JUDGMENT : Learned counsel for the parties are present. 2. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 15.10.2015 (decree signed on 03.12.2015) passed by learned District Judge-III, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Title Appeal No. 41 of 2009 whereby the learned 1 st appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 27.05.2009 (decree signed on 02.06.2009) passed by learned Sub-Judge-VI at Jamshedpur in Title Suit No. 68 of 2000. Title Suit No. 68 of 2000 was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. 3. This appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 09 th May2024 on the following substantial questions of law:- “I. Whether a proposed seller can take a plea of imperfect title on his part in the suit property, in a suit brought against him for specific performance of agreement of sale? II. Whether first appellate Court has assigned the specific reason for setting aside the findings of the learned trial court?” 4. Title Suit No. 68 of 2000 was filed by the plaintiffs seeking Specific Performance of Contract for sale with respect to suit property as described in Schedule-B of the Plaint having an area of 700 sq. ft. 5. The defendants had contested the suit and on the basis of the pleadings, following issues were framed by the learned trial court: - (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable and has the plaintiff valid cause of action for it? (ii) Is the suit barred by limitation, waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? (iii) Is the suit suffer from non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? (iv). Is the suit bad under any provisions of law? (v) Whether the deed of agreement alleged to have been executed on 13.01.1999 is genuine, valid and operative? (vi) Is the plaintiff entitled for the reliefs of Specific performance of Contract for sale or in alternative for a money decree of Rs. 45,000/- advanced to defendant no. 1 & 2 by the plaintiff? (vii). To what other relief and reliefs, plaintiff is entitled to?” 6. It was the case of the plaintiffs before the learned trial court that Schedule-A property which is a house premises previously belonged to and was in possession of Yudhistir Giri, father of defendant no. 45,000/- advanced to defendant no. 1 & 2 by the plaintiff? (vii). To what other relief and reliefs, plaintiff is entitled to?” 6. It was the case of the plaintiffs before the learned trial court that Schedule-A property which is a house premises previously belonged to and was in possession of Yudhistir Giri, father of defendant no. 1 & 2, who died on 16.04.1994 leaving behind him, his widow and Smt. Bhama Devi and two sons Nirankar Giri and Bharat Giri as his legal heirs and successors. Nirankar Giri and Bharat Giri are defendant nos. 1 & 2 and they inherited 2/3rd property jointly in the house premises after the death of Yudhistir Giri according to Hindu Succession Act. Legal heirs and successors of Yudhistir Giri amicably partitioned the suit property and 2/3 rd share measuring 700 sq.ft. was allotted to defendant nos. 1 & 2 and 1/3 rd share measuring 350 sq.ft., out of total area of 1050 sq.ft. was allotted to Smt. Bhama Devi widow of Yudhistir Giri, who was proforma defendant no. 3 in the suit. After partition, defendant nos. 1 & 2 became the absolute owner of 2/3 rd share of the premises described in Schedule-A of the plaint which is separately described in Schedule-B of the plaint and defendant nos. 1 & 2 were in peaceful possession of the Schedule-B premises which was 2/3 rd portion of Schedule-A premises being the rightful owner of the same. 7. It was further case of the plaintiffs that Defendant nos. 1 & 2 expressed their desire to sell the Schedule-B property to the present plaintiffs on a consideration amount of Rs.50,000/- only and accordingly on 13.01.1999, they entered into a written agreement for sale with respect to Schedule-B property with the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs being agreed to purchase the same, paid a sum of Rs.45,000/- to defendant nos. 1 & 2 in advance and it was agreed that the rest consideration amount of Rs.5,000/- would be paid at the time of registration of proper sale deed in respect to Schedule-B property in favour of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs being agreed to purchase the same, paid a sum of Rs.45,000/- to defendant nos. 1 & 2 in advance and it was agreed that the rest consideration amount of Rs.5,000/- would be paid at the time of registration of proper sale deed in respect to Schedule-B property in favour of the plaintiffs. It was also agreed between the parties that within six months from the date of execution of agreement for sale, the sale deed will be executed followed by delivery of possession with respect to Schedule-B Property, but despite repeated demands and offer of the balance amount, the principal defendants avoided to register the sale deed as agreed upon. Consequently, on 09.03.2000, the plaintiffs sent a registered notice to the concerned defendants for execution and registration of proper sale deed with respect to schedule-B property in favour of plaintiffs, but defendant nos. 1 & 2 were avoiding to execute the sale deed. 8. It was further contended by the plaintiffs that they were still ready and willing to perform their part of agreement. In the aforesaid circumstances, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. Defendant no. 3 was the mother of defendant nos. 1 & 2 and though no relief had been claimed against her, but the plaintiffs wanted that suit be decided in her presence. 9. The cause of action for the suit arose on 13.01.1999 and 13.07.1999 at Jamshedpur within the jurisdiction of the learned trial court. The plaintiffs prayed for Specific Performance of Contract directing the defendant nos. 1 & 2 to execute the sale deed in their favour after receipt of the balance consideration amount of Rs.5000/-within time fixed by the court and if the defendants failed to execute the sale deed within fixed time, it was prayed that the same may be executed by the court on behalf of defendant no. 1 & 2 on deposit of the balance consideration amount in the court and in the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed for a money decree of Rs.45,000/- advanced to defendant no. 1 and 2. 10. 1 & 2 on deposit of the balance consideration amount in the court and in the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed for a money decree of Rs.45,000/- advanced to defendant no. 1 and 2. 10. The learned trial court considered the oral and documentary evidences on record and while deciding the main issue i.e. issue nos.(v) and (vi), the learned trial court gave its finding as under: “5…It is the settled principle of law that documentary proof shall prevail upon the oral evidence and in the present suit, plaintiff has brought the agreement for sale which has been proved as Ext.4 and signature of witnesses on agreement for sale has been proved as Ext 4/a & 4/b by one of the witness of agreement for sale who is P.W.5 Namely Gayan Singh. Not only that experts opinion has also been taken by the plaintiff when defendants challenged the genuineness of agreement for sale and expert has given their opinion in favour of plaintiff stating in the court as P.W.1 that L.T.I. of defendants appearing on the agreement for sale is the same and similar to the specimen L.T.I. of the defendants taken by the court. So, there is no doubt at all that agreement for sale is genuine and valid though, the description of suit property is not properly mentioned in the agreement for sale and in the agreement for sale only 700 sq.ft. land has been mentioned but suit property consists of a dwelling house which is lacking in the agreement for sale. No previous partitions among the defendants with respect to suit property could be proved. If the agreement for sale with respect to Schedule B property has been proved to be genuine and correct by the plaintiff, this fact also appears to be true that defendants have received advance amount of Rs. 45,000/- from the plaintiff at the time of execution of agreement for sale which gets support from the oral evidence of the P.Ws. So, the court comes to a conclusion that plaintiff at least should get a relief of return of advance money given by him to the defendants amounting to Rs. 45,000/- only in the circumstances of this case which is alternative prayer of plaintiff. Accordingly, the answer of issue no. (v) & (vi) goes in favour of plaintiff.” 11. So, the court comes to a conclusion that plaintiff at least should get a relief of return of advance money given by him to the defendants amounting to Rs. 45,000/- only in the circumstances of this case which is alternative prayer of plaintiff. Accordingly, the answer of issue no. (v) & (vi) goes in favour of plaintiff.” 11. The learned trial court ultimately decreed the suit and held the plaintiffs entitled to get back Rs. 45,000/- given in advance to the defendant nos. 1 and 2 at the time of execution of sale-deed. Defendant nos. 1 and 2 were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 45,000/- to the plaintiffs within three months from the date of passing of the order by the learned trial court, failing which the plaintiffs were given liberty to get the decree executed through the process of the Court. 12. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 filed appeal before the learned 1 st appellate court. The learned 1 st appellate Court considered the materials on record and held that onus lies upon the plaintiffs to establish genuineness of agreement which they failed to discharge. The learned 1 st appellate court was of the view that the agreement for sale dated 13.01.1999 was not a genuine document and there was no proof of payment of Rs. 45,000/- to the defendant nos. 1 and 2. The learned 1 st appellate Court recorded its finding in Paragraphs 8 to 10 as under: “ 8. It has been held by the Hon’ble Court in case law reported in 2012 (3) JCR 239 (Jhr.) that plaintiff is bound to prove plaint assertion and not to take advantage of the weakness of the Defendants. Case of plaintiff is based on s deed of agreement for sale dated 13.01.1999 which has been marked Ext.-4. From perusal of Deed of Agreement for sale it transpires that it has been mentioned that there was amicable oral partition among legal heirs of the late Yudhistir Giri and 1st Party got possession over 2/3rd of the land. It has also been mentioned that Yudhistir Giri was absolute owner of the property. It has also been mentioned that consideration money for 700 square feet of land was Rs 50000 and Rs. 45000/- has been paid as earnest money in cash. It has also been mentioned that Yudhistir Giri was absolute owner of the property. It has also been mentioned that consideration money for 700 square feet of land was Rs 50000 and Rs. 45000/- has been paid as earnest money in cash. From perusal of Ext.-4 it transpires that 1st Party namely Nirankar Giri and Bharat Giri, both are illiterate persons and as per deed they put LTI. This agreement is also not registered rather it is notarized. From perusal of the agreement for sale it transpires that no reason has been shown for selling the suit property. Not only this LTI has not been verified by any persons. Not only this in this case there is payment of 90% of the consideration money as earnest money which is not a normal practice. There is no averment or endorsement on the agreement to the effect that contents of the agreement which is in English has been explained to the 1st Party who are obviously illiterate persons. In the bottom of the agreement stamp which contents “Executen is know to me and signed/put LTI in my presence” has been put and it bears signature of an Advocate of the Jamshedpur. From the above mentioned discussion of the peculiar features of the agreement, it is significant that an illiterate person was paid Rs. 45000/- in cash by the 2nd Party to the agreement. Not only this there is averment that payment of Rs. 45,000/- was acknowledged however, I find that no such endorsement has been brought to the notice of this Appellate court. Not only this payment of 90% amount as earnest money is itself very unusual conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Not only this there is claim on the part of the plaintiff who is purported purchase of the suit property that suit property have been partitioned among the legal heirs of the Yudhistir Giri. There is no document which shows that property has been purchased by Yudhistir Giri so, title of the defendant is also not above suspicion. If there is partition even among three co-sharers i.e. widow and two sons how a common sale deed was executed without showing individual share of Defendent no 1 and defendant no 2. Purported common payment to both defendants without individual acknowledgment also makes entire transaction suspicious. If there is partition even among three co-sharers i.e. widow and two sons how a common sale deed was executed without showing individual share of Defendent no 1 and defendant no 2. Purported common payment to both defendants without individual acknowledgment also makes entire transaction suspicious. As in this case agreement for sale is in English and purported vendor has put LTI, so there should have been recital that contents of the Deed were explained to both persons and they understood same. However, there is no such evidence. So far as opinion of the expert that LTI on the sale deed of defendant nos. 1 and 2 are genuine is concerned it is just an opinion of the expert and even if I consider that LTI are of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 still question is whether they put LTI knowingly and with full knowledge about the contents of the document. Being plaintiff onus lies upon the plaintiff to establish genuineness of agreement which plaintiff has failed to discharge. so I find that deed agreement for sale dated 13.01.1999 is not a genuine document and there is no proof of payment of Rs 45000 to defendants. 9. So far as submission of the learned counsel that in view of amendment of section 53-A T.P. Act, even unregistered document can be relied for the purpose of transfer of ownership and learned counsel has also relied on case law reported in AIR 2015 Punjab and Haryana 124. Ld. Counsel has submitted that there is no requirement of compulsory registration of an agreement for sale and it is not barred by section 17 (1A) of Registration Act. So far as section 53-A T.P. Act is concerned no benefit can be given to the plaintiff on the basis of section 53-A TP Act. It is settled law section 53- A can be used only as a shield and not as a sword. Moreover, there is no pleading from the either side regarding delivery of possession of suit property to the plaintiff and so basic requirement that plaintiff should be in possession of the suit property has also not fulfilled. So, I find that this case law is not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the case. Moreover, as per the above mentioned agreement for sale itself is not genuine, so no right would accrue from such document. 10. So, I find that this case law is not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the case. Moreover, as per the above mentioned agreement for sale itself is not genuine, so no right would accrue from such document. 10. From perusal of impugned judgment, it transpires that suit has been decreed and it has been held that plaintiff is entitled to get back Rs. 45000/- which was paid as earnest money to the defendant nos. 1 and 2 for execution of sale deed. It has further been held by the Trial court that agreement of sale is genuine agreement however, plaintiff is not entitled for relief of execution of agreement for sale but plaintiff is entitled for relief of return of Rs. 45000/-. From perusal of the impugned order a disturbing aspect is noticed by this court i.e. at the time of finding on Issue Nos. V & VI it has been held that there is no proper description of the suit property and there is also no proof of previous partition among the defendant, so relief of Specific Performance for execution of the sale deed has been denied. However it has also been held that plaintiff is entitled to get back Rs. 45000/- from defendant no. 1 and 2 and in case of failure to return Rs. 45000/- to plaintiff within three months from the date of order Plaintiff would be at liberty to get a decree executed through the process of the court. So, I find that relief which has been turned down by the trial court has been allowed in indirect manner. As per section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, even if agreement for sale is legally enforceable court would not pass decree in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, if it not just and equitable. So, lower court should have considered this aspect and should not have passed any decree in favour of the plaintiff.” 1 st substantial question of law 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised an objection by submitting that so far as 1 st substantial question of law is concerned, the same does not arise for consideration in the present case. He submits that the trial court refused to decree the suit for specific performance of contract, but only directed refund of consideration amount of Rs. 45,000/-. The defendant nos. He submits that the trial court refused to decree the suit for specific performance of contract, but only directed refund of consideration amount of Rs. 45,000/-. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 went in appeal and the learned 1 st appellate Court has set-aside the direction for refund of Rs. 45,000/- and therefore, the 1 st substantial question of law does not arise at all in the present case. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants does not dispute the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents. 15. In view of the impugned judgments and the dispute involved, this Court finds that the 1 st substantial question of law does not arise in the present case and consequently, the same need not be answered. 2 nd substantial question of law 16. So far as 2 nd substantial question of law is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned trial court has considered both the oral and documentary evidences on record while holding that the agreement was executed, but declined to decree the suit for specific performance of contract on the ground that the description of the property in the agreement was not proper. The learned Court also referred to the oral evidences on record and came to a finding that there was oral evidence with regard to payment of Rs. 45,000/- as earnest money. He has submitted that the learned 1 st appellate Court has not at all considered the oral evidences and has recorded a finding that the plaintiff could not establish the genuineness of the agreement and further recorded that the agreement for sale dated 13.01.1999 was not genuine document and there was no proof of payment of Rs. 45,000/- to the defendants. He submits that none of the oral evidences have been discussed by the learned 1 st appellate Court and the finding of the learned trial court are based on oral and documentary evidences and the learned 1 st appellate Court has not assigned any specific reason for setting the finding of the learned trial court with regard to the legality and validity of the agreement. He submits that the substantial question of law no. (ii) be answered in favour of the appellants and the appellate court’s judgment be set-aside. 17. He submits that the substantial question of law no. (ii) be answered in favour of the appellants and the appellate court’s judgment be set-aside. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has also not been able to point out any discussion of the oral evidence from the perusal of the entire judgment passed by the learned 1 st appellate Court, although admittedly, there were both oral and documentary evidences led by both the parties. He submits that at the 2 nd appellate stage the evidences may not be appreciated to come to a finding and at best it is a case for remand. For this, the learned counsel for the respondents has referred to Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the materials on record, this Court finds that the learned 1 st appellate court has ignored the findings as well as the reasons of such findings recorded by the learned trial court while reversing the decree. The learned 1 st appellate court while reversing the judgement and decree passed by the learned trial court has also ignored the numerous materials placed on record particularly the oral evidences of the witnesses which were discussed by the learned trial court to come to findings and decree the suit. This Court finds that the reasons given by the trial court and the findings derived and consequences of such findings have neither been discussed, nor considered while reversing the decree. 19. Order XLI Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure is quoted as under: - “ Contents, date and signature of judgment- The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon: (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 20. This aforesaid provision was subject matter of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2022) 3 SCC 90 (Manjula and others Vs. This aforesaid provision was subject matter of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2022) 3 SCC 90 (Manjula and others Vs. Shyamsundar and others) wherein it has been held that the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court and it is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the jurisdiction of the appellate court involves re-hearing of appeal on question of law as well as the facts and all the questions of facts and law are open for consideration. It has also been held that the judgment of the appellate court must reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court’s findings, supported by reasons, for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. It has been held that the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and non- observance of these requirements amounts to the serious infirmity in the judgment. Paragraph-8 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: - “ 8 . Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by a court of original jurisdiction. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines to the appellate court for deciding the appeal. This rule mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) points for determination; (b) the decision thereon: (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. Thus, the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. The appellate court’s jurisdiction involves a rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as fact. The first appeal is a valuable right, and at that stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court’s findings, supported by reasons for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court’s findings, supported by reasons for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. Needless to say, the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and non- observance of these requirements lead to infirmity in the judgment.” 21. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2010) 13 SCC 530 (B. V. Nagesh and Another) wherein it has been held that without framing points for determination and considering both facts and law and without proper discussion and assigning reasons, the first appellate court’s judgment cannot be sustained. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under: - “ 4 . The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, SCC p.758, para 5.) 1. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 22. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in AIR 1985 Patna 214 (Narain Singh and others), it has been held that in case of reversal, it is all the more important for the Court of first appeal to consider the evidence and also the reasoning of the trial court and only thereafter to give its own reasons for not agreeing with the findings of the trial court. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under: - “ 18 . It is well settled that if a finding of a fact is recorded without any discussion of the evidence, it is no judgment at all. The lower appellate Court is the final Court of fact and a very important duty is cast upon it. It is for this Court to decide final questions of fact on which the disposal of the suit might depend. On a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, it must appear that it has made an honest endeavor to make a proper appraisement of the merit of the case put forward by the parties. In case of reversal, it is all the more important for the Court of appeal below to consider the evidence and also the reasonings of the trial court and only thereafter to give its own reasons for not agreeing with the findings of the trial court. A perusal of the judgment must show that the lower appellate Court has applied its own mind independently to the evidences on the record. 19 . A perusal of the judgment must show that the lower appellate Court has applied its own mind independently to the evidences on the record. 19 . It is also well-settled that every non-consideration of the reasons given by the trial court in a judgment of reversal is not enough for interference by the High Court sitting under S. 100 of the C.P.C. What has to be seen is whether the lower appellate Court has failed to consider the most material evidence and if it has, then in that case finding is not binding on the High Court. If the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court is sustainable from the reasonings given by the lower appellate Court, in that case finding cannot be interfered with.” 23. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned 1 st appellate court and in view of the discussions made above in connection with the impugned judgement, this Court finds that the learned 1 st appellate court has not adjudicated the 1 st appeal in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC when read with the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Patna High Court. 24. Accordingly, substantial question No. (ii) is answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. 25. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the matter is required to be remanded to the learned 1 st appellate court for fresh decision in accordance with law. 26. The judgment passed by the learned 1 st first appellate court is hereby set-aside and the matter is remitted to the learned 1 st appellate court for fresh decision. 27. All the parties to appear before the learned 1 st appellate court by filing fresh Vakalatnama on 28.07.2025 28. This second appeal is hereby disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 29. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.