JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 07.05.2007, being a communication from the Manager, Chashmai Rahmat Oriental College, Ghazipur, informing the petitioner of the resolution passed by the Committee of Management dated 06.05.2007 of the College last mentioned, dismissing him from service. Also under challenge is an order of the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa dated 14.07.2007, approving the resolution of the Committee of Management to dismiss the petitioner, an Assistant Teacher with the College last mentioned, from service under Rule 34 of the Uttar Pradesh Non-Government Arabic and Persian Madrasa Recognition and Service Rules, 1987 (for short, 'the Rules of 1987'). The petitioner, through an amendment application that was allowed vide order dated 09.08.2007, has also challenged the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 06.05.2007, raising grounds for the purpose, but without incorporating a formal prayer to that effect. 2. In the circumstances, we propose to examine the validity of the impugned resolution dated 06.05.2007, notwithstanding the flaw in the form of relief. 3. It is undisputed that the Chashmai Rahmat Oriental College, Ghazipur (for short, 'the Institution') is a Madrasa, imparting instructions to scholars in Arabic and Persian languages, which is duly recognized by the State Government. It is in receipt of a maintenance grant for payment of salaries to its teachers and other employees drawn on the Exchequer. 4. The petitioner was appointed with the Institution on 20.08.1988 as an Assistant Teacher in the Tehtania Section (Primary Section) and has been working regularly ever-since. The petitioner says that his work and conduct has always been satisfactory. 5. The petitioner says that without basis, he was served with a charge-sheet by the Manager and Secretary of the Institution dated 08.04.2006. The charge-sheet carries nine charges. It appears that the petitioner resisted answering the charge-sheet, raising objections as to jurisdiction of the Manager to issue the same, but those demurrers being rejected by the Management of the Institution, a notice dated 09.12.2006 was issued by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner, saying that he had been given sufficient time to submit his reply, which he has failed to do, and, in case he does not submit his reply on or before 13.12.2006, the Inquiry Officer would proceed ex parte. 6. 6. The petitioner then submitted a response dated 13.12.2006, saying that he had not been given a complete copy of the charge- sheet and various other proceedings connected therewith. It was also said in the reply aforesaid that the petitioner was unwell and the doctor had advised him complete rest. He, therefore, sought extension of time to file his reply. The said reply was supported with a medical certificate from Dr. Kedar Nath, B.M.S. dated 13.12.2006. The Inquiry Officer did not accede to the petitioner's request and proceeded ex parte submitting a report dated 21.04.2007 to the Management of the Institution. A copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner, to which he submitted a reply dated 05.05.2007. 7. The case of the petitioner is that, without considering his reply, the Committee of Management, by the resolution impugned dated 06.05.2007, ordered his dismissal from service, which was communicated by the Manager vide the order impugned dated 07.05.2007. Against the order passed by the Manager and the resolution of the Committee of Management of the Institution, dismissing the petitioner from service, the petitioner says, he moved an appeal dated 22.05.2007 to the District Minority Welfare Officer, Ghazipur. There is no reference to any provision of the law providing for an appeal, either from the Management's resolution, resolving to dismiss the petitioner from service, or the Manager's communication thereof. The petitioner's appeal to the District Minority Welfare Officer as aforesaid, can only be regarded as a representation before an officer of the State in the appropriate Department, seeking to set aside the order of his dismissal from service. 8. The petitioner's representation as aforesaid was forwarded by the District Minority Welfare Officer, Ghazipur to the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa. The Registrar/ Inspector addressed a letter to the petitioner dated 21.06.2007, directing him to appear in the Registrar's office on 29.06.2007 at 11.00 a.m. in order that the Registrar could give suggestions under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1987 to the Management. The petitioner says that he appeared in the office of the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic- Persian Madrasa on 29.06.2007 and submitted a detailed brief. Subsequently, a supplementary brief was also submitted by the petitioner to the Registrar on 10.07.2007. The Registrar/Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa, rejected the petitioner's claim vide his order dated 14.07.2007. 9. The petitioner says that he appeared in the office of the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic- Persian Madrasa on 29.06.2007 and submitted a detailed brief. Subsequently, a supplementary brief was also submitted by the petitioner to the Registrar on 10.07.2007. The Registrar/Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa, rejected the petitioner's claim vide his order dated 14.07.2007. 9. In substance, aggrieved by the resolution of the Committee of Management of the Institution dated 06.05.2007 and formally by the order of the Manager dated 07.05.2007 as well as that of the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa dated14.07.2007, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition. 10. A notice of motion was issued in this case on 09.08.2007, after granting an amendment. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2, that is to say, the Management of the Institution, was filed on 19.07.2012, to which the petitioner filed a rejoinder on 25.02.2025. A supplementary counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 on 07.11.2024. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No.3, another on behalf of respondent No.4, and still another on behalf of respondent No.5, were filed on 05.11.2024, to which the petitioner filed separate rejoinders. Parties having exchanged affidavits, this writ petition was admitted to hearing on 17.01.2025. 11. Heard Mr. Vijay Kumar Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Mahesh Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Chaudhari N.A. Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Irfan Raza Khan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Mr. Pranav Mishra, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 3 and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 & 5. 12. The only question worth consideration in this case is if the disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner were in conformity with the principles of natural justice, in that that no date, time and place for holding the inquiry were intimated to the petitioner. The fact that no date, time and place were intimated to the petitioner does not appear to be in dispute. It is asserted in paragraph No.25 of the writ petition that no notice or opportunity whatsoever has been given to the petitioner by the Inquiry Officer to produce his witnesses nor any date or time was fixed with intimation to the petitioner to join the inquiry. It is asserted in paragraph No.25 of the writ petition that no notice or opportunity whatsoever has been given to the petitioner by the Inquiry Officer to produce his witnesses nor any date or time was fixed with intimation to the petitioner to join the inquiry. Paragraph No.25 of the writ petition has not been denied in the counter affidavit dated 08.05.2012 with regard to its material allegations. All that is said is that the petitioner, after receiving the charge-sheet, did not file his reply, or cooperate with the inquiry. He, therefore, avoided the inquiry, a fact proved by documents on record. There is no denial of the fact that the date, time and place scheduled for holding the inquiry were never intimated to the petitioner. 13. We are not concerned about what the charges against the petitioner are, and if they have been proved. The issue is about procedural fairness and adherence to the principles of natural justice regarding one of the facets of salutary procedure governing the holding of a disciplinary inquiry in a matter, where a major penalty may be imposed. It is true that the respondents are a minority institution and at the relevant time, were governed by a non-statutory government order in the form of the Rules of 1987. It is nevertheless not in dispute that the Institution is in receipt of grant-in-aid from the Exchequer. In cases, such as these, notwithstanding the protection afforded by Article 30 of the Constitution to a minority institutions, whether religious or linguistic, to establish and administer institutions of its choice, the right to administer does not include the right to maladminister. 14. In the context of the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, the freedom of a minority institution to terminate the services of its Principal, without adhering to the principles of natural justice, fell for consideration before this Court in Iftekhar Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others , 2013 (5) ADJ 168 . It was held in Iftekhar Ahmad (supra): “ 28. It was held in Iftekhar Ahmad (supra): “ 28. In a recent judgment in Sindhi Education Society v. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 8 SCC 49 , the Supreme Court observed as under : “Last of the judgments, which has some bearing on the subject in question, is on the principle reiterated by a Bench of this Court in Malankara Syrian Catholic College,where the Court again dealt with the aided minority educational institutions and terms and conditions of services of employees. The Court in para 12 of the judgment framed the following two questions: (SCC p. 393) “12. The rival contentions give rise to the following questions: (i) To what extent, the State can regulate the right of the minorities to administer their educational institutions, when such institutions receive aid from the State? (ii) Whether the right to choose a Principal is part of the right of minorities under Article 30(1) to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. If so, would Section 57(3) of the Act violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India?” The answer to Question (i) was provided in para 21 while Question (ii) was answered in paras 27 and 28 of the judgment which read as under: (SCC pp. 400 and 404) “21. We may also recapitulate the extent of regulation by the State, permissible in respect of employees of minority educational institutions receiving aid from the State, as clarified and crystallised in T.M.A. Pai. The State can prescribe: (i) the minimum qualifications, experience and other criteria bearing on merit, for making appointments, (ii) the service conditions of employees without interfering with the overall administrative control by the management over the staff, (iii) a mechanism for redressal of the grievances of the employees, (iv) the conditions for the proper utilisation of the aid by the educational institutions, without abridging or diluting the right to establish and administer educational institutions. In other words, all laws made by the State to regulate the administration of educational institutions and grant of aid will apply to minority educational institutions also. But if any such regulations interfere with the overall administrative control by the management over the staff, or abridges/dilutes, in any other manner, the right to establish and administer educational institutions, such regulations, to that extent, will be inapplicable to minority institutions.” 29. But if any such regulations interfere with the overall administrative control by the management over the staff, or abridges/dilutes, in any other manner, the right to establish and administer educational institutions, such regulations, to that extent, will be inapplicable to minority institutions.” 29. Principal of law emanates from the above judgments are that Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution is under the head of Cultural and Educational Rights. Article 29 is in two parts 29 (1) provides that any section of citizen have a fundamental right to conserve its language, script or culture. Any section society can get its protection irrespective of their religion. 30. In Punjab Hindus got its protection because Gurumukhi is there language of majority. 31. Article 29 (2) provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any education institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State Fund on the ground only of relegion, race, caste, language or any of them. 32. But Article 30 (1) of the Constitution provides that all religious or lignuistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institution of their choice. A combined reading of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution makes it clear that there are four distinct rights: (1) any section of citizen has a fundamental right to conserve its language or culture; (2) all the religious and linguistic minorities have fundamental right to establish and administer education institution of their choice in terms of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution; (3) the State shall not discriminate any education institution while sanctioning financial grant to it on the basis of religion, race or caste and (4) the citizen of any religion will not be denied admission into any State maintained or aided education institution on the ground of religion, caste race or language. 33. Thus a minority has two choices they can establish an educational institution in terms of Article 29 (1) of the Constitution to conserve its language and culture. The second option is to come out from the ambit of Article 29 (1) of the Constitution and opt for a secular education under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. 34. A common thread running through all these judgments are that under the umbrella of Article 30 (1) the minority Institutions do not have absolute right .The state may regulate service condition of teaching staff. 35. 34. A common thread running through all these judgments are that under the umbrella of Article 30 (1) the minority Institutions do not have absolute right .The state may regulate service condition of teaching staff. 35. In absence of job security, talented teachers, even of their own religion will not like to serve in an institution where Damascus sword is always hanging over their head. 36. A minority institution which receives aid out of the State Fund owes a greater responsibility to the society as the children of the minority are entitled to get same standard of education like in the State run or other private institution, otherwise the students belonging to minority would not be able to compete with other students who are fortunate enough to get quality education in the other institutions. If the law gives free hand to the management of a minority institution to appoint and remove the teachers in an autocratic way then it will tend to adopt hire and fire policy under the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In such situation the ultimate sufferer would be the students of their own religion. If a sizeable section of society is left behind and they are unable to join the mainstream of the country. The task of the nation building which was envisaged by the founding fathers of the Constitution will remain a mirage.” 15. It is true that unlike Iftekhar Ahmad , there are no statutory regulations in the field requiring adherence to the principles of natural justice by the Institution in this case, that is to say, at the relevant time, when the cause of action arose, but regulation by the State to maintain basic standards of fairness, in the employment and removal of teachers, was introduced by the Rules of 1987. At the relevant time, there was no statutory regulation for the Arabic-Persian Madrasa, which came later on in the year 2016 in the form of the Uttar Pradesh Non-Governmental Arabic and Persian Madarsa Recognition, Administration and Services Regulations, 2016 (for short, 'the Regulations of 2016'). It is well settled that regulation by the State is permissible by the exercise of its executive authority regarding any kind of activity, which a law of the competent legislature does not regulate. It is well settled that regulation by the State is permissible by the exercise of its executive authority regarding any kind of activity, which a law of the competent legislature does not regulate. Therefore, the Rules of 1987, which have been framed in the exercise of the executive power of the State, as a government order, would certainly regulate procedure for holding inquiries against teachers of Arabic-Persian Madrasa to the extent they provide for it. Rule 33 of the Rules of 1987 provides: 16. What is given to the charge-sheeted employee or teacher of an Arabic-Persian Madrasa at the relevant time is the right to defend himself on the charges after he receives a charge-sheet. Here, no doubt, the petitioner evaded answering the charge- sheet, but that was not the end of the matter. The Institution contemplated dismissing the petitioner from service, which is certainly a major penalty – a terminal one. Salutary procedure requires that in such a case, date, time and place for holding the inquiry be intimated to the delinquent, and witnesses heard in support of the charges to be produced by the establishment. There is no issue in this case about the establishment or the Institution not producing witnesses. It is about non-intimation to the petitioner of the date, time and place for holding the inquiry. The mere fact that the petitioner has not responded or failed to answer the charge-sheet, does not deprive him in accordance with the salutary principles of holding departmental inquiries in major penalty matters of opportunity to appear at the inquiry, where witnesses for the establishment are heard and cross-examine them. 17. It is true that if the delinquent does not file a reply to the charge-sheet, he may be precluded from producing his own evidence, if set down ex parte on that ground. But, still, he would have, as already remarked, the right to cross-examine the establishment witnesses, who testify in support of the charges. Undisputedly, the respondents have not intimated the petitioner of the date, time and place for holding the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer gave a last opportunity to the petitioner to file his reply to the charge-sheet vide letter dated 09.12.2006, in response to which the petitioner did not file a reply before the date indicated, i.e. 13.12.2006, and an inquiry report dated 21.04.2007 was submitted. The Inquiry Officer gave a last opportunity to the petitioner to file his reply to the charge-sheet vide letter dated 09.12.2006, in response to which the petitioner did not file a reply before the date indicated, i.e. 13.12.2006, and an inquiry report dated 21.04.2007 was submitted. In between, the date fixed for holding the ex parte inquiry was apparently not intimated to the petitioner. This is where the petitioner was denied his right of cross-examining the establishment witnesses, assuming that such witnesses were examined. If they were not, that would be an added violation of the salutary procedure in a major penalty matter. 18. The Institution is maintained out of State funds and the Rules of 1987, in particular Rule 33, in the absence of a statute or statutory rules, would bind the Institution to act in accordance with the said Rules. Also, the respondents would be bound by the salutary procedure for holding departmental inquiry in a major penalty matter, where their employee, like the petitioner, was receiving salary, borne of State grant. 19. This Court is informed by the learned Counsel appearing for the Institution that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation. The learned Counsel appearing for the Institution says that this writ petition be, therefore, dismissed as infructuous. We do not agree. The superannuation of an employee only alters his entitlement to the kind of relief, that may be granted. It does not destroy his cause of action. The relief, after superannuation, if that be true for a fact, has to be molded in the event, ultimately the petitioner is not found guilty or not found worthy of a dismissal penalty, as regards his service. 20. We are of opinion that on account of non-adherence to salutary procedure, as indicated above, the proceedings against the petitioner beyond the stage, where he was set down ex parte in the inquiry, are vitiated. The impugned orders would, therefore, have to be quashed with liberty to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner, if they so desire, setting him down ex parte, or may be granting him an opportunity to file a reply to the charge- sheet as a onetime measure, but certainly intimating him of the date, time and place of holding the inquiry. At this distance of time, there can be no order of reinstatement passed by the Court, even if the petitioner has not yet attained the age of superannuation. The consequences of quashing the impugned orders of dismissal from service and its approval by the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic- Persian Madrasa, would depend upon the ultimate event in the inquiry and the fresh orders that are made by the Disciplinary Authority. 21. This writ petition, accordingly, succeeds and is allowed in part . The resolution of the Committee of Management dated 06.05.2007, the impugned order passed by the Manager of the Institution dated 07.05.2007 and the order of the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa, are hereby quashed . The respondent Institution shall be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner afresh, bearing in mind the guidance in this judgment. 22. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. Let this judgment be communicated to the Manager, Committee of Management, Chashmai Rahmat Oriental College, Ghazipur, the Registrar/ Inspector, Arabic-Persian Madrasa, U.P., Lucknow and the District Minority Welfare Officer, Ghazipur by the Registrar (Compliance).