuev. Mohammed Nisar Holia, (2008) 2 SCC 370 , this Court explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without sufficient grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the requirement and need to balance the law enforcement power and protection of citizens from injustice and harassment must be maintained. It goes without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished but at the same time it also owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed.” (Emphasis supplied) On the aforesaid circumstances, the Apex Court in the very judgment holds that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should read between the lines of the complaint to annul manifestly frivolous or vexatious complaint being registered to wreak vengeance. The Apex Court has held as follows: “34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 35. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:— “5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g.want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death…..” (Emphasis supplied)” (Emphasis supplied) The elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment would clearly become applicable to the facts obtaining in the case at hand. The Courts must remain vigilant against the weaponization of criminal law for setting the civil disputes. The law when misused ceases to be a shield and becomes a sword. The complainant, to wreak vengeance or arm twist the petitioner for financial dispute, has made use of the criminal justice system. The subject complaint is a blade of vengeance, cloaked in the garb of law . A criminal trial, if permitted to proceed on the aforenarrated glaring facts, it would amount to an egregious abuse of legal machinery and would undoubtedly result in patent injustice. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in Special Case No.943 of 2024 pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.126 of 2024, stands quashed. All pending I.A.s’ stand disposed, as a consequence.