ORDER : P. Sam Koshy, J. Heard Ms. D.Shalini, learned counsel, representing Mr. D.Srinivas Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Ms. Bokaro Sapna Reddy, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax Department, representing Mr. J.V. Prasad, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax Department for the respondents. 2. Since the issue involved in this batch of writ petitions and the parties to the dispute are also being the same, they are taken up for analogous hearing and decided by this Common Order. 3. For convenience, the facts in Writ Petition No.27464 of 2008 are discussed hereunder. 4. The instant Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:- a) To correct the mistake in the Assessment Order dated 29.03.1994, for the assessment year 1991-92 in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No.2063 of 1999, dated 29.01.2002 and grant consequential relief by directing the respondents to pass fresh assessment orders for assessment year 1991-92 in conformity with the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court b) To set aside the order dated 12.01.1996, in Appeal No.119/WTO/1(5)/CWT(A)/94-95, passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - I. c) To set aside the order dated 15.06.1998, in WTA No.114/Hyd/1996, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. d) To set aside the order dated 11.02.2004, in application Hqrs.4/W.T. Revision/01-05/2003-04. e) To set aside the order dated 05.01.2007, in M.P.Nos.52 to 55/Hyd/2003 in W.T.A. Nos.111 to 114/Hyd/1996, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. 5. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner late Mr. Konda Laxman Bapuji, was in possession of a property known as “Jala Drushyam” situated in Survey Nos.9/15, 9/16, and 9/17 near Lumbini Park, Hyderabad, on one side of Hussain Sagar since 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “subject property”). The subject property was subjected to litigation when one Sri Shahpurji Chenoy filed O.S.No.13 of 1958, before the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, claiming the ownership. However, the suit was dismissed on 11.11.1975 with a finding that Sri Shahpurji Chenoy did not have title over the property. On 28.02.1976, the Tahasildar of Hyderabad Urban Taluka, issued eviction notice to the petitioner to vacate from the subject property and also passed order of eviction against the petitioner on 28.05.1977. 6. However, the suit was dismissed on 11.11.1975 with a finding that Sri Shahpurji Chenoy did not have title over the property. On 28.02.1976, the Tahasildar of Hyderabad Urban Taluka, issued eviction notice to the petitioner to vacate from the subject property and also passed order of eviction against the petitioner on 28.05.1977. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner challenged the said order by way of W.P.No.1414 of 1977 before this Court. The Hon’ble Single Judge Bench of this Court allowed the petition; however, the Division Bench in W.A.No.61 of 1978 ruled that the title dispute required adjudication in a regular Court. 7. The Government then filed the O.S.No.1497 of 1985 which was later transferred to the Special Court as L.G.C. No.61 of 1990. The Special Court declared the petitioner as land grabber on 16.04.1993. Subsequently, W.P.No.5332 of 1993 was filed by the petitioner challenging the aforesaid order dated 16.04.1993, in L.G.C. No.61 of 1990, was also dismissed. Challenging the said judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Civil Appeal No.2063 of 1999. 8. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the Wealth Tax authorities assessed the petitioner for the subject property for assessment years 1987-88 to 1991-92 with assessment orders all passed on 29.03.1994, levying substantial taxes of Rs.4,25,798/- for the assessment year 1987-88, Rs.2,88,932/- for the assessment year 1988-89, Rs.3,78,309/- for the assessment year 1989-90, Rs.3,07,252/- for the assessment year 1990-91, and Rs.3,39,660/- for the assessment year 1991-92. 9. Aggrieved by the said assessment order, the petitioner filed appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - I which were partly allowed on 12.01.1996, followed by second appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which were all dismissed on 15.06.1998. In a critical turning point, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment on 29.01.2002 confirming that the petitioner was not the owner of the property and it belonged to the Government. 10. Following this judgment, the petitioner, despite his advanced age and poor health promptly initiated a series of applications seeking rectification of the assessment orders for the assessment years 1987-88 to 1991-92 in light of the Supreme Court's judgment. 11. The petitioner filed a petition dated 02.12.2002, before the Deputy Commissioner (Wealth Tax) Circle 6(1), Hyderabad, invoking the rectification provisions under Section 35 of the WEALTH TAX ACT to correct what he considered a mistake apparent on record. 11. The petitioner filed a petition dated 02.12.2002, before the Deputy Commissioner (Wealth Tax) Circle 6(1), Hyderabad, invoking the rectification provisions under Section 35 of the WEALTH TAX ACT to correct what he considered a mistake apparent on record. However, in many attempts to obtain rectification, the petitioner met series of rejections primarily on technical and procedural grounds. The Deputy Commissioner (Wealth Tax) rejected the said petition on 13.12.2002 on the ground that since he had already pursued appellate remedies, there was no mistake apparent on record that could be rectified. The petitioner further filed an application under Section 25 of the WEALTH TAX ACT before the Commissioner of Wealth Tax - IV, Hyderabad, seeking revision of the assessment orders, which was also dismissed on 11.02.2004 on the ground that the orders were already subject matter of appeals before the Tribunal. 12. As a final effort, the petitioner filed Miscellaneous Petitions (M.P. Nos.52 to 55 of 2003) in W.T.A. Nos.111 to 114 of 1996 before the ITAT, which too were dismissed on 05.01.2007 for being time-barred under Section 35 (7) of the WEALTH TAX ACT which prescribes a limitation period of 4 years. Only for the assessment year 1987-88 was the assessment order set aside with directions to pass fresh orders in conformity with the Supreme Court’s judgment. But for the remaining four assessment years (1988-89 to 1991-92), the petitioner found himself in the peculiar situation where, despite the Supreme Court's clear declaration that he was not the property owner, the tax authorities continued to treat him as the owner and demanded substantial wealth tax along with accumulated interest. 13. Having exhausted all available statutory remedies under the WEALTH TAX ACT without obtaining relief for assessment years 1988-89 to 1991-92, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the reliefs which are already mentioned in the initial part of this common order. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Wealth Tax assessment orders for the assessment years 1988-89 to 1991-92 are inherently flawed and legally unsustainable following the Supreme Court's judgment in Civil Appeal No.2063 of 1999, dated 29.01.2002. The Supreme Court conclusively established that the petitioner was not the owner of the subject property and that the subject property belonged to the State Government. The Supreme Court conclusively established that the petitioner was not the owner of the subject property and that the subject property belonged to the State Government. However, despite this judicial pronouncement the tax authorities continued to treat him as the property owner and demanded substantial wealth tax with accumulated interest creating a legal contradiction that must be rectified. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner continued enforcement of wealth tax assessments based on ownership that has been judicially negated constituting a gross miscarriage of justice. Despite diligently pursuing all available statutory remedies, including rectification under Section 35 , revision under Section 25 , and miscellaneous petitions before the ITAT, the petitioner has been denied relief on merely technical and procedural grounds rather than on substantive merits. Moreover, the petitioner being a freedom fighter with no income or property to satisfy the substantial tax demands, enforcement of these assessment orders would cause the petitioner irreparable harm and financial distress. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the petitioner’s prompt and persistent efforts to seek rectification following the Supreme Court judgment demonstrate his good faith and absence of any latches making his petition worthy of consideration on humanitarian grounds in addition to legal merits. 17. Lastly, the counsel for the petitioner contended that having exhausted all available statutory remedies without obtaining substantive relief, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 represents his only effective recourse. The counsel for the petitioner seeks relief by way of setting aside the assessment orders that have prevented rectification and directing the tax authorities to pass fresh assessment orders in conformity with the Supreme Court's judgment. 18. Per contra, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax Department argued that, through the District Valuation Officer's report dated 31.03.1993, which determined the fair market value of the subject property at Rs.1,19,31,000/- on 31.03.1989, Rs.1,32,50,000/- on 31.03.1990 and Rs.1,65,29,000/- on 31.03.1991 was justified based on the property's premium location and strategic advantages being bounded by the Hussain Sagar Lake. Further, the learned Senior Standing Counsel contended that such prime positioning of land / property in Hyderabad significantly enhanced the property's market value making it a high-value asset despite any ongoing disputes regarding its ownership. 19. Further, the learned Senior Standing Counsel contended that such prime positioning of land / property in Hyderabad significantly enhanced the property's market value making it a high-value asset despite any ongoing disputes regarding its ownership. 19. Moreover, the learned Senior Standing Counsel contended that the petitioner's application for rectification under Section 35 of the WEALTH TAX ACT was properly rejected as there was no mistake apparent on the record that would warrant rectification. The learned Senior Standing Counsel further argued that the assessment orders for the years 1988-89 to 1991-92 had attained finality through the regular appellate process when the ITAT dismissed the petitioner's appeals on 15.06.1998, and the petitioner failed to challenge these orders before the High Court under Section 27 of the WEALTH TAX ACT within the prescribed limitation period. The Supreme Court’s judgment dated 29.01.2002 coming years after the assessment proceedings had concluded cannot be retrospectively applied to reopen settled assessments particularly when the petitioner did not exercise due diligence in pursuing available legal remedies at the appropriate time. 20. The learned Senior Standing Counsel further contended that the miscellaneous applications filed by the petitioner before the ITAT were correctly dismissed as time-barred under Section 35 (7) of the WEALTH TAX ACT , which stipulates a strict limitation period of 4 years for rectification. Learned Senior Standing Counsel also maintained that limitation periods are substantive legal provisions that cannot be circumvented through writ jurisdiction as doing so would undermine the statutory scheme and finality of tax proceedings. She further argued that the principle of res judicata applies to the petitioner's claims, as the issues raised in the present petition have already been conclusively determined through various orders of statutory authorities, none of which were challenged within the time prescribed by law. 21. Lastly, she contended that Article 141 of the Constitution which makes the Supreme Court's declarations of law binding on all Courts does not automatically nullify assessment orders that have attained finality through the statutory process. While the Supreme Court’s judgment may have settled the question of ownership prospectively, it cannot be used as a tool to reopen assessment proceedings that had concluded a year before the judgment was delivered. The learned Senior Standing Counsel maintained that tax assessment is a time-bound statutory process with prescribed remedies and limitation periods that cannot be overridden merely because subsequent judicial pronouncements alter the legal understanding of certain facts. The learned Senior Standing Counsel maintained that tax assessment is a time-bound statutory process with prescribed remedies and limitation periods that cannot be overridden merely because subsequent judicial pronouncements alter the legal understanding of certain facts. Thus, prayed that entertaining the present writ petition amounts to an abuse of process, seeking to circumvent statutory limitations through writ jurisdiction when regular remedies were either not pursued diligently or have been exhausted. 22. Having gone through the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant at this juncture to take note of a couple of decisions of the Supreme Court. Firstly, in the case of petitioner itself before the Supreme Court i.e. Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others , [(2002) 3 Supreme Court Cases 258] , the Supreme Court after scrutinizing the entire factual matrix of the case, in paragraph No.44 and 75 to 77, and declaring the petitioner to be a land grabber and categorically holding that he is not the owner of the property has held as under, viz., “ 44. The Special Court has determined that the occupation of the land in dispute by the appellant is without any lawful entitlement and decided the question of the ownership and title to and lawful possession of the land in dispute on appreciating the evidence on record. It held, inter alia, that the land in dispute was not part of Inam and that even if it was so there was no valid confirmation of grant of the land in dispute by the civil administrator under Ext. B-6 and consequently no title had passed under Ext. B-9 to the vendor of the appellant and hence no title was obtained by the appellant under Ext. B-40. Though the findings recorded by the Special Court in regard to absence of lawful entitlement of the appellant to the land in dispute and upholding the title of the first respondent that it is a government land, are findings of fact which were not interfered with by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant, yet to satisfy ourselves, we have gone through the depositions of PW 1 and RW 1 and perused the documentary evidence in great detail; the original record is in Urdu. We find no valid reason to take a different view of the matter and inasmuch as we are sustaining the said findings it is not necessary to redo the whole exercise of discussing all the evidence here. However, we shall refer to a few important documents and aspects which clinch the issue. xxx xxx xxx 75. The Special Court is, therefore, correct in discussing the evidence on record under the caption “design” in view of the pleading on that aspect, adverted to above and the High Court rightly upheld the same. We have already pointed out that the activity of grabbing of any land should not only be without any lawful entitlement but should also be, inter alia, with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands. These two ingredients are found against the appellant. 76. It is nonetheless submitted by Mr Parasaran that the plaint mentions that the possession of the appellant partakes the character of permissive possession and this averment negates the very concept of land grabbing. It is no doubt true that if the possession is permissive then it cannot be treated as illegal for purposes of clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (2) of the Act. We have already discussed above with regard to the alleged plea of permissive possession and held that those averments in the plaint would not constitute plea of “permissive possession”. 77. In the light of the above discussion, we have no option but to sustain the view of the High Court in approving the finding of the Special Court on Issue 6, that the appellant falls within the mischief of the definition of the expression “land grabber” under the Act.” 23. The principle of law dealing with Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and also touching the right of an assessee insofar as payment of tax on the property in possession is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad , [1986 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 700] , in paragraph Nos.33 to 36 has held as under, viz., “ 35. Under Section 53 -A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 where possession has been handed over to the purchasers and the purchasers are in rightful possession of the same as against the assessee and the occupation of the property in question, and secondly that the entire consideration has been paid, and thirdly the purchasers were entitled to resist eviction from the property by the assessee in whose favour the legal title vested because conveyance has not been yet been executed by him and when the purchasers were in possession had right to call upon the assessee to execute the conveyance, it cannot be said that the property legally belonged to the assessee in terms of Section 2(m) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case even though the statute must be read justly and equitably and with the object of the section in view. We are conscious that is a person has the user and is in the enjoyment of the property it is he who should be made liable for the property in question under the Act ; yet the legal title is important and the legislature might consider the suitability of an amendment if it is so inclined. 36. This question therefore must be answered in favour of the revenue and in the affirmative. The appeal on this aspect must therefore fail.” 24. On the basis of the judicial precedents referred in the preceding paragraphs, what needs to be considered is “whether in the said circumstances the writ Court can issue an appropriate direction of the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to correct the mistake in the assessment order dated 29.03.1994 for the assessment year 1991-92?” 25. In the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), it stands proved and established that the petitioner was not the title holder of the subject property and the title holder was the State Government and the petitioner does not have any further claim on the subject property. Further, taking of the case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan (supra) it is held that by the Supreme Court that for the purpose of collecting wealth tax what is mandatorily required is the presence of actual owners not just by possession, but also having title rights over the said property. 26. Further, taking of the case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan (supra) it is held that by the Supreme Court that for the purpose of collecting wealth tax what is mandatorily required is the presence of actual owners not just by possession, but also having title rights over the said property. 26. In the instant case, undoubtedly there is a demand raised by the respondents for payment of wealth tax which perhaps the petitioner has also adhered to. However, for the subsequent period the petitioner prays that since he is not the title holder he cannot be termed as the owner of the property and therefore, he should be exempted from payment of tax. Moreover, for the assessment order dated 29.03.1994 for the assessment year 1991-92 is also required to be modified as a consequence. If such a rectification is not permitted at this juncture, the assessment order would be contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court. If such a rectification even if now permitted would not adversely prejudice the claim of either side as the question of title already stands established in favour of the respondents. 27. In view of the same, the tax collected by the State Government treating the petitioner as the owner and title holder would not be justifiable and logically correct. Therefore, the respondent-authorities are directed to take up the case of the petitioner and see that necessary corrections are made in the assessment order dated 29.03.1994, for the assessment year 1991-92, keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra). The respondent-authorities are also directed to carry out necessary corrections within an outer limit of three (03) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. In view of the rectification of the assessment order dated 29.03.1994, for the assessment year 1991-92, all consequential orders arising therefrom are also hereby set aside / quashed. The instant writ petition accordingly stands allowed. 28. Consequently, Writ Petition Nos.27348 and 27390 of 2007 also stand allowed. 29. Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.